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SITES OF CRISIS

Histories of the satellite town

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1
Satellite town challenges

> We have seen how increasing levels of outsiderness have been fuelling large-scale riots and social unrest in cities such as Stockholm, Malmö, Copenhagen, London and Paris. Such manifestations of outsiderness are found especially in the least attractive areas of a metropolitan city, those in which there is a concentration of low-income groups, a high proportion of residents with immigrant backgrounds, high unemployment rates, an accumulation of welfare challenges; and where few see opportunities to improve their situation. [...] Oslo has not faced the same challenges in its suburbs that have been seen in other Nordic metropolitan cities. Explanations for this include e.g. differences in the countries' housing policies, employment models, education systems, general welfare levels, and immigration policies. There is however no guarantee that Norway and Oslo will not encounter such challenges in the future, and preventative measures may thus be necessary to counterbalance the unfolding of situations similar to those in our neighbouring countries.[1]

The satellite town epitomises the risk of severe societal challenges. This is the essence of the above quote, an extract from the 2016 programme

[1] Unless otherwise noted, all translations and transcriptions are my own. Kommunal- og moderniseringsdepartementet and Byrådsavdeling for byutvikling, *Programbeskrivelse for Groruddalssatsningen 2017–2026* (Oslo, 2016), 4–5.: 'I byer som Stockholm, Malmø, København, London og Paris har man sett hvordan økende grad av utenforskap har bidratt til omfattende opptøyer og sosial uro. Slike utslag av utenforskap finner man særlig i de minst attraktive områdene i en storby, preget av en konsentrasjon av lavinntektsgrupper, høy andel beboere med innvandrerbakgrunn, høy arbeidsledighet, opphoping av levekårsutfordringer og der få ser muligheter til å kunne forbedre sin

statement for the area-based policy for Oslo's Groruddalen district. This document is the foundation for future actions in a number of satellite towns built in the 1960s and 1970s. It emphasises the problem of outsiderness: spatial segregation effects in satellite towns caused by an 'accumulation of welfare challenges'. The programme statement identifies different types of outsiderness, defined as a lack of affiliations with the larger society, both in terms of economic participation through work and experiences in social, cultural and political arenas.[2] Indeed, the area-based policies appear to describe welfare problems similar to those that the satellite towns, as welfare state materialisations, were originally created to solve, and variances in welfare state policies are indicated as causes for different degrees of contemporary problems. Crucially, the problems are directly linked to the satellite town as geographic location and urban typology.

The satellite town is the urban materialisation of the post-war welfare state. Built in the period between 1945 and 1975 and labelled *New Town*, *banlieue*, *förort* or *drabantby*, large-scale suburban developments dovetailed with the post-war period of *The Welfare State* (Britain), *Les Trente Glorieuses* (France), *Folkhemmet* (Sweden) or *Den sosial-demokratiske orden* (Norway). The satellite town and the welfare state both epitomised social progress. While the welfare state has been defined as a society in which state power was 'deliberately used (through politics and administration) in an effort to modify the play of market forces,'[3] the concept of the satellite town belongs to a planning movement for finding ways of controlling market forces in urban development for the social benefit of the mass population.[4] The concept of welfare state

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livssituasjon. [...] Oslo har ikke møtt de samme utfordringene i sine forsteder som man har sett i andre nordiske storbyer. Forklaringene på dette handler blant annet om forskjeller mellom landene både når det gjelder boligpolitikk, sysselsetting, utdanningssystem, generelt velferdsnivå og innvandringspolitikk. Det er likevel ikke gitt at man i fremtiden ikke kan bli stilt overfor slike utfordringer også i Norge og i Oslo. Det kan av den grunn være nødvendig å jobbe forebyggende for å motvirke den type prosesser som har kunnet utvikle seg i våre naboland.'

[2] Kommunal- og moderniseringsdepartementet and Byrådsavdeling for byutvikling, 4.

[3] Asa Briggs, 'The Welfare State in Historical Perspective', *European Journal of Sociology* 2, no. 2 (1961): 228.

[4] In this thesis, 'satellite town' is used as an umbrella term for a range of different types of urban developments derived from the Garden City and Neighbourhood Unit. Satellite town is the literal translation of the Norwegian term *drabantby*, used as a label for housing areas from the early 1950s to the late 1970s in the urban periphery. Unlike

architecture and planning has been associated with the welfare state system for social insurance, which includes health care, unemployment benefits, old age pensions, child benefits and vacation funds.[5] This system was implemented as subsidised housing areas, social and cultural infrastructure, and outlined as a large social experiment.[6]

Nevertheless, beneath this programme for progress was also the notion of crisis. The historical background for both the post-war welfare state and the satellite town was the dire socioeconomic situation in the early 20th century. The post-war plans for economic growth in welfare states were built on Keynesian economic theory. Aiming to dynamically manage crisis, John Maynard Keynes' General Theory was a response to the deep economic crisis that followed the 1929 stock market crash.[7] Devising a growth plan that included the extensive construction of diverse infrastructures, this economic crisis management created the basis for the satellite town as a physical manifestation of welfare state progress.

Since the late 1960s however, the satellite town has metamorphosed from a symbol of progress to the embodiment of crisis. Good intentions and failed executions, social ambition that has evolved into social predicament, progress reverting into regression, collectivism mutating into alienation and universalism being recast as repression: these are but

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British New Towns, Oslo's satellite towns are functionally dependent on the city centre for workplaces and services. They are based on the 1950 *Generalplan for Oslo* and characterised by hierarchically organised housing and local services, public infrastructure that links them to the main city centre, and small greenbelts that separate them from each other. For the history of the dissemination and development of the ideas of Garden Cities and Neighbourhood Units, see Peter Hall, *Sociable Cities: The Legacy of Ebenezer Howard* (Wiley, 1998); and Lewis Mumford, 'The Neighborhood and the Neighborhood Unit', *Town Planning Review* 24, no. 4 (1 January 1954): 256–70; See also Ebenezer Howard, *Garden Cities of Tomorrow* (Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1902); and Clarence Perry, 'The Neighborhood Unit', in *The City Reader*, ed. Richard T. LeGates and Frederic Stout, 6 edition (1929; repr., Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2015), 563–75.

[5] Mark Swenarton, Tom Avermaete, and Dirk van den Heuvel, *Architecture and the Welfare State* (Routledge, 2014), 7; Wil Arts and John Gelissen, 'Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism or More? A State-of-the-Art Report', *Journal of European Social Policy* 12, no. 2 (1 May 2002): 137–58.

[6] See Janina Gosseye and Hilde Heynen, 'Designing the Belgian Welfare State 1950s to 1970s: Social Reform, Leisure and Ideological Adherence', *The Journal of Architecture* 15, no. 5 (October 2010): 557–85; Kenny Cupers, 'The Social Project', *Places Journal*, 2 April 2014.

[7] See John Maynard Keynes, *The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money* (London: Macmillan, 1936).

some of the histories that form the background for the present understanding of satellite town challenges.

Area-based policies are currently being used to resolve these challenges across Europe.[8] Such policies can be seen as transformations to adapt the satellite towns to the present context in terms of lifestyles and ideology. Still, area-based policies constitute a contemporary equivalent to the earlier planning and construction of satellite towns, sharing a focus on a specific, limited geographical area as the scope, delimitation, and concept for dealing with complex problems. Although they are transformations rather than new structures, the processes can be as complex as the original construction of the satellite towns.[9] Nevertheless, the issuing of reports of experienced or anticipated problems, biased or sensational media coverage – as well as the discourses on area-based policies – ensure that the satellite town remains a site of crisis.

In this PhD thesis, I analyse the crisis-history of the satellite towns in Oslo to develop new knowledge for alternative actions in the present. In this endeavour, the present-day satellite town is reconstructed through an analysis of the complexities, contingencies and conflicts of its historical development, not of architecture or planning as autonomous disciplines, but as a part of welfare capitalism. The notion of crisis is used both as a research prism and an essential *and* productive aspect of the research object. At the centre of the research are three analytical devices that investigate the contradictory parts of architecture and planning and the welfare state compromise between state, capital and civic society and the corresponding parts of the satellite town.[10] These functions are the mass housing that needed to be ensured by the political action of the state, the

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[8] See Hans Skifter Andersen, 'Can Deprived Housing Areas Be Revitalised? Efforts against Segregation and Neighbourhood Decay in Denmark and Europe', *Urban Studies* 39, no. 4 (1 April 2002): 767–90; Roger Andersson and Sako Musterd, 'Area-Based Policies: A Critical Appraisal', *Tijdschrift Voor Economische En Sociale Geografie* 96, no. 4 (2005): 377–89; Wouter P. C. van Gent, Sako Musterd, and Wim Ostendorf, 'Disentangling Neighbourhood Problems: Area-Based Interventions in Western European Cities', *Urban Research & Practice* 2, no. 1 (7 April 2009): 53–67; for area-based policies of Groruddalen and Oslo, see Guro Voss Gabrielsen, 'Groruddalen; Oslos vakreste verkebyll? Problemrepresentasjoner og stedsforståelser i Groruddalssatsingen' (PhD thesis, Oslo, Arkitektur- og designhøgskolen i Oslo, 2014).

[9] See for example Claus Bech-Danielsen, *Fra ghetto til blandet by* (København: Gads Forlag, 2017).

[10] For the welfare state compromise, see Claus Offe, *Contradictions of the Welfare State*, Contemporary Politics (London: Hutchinson, 1984).

shopping centre which was enabled by the productivity and consumption of capital, and the neighbourhood as the embodiment of the civil society. The analytical devices investigate three sides of the histories of the welfare state and satellite town by studying crises and identifying contradictions, discontinuities, and disruptions.

Histories of architecture and welfare

Referring to Kevin Lynch and Jane Jacobs,[11] the architectural theorist Christian Norberg-Schulz had since 1966 warned of an *omverdenskrise* (environment crisis) caused by post-war reconstruction. The satellite town suffered from a loss of place.[12] This critique of environment and place appears to permeate still how Norwegian architectural historians – and the general public – view the satellite towns.[13]

The formulation of international ideas, past planning and construction, and the current reassessments mean that Oslo's satellite towns are similar to others around the globe. The Norwegian welfare state also shares essential traits with other welfare states. The discussions and conclusions of this thesis may thus be placed in the general international context of histories of architecture and welfare state. The question, then, is: how are the international histories of architecture in the welfare state useful for the analysis of the present relationship between architecture and its neoliberal or third way context, or more specifically, how have those histories participated in the social construction of the present satellite town? In conjunction with this

[11] Kevin Lynch, *The Image of the City* (MIT Press, 1960); Jane Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities* (New York: Vintage Books, 1961).

[12] See Norberg-Schultz' repeated warnings of 'stedstap og omverdenskrise' and 'environmental crisis and need of place': Christian Norberg-Schulz, 'Sted eller ikke-sted?', *Byggekunst: The Norwegian Review of Architecture* 48, no. 4 (1966): 85; Christian Norberg-Schulz, 'Fra gjenoppbygging til omverdenskrise', *Byggekunst: The Norwegian Review of Architecture*, no. 6 (1970): 201–3; Christian Norberg-Schulz, 'Fra gjenreisning til omverdenskrise: Norsk arkitektur 1945–1980', in *Norges kunsthistorie: Bind 7 Inn i en ny tid*, ed. Knut Berg (Oslo: Gyldendal, 1983), 90.: 'stedstap og omverdenskrise'; see also Christian Norberg-Schulz, 'Environmental Crisis and Need of Place', in *Modern Norwegian Architecture* (Oslo: Norwegian University Press, 1986), 131.

[13] This has also been argued by Rikke Stenbro and Svava Riesto, 'Beyond the Scope of Preservation? - On the Life and Potential National Heritage Protection of Early Danish and Norwegian Mass Housing', *Nordisk Kulturpolitisk Tidskrift* 17, no. 02 (15 December 2014): 224.

question, it is important to establish, if not a definition, a workable conceptualisation of the historical architecture-welfare state relationship.

In a first reading of histories of architecture and welfare, the period between 1945 and 1975 is seen as a period of progress, where the architect is constructed as a heroic figure of forward movement. The close relationship between welfare state policies and architecture is stated repeatedly. In a closer reading however, these histories are permeated by the notions of both progress and crisis. These notions have a certain relationship since crisis is used to describe the temporal limits of the economic growth and progress that characterise the 'golden years' of the post-war welfare state and its architecture. This thirty-year period is bookended by the Second World War and the economic crisis of the 1970s, with the possible inclusion of a 'proto-welfare' architecture before this period.[14] The end of this period has been interpreted as a culmination of the welfare state caused by the economic crisis in 1973.[15] In most cases, post-war economic and social growth and progress is seen as the essential context of welfare state architecture. The 1970s therefore represent the unravelling of welfare state architecture, instigated by economic and environmental crises.[16] Swenarton and Avermaete explain how the 1970s crisis made it clear that the limits of the welfare state project were determined by economy:

> The 1970s are considered the point when the welfare state project went into crisis and, just when the goal of a more equitable society seemed within reach, the welfare state system started to unravel […]. Three

[14] See Swenarton, Avermaete, and Heuvel, *Architecture and the Welfare State*, 8; Michael Ryckewaert, *Building the Economic Backbone of the Belgian Welfare State – Infrastructure, Planning Architecture*, 01 edition (Rotterdam: 010 Uitgeverij, 2011), 15; Janina Gosseye and Tom Avermaete, eds., *Shopping Towns Europe: Commercial Collectivity and the Architecture of the Shopping Centre, 1945–1975* (New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2017), 21; Patrick Dunleavy, *The Politics of Mass Housing in Britain, 1945-75: Study of Corporate Power and Professional Influence in the Welfare State* (Oxford: New York: Oxford University Press, 1981).

[15] Ryckewaert, *Building the Economic Backbone of the Belgian Welfare State – Infrastructure, Planning Architecture*; Swenarton, Avermaete, and Heuvel, *Architecture and the Welfare State*; Gosseye and Avermaete, *Shopping Towns Europe*.

[16] Gosseye and Avermaete, *Shopping Towns Europe*, 21.

> decades of economic expansion abruptly came to an end with the first oil crisis and the arrival of 'stagflation'.[17]

The same authors also describe the end of welfare state architecture in terms of a social crisis caused by the contradictions of the combination of a continued push for (social) redistribution and the limitations created by stalling economic growth and the shift in values and ideology towards neoliberalism despite the progressive political projects of the 1970s.[18]

These histories tend to understand crisis as signalling or constituting the beginnings and ends of periods of progress. Consequently, the 1970s and 1980s are conceptualised as the ideological transition from welfare state consensus to neoliberal entrepreneurism, replacing the class society with a 'lifestyle society where the individual person increasingly needed to manifest himself and his personal values.'[19] Or, similarly, proposing a welfare state crisis when faced with the 'rise of the individual', a change accommodated in new, neoliberal urban developments and caused by liberalist criticism, life-world and system crisis and left-criticism.[20] Crucially, historical accounts of this kind employ a perspective on history that emphasises breaks and disruptions between ideologically harmonious periods of progress, and consequently, the separations of the norms of past and present. In present-day discourses related to area-based developments, the need to manifest the new values also becomes the argument for introducing processes of physical change:

> The general residential areas that were built in the post-war era are ideologically challenged by individualism and the free market forces, and the physical transformations are therefore also about adapting the residential areas to the norms of a new era.[21]

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[17] Swenarton, Avermaete, and Heuvel, *Architecture and the Welfare State*, 14.
[18] Swenarton, Avermaete, and Heuvel, 14–16.
[19] Bech-Danielsen, *Fra ghetto til blandet by*, 7.: 'Samtidig var klassesamfundet under afvikling, og det blev erstattet av et livstilssamfund, hvor det enkelte individ i stigende grad havde behov for at manifestere sig selv og sine personlige værdier.'
[20] Tom Nielsen, 'Kapitel 3: Velfærdsstatens krise og interessen for individet', in *Gode intentioner og uregerlige byer* (Aarhus: Arkitektskolens Forlag, 2008), 54–73.
[21] Bech-Danielsen, *Fra ghetto til blandet by*, 11.: 'De almene boligområder, der blev opført i efterkrigstiden, udfordres ideologisk af individualismen og de frie markedskræfter, og de fysiske omdannelser handler derfor også om at tilpasse boligområderne til en ny tids normer.'

This notion of change as a complete replacement of the values of society and the urban environment has been challenged; Kenny Cupers opposes the view that the period between 1945 and 1975 was coherent, as well as there having been any abrupt crisis at its end, emphasising contradictions within the period and a gradual sociological change to the later phase.[22] Indeed, the political sciences describe the welfare state as having different phases or stages, of which the post-war period – the focus of most research on architecture and welfare – was but one. For example, the comparative history of what has been called the age of social democracy in Sweden and Norway has been conceptualised as lasting from 1905 until the end of the 20th century.[23] *The Oxford Handbook of the Welfare State* places the origins of the welfare state in the 1870s, with a founding period until 1945, a golden age that lasted until the 1970s and early 1980s, and a silver age until the present.[24] In contrast to the history of the architecture of the welfare state, associated foremost with the period 1945 to 1975, the great volume of research in the political sciences on welfare state development is concentrated on the period after 1980. This body of research comprises an extensive discourse on the future of the welfare state.[25] The major question is whether there is a crisis for the welfare state, or if – at least in some cases – the welfare state is resilient to change, which Esping-Andersen claimed was the case with the social-democratic welfare states.[26]

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[22] Kenny Cupers, *The Social Project: Housing Postwar France* (University of Minnesota Press, 2014), xxiv, xxvi–xxvii.

[23] Francis Sejersted, *The Age of Social Democracy: Norway and Sweden in the Twentieth Century*, ed. Madeleine B. Adams, trans. Richard Daly, First edition (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2011), 8–10.

[24] Francis G. Castles et al., eds., *The Oxford Handbook of the Welfare State* (Oxford: OUP Oxford, 2012), 3–14.

[25] See for example Jørgen Goul Andersen, 'The Scandinavian Welfare Model in Crisis? Achievements and Problems of the Danish Welfare State in an Age of Unemployment and Low Growth', *Scandinavian Political Studies* 20, no. 1 (1 March 1997): 1–31; Jon Erik Dølvik, Jørgen Goul Andersen, and Juhana Vartiainen, 'The Nordic Social Model in Turbulent Times', in *European Social Models from Crisis to Crisis: Employment and Inequality in the Era of Monetary Integration*, ed. Jon Erik Dølvik and Andrew Martin (Oxford University Press, 2014), 246–86; Francis G. Castles, *The Future of the Welfare State: Crisis Myths and Crisis Realities* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).

[26] See Mattias Lundberg and Mattias Tydén, 'In Search of the Swedish Model: Contested Historiography', in *Swedish Modernism: Architecture, Consumption and the Welfare State*, ed. Helena Mattsson and Sven-Olov Wallenstein (Black Dog, 2010), 38–39. In *Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*, Esping-Andersen identified the conservative, the liberal, and

An extended periodisation of the welfare state can also be found in the spatial disciplines, notably in planning and urban history. While histories of architecture almost univocally report a crisis for welfare state architecture in the 1970s, the concept of the Danish notion of the welfare city is not limited to the post-war period.[27] For example, describing the development of planning and urbanity, Tom Nielsen outlines three phases of the Danish welfare state: a foundation phase that began in the 1930s; an expansion phase from 1945 until the early 1970s; and lastly, an adaptation phase during which the welfare state is reorganised.[28] In other words, the history of the welfare state is conceptualised as multiple cycles of crisis and progress.

The extended perspective of multiple phases does not change the fact that welfare state architecture of the post-war expansion is constructed in terms of social progress, linked to the conventional understanding of the welfare state as a social project. However, the political sociologist Claus Offe rejects the conventional understanding of the welfare state as merely the provider of social services, and instead posits the welfare state as a crisis manager.[29] Thus, instead of being the limit of the welfare state, crisis is the main feature of the welfare state. Defining the welfare state as a project of economic crisis management means that the failure of that management – evident in the 1973 oil crisis and the stagflation crisis – became a crisis of crisis management.[30] This crisis was not a sudden breakdown of the stable, progressive and optimist post-war years; instead, it was the realisation of a latent crisis because of the interdependent, but

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the social-democratic welfare regimes. The conservative welfare states are those in which the bourgeois revolution was incomplete, so there is some power retained by the aristocracy or the church; typical examples include Italy and France. In contrast, the liberal welfare states experienced a strong bourgeois revolution, with the consequence that the capitalist class holds significant power; the typical example is the United States. The social-democratic welfare states are characterised by a strong labour movement and include Sweden, Denmark, and Norway.

[27] Niels Albertsen and Bülent Diken, 'Welfare and the City', *NA* 17, no. 2 (11 April 2013): 7–22.

[28] Nielsen, 'Kapitel 3: Velfærdsstatens krise og interessen for individet', 55–58.

[29] John Keane, 'Introduction', in *Contradictions of the Welfare State*, by Claus Offe, Contemporary Politics (London: Hutchinson, 1984), 13.

[30] Peter Starke, Alexandra Kaasch, and Franca van Hooren, *The Welfare State as Crisis Manager: Explaining the Diversity of Policy Responses to Economic Crisis* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).

contradictory components of the welfare state compromise. In the introduction to *Postwar*, the historian Tony Judt states that

> post-national, welfare-state, cooperative, pacific Europe was not born of the optimistic, ambitious, forward-looking project imagined in fond retrospect by today's Euro-idealists. It was the insecure child of anxiety. Shadowed by history, its leaders implemented social reforms and built new institutions as a prophylactic, to keep the past at bay.[31]

From the perspective of Offe and Judt, post-war planning in the welfare state was based on a *pessimist crisis*-obsession. The societal planning that was at the core of the welfare state not only aimed to keep the past at bay, but also keep the future under control. This is what the art historian Fredric Jameson – with reference to the architecture historian Manfredo Tafuri and the philosopher Massimo Cacciari – describes as a neutralisation and economic annexation of the future, depriving the future of its explosiveness and colonising it for the expansion of capitalism.[32] Such a perspective establishes an economic relationship between the past and the future. According to the economic sociologist Wolfgang Streeck, the consequence of this expansion into the future is a delayed crisis of democratic capitalism.[33] Thus, as the 'colony' of this Keynesian democratic capitalism, the present is now paying the price for the post-war economic expansion.

The satellite town as compromise

Challenging the focus on the *state* in welfare state architecture and instead involving multiple sources of power, the 1970s crisis has been interpreted as the result of shifts in the power balance of the welfare state compromise between the public and private sectors and civil society.[34] All welfare regimes are based on this compromise between capital and labour, which – with the state as an active, non-neutral arbitrator – becomes a three-part balancing act. Alternatively, this act can be

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[31] Tony Judt, *Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945* (Penguin Press, 2005), 6.
[32] Fredric Jameson, *Archaeologies of the Future: The Desire Called Utopia and Other Science Fictions*, 1st ed. (New York: Verso, 2005), 228.
[33] Wolfgang Streeck, *Buying Time: The Delayed Crisis of Democratic Capitalism* (Brooklyn, NY: Verso, 2014).
[34] Gosseye and Avermaete, *Shopping Towns Europe*, 21.

described as a compromise between the power of political systems, market dynamics and civic organisations.[35] Indeed, the sociologist Stein Rokkan explains that the state and elective democracy constitute just one of several different political power resources: 'what actually counts is the ability to damage or delay a system of strongly interdependent activities in knowledge and power-based organisations'.[36] Power is exercised in both the numeric-democratic and the corporative-organisational channels with the support of mass media.[37]

An analysis of distributed power in the welfare state compromise makes it possible – and necessary – to ask new questions about architecture. For example, associating welfare state architecture with social policies *and* the thirty-year (golden) post-war period creates a paradox, since the great expansion of social polices was from the 1970s onwards and thus does not fit into the standard periodisation of welfare state architecture. Indeed, the historian Eric Hobsbawm has argued that if the appearance of welfare states is understood as the moment when 'states in which welfare expenditures – income maintenance, care, education, etc. – became a *greater part* of total public expenditure, and people engaged in welfare activities formed the largest body of all public employment', the first welfare states appeared around 1970. It was only by the late 1970s that all advanced capitalist states had become welfare states by this definition.[38]

The history of Norwegian social policies similarly describes the misalignment between political centralisation, a governmental model which ended in the 1970s, and the continued development of social policies.[39] Naturally, such misalignments between the development of social welfare, the economy and politics were the source of considerable problems for the welfare state.[40] Other such misalignments exist between housing policy and social policies. Changes in housing policy in the early 1970s signalled the 'end of the welfare state', while many other welfare policy areas were unchanged or even saw increased efforts. From such

[35] Offe, *Contradictions of the Welfare State*.
[36] Stein Rokkan, *Stat, nasjon, klasse: essays i politisk sosiologi* (Universitetsforlaget, 1987), 96–97.
[37] Rokkan, 99–100.
[38] Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, 1914–1991* (London: Abacus, 1995), 284.
[39] Anne-Lise Seip, *Veiene til velferdsstaten: norsk sosialpolitikk 1920–75*, *Norbok* (Oslo: Gyldendal, 1994), 16.
[40] Hobsbawm, *The Age of Extremes*, 284.

perspectives, 'progress' or 'crisis' do not refer to the welfare project as a whole, but are associated with the different parts of the welfare state compromise and the relationships between them.

Architecture and planning have played and will play different political, social and economic roles depending on the sides of the welfare state compromise of which they are part or to which they respond. In Janina Gosseye's account of Milton Keynes' Centre, conflicting roles for architecture appears as the result of the complex and contradictory relationship between public and private interests.[41] Swenarton, Avermaete and van den Heuvel explain crisis as the contradictions of continued policies for (social) redistribution, stalling economic growth and ideological and cultural shifts.[42] Notably, Helena Mattsson has examined the planning and construction of the much-criticised Skärholmen Centre as an outcome of changes to the power balance in planning. The welfare state compromise is here discussed as a neo-corporatist system of economic tripartism, a negotiation between labour unions, employers' associations and governments, representing labour, capital and state. This became a crisis and a turning point for the welfare state when the originally democratic principle of corporatist organisation turned into a lobbyist system where capital increased its power, so that consumerism came to dominate over other functions in the centre.[43] In Mattsson's analysis, the crisis of the Skärholmen satellite town is also a crisis of democracy.[44] A further point that can be made from this article is that the corporatist system, or the welfare state compromise, is not static, but an ongoing dynamic struggle for power and influence over the development between the parts of the welfare state compromise.

This struggle was also about the creation of different, conflicting types of modern subjects and subjectivities. According to Jennifer Mack, the contradictions of the welfare state compromise between state, market and civic society became an alliance and a collision of commerce and

[41] Janina Gosseye, 'Milton Keynes' Centre: The Apotheosis of the British Post-War Consensus or, the Apostle of Neo-Liberalism?', in *Shopping Towns Europe: Commercial Collectivity and the Architecture of the Shopping Centre, 1945–1975*, ed. Janina Gosseye and Tom Avermaete (New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2017), 138–39.
[42] Swenarton, Avermaete, and Heuvel, *Architecture and the Welfare State*, 14–16.
[43] Helena Mattsson, 'Where the Motorways Meet: Architecture and Corporatism in Sweden 1968', in *Architecture and the Welfare State*, by Mark Swenarton, Tom Avermaete, and Dirk van den Heuvel (Routledge, 2014), 157–59.
[44] Mattsson, 170–72.

civic functions.[45] The core of the conflict is the inherent antagonism of the *consumer-citizen*, the troubled compromise of the actively participating citizen and the passive consumer. The contradictions between parts of the welfare state compromise – and different mentalities – suggest that the satellite town is a collision of different interests belonging to state, market and civic society. However, within each of these parts of the welfare state compromise there are institutions, organisations and disciplines which develop according to different logics with unique trajectories, each with their different crises or types of crises.

Architecture is one such institution, where the architect in the welfare state is portrayed as a central, heroic protagonist, working for a better future. The histories of welfare state architecture, especially in the case of housing, have often been linked to the political governance of the state. In many countries, most notably Britain, housing was a form of welfare provided directly by the state: state architecture for the people. In the Scandinavian countries, it is associated with social democratic hegemony. In Sweden, the periodisation of welfare state architecture correlates with the period of *Folkhemmet* (people's home), which is the common label for the period between 1932 and 1976 during which *Sveriges socialdemokratiska arbetareparti* (Sweden's social democratic Labour party) was in power. Correspondingly, in Norway, welfare state architecture is associated with the label *den sosialdemokratiske orden* (the social-democratic order) which has been used to designate the period of Norwegian post-war history between 1945 and 1980,when the political scene was dominated by *Det Norske Arbeiderpartiet* (the Labour party).[46] Still, the absolute social-democratic political hegemony, derogatively described in 1963 as a one-party state, only lasted until 1965.[47] In Norway, the architects assigned central roles in the construction of satellite towns were also politically engaged in the Labour party; this was the case in many other welfare states.

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[45] Jennifer Mack, 'Hello, Consumer! Skärholmen Centre from the Million Programme to the Mall', in *Shopping Towns Europe: Commercial Collectivity and the Architecture of the Shopping Centre, 1945–1975*, ed. Janina Gosseye and Tom Avermaete (New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2017), 122–37.

[46] For more on the 'social-democratic order', see Berge Furre, *Norsk historie 1905–1990: vårt hundreår* (Oslo: Samlaget, 1992).

[47] Jens Arup Seip, *Fra embedsmannsstat til ettpartistat og andre essays* (Universitetsforlaget, 1963).

Still, in these same histories of architecture and welfare are stories of the architect in crisis because of the lack of influence in the shaping of society with the changing role of the institution of architecture. One example is Luca Molinari's tale of the complete impotence of architecture in Italy in the late 1960s due to the architect's failure to challenge the state by organising civic participation and the inability of autonomous architecture to successfully establish an independent position 'outside' the welfare state by constructing what Aldo Rossi called 'modern monuments' – architectural structures inspired by *Unité d'habitation* and Cumbernauld as an attempt to make architecture 'act as a fragmented antithesis of the crisis of the contemporary city'.[48] Caroline Maniaque-Benton has described the failure of French do-it-yourself approaches as a strategy for achieving autonomy for architecture by avoiding the economic logics of the building industry. The development of construction methods had forced the architect to adapt to working on large industrial schemes, which was seen as a fundamental crisis for the architectural discipline and architecture education. However, without managing to substantially challenge the industrial mass production, do-it-yourself became a historical parenthesis.[49]

In Helena Mattsson's account of Skärholmen in 1968, architecture did not come into crisis as a consequence of being replaced by the welfare state, as Tafuri would have it, but the welfare state as a democracy entered into crisis as the architect was not represented in the corporate decision system for the physical planning of this satellite town.[50] Another type of crisis is mentioned by Florian Urban, who emphasises that the architect has a limited influence on public opinion, with little control over how architecture and planning are socially constructed in the media.[51] Indeed, the discourse of crisis can engender crisis. Crucially, all of these crises are from the perspective of the architecture profession;

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[48] Luca Molinari, 'Matteotti Village and Gallaratese 2: Design Criticism of the Italian Welfare State', in *Architecture and the Welfare State*, by Mark Swenarton, Tom Avermaete, and Dirk van den Heuvel (Routledge, 2014), 263–65, 269, 271.

[49] Caroline Maniaque-Benton, 'Alternatives to Welfare State: Self-Build and Do-It-Yourself', in *Architecture and the Welfare State*, by Mark Swenarton, Tom Avermaete, and Dirk van den Heuvel (Routledge, 2014), 199–200.

[50] See Mattsson, 'Where the Motorways Meet: Architecture and Corporatism in Sweden 1968', 170–72.

[51] Florian Urban, 'The Märkisches Viertel in West Berlin', in *Architecture and the Welfare State*, by Mark Swenarton, Tom Avermaete, and Dirk van den Heuvel (Routledge, 2014), 177–98.

they are indeed crises *of* architecture. But what about crisis from the perspectives of the different sides of the welfare compromise and the specific roles architecture plays in them?

State, politics and housing

Housing has a special place in the histories of welfare state architecture, being the one welfare area to tackle William Beveridge's 'five giants' – want, disease, ignorance, squalor and idleness – that translates most directly into space.[52]

There are different ways of conceptualising housing in relation to the welfare state or as welfare provision with reference to Beveridge's giants or pillars. Housing as a 'wobbly pillar' under the welfare state is a much-referenced concept that emphasises the 'institutional peculiarity of housing as part of the welfare state', as housing is not a 'unified institutional complex' – which is the case for the other pillars that ensure welfare benefits in pensions, schooling and health .[53] Peter Malpass argues, however, that considering housing as a welfare benefit results in a view of the welfare state that is too narrow; he suggests that housing should be conceptualised in relation to welfare, not as part of it.[54] Expanding Malpass' notion, one may conceptualise housing as a complex, contradictory compromise – indeed similar to the welfare state compromise. This reveals several aspects of housing and their contradictions, between housing as a state-provided welfare benefit, as a commodity in a market, and as a collaborative effort by civil society. The productivity aspect is also to be found in research on social housing that emphasises housing production as part of growth-enabling economic policies rather than policies of welfare distribution.[55]

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[52] For the five giants, see the *Beveridge Report*, influential in the founding of the British welfare state: William Beveridge, 'Social Insurance and Allied Services (Cmd. 6404)', Report to the parliament (London, November 1942).

[53] Ulf Torgersen, 'Housing: The Wobbly Pillar under the Welfare State', *Scandinavian Housing and Planning Research* 4, no. sup 1 (1 January 1987): 118.

[54] Peter Malpass, 'Housing and the New Welfare State: Wobbly Pillar or Cornerstone?', *Housing Studies* 23, no. 1 (2008): 1–19.

[55] Sven Sterken, 'Architecture and the Ideology of Productivity: Four Public Housing Projects by Groupe Structures in Brussels (1950-65)', *Footprint*, The European welfare state project – ideals, politics, cities and buildings, 5, no. 9 (2011): 25–39.

This notion of a housing compromise may facilitate analysis of the variations of housing systems relative to different welfare states.[56] The significant changes in housing policies around 1980 have in and of themselves epitomised welfare state crisis. In Britain, the housing system was directly provided and managed by the local government, and dwellers were direct clients of the local state, the council.[57] The privatisation of housing in the 1980s was therefore especially dramatic – this is evident from the large body of literature that analyses the 'fall of public housing', or the 'selling of the welfare state'.[58] In the Scandinavian setting, the dissimilarity of housing politics in the social-democratic welfare states of Sweden, Denmark and Norway is explained by path-dependency: the divergent development of housing politics.[59] Denmark developed a large rental sector, Sweden ensured an 'equalisation' of different types of housing tenures, and Norway focused mainly on cooperative ownership. Described as a turning point for the social-democratic order of the welfare state,[60] the changes in Norwegian housing policies have also been equated with a welfare state crisis, but due to the differences in welfare state housing policies, this change was still qualitatively different from the British case. Nevertheless, even if the wave of deregulations across Europe in the 1980s brought varying results, the history of mass housing is still universally linked to the standard periodisation of the welfare state, the thirty post-war years.[61]

This universal periodisation aligns well with a housing crisis in terms of criticism of the tower block as a welfare state housing typology. [62] The

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[56] For the relationships between housing systems and welfare states, see J. S. C. M. Hoekstra, *Divergence in European Welfare and Housing Systems* (IOS Press, 2010).

[57] Alison Ravetz, *Council Housing and Culture – The History of a Social Experiment* (London: Routledge, 2001), 4.

[58] See for example Ray Forrest and Alan Murie, *Selling the Welfare State: The Privatisation of Public Housing* (Routledge, 2014); George Boyne, 'The Privatisation of Public Housing', *The Political Quarterly* 55, no. 2 (1984): 180–187.

[59] Erling Annaniassen and Bo Bengtsson, *Varför så olika? Nordisk bostadspolitik i jämförande historiskt ljus* (Égalité, 2006).

[60] Erling Annaniassen, 'Vendepunktet for "den sosialdemokratiske orden": 1970-tallet og boligpolitikken', *Tidsskrift for samfunnsforskning* 43 (2002): 155–89; Forrest and Murie, *Selling the Welfare State*.

[61] Nils-Ole Lund, 'Housing in Scandinavia, 1945–85. Architectural Ideologies and Physical Organization', *Scandinavian Housing and Planning Research* 5, no. 2 (1 January 1988): 65–84.

[62] In architecture history, welfare state housing is often associated with the housing block. See for example Miles Glendinning and Stefan Muthesius, *Tower Block: Modern Public*

high-rises from the mass housing production peak in the late 1960s and early 1970s have become the centre of the discourse as a visible target for criticism, representing the crisis and failure of the welfare state, the satellite town, and modern architecture.[63] In general however, mass housing developments came to represent a social crisis: human catastrophe, and the failure of modernism.[64] The most obvious target for this critique is the industrialised mass production of housing, which is associated with collectivism and state policies; in other words, the exact opposite of the new norms of individuality. Kenny Cupers describes the new phase of housing as a transition from community from modern *habitat* to postmodern *territory*; a replacement of architectural ideologies of community, not merely replacing collectivity with individualism, but redefining community:

> even though the concept of defensible space was meant to promote community rather than strict individualism, it dovetailed with emerging political theories that explained collective welfare as the outcome of individual economic interest and autonomy.[65]

This transition does not constitute an *end of welfare*, but a reframing of its ideological foundation and power base. This account questions a taken-for granted straightforward transition from collectivist welfare state to individualist neoliberalism, and turns it into a conflict about how collective welfare is actually created and sustained – so that the present architecture still can be analysed as welfare architecture, but in a new context.

Housing in England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland (New Haven: Published for the Paul Mellon Centre for Studies in British Art by Yale University Press, 1994); Florian Urban, *Tower and Slab: Histories of Global Mass Housing* (Routledge, 2013); For examples of the critique of housing blocks, see Oscar Newman, *Defensible Space: Crime Prevention through Urban Design* [1973] (New York: Collier Books [u.a.], 1978); Alice Coleman, *Utopia on Trial: Vision and Reality in Planned Housing* (London: Hilary Shipman, 1985).

[63] See for example Charles Jencks, *The Language of Post-Modern Architecture* (New York: Rizzoli, 1977); Katharine G. Bristol, 'The Pruitt-Igoe Myth', *Journal of Architectural Education* 44, no. 3 (May 1991): 163–71.

[64] Cupers, *The Social Project*, 2014, xiii.

[65] Kenny Cupers, 'Human Territoriality and the Downfall of Public Housing', *Public Culture* 29, no. 1 (81) (2017): 178.

Capital, economy and the centre

In contrast to the association between welfare state and mass housing in terms of policy changes, the use of the term *Les Trente Glorieuses* (the glorious thirty) indicates an association of architecture with the unprecedented economic growth of the thirty post-war years between 1945 and 1975.[66] It consequently also links to capital or the economy in the welfare state compromise. Indeed, Hobsbawm describes the post-war period as *the golden years of capitalism*.[67] In discussing this period as an advanced stage in the historical development of capitalism, he describes the mixed economy as a political compromise between state and capital that became the welfare state:

> Post-war capitalism thus was a sort of marriage between economic liberalism and social democracy (or, in American terms, Roosevelian New Deal policy), with substantial borrowing from the USSR, which had pioneered the idea of economic planning.[68]

A number of architecture historians also emphasise that the state with its social institutions was not the sole agent behind welfare state architecture, asserting that market and private entrepreneurs and developers were important, even dominant in creating welfare state architecture.[69] Recent research emphasises the role of the private sector and the construction of economic infrastructure in creating the economic growth that enables welfare.[70] Crucially, Hobsbawn also links welfare and mass consumption, stating that the golden years were characterised by a 'substantial restructuring and reform of capitalism', producing

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[66] Swenarton, Avermaete, and Heuvel, *Architecture and the Welfare State*, 8.
[67] Hobsbawm, *The Age of Extremes*, 257–86.
[68] Hobsbawm, 270.
[69] Gosseye and Avermaete, *Shopping Towns Europe*; Janina Gosseye, '"Uneasy Bedfellows" Conceiving Urban Megastructures: Precarious Public–Private Partnerships in Post-War British New Towns', *Planning Perspectives*, 18 June 2018, 1–21; Ryckewaert, *Building the Economic Backbone of the Belgian Welfare State – Infrastructure, Planning Architecture*; Tim Verlaan, 'Producing Space: Post-War Redevelopment as Big Business, Utrecht and Hannover 1962–1975', *Planning Perspectives* 34, no. 3 (4 May 2019): 415–37.
[70] Ryckewaert, *Building the Economic Backbone of the Belgian Welfare State – Infrastructure, Planning Architecture*; Verlaan, 'Producing Space'.

> a 'mixed economy' which both made it easier for states to plan and manage economic modernisation, and which also enormously increased demand. [...] At the same time the political commitment of governments to full employment and – to a lesser extent – to the lessening of economic inequality, i.e. a commitment to welfare and social security, for the first time provided a mass consumer market for luxury goods which could now become accepted as necessities.[71]

Hobsbawm thus gives consumption a central place in the welfare state. In the same spirit, Helena Mattsson and Sven-Olov Wallenstein place consumption at the very foundation of the Swedish welfare state with *Swedish Modernism: Architecture, Consumption, and the Welfare State*.[72] Helena Mattsson notes that in Sweden consumption was central in a 'politics of crises'.[73] This Keynesian economy worked then by internalising the crisis-generating contradictions of capital by planned collective consumption.

One problem with this politics of consumption for a mass market is the possible negative effects in the form of massified conspicuous consumption. Mass consumption is historized as an activity to be controlled by the welfare state, educating reasonable consumers.[74] Mattsson asserts that the reasonable consumer is to internalise the contradictions of the (moral) regulation of needs, and the driving force of the economy based on unconscious desires.[75] The stated aim was to produce a consumer and commodities representing the common and collectivist society. For the Norwegian-American Thorstein Veblen, who coined the term 'conspicuous consumption', this was more than a moral or cultural question. He distinguished 'industry' producing commodities

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[71] Hobsbawm, *The Age of Extremes*, 269.
[72] Helena Mattsson and Sven-Olov Wallenstein, *Swedish Modernism: Architecture, Consumption, and the Welfare State* (Black Dog Publishing, 2010).
[73] Helena Mattsson, 'Designing the Reasonable Customer: Standardisation and Personalisation in Swedish Functionalism', in *Swedish Modernism: Architecture, Consumption, and the Welfare State*, by Helena Mattsson and Sven-Olov Wallenstein (Black Dog Publishing, 2010), 79.
[74] Mattsson, 'Designing the Reasonable Customer: Standardisation and Personalisation in Swedish Functionalism'; Helena Mattsson, 'Designing the "Consumer in Infinity": The Swedish Cooperative Union's New Consumer Policy, c. 1979', in *Scandinavian Design: Alternative Histories*, by Kjetil Fallan (London: Berg, 2012).
[75] Mattsson, 'Designing the Reasonable Customer: Standardisation and Personalisation in Swedish Functionalism', 82.

to fulfil the needs of the consumer, from 'business' aiming to take advantage of the conspicuous consumers' willingness to spend more than necessary on a product and thus increase wealth for the capitalist class.[76] While often framed as an ethics of collectivist society, the economic function of the policy of reasonable consumption is therefore to avoid exploitation of the consumer. In this context, we can see the Swedish welfare state's use of consumption as a mechanism to *internalise decommodification*.[77] In other words, the welfare aspect of consumption lies in creating a total moral and cultural economic mechanism for resolving the contradictions of advanced capitalism.

The internalisation of economic contradictions also appears in the histories of the post-war shopping centre as the balance between the (American) consumer and the (European) citizen. In *Shopping Towns Europe*, the European welfare state is described as a contract between the public sector, the private sector and civil society. Government-funded architecture for welfare is only part of the picture; it was private actors that created spaces in shopping centres 'imbued with the tantalising logic of mass consumption.'[78] The problems of the centre are described as a conflict between developers that propagandize American consumerism and public planners who want civic functions in the centres.[79] Shopping centres planned to redefine the relationship between the individual and the collective by creating the 'consumer-citizen', a hybrid of the 'socialist' and 'capitalist' versions of man.[80] Avermaete and Gosseye have problematised this relationship as a question of the power of commercial developers in relation to public planners, architects and civic interests. Addressing the same topic in her analysis of Skärholmen Centre, Mattsson emphasises the scale of construction as an additional problem. Because public services and social programmes did not follow the upscaling of the commercial programme, the centre was met with

[76] See Thorstein Veblen, *The Theory of the Leisure Class* [1899], Oxford World's Classics (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).
[77] Mattsson, 'Designing the Reasonable Customer: Standardisation and Personalisation in Swedish Functionalism', 86.
[78] Gosseye and Avermaete, *Shopping Towns Europe*, 2.
[79] Kenny Cupers, 'Shopping à *l'americaine*', in *Shopping Towns Europe: Commercial Collectivity and the Architecture of the Shopping Centre, 1945–1975*, ed. Janina Gosseye and Tom Avermaete (New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2017), 34–35; Gosseye, '"Uneasy Bedfellows" Conceiving Urban Megastructures'.
[80] Gosseye and Avermaete, *Shopping Towns Europe*, 10–12.

massive criticism and protests.[81] Mattsson's account of Skärholmen Centre thus demonstrates the crisis of a welfare state contradiction between market, state and civil society in physical form.

Civil society, the social and the neighbourhood unit

Whilst satellite towns were sites of social progress, as the physical realisations of the welfare state as a social project, they also became sites of social crisis. This may be partly due to the aforementioned misalignment between political government, economic growth and the development of social policies.[82] At the centre of this social crisis stand the community and the family, especially women and children. Solutions for the emancipation of women created new problems;[83] the inclusion of women into the workforce and the placing of new value on children were to be facilitated by diverse institutional bodies taking over domestic functions. Indeed, the relationship between the state and the child became central to the welfare state contract.[84] This fundamental change caused a crisis for the traditional family. Authors describe incorporation, linking, and restoring old patterns as strategies for solving this problem. According to Sven-Olov Wallenstein's analysis of *Acceptera* – a foundational manifesto for Swedish modernism – the transformation of the *family* was essential: the family needed to be reassembled in a new, more *flexible* way that could incorporate (internalise) the restructuring forces of modernity.[85] This difficult task put the family in crisis as it was

[81] Mattsson, 'Where the Motorways Meet: Architecture and Corporatism in Sweden 1968', 164–65.
[82] Seip, *Veiene til velferdsstaten: norsk sosialpolitikk 1920–75*.
[83] For an account of the problems of the emancipation of women in the early Swedish welfare state, see Yvonne Hirdman, 'The Happy 30s: A Short Story of Social Engineering and Gender Order in Sweden', in *Swedish Modernism: Architecture, Consumption, and the Welfare State*, by Helena Mattsson and Sven-Olov Wallenstein (Black Dog Publishing, 2010), 71.
[84] Henrik Berggren and Lars Trädgård, 'Pippi Longstocking: The Autonomous Child and the Moral Logic of the Swedish Welfare State', in *Swedish Modernism: Architecture, Consumption, and the Welfare State*, by Helena Mattsson and Sven-Olov Wallenstein (Black Dog Publishing, 2010), 61–62.
[85] Sven-Olov Wallenstein, 'A Family Affair: Swedish Modernism and the Administering of Life', in *Swedish Modernism: Architecture, Consumption, and the Welfare State*, by Helena Mattsson and Sven-Olov Wallenstein (Black Dog Publishing, 2010), 195.

faced with the challenge of acting as the link between a new type of individual and a new type of population.[86]

Janina Gosseye and Hilde Heynen, however, assert that while one aim of architecture as social infrastructure in the welfare state was to 'reconnect with family', it also used the population to 'recreate a romanticised version of community'.[87] Included here was architecture as social infrastructure for youth – a new social category that had appeared as a result of social changes.[88] This architecture can be seen as a reaction to institutions assuming functions of both the family and community. While these social welfare measures can be interpreted as 'positive' policies for social progress, they can also be seen as reactions to crises and attempts to repair families and communities confronted with the welfare state. The roles of the family in conservative, liberal and social-democratic welfare states are in contrast with one another, emphasising, respectively, family and tradition, market choice and autonomy of the individual – including the child – from the oppression and dependency of the conservative family and from the liberal market.

In Jennifer Mack's account, the protests following the inauguration of Skärholmen Centre similarly displayed a general dissatisfaction with the welfare state understood as a consumer society. The crisis of consumption society appearing in these protests, known as *Skärholmsdebatten*, can possibly be interpreted as a failure to internalise these contradictions. Jennifer Mack describes a crisis because of the antagonism of the 'consumer-citizen', which unexpectedly ended up creating *critical* consumers.[89] Crucially, the debate turned Skärholmen Centre into a site of struggle, where over-commercialisation, accused of creating passive consumers, was what created not only active but activist participants.[90] This research brings to light that the satellite town is a site of struggle based on a contradiction of mentalities – the conflict of interests in the welfare state compromise.

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[86] Wallenstein, 'A Family Affair: Swedish Modernism and the Administering of Life'.
[87] Janina Gosseye and Hilde Heynen, 'Campsites as Utopias? A Socio-Spatial Reading of the Post-War Holiday Camp in Belgium, 1950 to 1970s', *International Journal for History, Culture and Modernity* 1, no. 1 (2013): 53–85.
[88] Tom Avermaete, 'A Thousand Youth Clubs: Architecture, Mass Leisure and the Rejuvenation of Post-War France', *The Journal of Architecture* 18, no. 5 (October 2013): 632–46.
[89] Mack, 'Hello, Consumer! Skärholmen Centre from the Million Programme to the Mall', 137.
[90] Mack, 131–34.

The crisis of the welfare state is also a question of conceptualisation of time, which is demonstrated in Thordis Arrhenius' account of counter-culture protests against Swedish welfare state planning and in favour of the preservation of cultural heritage, which 'overturned an existing paradigm about the relation of the past to the present'.[91] In other words, this crisis is understood as dissatisfaction with the welfare state as a paternalistic and technocratic government with a fixed plan for progress. From this perspective, the counter-culture protests against the welfare state – construed as evidence of the critical and pessimistic end-phase of the welfare state – can be seen as concrete, civic struggles to reactivate history and open for alternative futures not predetermined by the fear of returning crisis that was inherent in Keynesianism. Consequently, the crisis can produce a different type of political subject than originally imagined – the creation of new criticality.

Crisis as object of research

Going from crisis as the object of study and criticality as a possible result to crisis as the analytical approach of the study, I argue that crisis – as an analytical strategy – may productive new criticality in architecture.[92] In this thesis, criticality is used in the meaning of a political critique of the present-day conceptualisations of the satellite town.[93] This criticism draws on Tafuri, who stated that the main problem for architectural history is 'the assessment of the present contradictions.'[94] The thesis is thus an assessment of the present which is critical of the conceptualisation of the present-day satellite town – which influences not only area-based policies, but also the social, political and economic aspects of everyday lives. The analysis illuminates the contingent

[91] Thordis Arrhenius, 'Preservation and Protest: Counterculture and Heritage in 1970s Sweden', *Future Anterior* 7, no. 2 (2010): 108.
[92] The thesis can thus be read in the context of the discourse of post-criticality, see Robert Somol and Sarah Whiting, 'Notes around the Doppler Effect and Other Moods of Modernism', *Perspecta* 33 (2002): 72; George Baird, '"Criticality" and Its Discontents', *Harvard Design Magazine*, no. 21 (2004): 1–6.
[93] Reinhold Martin criticises post-criticality's removal of any notion of radical politics by the conflation of political and aesthetical critique. See Reinhold Martin, 'Critical of What? Toward a Utopian Realism', *Harvard Design Magazine*, no. 22 (Spring/Summer 2005): 2, 5.
[94] Manfredo Tafuri, *Theories and History of Architecture* (London: Granada, 1980), 4.

historical processes of changes in power relations within the welfare state compromise and the satellite town functions upon which the present-day satellite town depends. The satellite town is analysed as a history of the present; the past crisis of the satellite town is analysed with the aim to create new knowledge and new possibilities for actions in the present. In this thesis, *crisis*, both as the object of the analysis and the analytic approach, is the strategy to expose other possibilities.

The object of research is the relationship between the welfare state and the satellite town, an affinity which, according to Tafuri, is essentially defined by crisis. The crisis-managing welfare state was the context for Tafuri when he described Keynesianism as '*starting from the crisis* and not abstractly against it'.[95] This formulation is a reference to John Maynard Keynes' theories, which were created as a response to the economic crisis of 1929 and implemented by welfare states as a *plan* to manage crisis by state intervention in planned production and consumption.[96] This was a dynamic plan for making the crises of modernity serve capital:

> The plan was conceived as a process of constant intervention and revision that aimed to absorb and adapt capitalism's contradictions at ever-higher levels. This meant that negativity – the transitory, the temporary, the contingent and the oppositional – was incorporated into the very processes of social and economic development, as capital's power; the plan, sought to harness this dynamic.[97]

For Tafuri, the discipline of architecture thus entered a crisis as a result of the emergence of an all-encompassing welfare state system which also encompassed architecture: 'Architecture as ideology, as an institution that "fulfils" the ideology, as a discipline in crisis because of the new integrative techniques of the world of production and anti-cyclical planning'.[98] The essence of Tafuri's criticism is that the architecture discipline is fully incorporated into the processes of advanced capital in

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[95] Manfredo Tafuri, *Architecture and Utopia: Design and Capitalist Development* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1976), 62.
[96] John Maynard Keynes' theory was a response to and a solution for the economic crisis in the 1930s. See Keynes, *The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money*.
[97] Gail Day, 'Strategies in the Metropolitan Merz: Manfredo Tafuri and Italian Workerism', *Radical Philosophy*, no. 133 (October 2005): 31.
[98] Tafuri, *Theories and History of Architecture*, notes to the second (Italian) edition.

the form of the welfare state and must therefore be analysed as part of this system: 'A critical analysis must direct itself towards an entire production cycle rather than a single work, and aim to understand the role of (architectural) construction in the capitalist system.'[99]

Tafuri's notion of a crisis for architecture has been interpreted as a complete dismissal of any hope for the architecture discipline.[100] This stems back to the reception of his article 'Per una critica dell'ideologia architettonica' in the Italian magazine *Contropiano* in 1968, translated as 'Toward a Critique of Architectural Ideology'.[101] In the foreword to *Architecture and Utopia*, he commented that this misinterpretation was rooted in a disconnection of the problems of architecture from the central project of *Contropiano*:

> By isolating the architectural problems treated from the theoretical context of the journal, the way was found to consider my essay an apocalyptic prophecy, 'the expression of renunciation, the ultimate pronouncement of the 'death of architecture.[102]

One such negative interpretation was made by Jameson, who claims that Tafuri removes any possibility for the architectural practitioner or the architectural historian or critic to affect society, as the critic should not be 'a visionary proponent of the future', but must 'denounce architectural ideologies', while the practicing architect 'cannot hope to devise a radically different, a revolutionary, a utopian architecture.'[103] As a result, Tafuri's work is absolutely negative, as it 'ends up conveying a paralyzing and asphyxiating sense of the futility of any kind of architectural or urbanistic innovation on this side of that equally inconceivable watershed, a total social revolution.'[104]

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[99] Manfredo Tafuri, 'L'Architecture Dans Le Boudoir: The Language of Criticism and the Criticism of Language', in *Architecture Theory Since 1968*, by K. Michael Hays, [1974] (MIT Press, 2000), 57.
[100] See for example Fredric Jameson, *Postmodernism: Or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism* (Verso Books, 1992), 60–62.
[101] Manfredo Tafuri, 'Toward a Critique of Architectural Ideology', in *Architecture Theory Since 1968*, by K. Michael Hays (MIT Press, 2000), 6–35.
[102] Tafuri, *Architecture and Utopia*, viii.
[103] Fredric Jameson, 'Architecture and the Critique of Ideology', in *Architecture Theory Since 1968*, ed. K. Michael Hays (MIT Press, 1998), 442–61.
[104] Jameson, 446.

Jameson interprets Tafuri's critique of architectural ideology in the framework of a classical Marxist determinist view on history, which anticipates a crisis in the form of a breakdown of capitalism and a revolution of the working class. This, however, might be a case of 'rushing Marxist labels': misattributing Marxist views to Tafuri.[105] What Jameson consequently misses is that Tafuri's aim is not to declare a pessimistic diagnosis of architecture, but to establish a historical perspective – a project of crisis – that has to reject both the architect as a figure of progress, and the idea of progress as a concept of time and of history in order to be productive and potentially transformative.

According to the historian Reinhard Koselleck, 'crisis' and 'progress' are both central modern concepts of time. Referring to Koselleck, the historian Helge Jordheim notes that 'progress' denotes a way of understanding time that constructs the past as something that is continuously left behind, while attention is directed towards the future. The 'built-in teleology' of 'progress' is that the future to come will be better than the past, while the present is merely the moving boundary between discarded past and anticipated future.[106] In contrast, 'crisis' as a concept of time does not have the attention fixed on the future, but on the present in which the crisis is played out. The past is thus not merely something which is left, or from which one travels as one moves towards the future, but it is a source for finding causes, causal relations and guilt while the future becomes (ultimate) insecurity, or estimation of risk.[107] More than a mere interface between an irrelevant (and inferior) past and an imagined future, crisis activates the present. Crisis 'postulates hard alternatives and demands clear choices'; there is little room for compromise.[108] Crisis, in other words, represents an entirely different way of viewing history.

Tafuri's project is the establishment of the historical concept of 'crisis' as it is particularly useful for research on the history of the present. Tafuri himself states that his criticism of architectural ideology is not apocalyptic, but aims to destroy the myth of the metahistorical values

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[105] Patrizia Lombardo, 'Introduction', in *Architecture and Nihilism: On the Philosophy of Modern Architecture*, by Massimo Cacciari, Theoretical Perspectives in Architectural History and Criticism (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1993), xxxvii.
[106] Helge Jordheim, 'Krisetid: Introduksjon til en begrepshistorisk forståelse av krisebegrepet', *Arr: Idehistorisk tidsskrift*, no. 2 (2017): 15–16.
[107] Jordheim, 17.
[108] Jordheim, 18.

associated with the architecture discipline.[109] According to Pier Vittorio Aureli, Tafuri criticises 'theories' of architecture which attempted to render the idea of modernity in terms of *progress*, where the architect is a hero: 'His critique consisted in showing how such a historical perspective was achieved by systematically masking the very cause of such progress, meaning the continuous state of cultural crisis provoked by the development of modernity.'[110] Aureli claims that the object of Tafuri's critique was not primarily the historical adaptations these historians made in order to fit architectural history into modern architects' agendas. The main problem was how these historical perspectives – which Tafuri calls 'operative history' – constituted a legitimatisation of the present development.[111] As Aureli formulates it:

> by instrumentalizing history as a source of legitimacy, operative history was not only reconfiguring the past to suit present conditions, but also separating historical developments from their related contradictions and crises. By editing out these contradictions, operative history helped to render as almost natural the political forces that shaped historical processes.[112]

Tafuri is establishing 'crisis' as an approach to a history of the present. By reintroducing present contradictions, he addresses precisely the problems of naturalisation.

Indeed, the notion of crisis can act as a particular type of analytical prism for a history of the present, both as an object of research and as the research approach. The historian Randolph Starn posits that notions of crisis can function as 'serious conceptual tools' for history. In 1971 – a time of crisis, according to Starn – he commented on the popularity of crisis as a concept among historians. Starn referred to the Classic Greek definition of crises as key points in processes of change and thus as moments of truth, stating that crises 'reveal the fibre of its subject' and that 'crisis interpretations may open up the intermediate zone between

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[109] Tafuri, *Theories and History of Architecture*, notes to the second Italian edition.
[110] Pier Vittorio Aureli, 'Recontextualizing Tafuri's Critique of Ideology', *Log*, no. 18 (Winter 2010): 95; Pier Vittorio Aureli, 'Intellectual Work and Capitalist Development: Origins and Context of Manfredo Tafuri's Critique of Architectural Ideology', *Site*, no. 26–27 (2009): 18.
[111] See Tafuri, *Theories and History of Architecture*.
[112] Aureli, 'Recontextualizing Tafuri's Critique of Ideology', 95–96.

"revolution" and "continuity"'.[113] Unlike times of relative stability, times of crisis and upheaval are often assumed to expose hidden power structures, processes of control, secret agendas, and underlying ideologies. The potential extends to the material world. In the field of geography, it has been argued that crisis exposes the functions and contradictions of urban infrastructures and systems, which are invisible when they work as planned and designed.[114] Consequently, crisis events can constitute special analytic potentials for the discursive and material history of the satellite town, so laden with legitimising preconceptions, ideologies and histories.

Importantly, Starn noted three limitations of the use of the concept of crisis for history.[115] Firstly, he states that crises do not exist objectively but are socially constructed. The use of the concept of crisis exists as it is experienced from different points of view. Secondly, Starn states that the term 'crisis' has inherent pathological associations. The general contemporary uses of 'crisis' – 'a time of intense difficulty or danger' and 'a time when a difficult or important decision must be made' – draw their meaning from an earlier historical definition of crisis as 'the turning point of a disease when an important change takes place, indicating either recovery or death.'[116] Pathological interpretations of crisis tend to focus on the possibility of the undesirable outcome of crisis, but one must be aware that this depends on perspective, so from certain perspectives, a crisis signals imminent change for the better. Further, crisis interpretations that depict conflicts, stresses and strains as only abnormal and unhealthy symptoms of disease in society or architecture are to be avoided. Starn's third limitation is that the study of crisis entails a risk of overlooking or misrepresenting long-range development. By focusing on the crisis event as a dramatic and abrupt change that determines history, other, slower and continuous changes are underestimated by default.

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[113] Randolph Starn, 'Historians and "Crisis"', *Past & Present*, no. 52 (1971): 4, 16–17.
[114] See Stephen Graham and Simon Marvin, *Splintering Urbanism: Networked Infrastructures, Technological Mobilities and the Urban Condition* (London; New York: Routledge, 2001); Stephen Graham, ed., *Disrupted Cities: When Infrastructure Fails*, 1st ed. (Routledge, 2009).
[115] Starn, 'Historians and "Crisis"', 20–22.
[116] For these definitions of crisis, see Angus Stevenson, ed., 'Crisis', in *Oxford Dictionary of English* (Oxford University Press, 2010).

Starn primarily addresses the crisis event as an *object* of study. In contrast, Koselleck describes three uses of crisis as general *approaches* to history: crisis as condition, crisis as break or disruption, and crisis as apocalypse.[117] The first type establishes crisis as a generalisation of the modern experience. It is this permanent state of crisis that, according to Tafuri, was edited out by operative history, which instead functions as an instrumentalised history of progress.[118] The second type is crisis understood as a break or disruption, thus an 'iterative period concept' where accumulations of conflicts and contradictions lead to the breakdown of a system, where one epoch ends and another begins. As such, this perspective establishes a relationship between crisis and progress, as a structure of recurrence where the crisis indirectly generates progress. An important example is found in Marxist theory, where it is assumed that the inherent lack of equilibrium between production and consumption will cause crisis in capitalism. Confronted with crisis, capital will attempt to recreate progress by increasing production, generating new growth. Keynesianism as a theory of crisis, which Tafuri describes as 'starting from the crisis and not abstractly against it',[119] was a response to the situation after the 1929 crisis, when growth did not reappear, thus breaking the cyclical relationship between progress and crisis. Lastly, crisis is used as a term for a final decision, an apocalypse, or the end of world as we know it. One example is the present climate crisis; another example, perhaps harder to imagine, is a final breakdown of capitalism and a total social revolution.

In Jameson's interpretation of Tafuri, architecture is dependent on a final crisis, a total revolutionary and systemic transformation, before any qualitative change can happen.[120] Jameson actually insists on a pathological understanding of the crisis of architecture that can only be resolved by an ultimate crisis in the form of a social revolution. Tafuri instead employs the two other concepts of crisis as categorised by Koselleck. When he criticises Keynesianism as a theory of harmonising

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[117] Reinhart Koselleck, 'Crisis', trans. Michaela Richter, *Journal of the History of Ideas* 67, no. 2 (2006): 371.

[118] See Tafuri, *Theories and History of Architecture*, 141; Pier Vittorio Aureli, 'Manfredo Tafuri, Archizoom, Superstudio, and the Crtitique of Architectural Ideology', in *Architecture and Capitalism: 1845 to the Present*, ed. Peggy Deamer (London; New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2014), 137.

[119] Tafuri, *Architecture and Utopia*, 62.

[120] See Jameson, 'Architecture and the Critique of Ideology', 452.

the crisis and progress cycles of capitalism, Tafuri draws on Koselleck's second type of crisis – the crisis of break and disruption. In re-establishing the historical perspective of a continuous state of crisis in modernity however, Tafuri emphasises Koselleck's first type of crisis – the crisis as condition. Thus, for analysis, the determining of different types of crisis is essential.

The philosopher and sociologist Jürgen Habermas connects the notion of crisis to the welfare state compromise. He argues that the need to legitimise advanced capitalism led to the development of a welfare state system of formal democracy to prevent class contradictions from transforming into political struggle: 'The trick is to get diffuse mass loyalty, but avoid participation, a kind of civic privatisation of politics, a political abstinence, and an interest in the rewards of the system.'[121] Habermas suggests that this *normative* crisis management system of advanced capitalism consists of three interacting subsystems which correspond to the state-capital-civic society welfare compromise. The economic system (capital) provides fiscal skim-off to the political-administrative system (the state), which in return provides steering tasks for the economic system. The political-administrative system provides social welfare tasks to the socio-cultural system (civic society), which in return grants mass loyalty to the political-administrative system.[122] In this system, however, Habermas takes for granted that welfare is only, or primarily, provided by the state. What is missing is that welfare has also been provided by civic society or the market, what is currently described as 'the welfare mix'. Indeed, the different sides of the welfare state compromise constitute different crisis perspectives and types of welfare.

Sites of crisis

As a logical consequence of the relationship between the welfare state and the satellite town, these crisis types and perspectives are also manifested in the architecture and planning of the satellite town. Indeed, Tafuri describes how the *Siedlung*, especially Siemensstadt as an interwar

[121] Jürgen Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis* (London: Heinemann, 1976), 40.

[122] According to Habermas, the four possible crisis tendencies of advanced capitalism stem from these three subsystems: Economic *system* crisis has its origins in the economic system. Rationality *system* crisis and legitimation *identity* crisis originate in the political system. Motivation *identity* crisis, the lack of mass loyalty to the political system, has its origin in the socio-cultural system. See Habermas, 45–48.

planned settlement and a 'realized social democracy', had 'insufficient strategies for managing the state-capital-socio-cultural systems in space.'[123] In the case of Siemensstadt, 'the crisis lay above all in the twofold failure of the urban policy set in motion by European democratic socialism'[124] Compared to the dynamic crisis management in the welfare state compromise, Tafuri writes, the 'realized social democracies' of *Siedlungen* attempted to handle crises through the static stability of anti-urban ideology. However, because of this static nature, they are 'destined to be reabsorbed by new levels of productive organisation' through a series of crises and conflicts between the interests of housing cooperatives, productivity systems for economic growth, community ideals and institutional systems. The contradictory aspects of modernity which were included in complex operations of the welfare state as a crisis manager thus remained outside the attempts of rationalization by architecture.[125]

The satellite town, based on the same ideas as Siedlungen, is equally static in its crisis management; it is too concerned with the contradictory ideologies of progress and anti-urbanity. Indeed, the history of progress materializes itself in the satellite town as a rejection of the contradictions (and crisis) of the metropolis. Architecture's role in the welfare state, as Tafuri interprets it, is that of a poorly functioning mix of ideologies rather than a well-functioning crisis management system. The reason is found in architectural ideology, in how architectural practitioners and historians conceptualise past, present and future as meta-histories of progress.

The central problem for history, according to Tafuri, is the relationship between the object of research and its theoretical and historical conceptualisation. With reference to Cacciari, Tafuri has emphasised that historical research is thus in itself 'always a project of a crisis.'[126] In contesting previous historiography, the critical historian risks replacing myths, meta-histories and universals with other myths, meta-

[123] Tafuri, *Architecture and Utopia*, 115; Note that the German translation uses 'satellite town' (Trabantenstadt) in the title: Manfredo Tafuri, *Kapitalismus und Architektur: Von Corbusiers 'Utopia' zur Trabantenstadt*, Analysen zum Planen und Bauen. 9 (Hamburg: VSA, 1977).
[124] Tafuri, *Architecture and Utopia*, 117.
[125] Tafuri, 124.
[126] Manfredo Tafuri, *The Sphere and the Labyrinth: Avant-Gardes and Architecture from Piranesi to the 1970s*, trans. Pellegrino d'Acierno and Robert Connoly (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1987), 3.

histories and universals. Faced with this danger of the historical analysis itself becoming a technique that conceals reality, the task of history, according to Tafuri, is to establish a criticism that constantly puts itself into crisis by putting reality into crisis.[127] The shattering of historical myths – putting reality into crisis – is only possible by shattering the approaches and methods of research: One must continuously re-evaluate and reformulate the analytical approach in relation to the concrete, historical problems that are studied.[128] This challenge amounts to the unresolved relationship between the analysis and the object of research, which becomes an area of constant struggle, definitions and redefinitions. What Tafuri does is to challenge the dominant perspectives of science which divide knowledge into strict *disciplines* with strong, almost unbreakable bonds between objects of research and methods. What the project of crisis attempts is then instead to continuously question the relationship between objects of research and methods.

Seeing the history as a project of crisis, then, is a prerequisite for the analysis of a 'history of the present', which means avoiding interpretation of the past as origins and truths that act to reinforce and naturalise the present. Instead, we need to 'give up simplifying history, and to accept its internal contradictions and its plurality, stressing its dialectical sides, and exalting it for what it really is.'[129] According to Tafuri, researchers should not look to history for answers:

> Rather than turning to the past as a sort of fertile ground, rich in abandoned mines to be successively rediscovered finding in them anticipations of modern problems, or as a slightly hermetic maze good for amusing trips leading to a more or less miraculous *catch*, we must get used to seeing history as a continuous *contestation of the present*, even as a threat, if you like, to the tranquillising myths wherein the anxieties and doubts of modern architects find peace.[130]

[127] Tafuri, 9.
[128] Tafuri, 10–15.
[129] Tafuri, *Theories and History of Architecture*, 233.
[130] Tafuri, 233.

There are obvious similarities with the philosopher Michel Foucault's refusal to crystallise his own analytical strategies into methods.[131] Indeed, Tafuri discusses genealogies – a concept Foucault has inherited from Nietzsche – as an analytical method to address the history of the present.[132] As a method, genealogies do not attempt to connect the present to its origins, but are rather 'a search for processes of descent and emergence, as an erratic and discontinuous process whereby the past becomes the present – to show the contingency of the present and the openness of the future.'[133] The result of this type of research is that 'what is found at the historical beginning of things is not the inviolable identity of their origin; it is the dissention of other things. It is disparity'.[134] In opposition to authoritarian discourses, genealogies are the combination of specialised scholarly knowledge and local memories and aim 'to constitute a historical knowledge of struggles and to make use of that knowledge in contemporary tactics.'[135] In other words, genealogies are meant to be productive and creative, an ambition similar to that of Tafuri's project of crisis.

In Foucault's notion of genealogies, however, there lies a criticism of Marxist critique of ideology. What Tafuri describes as an ideology of architecture is to be understood in the Marxist sense: a false consciousness that conceals class contradictions, making architecture act against its own best interest – which facilitates the perpetuation of existing power relations in capitalism. In classical Marxism, there is an underlying assumption that ideology can be analytically 'removed' so one can see the true power relations. Foucault dismisses this assumption, labouring instead to question the present by comparing it with another period – by the principle of archaeology – and analyse its becoming by tracing its genealogy. Foucault emphasises that power is in reality fragmented and contradictory and exists everywhere, so that resistance

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[131] For Foucault's analytical strategies, see Niels Åkerstrøm Andersen, *Discursive Analytical Strategies: Understanding Foucault, Koselleck, Laclau, Luhmann* (Bristol: Policy Press, 2003).

[132] See Michel Foucault, 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History [1971]', in *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews by Michel Foucault*, ed. Donald F. Bouchard, 1 edition (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1977).

[133] David Garland, 'What Is a "History of the Present"? On Foucault's Genealogies and Their Critical Preconditions', *Punishment & Society* 16, no. 4 (October 2014): 365–84.

[134] Foucault, 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History [1971]', 142.

[135] Michel Foucault, *Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975-76* (New York: Picador, 2003), 8.

must be similarly fragmented and tactical in character: 'The analysis, made in terms of power, must not assume that the sovereignty of the state, the form of the law, or the over-all unity of a domination are given at the outset; rather, these are only the terminal forms power takes.'[136] Contradicting Jameson's claim that Tafuri is a classical Marxist, Tafuri agrees with Foucault that there is no single target for the criticism of power, stating that 'power is itself plural: it runs through and cuts across social classes, ideologies, and institutions.' Nevertheless, Tafuri's criticises genealogies for not proposing any way of critiquing the fragmentation they perform:

> Once a system of power is isolated, its genealogy cannot be offered as a universe complete in itself. The analysis must go further, it must make the previously isolated fragments collide with each other; it must dispute the limits it has set up.[137]

Indeed, Tafuri suggests putting Foucault's genealogies into crisis. The problem is not only how to juxtapose the genealogies once they are created. When Tafuri states that genealogies 'must necessarily negate the existence of the *historic space*', he asserts that the analysis through genealogies is in essence incomplete, and misses how things play out in reality.[138] Tafuri appears to suggest that what is missing from Foucault's genealogies are the contradictions between different interests. He states that the important task is to analyse the struggles caused by the conflicts of interests *between* these genealogies.

> But if Power – like the institutions in which it incarnates itself – 'speaks many dialects,' the analysis of the 'collision' among these dialects must then be the object of historiography. The construction of a physical space is certainly the site of a 'battle': a proper urban analysis demonstrates this clearly.[139]

The satellite town is also a site of the confrontation between the welfare policies of the state and the social ideas of architecture and planning.

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[136] Michel Foucault, *The Will to Knowledge: The History of Sexuality* [1978], vol. 1 (London: Penguin Books, 1998), 92.
[137] Tafuri, *The Sphere and the Labyrinth*, 10.
[138] Tafuri, 9.
[139] Tafuri, 8.

More specifically, it is the clash of the sides of the welfare state compromise of state, capital and civic society, represented in the satellite town by the programmatic elements of mass housing, the shopping centre and the neighbourhood. The satellite town is a collision site for disciplinary discourses, and is thus in this thesis researched as the concrete space in which the fragmented power in disciplines and professions of the welfare state converge.[140] Indeed, the crisis of the welfare state around 1973 can be said to have *taken place* in the satellite towns.

This collision does not only happen in the planning and design of the satellite town; it is repeated in ongoing discourses, the series of new appraisals and transformations. The satellite town therefore remains a primary site where politics materialise in space. This thesis devises an alternation between macro- and micro-perspectives in an analysis of the conflict between architecture and the different sides of the welfare state compromise. Three analytical devices are used to investigate architecture's different roles in the welfare state constructions of satellite towns. These separate analyses combine the welfare state compromise of state, capital and civic society and the satellite town functions of housing, centre and neighbourhood. In this way, the thesis contains both synthesis and fragmented analysis, corresponding to Tafuri's suggestion:

> The interweaving of intellectual models, modes of production, and modes of consumption ought to lead to the 'explosion' of the synthesis contained in the work. Wherever this synthesis is presented as a completed whole, it is necessary to introduce a disintegration, a fragmentation, a 'dissemination' of its constitutive units. It will then be necessary to submit these dis-integrated components to a separate analysis.[141]

The satellite town is a site of crisis because it is the space where multiple entities collide. It is the meeting place of the contradictions of past and present, a contrast of the historical specificities of ideas of welfare in the post-war construction and the corresponding contemporary ideas of area-based policies as methods for aligning the satellite towns with the

[140] See Tafuri, 1–21.
[141] Tafuri, 14.

contemporary ideas of urban environments and the neoliberal or third-way ideologies of individualism in the present welfare society.[142]

The problem-definitions are set in a contemporary context of neoliberalism, where the now taken-for-granted values appear to contrast with those of the historical period during which the satellite towns were planned and built. However, present-day values are not a result of a linear historical evolution in the direction of fuller knowledge. As Foucault has argued, what appears to be true in the present does so because it integrates well in the discursive context of the present. Present truths are thus not intrinsically better, nor do they represent real progress over any failed or outdated truths of the past.[143] Such a historical perspective emphasises historical discontinuities generated by periods of incompatible knowledges.

The notions of crisis are emergent; while they spring from historical incidents and events as reactions to concrete problems, over time they are adapted to other environments and uses, emphasising contingent historical continuities.[144] The satellite town is therefore also a site of emergence and evolution: The problem-definitions have evolved in the concrete historical development of welfare state architectures, characterised by contradictions, conflicts, struggles and crises. They are thus not even really true in the current neoliberal context. The sense that the problem-definitions makes today is only apparent; they are adapted from other uses in other historical periods. Furthermore, the truth and knowledge of problems are specific to the discursive formations in disciplines, constituting a parallel fragmentation of power in disciplines and professions.[145] The knowledge behind the problem-definitions is the result of complex and contradictory historical processes rather than any rational analysis. In these processes, crisis is a productive discourse, as the

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[142] See Bech-Danielsen, *Fra ghetto til blandet by*.

[143] This perspective emphasises historical breaks and discontinuities, based on Foucault's use of *archaeologies* for the analysis of different regimes of knowledge, called 'epistemes'. See especially Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences* (London: Routledge, 2002).

[144] This perspective emphasises historical continuities in the form of emergent and evolutionary processes, based on Foucault's use of *genealogies* for the analysis of a 'history of the present'. See Foucault, 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History [1971]'.

[145] For Foucault's first use of *genealogies* as an analytical approach for the emergence of knowledge and power formations in a specific discipline or profession, see Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* [1975] (London: Penguin Books, 1991).

use of the concept crisis can create crisis. Consequently, the crisis concept can be seen as part of a rhetorical strategy for undermining or delegitimising (state) power.[146] Or, as in this thesis: for contesting present-day discourse.

Thesis structure

The thesis is a satellite town history of the present analysed as a project of crisis. The object of research – the notion of satellite town crisis – emerged through the international critique of welfare state architecture and planning that arose in the 1960s and 1970s.[147] In Norway, the crisis appeared in several different types of publications and mass media in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Reference is often made to some of the publications and media presentations. Common to these publications and their media presentations are their essential roles in the discourses that have established problem-definitions of the satellite towns.

In this thesis, Chapters 2–5 are analyses of four such publications that couple the three parts of the welfare state compromise with the three different perspectives on the satellite town found in the use of labels in the 1950 *Generalplan for Oslo* and the plan's 1960 revision.[148] The planner-perspective on the satellite town as a whole in the research report *Ammerudrapporten* (1969) encompasses the three perspectives based in the parts of the welfare state compromise and the corresponding components of the satellite town.[149] The perspective of retail and capital

[146] Jordheim, 'Krisetid: Introduksjon til en begrepshistorisk forståelse av krisebegrepet', 19.

[147] See for example the Swedish reports: Olle Bengtzon, Jan Delden, and Jan Lundgren, *Rapport Tensta* (PAN/Norstedt, 1970); Carin Flemström, *Fallet Rosengård: en studie i svensk planerings- och bostadspolitik*, vol. 4, Det nya samhället (Stockholm, 1972); Hans Gordon and Peter Molin, *'Man bara anpassar sig helt enkelt': en forskningsrapport om människor i Skärholmen* (Stockholm: Bokförlaget Pan/Norstedts, 1972).

[148] The label *drabantby* (satellite town) is never used in the 1950 *Generalplan for Oslo*, which appears to avoid any formal labelling of the new developments. The term used for the satellite town as a whole is *de moderne boligsamfundene* (the modern housing communities), which represents a diagrammatic model for 'decentralisation of city functions', based on the neighbourhood unit concept and ideas from the British plans for New Towns. See Erik Rolfsen, *Generalplan for Oslo: et utkast lagt fram som diskusjonsgrunnlag for de kommunale myndigheter og etater og for andre interesserte* (Oslo reguleringsvesen, 1950), 39, 40.

[149] Anne Sæterdal and Thorbjørn Hansen, *Ammerud 1: planlegging av en ny bydel*, Rapport 58 (Norges byggforskningsinstitutt, 1969).

on the critique of *centres* presented in the retail handbook *Planlegging og etablering av detaljhandelsbedrifter: en håndbook* (1976) links the discourse of economic development with satellite town centres.[150] Consequently, capital is connected with *lokalsentre* (local centres), called a *sub-centre system* in the 1960 revision of the *Generalplan for Oslo*.[151] The state perspective on the critique of *housing* in the report to Parliament *St. meld. nr. 76 Om boligspørsmål* (1972) – known as *Boligmeldingen* (the housing report) – links the discourse of the development of housing politics and *housing crisis* to the housing environment in the satellite town.[152] Accordingly, the state is associated with *boligstrøk* (housing areas).[153] Inhabitants' and civic society's perspectives on the critique of the school and community in *Stovnerrapporten* (1975) and *Romsåsrapporten* (1976) couples the discourse of social welfare with neighbourhood units.[154] In *Generalplanen,* these social units are called *husgrender* (hamlets), *nærhetsgrupper* (vicinity groups) and *skolekretser* (school districts).[155]

With these multiple perspectives on the satellite town and on the welfare state, the theorisation of a history of present satellite town challenges is made with multiple, contrasting interpretations of Tafuri's approaches to architectural history to put the historical approach in crisis. Tafuri has emphasised that the main problem for criticism is 'the historical assessment of the present contradictions', and that criticism must 'continually revolutionise itself' to be able to find the parameters to address specific problems.[156] History is thus always a project of crisis, caused by 'the constant struggle between the analysis and its objects'.[157]

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[150] Asbjørn Borg, *Planlegging og etablering av detaljhandelsbedrifter: en håndbok* (Oslo: Norsk Produktivitetsinstitutt, 1976).

[151] Rolfsen, *Generalplan for Oslo*, 8, 40, 42, 44; Oslo Byplankontoret, *Oslo: planlegging og utvikling: oversikt over den geografiske og historiske bakgrunn, utviklingen av befolkning og næringsliv m.m. og planlegging og utbygging etter krigen = Oslo: planning and development: a survey of the geographical and historical background, the development of population and economic activities and post-war planning and building* (Oslo: Oslo kommune, 1960).

[152] Kommunal- og arbeidsdepartementet, 'St. meld. nr. 76 (1971–72) Om boligspørsmål', Parliamentary report, 14 April 1972.

[153] Rolfsen, *Generalplan for Oslo*, 8, 37, 40, 42, 62, 86.

[154] Terje Gammelsrud, ed., *Sinnets helse: Tidsskrift for mentalhygiene*, [Stovnerrapporten] Barn i krise, no. 5 (1975); Terje Gammelsrud, ed., *Sinnets helse: Tidsskrift for mentalhygiene*, [Romsåsrapporten] Rapport fra Oslo: Barn i krise 2, no. 5 (1976).

[155] Rolfsen, *Generalplan for Oslo*, 40, 42, 44.

[156] Tafuri, *Theories and History of Architecture*, 2, 4.

[157] Tafuri, *The Sphere and the Labyrinth*, 3.

In the theoretical treatments, there are consequently four different interpretations of Tafuri's critique of architecture and the welfare state, based on the theoretical framework of the present chapter. While Chapter 2 addresses the satellite town as a complete plan, characterised by the collision of the different interests, perspectives and discourses of the three parts of the welfare state compromise and the three apparatuses of the satellite town, the subsequent three chapters, Chapters 3–5, each address one of these perspectives. Finally, Chapter 6 again synthesises the analysis, so that the thesis structure forms a set of analytical devices that both divide and bring together as they approach specific parts of the satellite town through specific critical discourses, but still include broader perspectives on the history of architecture and the welfare state.

Chapter 2, *Against the Plan*, is an analysis of satellite town crisis, linking welfare state development with satellite town planning. Criticism of satellite towns had already begun in the 1960s, citing anonymous and alienating housing blocks, a lack of shops and services, and dysfunctional social environments, and there was a growing sense that the problem was a systemic one. The satellite town of Ammerud, completed in 1965–1966 and realised according to the 1950 Generalplan for Oslo, was chosen to represent Oslo satellite towns in the research report Ammerudrapporten (the Ammerud report) published by Norsk *byggforskningsinstitutt* in 1969.[158] A critique of planning by planners, this report has been labelled as the greatest watershed in the Norwegian discourse on satellite towns. Newspapers, public debate, policy documents and scholarly articles have interpreted the report as either a criticism of modernist high-rise architecture, a condemnation of a specific satellite town, or proof of the failure of post-war physical planning as part of the politics of the welfare state. Nevertheless, these different media presentations do not reflect the complex and contradictory nature of the report, and they omit the political issues that the Ammerud report intended to raise. With the use of Tafuri's critique of architectural ideology, interpreted with Antonio Negri's analysis of the

[158] The label *Ammerudrapporten* is most often used for the report published in 1969, but also in reference to two later reports and a publication in pocket-book format for the mass market: Sæterdal and Hansen, *Ammerud 1*; Grete Bull, *Å bo i drabantby: Ammerud II: intervjuundersøkelse 1968–69*, Rapport 66 (Norges byggforskningsinstitutt, 1971); Ole Gulbrandsen, *Å bo på ett rom i blokk: intervjuundersøkelse blant beboerne av ett-roms leilighetene på Ammerud*, Rapport 82 (Oslo: Norges byggforskningsinstitutt, 1973); Thorbjørn Hansen and Anne Sæterdal, *Ammerud* (Oslo: Pax, 1970).

Keynesian *plan* in 'Keynes and the Capitalist Theory of the State Post-1929', *Ammerudrapporten* and its reception are analysed as a critique of planning by planners, but also as a critique of the welfare state that is the context for this planning.[159]

Chapter 3, *Welfare as Consumption*, is an analysis of the critique and *crisis of consumerism*, coupling economic planning for welfare with the welfare function of satellite town centres. The problem addressed is the development of shops and services in the satellite towns, which the *Generalplan for Oslo* left to private businesses, which were located in the plan but not *planned*, coming later than housing, and where modernisation posed the question of scale and proximity and the questioning of consumerist culture. In the retail handbook for the establishment of retail businesses published by *Norsk Produktivitetsinstitutt* (the Norwegian productivity institute), these problems are addressed from the point of view of capital.[160] The retail handbook suggested that the alternative satellite town centre of Romsås, completed in 1975 as part of the system of sub-centres, was a possible solution to the problems of welfare created by economic structural development and consumerism.[161] In contrast to *Ammerudrapporten*, the retail handbook had little impact on public discourse. Instead it represented an authority on how the problem of consumption should be addressed, as an economic perspective of welfare that continues to influence discourse. Using Tafuri's critique of architectural ideology interpreted against the background of Negri's analysis of Schumpeterian *business cycles* in 'Marx on Cycle and Crisis', the chapter analyses the history of conflicts and struggles between different perspectives on consumption, welfare, economic growth and environmental issues that are part of the historical development of the present-day culture of welfare as consumption.[162]

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[159] Tafuri, 'Toward a Critique of Architectural Ideology'; Antonio Negri, 'Keynes and the Capitalist Theory of the State Post-1929', in *Revolution Retrieved: Writings on Marx, Keynes, Capitalist Crisis, and New Social Subjects (1967-83)* (London: Red Notes, 1988), 5–42.

[160] Borg, *Planlegging og etablering av detaljhandelsbedrifter*.

[161] Oslo Byplankontoret, *Oslo: planlegging og utvikling*; See also Thorbjørn Hansen and Jon Guttu, *Oslo kommunes boligpolitikk 1960–1989: fra storskalabygging til frislepp* (Oslo: Norsk institutt for by- og regionforskning, 2000), 91.

[162] Antonio Negri, 'Marx on Cycle and Crisis', in *Revolution Retrieved: Writings on Marx, Keynes, Capitalist Crisis, and New Social Subjects (1967–83)* (London: Red Notes, 1988), 43–91.

Chapter 4, *The Politics of the Housing Environment,* is an analysis of *housing crisis* and links welfare state housing policies and the satellite towns as housing environments. The plans for satellite towns were ambitious solutions to the severe housing crisis after the Second World War. In the late 1960s however, these solutions were blamed for causing a new form of housing crisis: a crisis of the housing environment. The 1972 Parliamentary report *St. Meld. nr. 76 Om boligspørsmål* (On housing questions) – also known as *Boligmeldingen* (the housing report) – addresses this problem from the point of view of the state. The report presented criticism of the satellite towns as housing environments and suggested substantial changes in housing policies.[163] Historians discuss the report as a watershed for housing politics and *Den sosialdemokratiske orden*: the Norwegian welfare state.[164] If *Boligmeldingen* represented a peak for welfare state policy, the housing area of Romsås, built between 1969 and 1974, similarly represents a peak for the materialisations of these policies. Using Tafuri's outlining of the historical project – interpreted through Foucault's satirical reading of Nietzsche's critique of uses of history – the chapter analyses how the housing question is conditioned by political discourse as the notion of housing crisis is used for political purposes.[165]

Chapter 5, *A Battle of Civil Society*, is an analysis of *social crisis* and links welfare institutions to the satellite towns as communities and spatial organisations of civil society. The problem addressed is the development of the discourse of social crisis initiated by the *Barn i krise* (Children in crisis) – known as *Stovnerrapporten* – a themed issue of the magazine *Sinnets helse, tidsskrift for mentalhygiene* (Health of the mind, journal for mental hygiene). Published in 1975 by the non-profit organisation *Mental barnehjelp* (Mental child care), this report diagnosed an unprecedented social crisis in the satellite town of Stovner, which was later extended to Romsås in 1976 with a second themed issue of *Sinnets*

[163] Kommunal- og arbeidsdepartementet, 'St. meld. nr. 76 (1971–72) Om boligspørsmål'.
[164] Elsa Reiersen, *De tusen hjem: Den norske stats husbank 1946–96* (Oslo: Ad notam Gyldendal, 1996), 271–72; Annaniassen, 'Vendepunktet for "den sosialdemokratiske orden": 1970-tallet og boligpolitikken'.
[165] Tafuri, *The Sphere and the Labyrinth*; Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, 'On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life [1874]', in *Untimely Meditations*, ed. Daniel Breazeale, trans. R. J. Hollingdale, Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 57–124; Foucault, 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History [1971]'.

helse, called *Romsåsrapporten*.[166] In addressing the problem of social crisis from the point of view of civil society, the two themed issues can best be described as journalistic reports with a populist edge that aimed to raise awareness and prompt public debate about societal problems. However, historical accounts describe that this debate caused territorial stigma and the de-legitimisation of state-led welfare. Using Tafuri's outlining of the historical project, interpreted as a development of Foucault's genealogies, the chapter goes behind the discourse of social construction of stigma and reviews the two reports as aggregates of multiple institutional discourses that reveal the social complexity of satellite towns.[167]

Chapter 6, *Sites of Crisis*, concludes the thesis with a synthesis of the historical contradictions, struggles and crises analysed in the four preceding chapters. This synthesis constitutes what Tafuri describes as an analysis of the collision of multiple dialects of power.[168] As an illumination of the discourses of crisis that form the historical base for the understanding of current satellite town challenges, this analysis is an 'assessment of the present contradictions', a history of the present. Consequently, the thesis proposes a new understanding of satellite town history and current satellite town challenges, thus challenging both contemporary historical accounts, discursive uses of history, problem-definitions and suggested solutions related to area-based policies and mediations of satellite towns. Additionally, the research challenges periodization and definitions of welfare in current research on architecture and welfare. Despite limitations due to the satellite towns used being located in Norway, the material samples, methodical limitations and bias, this research has implications for other welfare states and other satellite towns or sites of crisis.

[166] Gammelsrud, 1975; Gammelsrud, 1976.
[167] Tafuri, *The Sphere and the Labyrinth*; Foucault, 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History [1971]'.
[168] See Tafuri, *The Sphere and the Labyrinth*, 8.

2
Against the plan

> What is wrong with the new city districts that rise towards the sky? How can we make them better, more pleasant and more human-friendly? Which visible and invisible forces affect the development?[1]

> The state was now prepared, as it were, to descent into civil society, to continuously recreate the source of its legitimacy in a process of permanent readjustment of the conditions of equilibrium. The new 'material basis of the constitution' became *the state as planner*, or better still, the state as *the plan*.[2]

Three questions about 'the new city districts' – the Oslo satellite towns – were posed on the cover of the paperback book *Ammerud* printed in 1970.[3] The book was an adaptation of the 1969 research report *Ammerud 1: planlegging av en ny bydel* (Ammerud 1: planning of a new city district) – commonly referred to as *Ammerudrapporten* (the Ammerud report) – which had generated considerable public debate as the first extensive criticism of the planning of Norwegian satellite towns.[4] The research

[1] Hansen and Sæterdal, *Ammerud*, book cover.: 'Hva er galt med de nye bydelene som skyter i været? Hvordan kan vi gjøre dem bedre, triveligere og mer menneskevennlige? Hvilke synlige og usynlige krefter påvirker utviklingen?'

[2] Negri, 'Keynes and the Capitalist Theory of the State Post-1929', 13; The article was originally published in Italian: Antonio Negri, 'La teoria capitalistica nel '29: John M. Keynes', *Contropiano*, no. 1 (1968): 3–40.

[3] Since its inception in 1964, the publisher of the paperback Ammerud – Pax forlag – had fronted left radicalism and published books that aimed to challenge the conventionalism of public discourse in Norway. See Kim G. Helsvig, *Pax forlag 1964-2014: en bedrift* (Oslo: Pax, 2014).

[4] See Sæterdal and Hansen, *Ammerud 1*.

report's critical text, the high-contrast black and white photographs of monotonous mass housing units, and the public debate had served to stigmatise the site of the study, the satellite town Ammerud.[5] Historians describe the report as a critique of planning processes and organisations, a turning point for housing policy, a crisis for housing blocks as a typology and a dismissal of the satellite towns as social environments.[6] *Ammerudrapporten* thus functioned both as an attack on a concrete place and a dismissal of the satellite town as a planning concept.

These interpretations overlook that the report is a system critique of the distribution of power. The authors of the paperback edition of *Ammerudrapporten* and the report that preceded it were the young architects Anne Sæterdal and Thorbjørn Hansen, researchers at *Norges byggforskningsinstitutt* (Norwegian Building Research Institute, NBI), which published the report. However, they were also central members of the socialist architect group *Kanal* (lit. channel), a name suggested by Sæterdal.[7] Together with three other Kanal-members, Sæterdal and Hansen had been elected to the board of Oslo Architect's Union (OAF) in 1969 and had subsequently presented a working programme for OAF

[5] See Jon Guttu, 'Drabantbyen som skyteskive', *Fremtid for fortiden*, no. 3/4 (2002): 56–67.

[6] The Ammerud report has been interpreted as a crisis and a turning point in multiple ways: As a crisis of processes and organizations of planning, see Sture Kvarv, *Yrkesroller og fagideologiske brytninger i fysisk planlegging i Norge, 1920-1970*, Con-text. Avhandling 12 (Oslo: Arkitekthøgskolen i Oslo, 2003), 189; as a turning point for housing policy, see Thorbjørn Hansen and Jon Guttu, *Fra storskalabygging til frislepp: beretning om Oslo kommunes boligpolitikk 1960-1989*, vol. 243–1998, Prosjektrapport (Norges byggforskningsinstitutt, 1998), 63–66; Erling Annaniassen, *Nå bygger vi den nye tid*, vol. 2, Boligsamvirkets historie i Norge (Oslo: Gyldendal, 1996); Reiersen, *De tusen hjem*, 249–51; as a crisis for housing blocks as a typology, see Jon Guttu, 'Høyhuset i etterkrigstidens boligdebatt', *St. Hallvard* 2001 nr 1 (2001): 4–25; Jon Guttu, '"Den gode boligen": fagfolks oppfatning av boligkvalitet gjennom 50 år' (Oslo, Arkitekthøgskolen i Oslo, 2003); Ane Hjort Guttu, 'Å bo i drabantby = [Living in a satellite town]', n.d.; as signalling a general social crisis, see Edgeir Benum, *Byråkratienes by: fra 1948 til våre dager*, vol. 5 (Oslo: Cappelen, 1994), 352; Ola Svein Stugu, 'Vekst og vendepunkt', in *Norsk byhistorie: urbanisering gjennom 1300 år*, by Knut Helle et al. (Pax, 2006), 462.

[7] The Kanal-group – or 'action front' – was formed in November 1968. For an outline of Kanal's formation from the perspective of one of its central actors, see Jan Carlsen, 'Kanal-historien 1. Drømmen om Nye Byggekunst', *Arkitektnytt*, no. 1 (1992): 7; for Kanal's context, see also Martin Braathen, *The Magician and the Shoemaker - Debates on Open Form and Marxist-Leninism in Norway around 1970* (NTNU, 2019).



1. Cover of *Ammerud 1: planlegging av en ny bydel* (*Ammerudrapporten*).

based on Kanal's Marxist critique of capitalism.[8] Kanal's manifesto asserted that '[planners] do not serve the interests of the people, but are paid to serve a privileged minority'.[9] In a similar vein, *Ammerudrapporten* stated that 'some of the conditions that we find unfortunate must be traced back to the social structure as a whole for an explanation'.[10] Sæterdal and Hansen argue that this structure comprises a cultural pattern in which individual freedom is prioritised over collective needs, the economic system with a lack of control of distribution of resources between the private and public sector, and the judicial system with land ownership. Consequently, with the question 'which visible and invisible forces affect the development?' the critique in *Ammerudrapporten* not only went beyond the aesthetics and organisation of urban space and ventured into a discussion of the power structures that form its prerequisites; it also criticised the post-war welfare state as a whole.

In this system critique of the welfare state, planning, and architecture, the report also raised questions about the political role of the architect. The problem of the architect's role was a topic in international architectural discourse in the late 1960s, and also appeared in the architectural historian Manfredo Tafuri's seminal article 'Per una critica dell'ideologia architettonica' (Toward a Critique of Architectural Ideology), published in the same year as *Ammerudrapporten*.[11] Crucially, Tafuri suggests that architecture as an institution had entered into crisis with the advent of the Keynesian welfare state, which completely encompassed architectural ideology. Tafuri's article has been interpreted as an absolute dismissal of any meaningful future for the architectural institution when confronted with the total system of advanced capitalism. This widespread interpretation, however, inaccurately

[8] See 'OAF generalforsamling 27. mars 1969', *Arkitektnytt*, no. 7 (1969): 154; Gunnar Christensen et al., 'Programerklæring', *Arkitektnytt*, no. 4 (1969): 61–62.
[9] See Kanal's manifesto, published in 1969: Kanal, 'Kanal – aksjonsfront for frigjøring og fellesskap', *Arkitektnytt*, no. 6 (1969): 110.: '[planleggere] tjener ikke folkets interesser, men betales for å tjene et privilegert mindretall.'
[10] Sæterdal and Hansen, *Ammerud 1*, 160. 'En del av de forhold som vi finner uheldige må føres tilbake til hele samfunnsstrukturen for å finne sin forklaring.'
[11] Manfredo Tafuri, 'Per una critica dell'ideologia architettonica', *Contropiano*, no. 1 (1969): 31–80; For the English translation used for the citations, see Tafuri, 'Toward a Critique of Architectural Ideology'.

portrays the specific historical and political context of the article and is thus a misinterpretation of the message.[12]

Tafuri's article was printed in issue 1/69 of the Marxist journal *Contropiano*, which was published three times a year from 1968 to 1971. The journal was initially edited by Alberto Asor Rosa, Antonio Negri and Massimo Cacciari, and brought together a group of leading figures of Italian autonomist Marxism's *operaismo* (workerism) movement. Like other Marxist thought, workerism sought to reveal the fundamental power relationships of modern class society, but what was unique for workerism was the special importance it placed on the 'relationship between the material structure of the working class, and its behaviour as a subject autonomous from the dictates of both the labour movement and capital'.[13] Literally translated as 'anti-plan', the journal's name reflected the workerist anti-statist stance of 'against the plan': *contro il piano*. Compressed into the journal title was thus a programme of not only criticising the capitalist welfare state, but also for establishing an autonomous position for actively working against it. Tafuri's active involvement in the journal included editorial work.[14] His 1969 article was influenced by this workerist context and Negri's article on Keynes published a year prior.

First published as 'La teoria capitalistica nel'29: John M. Keynes' in 1968, Negri's article was contemporary with the research process for *Ammerudrapporten.*[15] In it, Negri calls the welfare state *the plan,* a form of advanced capitalism based on Keynesian economic theory. He describes the economic crisis of 1929 as a moment of truth for capitalism, as it was being threatened from two directions: from the direction of capital came the threat of economic stagnation, since the crisis-ridden *laissez-faire* economy of the inter-war period meant that capital owners became hesitant to invest. From the direction of labour there was the threat of revolution, as the volatile market economy also created unpredictability for the employment of workers. According to Negri, unemployment had become a serious threat for state power after

[12] See Tafuri's own rebuttal of the interpretation of 'Toward a Critique of Architectural Ideology' as a dismissal of architecture: Tafuri, *Architecture and Utopia*, vii–viii.
[13] Steve Wright, *Storming Heaven: Class Composition and Struggle in Italian Autonomist Marxism* (London; Sterling, Virginia: Pluto Press, 2002), 3.
[14] Gail Day, 'Manfredo Tafuri, Fredric Jameson and the Contestations of Political Memory', *Historical Materialism* 20, no. 1 (1 January 2012): 47.
[15] See Negri, 'La teoria capitalistica nel '29: John M. Keynes'.

the October Revolution in 1917, which had proved that the labour class was a political force that could overturn power and result in state communism. For Negri, John Maynard Keynes' General Theory was primarily an attempt to 'save capitalism' from this double threat to the social order.[16] The central problem that capitalism needed to solve, Negri argues, was that the crisis of 1929 had created fear that destroyed the belief in the future. Keynes' saving operation addressed both the fear of unemployment in the working class and the fear of making capital investments by integrating the emerging working class and its political antagonism with capital in state power. The only way to do this was to *plan* the future according to present expectations of economic investments, meaning that the state must intervene in the economy: Investment risks must be eliminated, guaranteed by the state. The power of capitalism needed to be stabilised and the future cancelled out by prolonging the present state of power; thus, 'the future must be fixed as present, the state has to defend the present from the future.'[17]

This stability, however, demanded constant readjustments to ensure the wellbeing of the economy and the support of the working class.[18] In Negri's analysis, this is also a system for ensuring that the labour class will not assume real power. The Keynesian *plan* integrated all of society into the system of advanced capitalism in the specific form of the welfare state, where contemporary inherent conflicts are cancelled out while the focus is on the future. Importantly, Negri's article is an argument in favour of workerism, which he suggests as a possibility for the workers' struggle *against the plan*. Negri recognises the working class as an 'autonomous moment within capital', also in the welfare state, maintaining that the welfare state is a mechanism to prevent the working class from acting outside capital – becoming autonomous – and through struggle actualising its political power as the motor of development.[19] It is in this workerist context that Tafuri's critique of ideology must be interpreted, not as a statement that 'nothing is possible', but as the opposite.[20] His critique of the Keynesian welfare state and the failure of architectural ideology is not a sign of resignation. Interpreted in the

[16] Here Negri refers to Keynes, *The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money*.
[17] Negri, 'Keynes and the Capitalist Theory of the State Post-1929', 25.
[18] Negri, 13.
[19] Negri, 28–29.
[20] Day, 'Strategies in the Metropolitan Merz', 32–36; Day, 'Manfredo Tafuri, Fredric Jameson and the Contestations of Political Memory', 47–49.

context of workerism, it serves to map out the weaknesses of capital – the constant readjustments – that present opportunities for a class struggle *against the plan.*

The welfare state and its planning subscribe to 'progress' as a modern concept of time, which implies moving away from the past with attention focused on a better future.[21] In focusing on an abstract, better future, the planning of the welfare state obscures contemporary crisis, contradictions and struggles. Seeking to undermine this notion of 'progress', Negri and Tafuri apply crisis as a notion of time and history.

This chapter uses the notion of crisis as a tool for a reconceptualization of the Norwegian history of planning and of the welfare state. I investigate *Ammerudrapporten* through the theoretical prism of Negri's and Tafuri's concurrent workerist critique as an alternative conceptualisation of time and consequently a different historical perspective. The workerist critique by Negri and Tafuri serves a double purpose: as an analytical tool for history and in itself an example of the international context of socialist and Marxist criticism of capitalism in the late 1960s and early 1970s, of which *Kanal* and *Ammerudrapporten* were also a part.

The Norwegian welfare state and Oslo satellite towns

Before publishing *Ammerudrapporten*, *Norsk byggforskningsinstitutt* had concentrated almost exclusively on the technical aspects of building production. The report was a result of initiatives from *Kommunal- og arbeidsdepartementet* (Ministry of Local Government and Labour) in the 1960s to establish housing research with a societal perspective in the institute.[22] The British sociologist John Greve played an important role in the early phases of the establishment of this research.[23] Besides Sæterdal and Hansen, Greve is the only named contributor to the first research report on Ammerud. He also made significant contributions to

[21] See Jordheim, 'Krisetid: Introduksjon til en begrepshistorisk forståelse av krisebegrepet', 15–16.
[22] Tore W. Kiøsterud, *Hvordan målene ble nådd: Hovedlinjer og erfaringer i norsk boligpolitikk*, NOVA Temahefte 1/05, 2005, 101.
[23] See for example John Greve, *Boligpolitikk og økonomisk vekst*, vol. 109, Særtrykk (Oslo: Norges byggforskningsinstitutt, 1965); John Greve, 'Norsk boligbygging sett med engelske øyne', *Plan og arbeid*, no. 4 (1966): 10–17.

the second report.[24] Notably, these reports build upon Greve's less-known report, entitled 'Housing, Planning and Change in Norway'. Also published in 1969, it warns that Oslo is heading 'towards a crisis', caused by rising costs, longer journeys, overloaded communication systems, less access to recreation areas, pollution, and inadequate technical infrastructure:

> Much greater investment is needed in these essential services – and the communication systems – if Oslo is to avert a crisis in the early 1970s. Investment is only one of the measures to employ in seeking to avoid a crisis and to alleviate existing difficulties. Many of Oslo's urban problems arise from pressures, dislocations, and bottlenecks, arising from the use of land in (particularly) the inner region. Fundamentally, from the existing distribution of housing and employment.[25]

Greve's warning of a crisis was an unequivocal critique of Oslo's post-war urban expansion pattern, outlined in the 1950 *Generalplan for Oslo*. This plan served as the guide for satellite town planning in Oslo from 1950 until the early 1980s, dictating a spatial and functional organisation in local centres that have social institutions, technical facilities, housing, offices, workshops and factories, shown as a schematic system for the decentralization of city functions.[26] Its general principle was that Oslo should expand through many relatively independent city districts that would later be called *drabantbyer* (satellite towns) based on the idea – or ideology – of neighbourhood units as a unifying concept with a sociological basis.[27] According to Greve, this spatial development pattern had created rising costs and overloaded infrastructures, which – together with a socially unjust housing policy that reinforced existing social divisions and imbalances – would result in a future crisis. Considering that the *Generalplan for Oslo* and the subsequent construction of satellite towns had been produced in the context of the development of the

[24] Sæterdal and Hansen, *Ammerud 1*, 3.
[25] John Greve, 'Housing, Planning and Change in Norway' (Oslo: Norges byggforskningsinstitutt, 1969), 33–34.
[26] Rolfsen, *Generalplan for Oslo*, 8, 38–39.
[27] For a discussion of the use of the neighbourhood unit concept in *Generalplanen for Oslo*, see Erik Rolfsen, 'Sosiologi og byplan', *Byggekunst: The Norwegian Review of Architecture*, no. 12 (1948): 168–71.

Norwegian post-war welfare state, Greve's warning about planning was an indirect critique of the welfare state.

The Norwegian welfare state, *den sosialdemokratiske orden*, was built on compromises. At its foundation were cross-political agreements negotiated in Sweden in 1944, during the German occupation of Norway. The resulting document, *Framtidens Norge* (Future Norway), referred to the Beveridge plan for the British welfare state and argued that a similar plan should be implemented in Norway.[28] This agreement built on pre-war agreements that were the result of the Labour party's turn in the 1930s from class struggle to crisis politics with the goal of keeping the economy going in a time of stagnation. These agreements are known as *kriseforliket* (the crisis conciliation) between the organisations of workers and farmers which formed the power base of the 1935 Labour government; and *Hovedavtalen*, the parallel class compromise between *Arbeidernes Fellesorganisasjon* (Workers' National Trade Union) and *Norsk Arbeidsgiverforening* (the Norwegian Employer's Confederation).[29] *Framtidens Norge* was further developed into *Fellesprogrammet* (the common programme), a shared programme for all the political parties in the first election after the war which affirmed the need for a national plan directly controlled, stimulated and directed by social bodies: 'We need national planning and national implementation of the plans.'[30] According to *Fellesprogrammet*, the task of the business sector and all national economic activities was to create work for everyone and increase production, so that fair distribution of the results could create good conditions for everyone.[31] The historian Francis Sejersted described this common political programme as a plan for a corporatist system in the form of economic democracy and an extensive technocracy.[32]

One way to interpret this development is to say that the Norwegian welfare state was built on a political compromise that arose from the 1930s crisis. Following Negri however, it can be interpreted as the moment in time when economic growth to realise a promised future was

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[28] See *Framtidens Norge: Retningslinjer for gjenoppbyggingen* (Stockholm: Arbeidernes Faglige Landsorganisasjon, Norsk Sjømannsforbund, 1944), 88–89.
[29] *Arbeidernes Fellesorganisasjon* was renamed *Landsorganisasjonen i Norge* (LO) in 1957. *Norsk Arbeidsgiverforening* merged with *Næringslivets Hovedorganisasjon* (NHO) in 1989.
[30] Herman Smitt Ingebretsen et al., *Arbeid for alle: De politiske partienes felles program (blåboka)*, 1945.: 'Vi trenger nasjonal planlegging og nasjonal gjennomføring av planene.'
[31] Smitt Ingebretsen et al., 7.
[32] Francis Sejersted, 'Blåboka', in *Store norske leksikon*, 31 May 2017.

prioritised over the workers' struggle based in presently existing class contradictions. For Tafuri, this represents the point at which architecture as ideology entered into crisis, because 'once the plan came within the scope of the general reorganisation of production, architecture and urban planning would become its objects, not its subjects.'[33] In other words, architecture was to be subservient to the welfare state.

Nevertheless, architectural history places the architecture discipline as central in the post-war construction of welfare states. The architect Erik Rolfsen played a major role in the physical expansion of Oslo. As part of the radical socialist architects' group known as the Plan group (1933-6), he had in 1936 criticized the 1929 *General-reguleringsplan for Oslo* for being too conservative, as it did not challenge existing private property rights and economic conditions. As a solution, he declared a need for state interventionism (by the Labour party), and a planning organisation based on the broad support of tenants and rational housing solutions. In contrast to the later 1950 plan for satellite towns however, he suggested urban centralisation and high-rise housing to avoid increased traffic problems caused by long distances.[34] After the Plan group joined the Labour party in 1936, becoming social democrats, many of its members assumed central positions related to the physical planning of the Norwegian welfare state, thus turning from class critique to implementing post-war progress. Rolfsen became the director of City Planning in Oslo in 1947 and held this position until 1973. He was responsible for the 1950 *Generalplan for Oslo* and the construction of most of Oslo's satellite towns.

Rolfsen was also actively involved in the international discourse on urban planning. From 1942 to 1943 he had been a consultant for the Norwegian exile government in London, and from 1954 to 1958 he was president of the International Federation for Housing and Town Planning (IFHTP), where he served as a board member from 1946 to 1963.[35] In 1951, he participated in the eighth meeting of *Congrès*

[33] Tafuri, 'Toward a Critique of Architectural Ideology', 21.

[34] Erik Rolfsen, 'General-reguleringsplanen for Stor-Oslo', *Plan: tidsskrift for boligspørsmål og arkitektur*, no. 4 (1936): 47–49. Recognising the 1930s as a time of crisis for capitalism, the editorial of this issue of Plan identifies with the problem of the workers' movement, which is not to save capitalism, but to secure the positions of workers.

[35] IFHTP was established in 1913 as a federation for the international dissemination of Ebenezer Howard's Garden City idea, and exists today as IFHP. For the history of the federation, see Graham Allen, *A Hundred Years at the Global Spearhead: A Century of IFHP 1913-2013* (Copenhagen: IFHP/Architectural Publisher, 2013).

Internationaux d'Architecture Moderne (CIAM) in Hoddesdon, England, where he, as part of the Norwegian CIAM faction *Progressive Architects' Group Oslo Norway* (PAGON), presented a project for a local civic centre in the Oslo satellite town Tveita.[36] In short, Rolfsen – and consequently the 1950 plan – had a base in socialist ideas, but were positioned in Labour party politics and influenced by a mix of international planning ideas. The plan combined the utopianism of Ebenezer Howard with the technocratic ideas of CIAM and Anglo-Saxon empirical planning ethos. Crucially, this combination of ideas is the same one that Tafuri dismisses as contradictory architectural ideologies in the case of Siemenstadt; a combination of rationalist and anti-urban ideology.[37]

In the case of the *Generalplan for Oslo*, the alleged anti-urban ideology of the neighbourhood unit principle constituted the realisation of social welfare policies in space. The plan states that social services in the spatial plan are determined by welfare state arrangements, as adaptations must be made to the sizes determined by government agencies for kindergartens, day care centres and primary schools. Still, a series of spatial principles were presented as guidelines, revealing architectural ideological motives for the social composition of the areas. The plan set forth the principle that *nærhetsgrupper* (proximity groups) of 1000-2000 people around the daily shops and kindergarten should have 'a fairly uniform social standard', while age distribution and household size should be varied. The primary school district should include 4–6 proximity groups, and they should also include variations with regard to income groups for the school to function as a democratic centre. The local centre should encompass several school districts to be large enough to create vitality.[38] In accordance with Clarence Perry's 1929 article on the neighbourhood unit,[39] the expansion plan for Oslo emphasises the school as the central function and community centre in the satellite town as a spatial organisation of the social policies of the welfare state.

The rationalist ideas that influenced the plan for satellite towns concerned land policy and housing construction, and stemmed from the

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[36] See J Tyrwhitt, J. L Sert, and E. N. Rogers editors, *The Heart of the City: Towards the Humanisation of Urban Life Congrès Internationaux d'Architecture Moderne: CIAM 8.* (London: Lund Humphries, 1952); Erik Rolfsen, 'The Heart of the City, CIAM', *Byggekunst: The Norwegian Review of Architecture*, no. 11, tillegg (1952): 58.
[37] See Tafuri, *Architecture and Utopia*, 117, 124.
[38] Rolfsen, *Generalplan for Oslo*, 40.
[39] See Perry, 'The Neighborhood Unit'.

Garden City movement and IFHTP.[40] Patrick Geddes and Howard had suggested implementing mechanisms to protect urban units from profit generation and speculative development, which they saw as obstacles to a rationally founded and socially responsible urban development.[41] The organisation of land ownership and land use was consequently essential for Geddes and Howard, but it was also important in planning the Oslo expansion. In 1945, Rolfsen described land ownership as the most difficult task and asserted that planning should be based on public disposition rights to all land.[42] A precondition for the *Generalplan for Oslo* was the merging of Oslo and Aker municipalities in 1948, constituting a solution to the growth problems of Oslo by radically enlarging the city's jurisdictional territory. By the time of the merger in 1948, Oslo municipality had already acquired land in Aker.

The principle of the public disposition of land was important in international planning discourse. In 1946, Rolfsen and Jacob Christie Kielland reported from the IFHTP's 1946 congress in Hastings. The congress included 1200 delegates from about 25 countries that were facing similar reconstruction issues after the war, but Rolfsen and Kielland found Great Britain's New Towns law the most interesting, considering it a realisation of Howard's idea of the independent garden city. They found the public disposition rights to land the most important principle in the law, as it supported policies for the new towns and for urban expansions based on public ownership of urban land. Seeing the principle as a solution for Norway as well, they critically question when Norway would be able to make similar regulations or even theoretical guidelines.[43]

In the *Generalplan for Oslo* that came four years later, Rolfsen states that the major problem for the rationality of housing production is the cost of land on which to build, where laws and regulations are based on

[40] For the historical lineage of the Garden City idea, New Towns and other types of satellite towns as social projects, see Hall, *Sociable Cities*.
[41] See Howard, *Garden Cities of Tomorrow*, 2; Geddes, Patrick, *Cities in Evolution: An Introduction to the Town Planning Movement and to the Study of Civics.* (London: Williams, 1915). See especially Howard's less-known diagrams four and five, which describe the theory of land rent and administrative organisation for garden cities.
[42] Erik Rolfsen, 'Om Regionplan', *Byggekunst: The Norwegian Review of Architecture*, no. 3–4 (1945): 63.
[43] Jacob Christie Kielland and Erik Rolfsen, 'Bolig- og byplankongressen i Hastings 7–13 oktober 1946', *Byggekunst: The Norwegian Review of Architecture* tillegg, no. 9–10 (1946): 21–24.

the economy of housing production. He describes an inflation of land value caused by the taxation of 'all reasonably clear terrain' (*alt noenlunne oversiktlig terreng*), as if it was going to be divided into plots for housing, even if it was 'obvious to everyone' that large parts of the land would always remain open. Rolfsen argues that this factor has rendered the implementation of good urban plans expensive for the municipality of Oslo. In order to control the development of traffic lines and construction sites, the city must purchase properties, usually at high costs, because the plan does not make a distinction between different uses:

> Our urban planning legislation, which is from the 1920s, does not envisage anything called outline plans, zoning plans or general plans, not to mention urban geography surveys, sociological studies and regional plans. It only addresses the detailed urban regulation.[44]

In other words, institutional laws and regulations were major obstacles to supporting the goals and ambitions in the General plan and aligning them with the goals of the Norwegian social democratic state. Thus, while the question of public ownership of land was in principle resolved in Oslo, there remained practical problems related to land acquisition and possible speculations on land value in that process. In other words, there was still a contradiction between planning ideas proposing spatial organisation and legislation for administrative organisation.

What Tafuri describes as the contradiction between rationalist and anti-urban ideologies of architecture appears in the *Generalplan for Oslo* as a discussion of the importance of modern infrastructure and its visual appearance. The plan stated that buildings and facilities should be 'a visible expression of our society's level, socially and culturally' in the same way that medieval and renaissance cities were artistic and technical manifestations of the civilizations of their time. The problem was however that 'modern technology has created many wonders, but it has mostly just destroyed our cities.'[45] Rolfsen's rhetoric is similar to that of

[44] Rolfsen, *Generalplan for Oslo*, 73.: 'Vår byplanlovgivning som er fra 1920-årene regner ikke med noe som heter oversiktsplaner, soneplaner eller generalplaner, for å ikke snakke om bygeografiske og sosiologiske undersøkelser og regionale planer. Det handler bare om den detaljerte byregulering.'

[45] Rolfsen, 62.: 'Den moderne teknikk har jo skapt mange undere, men byene våre har den stort sett bare ødelagt'.

the short documentary film *The City*; narrated by Lewis Mumford, it contrasts the negative urban consequences of industrialism with the new planned settlements – in the form of neighbourhood units – of Greenbelt and Radburn.[46] Also arguing for neighbourhood units, Rolfsen states that the most important thing is to create housing environments in which people thrive, consisting primarily of nature, landscape and social and cultural communal facilities.[47]

A notable feature of *Generalplanen* is the focus on sports: six pages of the plan are dedicated to images of people engaging in sports activities in natural environments. Nevertheless, it is emphasised that the rational construction must have the highest priority in the spatial distribution in the Norwegian setting with varying ground conditions, coming before the preservation of natural qualities and areas for outdoor life and sports activities. The plan states that a large part of the cost of housing goes to the technical infrastructure, especially the preparation of roads with waterpipes and sewers. This prioritisation is readily apparent in the financial plan for the whole expansion programme.[48] *Generalplanen* also states that the economisation of housing production must be given precedence by building rationally on the best and least expensive sites, as 'outdoor life can be enjoyed on mountain outcrops and hilly terrain.'[49] The essential incarnations of modernity – installations, traffic lines, roads, wires and construction techniques – are only supporting infrastructure that should not dominate the new residential areas. This is indeed a contradiction; rationalisation of infrastructure should be prioritized in the plan, but it should not dominate.

Generalplanen for Oslo used fictional dialogues to illustrate contradictions between different needs in order to facilitate the reader's understanding of the rational priorities made in the plan.[50] Already in the 1948 article *Det nye Oslo* (The new Oslo), Rolfsen had warned that the main challenge of planning was the coordination of many different entities, describing the basic technical and hygienic installations and

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[46] Ralph Steiner and Williard van Dyke, *The City* (Civic Films, Inc., US National Archives, 1939).
[47] Rolfsen, *Generalplan for Oslo*, 62.
[48] Oslo Finansrådmannen, *Dokument nr. 46: (1951-1952): melding til Oslo bystyre om det utbyggingsprogram som er vedtatt av bystyret 16. februar 1951, m. v.* (Oslo: Finansrådmannen, 1952).
[49] Rolfsen, *Generalplan for Oslo*, 61.: 'Friluftslivet kan dyrkes på fjellrabber og kupert terreng.'
[50] See Rolfsen, 60–62.

facilities of housing that a municipality must deliver to the residents. Metros, roads and bus routes, electric lighting and power, water, drainage and maintenance are described as services that must be ready when the homes are built. In addition, there are social institutions such as schools, sports facilities, kindergartens, baths, hospitals, libraries, cinemas and community centres. Rolfsen warns that there are separate municipal committees and offices dedicated to these functions, and to include them in satellite town plans thus requires significant coordination. Furthermore, according to Rolfsen, the commercial purposes – shops, post offices, pharmacies, cafés, health practitioners' offices, local workshops, car services and garages – constitute an even greater challenge, since they are seldom represented by centralised offices with which planners can cooperate, and the planner has to resort to merely reserving land in the plans and then leave it up to the private initiative to provide 'the right functions'.[51] Rolfsen's note of collaboration thus only covers a part of what is actually necessary:

> This requires very extensive collaboration between the building entrepreneurs, a number of municipal offices, and importantly, internal cooperation between the municipal offices themselves.[52]

Instead, it is clear that the planning of the satellite town involved extensive coordination of the welfare state's different aspects, institutions and disciplines. Indeed, it had to resolve the relationships of the welfare state compromise in the space of the satellite town. But while housing, technical infrastructure and many of the social institutions were to be state-provided, other social functions were left to civic society, and the commercial purposes were left to the market.

Heading towards a crisis

When Greve cautions that Oslo is heading towards a crisis in 1969, his criticism reframes the challenges that Rolfsen warned about in 1948 and 1950. Greve emphasises the need for flexible planning because the

[51] Erik Rolfsen, 'Det nye Oslo', *Byggekunst: The Norwegian Review of Architecture*, no. 6 (1948): 80.
[52] Rolfsen, 80. 'Dette krever et meget omfattende samarbeid mellom de byggende og en rekke kommunale kontorer og ikke minst et innbyrdes samarbeid mellom de kommunale kontorer selv.'

housing problem is not static: 'demographic trends and rising material standards […] are continually altering the volume and nature of demand of housing'.[53] In criticising planning as a faulty knowledge system lacking sociological information, he repeats some of the early sociological criticism of *Generalplanen*.[54] Overall, Greve claims that planning as a field lacks holistic and dynamic models, stating that 'like economy before Keynes, planning is still in its "classical era"', concentrating on separate details or isolated factors.[55] Indeed, Greve states that contemporary planning is founded on guesswork. Or, as Tafuri would phrase it, planning is founded on architectural ideology which comes up short in comparison to the comprehensive and scientific scope of Keynesianism.

Greve criticizes Oslo's static rational land policy for creating an acute lack of sites for housing. Indeed, in 1962, *Boligrådet* (Oslo's housing council) had stated that compared to the other Nordic capitals, the municipality of Oslo had showed little actual foresight in acquiring suitable building sites, because for legal reasons, '[Oslo] ha[d] not been able to pursue a rational land policy in Aker.'[56] As access to labour and materials improved, the lack of ready-to-build land and capital became the two biggest obstacles to increased housing construction in Oslo, which had great political significance since the plot of land was the primary element over which the municipality had influence. According to Greve, a consequence of this failed land policy was that the population increase in Oslo put an unprecedented strain on housing and transport, but also strongly affected the other areas of welfare with their spatial needs, forcing land prices up.[57]

According to Greve, there was once a choice between building on expensive central sites – as suggested by Rolfsen in 1936 – or on land at increasing distances from workplaces, poorly served by public transport.[58] He asserts that the choice of the latter alternative – the

[53] Greve, 'Housing, Planning and Change in Norway', 27.
[54] See the sociologist Geiger's criticism of the use of the neighbourhood unit concept and Rolfsen's response and defence of the same: 'Geiger Mot Mumford', *Byggekunst: The Norwegian Review of Architecture*, no. 12, tillegget (1948): 48; Rolfsen, 'Sosiologi og byplan'.
[55] Greve, 'Housing, Planning and Change in Norway', 32.
[56] Oslo Boligrådet, *Oslo kommune og boligbyggingen: en beretning om Oslo kommunale boligråds virksomhet 1930-1959* (Oslo: Oslo kommune, Boligrådet, 1962), 69, 70.: '[Oslo] har ikke kunnet føre en rasjonell boligpolitikk i Aker'.
[57] Greve, 'Housing, Planning and Change in Norway', 26.
[58] Greve, 27–28.

spatial pattern of satellite towns – was based on a narrow focus on the financial aspect, rather than on the total economic consequences in terms of social value in a welfare perspective. This narrow focus on money and financial issues, he argues, was a result of the Chief Financial Officer (Finansrådmannen) having the most central role in the planning organisation.[59] In effect, Greve claims here that there is a misalignment between the physical planning document *Generalplan for Oslo*, which describes the many aspects of social welfare, and the accompanying budget for the urban expansion, *Dokument nr. 46* from the Chief Financial Officer, which only describes the financial costs of housing and its technical infrastructure.[60] Greve challenges the economic arguments that form the foundation for the spatial pattern of the Oslo expansion, as the reduced price of land (and thus reduced housing costs) does not compensate for the cost of travel, which leads to social and economic disadvantages for satellite town dwellers. The problems that accompany this spatial distribution, he claims, are an unsatisfactory social milieu, a non-viable economic base, a restricted scope of education and a lack of social services. Commutes increase as more people live further away from their workplaces, exacerbated by functional zoning and interspersion of greenbelts.[61]

A consequence of the scarcity of sites for housing, Greve warns, is competition between land uses, forcing impossible priorities. He polemically asks if housing should be prioritised over other necessary functions. Should housing take land from infrastructure which is already inadequate for its purpose, as the infrastructural analysis of 1965 demonstrated?[62] Should housing appropriate land from public buildings, even if the need for public buildings has become greater with the 'increasing complexity required to control and regulate a society which in turn is growing bigger and more heterogeneous', with decentralisation of administration (to the new satellite towns), and the creation of new social services? Or should housing take sites reserved for education despite growing educational demands and new laws for an expanded, standardised education system that mean that the sites are already inadequate? Perhaps housing should take space from recreational or

[59] Greve, 33.
[60] Oslo Finansrådmannen, *Dokument nr. 46*.
[61] Greve, 'Housing, Planning and Change in Norway', 30.
[62] Greve refers to the 1965 Transport analysis: Oslo Byplankontoret, *Transportanalysen for Oslo-området* (Oslo byplankontor Universitetsforlaget, 1965).

sports facilities, or industry and commerce?[63] The challenge of coordination between uses noted by Rolfsen in 1948 has now turned into a veritable conflict and competition between those uses – or indeed, a crisis.

Ammerud as a case study

The introduction to *Ammerudrapporten* states that its analysis is not directed at any specific satellite town, but at contemporary urban planning in Norway. Ammerud was chosen as the case study site for a discussion of Oslo's urban expansion based on the 1950 *Generalplan for Oslo*. Sæterdal and Hansen describe this expansion as a new type of urban development pattern – not based on concentric development of the old city like the previous General Plan from 1929, but on establishing a network of self-serviced urban districts.[64] As mentioned earlier, Norwegian newspapers called these districts *drabantbyer* (satellite towns) in the 1950s.[65] Similar to the Oslo chapter of Greve's report, *Ammerudrapporten* was exceptionally critical of the satellite town development pattern, but unlike Greve, Sæterdal and Hansen reveal a political agenda. Socialist radicalism and counter-discourse are essential to *Ammerudrapporten*, and this is discernible from both form and language. The text in the report alternates between descriptions and long passages directly cited from planning documents, city council meeting minutes, and interviews with central actors, and in bold type, comments

[63] Greve, 'Housing, Planning and Change in Norway', 28.

[64] Sæterdal and Hansen refer to Harald Hals, *Fra Christiania til Stor-Oslo: et forslag til generalplan for Oslo* (Oslo: Aschehoug, 1929).

[65] See for example: 'De nye bystrøk (editorial)', *Aftenposten*, 5 May 1956; P. E., 'Lambertseter – en norsk by bygd på sju år', *Arbeiderbladet*, 11 August 1958; Jacob Christie Kielland, 'Den sosialistiske by. Et nytt russisk eksperiment', *Dagbladet*, 20 June 1931; Edward Heiberg, 'Nye byer i Sovjetunionen', *Dagbladet*, 30 April 1932. While the conservative newspaper *Aftenposten* focussed on *drabantbyproblemer* (satellite town problems) such as a lack of shops and infrastructure that rendered the satellite towns dormitory towns or *kvinnebyer* (women's towns), the Labour press newspaper *Arbeiderbladet* emphasised the achievements reached in the construction of housing under the Labour government. The term *drabantby* had been introduced in Norwegian newspaper articles in the 1930s however, in reports about the planning of Soviet cities where the planner Ernst May argued that the satellite town was unfit for the socialist system, since it was a concept that corresponded to the capitalist system by combining capitalism's tendency of centralisation with 'anti-urban' housing areas determined by the bourgeois notion of the family.



Innledning

Mange bor dårlig i Oslo i dag.
Hvorfor?
Må det være slik?
Det bygges ca. 4000 nye boliger i Oslo hvert år. De fleste bygges i de ytre, østlige deler av byen på åpne jorder og på steder med dårlig tilknytting til de mest attraktive deler av byen.
Hvorfor bygger vi slik?
Ønsker vi det på denne måten eller er det en nødvendighet av andre grunner?
De nye leilighetene er stort sett helt like og kan vanskelig tilpasses den enkelte behovets krav.
Hvorfor må det være slik?
Har vi så like og uforanderlige krav?
Hvilke krav og ønsker har vi felles og hvilke varierer fra individ til individ?
Hvilke krav er stabile over tid og hvilke er det ikke?
Er det som bygges i dag uttrykk for det vi har felles?
Er det tenkt å skulle brukes i fremtiden?
Nye bydeler er i 20 år bygget ut og organisert etter samme mønster.
Vet vi om dette er et godt mønster?
Hvorfor er det så vanskelig å komme fra sted til sted innenfor byen?
Hvorfor er det umulig for barn å finne trygge steder å leke?
Hvorfor har ikke ungdom noe sted hvor de kan få være i fred?
Hvorfor må gamle mennesker klare seg i tungtlevnne leiligheter uten hjelp, og hvorfor må de flytte langt ut av bydelene for å få noe bedre?
Hvorfor må de ende sine dager ensomhetsgjorte på institusjon?
Hvorfor må vi flytte hver gang vår livssituasjon endrer seg?
På tross av at Oslo bygger ca. 4000 boliger hvert år blir det allikevel stadig vanskeligere å finne seg en tilfredsstillende bolig. Den store etterspørselen, omfanget og intensiteten i boligdebatten i offentlige organer, prioritering av valgsaker, uprofte rapporter fra psykologer, psykiatere og sosialarbeidere, er alle viktige indiser på at mange er utilfredse. I den offentlige debatt blir nesten utelukkende a n t a l l nye boligenheter, deres s t a n d a r d og p r i s trukket frem. Dette blir så drøftet som om vi alle hadde like problemer og like krav, og gir derfor bare i liten grad innsikt i problemets omfang og alvor. Vi vet svært lite om hvem som har de alvorligste problemer med boligforholdene, hvordan deres situasjon er og mer eksakt hva som er i veien. Hvem bor dårlig og hvordan bor de?

I Oslo er det ingen systematiske registreringer av de boligsøkende, hva deres situasjon er, og hva de krever av en bolig for å kunne akseptere den. De vente- og søknadslister vi har, inneholder få opplysninger om nåværende boligforhold og nesten ingenting om preferanser og krav til en akseptabel bolig. Det er ellers registrert endel data om forhold som antas å ha betydning for vurdering av boligsituasjonen, om omfanget av boliger uten innlagt vann og w. c., om fyringssystem, alder på boligen, o. l. Disse data er av betydning, men det er sikkert svært mange andre data som er like viktige, for eksempel mangel på service, utrygge lekemuligheter for barn, dårlig kommunikasjonsforhold, lite stimulerende omgivelser, vanskelige nabeforhold, etc.

7

2. Introduction of *Ammerud 1: planlegging av en ny bydel* (*Ammerudrapporten*).

from the authors, presented as a long series of critical – and rhetorical – questions. According to the authors, their strategy is to neutrally present the facts – the failures and the responsible parties – and then to pose a number of questions to draw attention to the specific problems, but without directly suggesting answers. The reporting is accompanied by caption-less images. Behind this alleged neutrality, however, is a persuasive rhetoric style and a dramaturgic visual technique, where stark images of monotonous housing blocks and environments devoid of life link the criticism of planning to the concrete location of Ammerud.

The satellite town of Ammerud, located about ten kilometres from central Oslo and completed in 1965-66, was chosen for the case study based on a set of criteria: The study case needed to have been financed by *Husbanken* (The National Housing Bank) and built by a housing cooperative, as this entails formal possibilities for the inhabitant's influence on planning. This criterion reveals that one main purpose of the study was to discuss participation and democracy in planning.[66]

[66] The theme of democracy in planning was discussed in a TV-broadcast prior to *Ammerudrapporten*. Anne Sæterdal was a central participant. See 'Bør vi stille større krav?' (NRK, 15 January 1969).

Other criteria were that the case needed to be large enough to contain service institutions (schools, shops); in other words, it needed to be a satellite town. In addition, it needed to be easily accessible for research purposes, and its construction should be recent enough that the planning process could be easily mapped and its actors interviewed while their experience was fresh.[67]

The previous year, Sæterdal and Hansen had presented the major points of the report in the architectural journal *Byggekunst* and in the anthology *Makt og miljø* (Power and environment).[68] The first report, *Ammerud I,* concerned the planning and construction process. It was followed by a second report on the experiences of the inhabitants, published in 1971 and entitled *Å bo i drabantby: Ammerud II: intervjuundersøkelse 1968-69* (Living in a satellite town: Ammerud II: interview study 1968-69).[69] The third report for which Ammerud was used as a case was *Å bo på ett rom i blokk: intervjuundersøkelse blant beboerne av ett-roms leilighetene på Ammerud* (Living in a single room in a block: interview study of inhabitants of single-room flats in Ammerud).[70] The research on the case of Ammerud thus did not exist as a single document, but comprised several reports and articles, sometimes referred to as *Ammerudundersøkelsene* (the Ammerud studies). Nevertheless, the label *Ammerudrapporten* as used in the mass media typically refers only to the first report by Sæterdal and Hansen in 1969.

While Ammerud met the case study criteria, its planning process, layout and architecture were not exactly representative of post-war satellite towns in Oslo. The planning process was an improvement from earlier, hurried processes of satellite town planning and construction, as the plans for Ammerud had been made available for political decision before they were implemented. While several earlier satellite towns had combined functionalist ideals with influences from Swedish empiricism

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[67] Sæterdal and Hansen, *Ammerud 1*, 12.

[68] Anne Sæterdal and Thorbjørn Hansen, 'Hvorfor blir de nye bydelene slik de blir?', *Byggekunst: The Norwegian Review of Architecture*, no. 6 (1968): 142–48; Anne Sæterdal and Thorbjørn Hansen, 'Hvorfor blir de nye bydelene slik de blir?', in *Makt og miljø: En antologi om planlegging*, ed. Maths Prag and Johan Refsum (Oslo: Pax Forlag AS, 1969), 11–58.

[69] The authors of the first report were also involved in the second report: Hansen was a co-author, and Sæterdal was involved in the planning of the report. The introduction strongly emphasised the importance of the professional environment of NBI. See Bull, *Å bo i drabantby*.

[70] Gulbrandsen, *Å bo på ett rom i blokk*.

and British city planning principles, the plans and architectural typologies for Ammerud were instead influenced by international high modernism. The architects behind the regulatory plan were Håkon Mjelva and Per Norseng. Mjelva was a central member of the Norwegian CIAM group *Progressive Arkitekters Gruppe Oslo Norge* (PAGON), which had on numerous occasions criticised the non-spectacular and monotonous architecture of earlier satellite towns.

Ammerud consisted instead of sculptural and contrasting housing typologies, with the four high-rises in the centre of the satellite town as its most prominent feature. Mjelva's original designs for these high-rises bore similarities to Le Corbusier's design for the *Unité d'Habitation* in Marseille.[71] These ideas were modified when the blocks were planned and built for the non-profit cooperative housing corporation OBOS by USBL – another cooperative housing corporation – with concrete elements manufactured by their respective entrepreneurs *Fagbygg AS* and *Ungdomsbygg AS* on licence from the Danish company Larsen & Nielsen. The four blocks instead became the apogee of rational housing production and construction systems using prefabricated elements in Norway.[72] The high-rises are supplemented with lower blocks and single-family housing. Of these, Mjelva and Norseng designed two sculptural low-rises that were carefully adapted to the hilly landscape, and an expansive field of one-storey atrium houses.[73] As a typology, these atrium houses had never been used before in the Oslo satellite towns. Their design was influenced by the atrium houses built in Denmark and Sweden by the Danish architect Jørn Utzon, who was also a member of PAGON.[74]

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[71] See Håkon Mjelva, *Ammerud. Perspektiv av skivehus*, 2 November 1962, Pencil on transparent paper, 43,2 x 65,0 cm, 2 November 1962, NMK.2005.hmj041.001, Nasjonalmuseet, Arkitektursamlingene.

[72] Terje Kili and Jon Skeie, *Pionér i 50 år: USBL fra selvbygging til økologi: 1948-1998* (Oslo: Boligbyggelaget USBL, 1998).

[73] For the architects' own description of Ammerud's architecture, see Håkon Mjelva and Per Norseng, 'Atriumhus på Ammerud', *Byggekunst: The Norwegian Review of Architecture* 49, no. 6 (1967): 149–51; Håkon Mjelva, 'Ammerudenga – Ammerudfaret', *Byggekunst: The Norwegian Review of Architecture*, no. 6 (1970): 225–29.

[74] Anne Grete Kvalvik, 'Atriumhuset: funsjonalismen sitt svar på problemet einebustad i byen', *Byminner*, no. 3 (2013): 40.

AMMERUDENGA – AMMERUDFARET

Arkitekt mnal **Håkon Mjelva**

240 tre-roms leiligheter i tre lavblokker for OBOS-brukere i furuskogen på Ammerud.

Foto: Teigen

Det verserer for tiden meget radikale eller i hvert fall oppsiktsvekkende teorier om hvordan man egentlig skal løse den såkalte sosiale boligbygging. Et par «arkitekter» som kaller seg **forskere** har oppdaget at alle som hittil har gjort mer eller mindre ærlige forsøk på å tyne noen få dråper ut av en mager materie nærmest har drevet rundt i tåken. Man har glemt å spørre **Brukeren** med stor B. Denne ukjente, mystiske figur som dukket opp som troll av eske for et år siden, skal etter disse «forskere» sitte inne med selve nøkkelen til løsningen. Sensasjonen er grepet begjærlig av stoffhungrende massemedia. Det er så i løpet av et år snakket og vist flere bilder for alt folket av snakkende arkitekter enn i de siste hundreogfemti år av byggekunstens historie. Fratrukket alt løst snakk går det hele ut på at «det må da finnes en måte å spørre brukeren på». Det merkelige og virkelig sensasjonelle er imidlertid at disse utvalgte ennå ikke har ropet **hvordan** dette skal skje. Et helt år har man holdt alt folket i ånde med disse enkle, fengende og lettfattelige, men i virkeligheten uklare påstander som allerede meget effektivt har redusert den fra før vaklende tiltro til arkitekten. En tiltro som alvorlig arbeidende kolleger har forsøkt å bygge opp de siste seksti år.

Personlig har jeg gjort et forsiktig forsøk på å sette «forskerne» på bedre tanker gjennom dagspressen, øyensynlig uten større hell. Siden Byggekunst nå er inne i en høyverbalistisk periode nytter jeg høvet til nok et par bemerkninger.

Det har blant mye annet slått meg at de nevnte forskere ynder å sympatisere med ultrasosialistiske idéer. Dette må de så gjerne, men hvordan kan de samtidig med så uhemmet iver og begeistring hylde for**bruker**samfunnet? Vet de ikke at hvis brukeren uten styring slippes løs på ressursene, vil det før eller senere føre til den store vareflom av mer eller mindre nødvendige varer? Når alle brukere av boliger om en tid var tilfredsstilt, ville f.eks. det vesle vi har av dyrka mark være oversvømmet og forurenset av de villeste varianter av mer eller mindre fabrikerte eneboligtyper. Reiser man litt lenger enn til Ammerud og leser litt statistikk, vil det gå opp for mange at vi er på god vei.

At det fører til store og kostbare veianlegg med mange eksos-spyende biler får vi ta med i regnskapet. Velger vi det ene følger andre ting og krav etter med lovmessig sikkerhet. Det er fare for at også disse forskere har låst seg fast til sine mikroskop, mens verden utenfor raser forbi.

Før detaljutformingen av lavblokkene fant jeg ved hjelp av dyp analyse og

3. Håkon Mjelva's presentation of the curved low-rises of Ammerud – and critique of the authors of *Ammerudrapporten* – in *Byggekunst: The Norwegian Review of Architecture*, no. 6 (1970). Photography by Teigens Fotoatelier.

meditasjon ut at jeg selv allerede hadde erfart mange forskjellige brukersituasjoner, eller mer oppfinnsomt uttrykt, at jeg til syvende og sist var en brukbar bruker. Og når sannheten skal frem: hvorfor kan ikke **jeg** få være bruker når alle andre er brukere? Dessuten har jeg lett tilgang til en masse viten om emnet, som er akkumulert gjennom de siste seks tusen år, foruten det materiale som OBOS, brukernes representant, sitter inne med etter å ha produsert ca. 90 000 enheter.

Det er på mange måter gledelig at vårt overflodssamfunn til en viss grad også har nådd den generelle boligsektor. Det er like riktig og viktig å bo bra som å ha en god jobb, men så får vi betale prisen i penger og lokalisering. Hvorfor stønnes det over «dyre» leiligheter når det villig punges ut til bil, hytte og båt?

Ingen er uenig i det som helt riktig er kritisert: at det skulle ha vært bygget mer komplette boligområder. **Planleggeren** har bare hatt for liten innflytelse og makt til å få slike idéer gjennom. Rapportørenes forbløffende konklusjon er her at planleggeren skal klandres for myndighetenes synder.

Hva går så den oppgave ut på som heter å detaljplanlegge et billig konfeksjonsprodukt. For flest mulig mennesker innenfor en gitt arealramme og pris? Den er i virkeligheten skremmende, men samtidig en utfordring som ved sin høye vanskelighetsgrad er fristende. Det ville være merkelig om man skulle unndra seg en slik oppgave. Jeg kunne godt ha tenkt meg at detaljoppgaven på Ammerud var friere, at det var langt større ressurser til rådighet, og at det kunne skapes et virkelig positivt og godt miljø ned til alle små viktige detaljer, slik det opplagt må være for en del prosjekter det ble jubel om for noen tid siden. Hvorfor er det forresten blitt noe stillere omkring disse, og hvordan kommer «brukeren» inn for alvor? Jeg snakker nå om den nakne virkelighet for ferdige billigvarer, ikke om luksusprosjekter.

I slike ulvetider er det nødvendig å beskrive hva som skjer også ved selve produksjonsprosessen. Selv om rasjonell boligproduksjon er relativt lite utviklet i Norge, må det sies at høyblokkene på Ammerud foreløpig representerer en topp hva gjelder gjennomført bruk av elementmontasje. Husene ble reist ved stabling av bærende skiveelementer, lettveggselementer, dekke-elementer, balkongelementer osv. Disse elementene ble for en overveiende del produsert på fabrikk i en nabokommune, fraktet med svære biler og heist direkte på plass i stort tempo. Den samlede produksjonstid som til syvende og sist bestemmer prisnivået, viste lavt timetall. Til sammenligning ble produksjonen for lavblokkene av det samme firma lagt noe forskjellig opp. Her ble de bærende skiver, trapperom og dekker plass-støpt med store stålformer og med støpetiden presset ned til minimumsgrensen. Mens vegger, trappetrinn, balkongskiller, golv og brystninger, vindusbånd, dører og kjøkken ble montert av tilkjørte elementer. De få innervegger som var tilbake ble lagt på tradisjonell måte av trerammverk og sponplater. Dette var sluttresultatet etter at planen på 85 m² var knadd og høvlet diverse ganger for å eliminere dødplass, for å gi hovedrommene en størrelse og form som tillater fleksidig bruk avhengig av brukerens behov og oppfinnsomhet; videre for at produksjon av råbygg, innredning og tekniske installasjoner skulle forenkles maksimalt, idet man etter hvert har lært av dyrekjøpte tabber at den virkelig store prisbesparelsen grunnlegges under planleggingens første fase, når de konkrete objekter gjennom analyseres og for selve uttegningen og produksjonen setter i gang — alt dette naturligvis for å drive innskudd og leier ned til et akseptabelt nivå. Taklistene og et klesskap måtte ofres.

Grunnen til at høyhusene er tatt med i denne forbindelse er det interessante faktum at produksjonstiden for disse og lavblokkene kom ut med omtrent samme tall. Dette viser at det for enkelte tunge komponenters vedkommende fremdeles lønner seg å frakte sement og sand til byggeplassen fremfor store ferdige elementer.

Hele strevet med å presse prisene til bunns har i hvert fall ført til at et betydelig antall biler blant beboerne — som for de påtenkte parkeringshuse er oppført — står lagret i hovedveiene og det som verre er — under soverommene på inngangssiden, et område som fra planleggers side var reservert nærlekeplasser. Her har brukerne, og sannsynligvis et sterkt mindretall av dem, forbedret situasjonen på egen hånd.

Samarbeidet med sjefing. Elster i OBOS, ing. Bøe og formann Karlson i P.P.kontoret (et produksjonsplanleggingsorgan for Fagbygg og Ungdomsbygg), foruten de tekniske konsulentene R. Brusletto og Stener Wold, og de respektive underentreprenører gikk så greit og knirkefritt at de tradisjonelle byggemøter, hvor det altfor ofte hender at store deler av det opprinnelige opplegg blir forandret, snart var overflødige og kunne sløyfes. På kontoret ble produksjonen påpasselig utført ved arkitektene A. Jorstad, B. Rode og L. Braathen.

H. Mjelva

4. The area plan for Ammerud as presented by Håkon Mjelva in *Byggekunst: The Norwegian Review of Architecture*, no. 6 (1970).

ATRIUMHUS PÅ AMMERUD

Arkitekter MNAL Håkon Mjelva og Per Norseng

Atrium-houses at Ammerud, Oslo

236 enheter i klyngeformasjon. Boligeksperiment med OBOS som byggherre. Del av boligby med 1500 leiligheter planlagt av Mjelva og Norseng i 1963 med hovedkjøpesenter ved Grorud stasjon på tunnelbanen.

Kjørende trafikk fra utvendig mategate til sekkegater. Gående har egne stier i grønnområdene. Stasjon, skole, barnehager, nærhetsbutikker og lekeplasser ligger til hovedsti. Toplankryssing med kjørevei.

Varierte husklynger følger det lett kuperte terreng. Hensikt: Unngå ensformighet. Enhver identifiserer seg med sin gruppe, sitt hus.

Enkel hustype med fire varianter. Ingen kjeller, kjøl- og svalskap i stedet. Tett gateside med hovedinngangsdør og bilport. Vindusåpninger mot skjermet atrium 9 x 9 m. Alle rom unntatt våtkjernen vendt mot dette.

Materialer: Støpte fundamenter, armerte lettbetong-elementer. Vindusvegger av tre. Utvendig Eternitplater i brystning. Innvendig finerte sponplater på vegger. Treverk i tak og golv. Asfaltpapp på tak. Linoleum på golv.

Farger: Lysgrå lettbetong. Treverk svart, brunt, rødt og trehvitt. Gule tegl gesimspanner, hvit brysting, rød ventilasjonshette, blå skorstein, grønne plener og busker. Elektrisk oppvarming.

Foto: Teigen.

H. Mjelva.

5. Håkon Mjelva and Per Norseng's telegram-style presentation of the atrium houses at Ammerud in *Byggekunst: The Norwegian Review of Architecture* 49, no. 6 (1967). Photography by Teigens Fotoatelier.

Ammerudrapporten: a planning critique

Whereas Greve warned about a problem, Sæterdal and Hansen attempted to pinpoint historical causes, outline present conflicts in detail, and suggest solutions. Building on Greve's critique of planning, Sæterdal and Hansen criticise the planning for Ammerud specifically and the satellite town project in its entirety for lacking a base of necessary systematic investigations.[75] They note that the satellite town model of the *Generalplan for Oslo* was built on insufficient knowledge: in the face of an urgent housing crisis, planners were confronted with the task of maintaining rapid construction and providing well-founded plans without extensive experience or data to facilitate consequence analysis.[76] However, although Ammerud was planned and built a long time after the *Generalplan for Oslo*, the Ammerud plan was laid out according to the same basic development pattern as previous plans for satellite towns, and the planners failed to utilise the satellite towns that had been planned and built since then as empirical sources to improve the plans for Ammerud. According to Sæterdal and Hansen, this lack of systematic accumulation of experience and learning was a general tendency in the satellite town expansion of Oslo, due to fragmented responsibility in planning.[77]

The report asserts that urban development of the many Oslo satellite towns was planned separately, as isolated, non-controlled experiments, without generating new knowledge to improve the developments over time.[78] Furthermore, the authors state, there have been no attempts to carry out a comprehensive assessment of costs, advantages and disadvantages, no alternatives or objections, no justifications for alternatives chosen, no knowledge of preconditions, no knowledge of or elucidation of consequences, and no programme for subsequent studies or testing of results. The conclusion is that the satellite town development is 'a giant experiment from which no one has attempted to systematically draw lessons'.[79]

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[75] Sæterdal and Hansen, *Ammerud 1*, 7.
[76] Sæterdal and Hansen, 20.
[77] Sæterdal and Hansen, 40.
[78] Sæterdal and Hansen, 119.
[79] Sæterdal and Hansen, 120.: 'et gigantisk eksperiment som ingen har forsøkt å følge systematisk opp og trekke lærdom og erfaringer av.'

Er det ikke nettopp det byplankontoret gjør når de planlegger rene boligstrøk på generalplannivå?

Groruddalens vedkommende, at dalbunnen var lite egnet for boliger på grunn av klimaet. I tillegg til dette var det tenkt å innpasse lett-industri i tilknytning til boligområdene med tanke på deltidsjobber for kvinner. Byplanleggerne ønsket å skaffe kort avstand mellom boliger og arbeidsplasser, men byplansjefen pekte i et intervju på at etter hans vurdering hadde myndighetene selvfølgelig ingen mulighet til å kunne dirigere utviklingen.

Forfatternes kommentarer

På tross av uttalt vilje til desentralisering, fortsatte man å samle alle næringsvirksomheter som ikke direkte skulle dekke et lokalt behov, i de sentrale områder. Dermed beholdt man i hovedtrekkene systemet med «rene» boligstrøk i ring rundt arbeidsplassene i sentrum. Trafikknettet avspeiler og forsterker denne sentraliseringen. Alle baner knytter boligstrøkene i de ytre sonene direkte til sentrum og det er ingen tverrforbindelser. Boligstrøkene blir delt i adskilte sektorer ut fra sentrum. En slik plan vil medføre at boligstrøkene blir fattige på kontakt med byens øvrige virksomhet. Boligstrøkene blir «hvileinstitusjoner», steder vi trekker oss tilbake til.

Vil ikke dette gi et lite stimulerende miljø for dem som er henvist til å leve der? Størst konsekvenser får det for dem som må være der det meste av sin tid, husmødre, barn, eldre osv.

Generalplanen har delt hele byens virksomhet i noen få, grove kategorier, som boliger, industri og forretningsstrøk. I en by foregår det et mylder av virksomheter som vanskelig lar seg plassere enten i boligstrøk eller i industristrøk. Industribedriftene har dessuten i meget varierende grad uheldige /heldige konsekvenser for et boligstrøk. Kontorlokaler, varelager osv. kan bidra positivt eller negativt til boligstrøk, alt etter art og omfang. Det må stilles krav fra myndighetenes side. Dersom virksomheten vil løse proble-



6. The satellite town environment. From *Ammerud 1: planlegging av en ny bydel.*

One example is the incongruity between physical organization and the school system and school politics. The report describes that new laws requiring universal 9-year schooling increased the total number of pupils in the school, whilst at the same time the number of flats at Ammerud was increased to accommodate 50 percent more inhabitants, without this being reflected in the plans for the school district. In addition, the estimated number of pupils was calculated in terms of the Oslo average social composition – i.e. as 10 percent of the population – and not in terms of the real need for schools in a new urban district characterised by a young population and many children, which would give an average of 17 percent of the population.[80] Sæterdal and Hansen conclude that the size of the school site in the plan was determined by assumptions already known to be false.[81] One possible cause were the coordination challenges about which Rolfsen had already warned in 1948: knowledge gained in one part of the planning system was not being communicated to other parts. From Greve's perspective, this not only showed a communication problem, but multiple problems of prioritisation caused by a lack of buildable land. In Sæterdal and Hansen's interpretation, these problems of prioritisation are political problems.

The crucial assertion of *Ammerudrapporten* is that planning determines the allocation of resources. According to the report, urban development constitutes sets of diverse, competing economic investments, so that one specific investment has implications for other areas of welfare.[82] In other words, planning is seen as the *distribution of welfare* that must deal with conflicts of interests, rather than an objective science or technocratic principles or ideologies. In a series of TV-broadcasts entitled '*Drabantby eller soveby*' (Satellite town or dormitory town) that aired in 1970, Anne Sæterdal presents a definition of planning that explains the Ammerud report's criticism of the expert architect, which she had presented a year earlier in another TV-broadcast entitled '*Bør vi stille større krav*' (Should we demand more):

> With *planning* I mean the making of decisions – about how society's values should be distributed. And these decisions are important, they have consequences for the living conditions of many people – and I

[80] Sæterdal and Hansen, 104–5.
[81] Sæterdal and Hansen, 47.
[82] Sæterdal and Hansen, 11.

> therefore also think it is important that people can take part in and influence these decisions.[83]

The distribution of flats is understood as the distribution of (welfare) goods. In the case of the regulations of the OBOS area of Ammerud, the report warns that assets are not distributed equally: as the different housing types are treated in isolation from each other there is no planning mechanism to ensure equality.[84] According to the report, housing types effectively cause social stigmatization. There is a lack of customization options for each housing type, and each housing type is standardised, meaning that housing type simply corresponds to the social profile of the resident (i.e. class).[85] According to Sæterdal and Hansen, this is a problem of equal distribution and inclusion, where the weakest groups, who are assigned dwellings by the municipality, are not heard.[86] In other words, planning of housing typologies is essentially political, as it determines how society's resources will be distributed among households, consumer categories and institutions.[87] The essential question of planning is thus 'whose claims will be taken into consideration?'[88] A central critique of *Ammerudrapporten* is that in the planning of the satellite towns, indeed in the planning of the welfare state, there is little awareness about how conflicting interests weaken the position of society's more vulnerable groups.

Sæterdal and Hansen also criticise the relationship between physical planning and formal political processes. Politicians do not know the consequences of proposals;[89] i.e., they do not have the opportunity to assess the distribution of values as they make plans because they cannot make informed choices – the freedom they have to decide is a formal,

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[83] See 'Drabantby eller soveby? (2)' (NRK, 4 November 1970), 00:00–01:06; See also 'Bør vi stille større krav?', 05:06–06:07. The quote is transcribed and translated from the broadcast: 'Med *planlegging* mener jeg det å fatte beslutninger – om hvordan samfunnets verdier skal fordeles. Og disse beslutningene er viktige, de får konsekvenser for en rekke menneskers livsbetingelser – og derfor mener jeg også at det er viktig at folk får være med å påvirke disse beslutningene.'

[84] Sæterdal and Hansen, *Ammerud 1*, 65.

[85] Sæterdal and Hansen, 74.

[86] Sæterdal and Hansen, 99.

[87] The introductory illustration of part 1 of *Ammerudrapporten* shows a cake being cut – an allusion to the distribution of assets. See Sæterdal and Hansen, 15.

[88] Sæterdal and Hansen, 70.: 'Hvem skal få sine krav tilgodesett?'

[89] Sæterdal and Hansen, 97.

not real freedom. One part of this is the lack of actual foresight; they cannot determine what will happen in the future. When the architect or planner fails to formulate the merits of his alternative, other proposals with demonstrable and quantifiable economic benefits will triumph instead, something that the report claims can (paradoxically) end up as *uneconomic* total solutions.[90] Different types of systems become their own goals, and their background disappears.[91] *Ammerudrapporten* consequently suggests that coordinated planning for the physical and the social must be established, a principle that, it states, was important both in the garden city idea and for the British new towns. Sæterdal and Hansen assert that an analysis of roles, requirements and expectations is necessary, that information should be coordinated and available, and that future data collection should be systematised.[92]

Knowledge and coordination issues can be seen as merely technical problems of planning, but in Sæterdal and Hansen's account, these problems become political through the discussion of participation. They argue that general, abstract guidelines are not really objective, but conceal subjective priorities and are therefore not (democratically) legitimate.[93] The report provides a few examples of planning in which social needs (social infrastructure) are eclipsed by technical infrastructures that are more 'objective': The border of the built area of the city (*markagrensen*) is determined by water supply, and the walking paths are negatively defined by land suitable for construction.[94] More importantly, there is an isolated, quantitative focus on the number of flats and their cost throughout the whole expansion programme – which is an economic plan – rather than the entire city structure being considered as a total economy and a single system.[95] Indeed, Sæterdal and Hansen state that the expansion programme says little about anything other than the technical aspects of housing, such as communications, businesses, jobs, recreation and services. While they are mentioned in the *Generalplan for Oslo*, these functions are not supported by the economic programme.

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[90] Sæterdal and Hansen, 104.
[91] Sæterdal and Hansen, 75.
[92] Sæterdal and Hansen, 161.
[93] Sæterdal and Hansen, 22.
[94] Sæterdal and Hansen, 20–21.
[95] Sæterdal and Hansen, 37; referring to Oslo Finansrådmannen, *Dokument nr. 46*.


Forfatternes kommentarer

OBOS hadde ansvaret for utbygging av boligene, for opprettelsen av borettslagene og for tildeling av 50 % av leilighetene. Det var lederkjernen innen administrasjonen i OBOS som deltok i planleggingen, i hovedsaken styremedlemmene som også utgjorde byggestyret (byggekomiteen) og de kontorstillede borettslagene. Medlemmene ble først kontaktet når byggene var påbegynt. Det ble da ikke innledet noen dialog, medlemmene skulle kun motta ledelsens informasjon om hva medlemmene kunne forvente og hva som forventes av medlemmene (sinnsforing i boligbyggelagenes ide). Beboernes overtakelse av borettslagene skal først skje når alle regnskaper er avsluttet og da skal medlemmene overta de kontrakter styret i OBOS har inngått med de kontorstillede borettslagene, representert ved styret i OBOS, dvs. med seg selv.

Alle muligheter for at et medlem skulle kunne delta i planleggingen skulle med dette være utelukket, bortsett fra stemmeretten på generalforsamlinger. Likevel ble det uttrykt ønske og håp fra ledelsen om at finansieringen kunne løses slik at medlemmene ikke behøvde kontaktes før etter at byggene var helt ferdig bygget. De følte seg plaget av sikverselanters som opprinnelig mot styrets beslutninger og skapte besvær ved alle sine forespørsler. «Småhuskliententelets» var mer besværlig enn de mer føyelige blokkbeboerne. Hvordan har boligbyggelaget, som ble stiftet for å ivareta de boligsøkendes interesser, kunnet utvikle et mønster, en organisasjonsform som i den grad unnyddiggjør medlemmene, som fratar dem all reell innflytelse på utformingen av sine boliger? Konfrontasjonsmønster med utenomhusbeboerne tyder på at medlemmene slett ikke ønsker dette formynderskapet. Motet viser at utformingen må ha negligert mange krav som beboerne fant vesentlige. Er det ikke samsvarslig at mange av disse kravene kunne vært imøtegått hvis de tidligere hadde vært kjent? I hvis interesse er det eventuelt å neglisjere kravene? Styret i OBOS? Arkitektene? Det kan ikke sies å ha vært i medlemmenes interesse, for de er ikke spurt.

En viktig forutsetning for en boligsøker til å få tilgodesett sine krav er at han får formidlet disse til planleggerne. Hvorfor sørger ikke OBOS for at dette kan skje? Tror styret i OBOS at medlemmenes krav er like, og at disse kravene er allment kjent?

Som tidligere fastslått opererer boligsøkeren overfor sine søkere på samme måte.

Problemene forbundet med deltakelse fra den enkelte beboer er kompliserte og mange. Det ville kreve mer systematisk erfaringsinnhenting og lagring av informasjon. Det ville kreve utarbeidet varierte tilbud der variasjonen kunne uttrykke den variasjon i krav som eksisterer blant beboerne. Dette krever mer omhyggelig planlegging.

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Det vil kreve opparbeidet et service-organ som kunne råde folk i sine valg. Det en kan bebreide OBOS og de kommunale etater som deltar i programmeringen er ikke at dette problemet ikke er lost – –, men at alle later som om det ikke eksisterer.

De trygdede har en spesielt vanskelig situasjon, idet de bare leier av sosialadministrasjonen, som er de egentlige andelshavere. De vil således ikke bare utelukkes fra å delta i planleggingen, men får heller ikke innflytelse i de fremtidige borettslagene. Avgjørelsen om trygdeboligenes plassering ble foretatt av styret i OBOS sammen med trygdemennds uten at de aktuelle innflyttere eller trygdehjemsbeboere ble spurt. Plasseringen var anmerkedes enn hyttyrets vedtak forutsatte, og det var et eksperiment med en ny ordning. Likevel er det ikke formulert noen presis hypotese over hva som skulle oppnås ved dette og det er ikke lagt opp til systematisk prøving.

I nyere felt er denne formen allerede forlatt. Hvorfor? På grunnlag av nye hypoteser på tvers av de gamle hypoteser? Planleggerne eksperimenterer, gjetter resultatet og utarbeider nye eksperimenter.

Ledelsen i OBOS var pålagt den omfattende og vanskelige oppgave å formulere kravene til bebyggelsen fra alle sine medlemmer, ivareta alle muligheter og fastlegge begrensningene. Boligrådmannen legger vekt på at bortfestingen skal kunne skje tidlig, slik at festerne kunne bidra i programmeringen. Stort sett ble hele oppgaven neglisjert. I stedet valgte ledelsen to forskjellige arkitektkontorer og overlot til dem alene å utføre programmeringen innen rammen av Husbankens krav og normer.

OBOS har vært med på en omfattende boligbygging siden før krigen. Det er merkelgende å tro at dette har avsluttet seg i et omfattende erfaringsmateriale som sto til disposisjon for nye utbygginger. Men slik som planleggingen av Ammerudfeltet ble organisert fikk OBOS bare en kontrollerende funksjon og kunne ikke bibringe annet enn spredte detaljer fra sitt erfaringsgrunnlag.

Ammerud er et viktig eksempel på muligheten ved industrialisert produksjon. Høyblokkene er prosjektert av arkitekter og entreprenører i samarbeid, og de måtte ta utgangspunkt i en eksisterende betongelementfabrikk og det systemet denne var basert på. I produksjonen er det dessuten eksperimentert med mer demokratisk organisasjon av arbeidere og ledere. Hva kan gjøres og hva blir gjort for å innhente systematiske erfaringer fra utbyggingen og få disse spredt til flest mulig? På grunn av de få tilfeller av industrialisert boligbygging vi har å vise til, vil det lett kunne trekkes konklusjoner på tilfeldige observasjoner som enten avviser denne produksjonsformen som ubrukelig eller går videre med den uten viktige korreksjoner.

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7. Critique of power in planning. *Ammerud 1: planlegging av en ny bydel.*

A major obstacle to any improvement of this situation, according to the report, is that the planning is static – an assumption that was essential to the growing critique of planning at the time. According to the authors, this condition binds areas and makes flexible use and adaptations to changing demands difficult.[96] The plan becomes a failed normative ideal conception of the future instead of a plan for accommodating inhabitants' concrete, immediate needs in the present and near future.[97] As knowledge of the future is limited, as is architectural agency, the Ammerud report proposes flexibility in planning. The descriptions of problems and preconditions are in constant transformation, which means planning cannot be locked in a particular pattern and speaks in favour of a type of planning that is not based on large long-term political goals for a whole population. One prerequisite for flexible planning is that opportunities must be given for continuous criticism and analysis from different angles.[98]

[96] Sæterdal and Hansen, *Ammerud 1*, 24.
[97] Sæterdal and Hansen, 121.
[98] Sæterdal and Hansen, 160.

Ammerudrapporten further asserts that because the architects knew nothing about the different requirements for the housing, they should have designed homes that provided the maximum possibilities for adaptation. The architects instead did the opposite: together with USBL, they expressed a strong resolve to determine and permanently set as many elements as possible, including internal concrete partition walls and standardized, ready-made units and fixtures; this made any potential adjustments especially difficult.[99] The lack of adaptation to changing needs is a consequence of conceptualising planning as an ideal projection into the future, rather than as an adaptation to shifting conditions and changing goals.

In addition to flexibility in the planning process, *Ammerudrapporten* also addresses inflexible socio-spatial models for planning. Sæterdal and Hansen take issue with the architect's use of 'static and ill-considered ideas' for the planning of Oslo satellite towns based on the neighbourhood unit – which is inflexible, as it is based on assumptions about ideal, static small communities in ideal, static societies. This model, they argue, is authoritarian and goes too far in managing the lives of the population; its knowledge foundation is weak, and it lacks understanding of changed conditions. Furthermore, the neighbourhood unit is based on outdated and unfounded assumptions about delimitation, the size of service functions, and needs for social contact. Sæterdal and Hansen believe that the development of new children's institutions, new habits and attitudes, the need for women's workplaces and other results of the modernisation and democratisation of society are also contrary to static socio-spatial models.[100] In addition, these ideas of the neighbourhood do not take into consideration changes in modern communications and infrastructures to reflect cars, changes in school districts and school models, or new education requirements.[101]

Nevertheless, elsewhere in the report the criticism is instead that the idea of establishing the satellite towns as neighbourhoods – small local communities with some degree of local self-governance – has in practise been abandoned by planners before they had made any serious attempts to make the idea work beyond physical organisation, thus neglecting the aspects of social organisation.[102] Crucially, Sæterdal and Hansen claim

[99] Sæterdal and Hansen, 114.
[100] Sæterdal and Hansen, 28.
[101] Sæterdal and Hansen, 104–5.
[102] Sæterdal and Hansen, 120.

that this problem owes to an incongruity between social organisation (the administration of school, church, child welfare services – all of which are centrally organised) and the spatial organisation of the small society in the satellite town neighbourhood, which is locally organized.[103] What Sæterdal and Hansen describe can also be interpreted as something larger however; namely, the contradictions between the modern institutions of the welfare state and more traditional concepts of communities and the social as the reason for the inabilities of the sectorised institutions of the welfare state, including the institution of architecture, to coordinate between themselves in space.

We build in delirium

On 6. September 1969, the popular weekly magazine *Aktuell illustrert ukerevy* summarises *Ammerudrapporten* in a piece entitled *Vi bygger i ørska* (We build in delirium).[104] With this title, *Aktuell* not only implied that Ammerud was a result of suboptimal organisation and insufficient knowledge foundation; it also interpreted Anne Sæterdal's description of the planning of Ammerud and other satellite towns as indications of 'planning against better judgement' that did not reflect 'what we actually know and are capable of.'[105] The civil engineer Trygve Mjøset had previously suggested that we plan against better judgement because we do not dare to accept the consequences of what we know, and possibly also because we lack the means to realise plans based on what we know.[106]

The context to which he was referring was the static, primitive planning of contemporary satellite towns, which plan for a 'normal population' despite being fully aware that this is not the case. Sæterdal and Hansen present the interdependency of housing and social services

[103] Sæterdal and Hansen, 29.
[104] Lise Winther, 'Vi bygger i ørska', *Aktuell*, 6 September 1969. The magazine *Aktuell* was distributed in Norway between 1945 and 1974. It was image- and reportage based, and the intention of the magazine was to further the Labour movement, not by political agitation, but by providing general information to the public related to the reconstruction of Norway after the Second World War. *Aktuell* was owned by LO, the Labour party, and *Kooperasjonen* (The co-operation).
[105] Winther quoting Anne Sæterdal: 'det planlegges mot bedre vitende'.
[106] Tryggve Mjøset, 'Planlegger vi mot bedre vitende?', in *Makt og miljø: En antologi om planlegging*, ed. Maths Prag and Johan Refsum (Oslo: Pax Forlag AS, 1969), 83.

FOTOS: SVERRE A. BØRRETZEN
TEKST: LISE WINTHER

VI BYGGER I ØRSKA

Nye bydeler i Oslo er i 20 år bygget ut og organisert etter samme mønster. Vet vi om det er et godt mønster? Arkitektene Anne Sætердal og Thorbjørn Hansen tar opp et bredt spekter i rapporten om byplanlegging.

Ammerud, med høyblokker og atriumhus, har vært Byggforskningsinstituttets objekt i undersøkelsen om planlegging av nye bydeler.

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8. 'Vi bygger i ørska', *Aktuell*. Photography by Sverre A. Børretzen.

as a concrete example of a 'complete disavowal of responsibility', since housing is built so expensively that both parents have to work to afford it, but the social infrastructure for children that this renders necessary are not built. In the larger societal context, the economic development patterns and migration patterns are the reasons for a 'pressure-situation that creates a permanent housing crisis' in Oslo. As the city is not equipped to handle this comprehensive problem, it should be the responsibility of the state. Sæterdal and Hansen argue that these problems arise because 'the plan is static and difficult to adapt to the real-world conditions.'[107] In practice, different sectors of planning interact, but as coordination between them is lacking, responsibilities become fragmented, and it becomes impossible to prioritise between needs.

Crucially, Sæterdal and Hansen point to a false contradiction between participation and future demands of planning, where the necessity of thinking in terms of long-term general needs is used as an argument against focussing on user participation and addressing *current* needs. Sæterdal and Hansen propose flexible plans of flats and a more flexible planning process as a solution to this contradiction. With their

[107] Winther, 'Vi bygger i ørska', 31. 'planen er statisk lagt opp og vanskelig lar seg tilpasse til de virkelige forhold'.

false contradiction, however, Sæterdal and Hansen are pointing to an aspect of *Ammerudrapporten* which becomes significant in the context of Negri and Tafuri's conceptualisation of the plan: namely the contradiction of static planning, which has a future perspective, but is not sufficiently dynamic to capture the *plan* or the needs of contemporary users. In other words, there is a contrast between the (conceptually dynamic) future of the plan, the (static) future of planning, and the present political struggle based on actual conflicts of interests which both of them suppress.

In *Aktuell*, Sæterdal and Hansen are depicted as less radically political than in the report itself, despite the critical title. Indeed, in the report's reception in mass media, the political message is often dismissed, but then 're-politicised' as the report is interpreted to support individual political agendas. The first such article to comment on *Ammerudrapporten* was printed in the conservative newspaper *Aftenposten* on 23 August 1969. It stated that

> A report from *Norges Byggforskningsinstitutt* on the construction of the Ammerud area shows how discouragingly many unfounded assumptions and how little experience there are behind the design of a new city district.[108]

The article focusses on the lacking coordination and cooperation between professionals and argues that the very information exchanged was inadequate. The planners did not provide the politicians with the information necessary to assess the plans to be approved; nor did the politicians formulate any criteria stating their expectations from a project such as Ammerud. One explanation offered for the planning failure was the interaction between elected politicians and the municipal technocratic planning administration involving architects and planners. An important issue was that the politicians did not understand the plans, and they were thus unable to make informed decisions; instead, they had to simply trust the technocrats. This aspect is further discussed in the second mention of the Ammerud report in *Aftenposten* on 29 August

[108] See Terje Gustavsen, 'Mange tilfeldigheter bak ny bydel: Kritisk rapport om Ammerudutbygging', *Aftenposten*, 23 August 1969.: 'En rapport fra Norges Byggforskningsinstitutt om utbyggingen av Ammerud-området viser hvor forstemmende mange ubegrunnede antagelser, hvor lite erfaringer som ligger bak utformingen av en ny bydel.'

1969, which refers to Erling Faaland, a conservative politician whose focus is on the report's problematisation of the relationship between technocratic planners and politicians.[109] Faaland points out that the Ammerud report contains critical comments about both the municipal administration and the elected political organs from the Labour party.[110] The criticism of the technocrats and administration in planning consequently becomes a critical commentary on the Labour government and the welfare state.

Conservative commentaries associate the practice of planning not only with the state, but with the welfare state, called a 'socialist' state; i.e., planning is *not* seen as independent of politics. Criticism regarding *what* is planned becomes criticism of housing politics as a Labour party project – and thus actually a critique of (socialist) state power. Roughly a month after *Ammerudrapporten* was first published, the mass media's focus shifted from the lack of knowledge and flaws related to the decision process to problems of the living environment created by these processes, with the escalating criticism also appearing in political debates on a national level. On 22 October 1969, *Aftenposten* published the conservative politician Jan P. Syse's comments on the report in the important annual *trontaledebatten*, a parliamentary debate on the government's programme statement for the coming year concerning main priorities and political profile in particular.[111] Syse strongly emphasised that construction of the large new urban areas was not merely a question of building new housing, but concerned the building of urban environments. 'A housing policy motivated by socialism is apparently no suitable tool for greater efficiency in housing production,' he stated. According to Syse, the Ammerud report made it uncomfortably clear that the social environment has not been taken into account. In other words, his critique aims at the Labour party's policy of prioritising production of housing for all over other concerns.

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[109] 'Oslo-kommentar til Ammerud-rapport etterlyst', *Aftenposten*, 29 August 1969.

[110] The article refers to the conservative politician Erling Faaland's statements at the city council meeting the previous day, where the report was mentioned in relation to a debate about a new housing district in Ellingsrud. Faaland was a representative from the conservative opposition party *Høyre.* He focusses on the errors of the Labour party and the Labour politician Brynjulf Bull, who was mayor of Oslo in the post-war period from 1952 and 1975.

[111] For the commentary on *Ammerudrapporten* in *Trontaledebatten*, see 'S.tid. (1969—70)', vol. 114, Stortingsforhandlinger 7a (Oslo: Centraltrykkeriet, 1970), 218–19.

In contrast, the Labour press sees *Ammerudrapporten* as reporting an organisational problem, not a political one. Planning is seen as a technical problem of organising, *in space*, the contradictions of the welfare state. Planning is not an ideological question, but rather an organisational one, and what is needed is more *flexibility* in the organisation. On 22 October 1969, the Labour press's Oslo newspaper *Arbeiderbladet* published quotes by the politician Reiulf Steen from *Arbeiderpartiet* (the Labour party). In a speech held at a conference on housing called *Om å bo* (On living), he stated that there is political agreement to put greater emphasis on the living environment. He interprets the Ammerud report, and advocates for action:

> The communication between financing institutions, politicians, planners, entrepreneurs and dwellers needs to be improved fast. We must start concrete work on actions that can create a greater intergenerational mix. Creating greater flexibility can already be set up as a concrete objective. Few things are so decisive for what our entire society should be like, and for the development of people, as housing and the way we solve housing problems. The task of engaging a broader group of people in the debate on the housing environments is a democratic challenge of the highest priority.[112]

In other words, improved coordination, flexibility and democracy are necessary. *Ammerudrapporten's* criticism regarding lacking knowledge is not addressed. The democratic challenge refers to participation, which also becomes a theme in newspapers. An article in *Aftenposten* on 9 September 1969 states, 'what is perhaps the most important issue raised in the report are the interests of the user.' Interpreting *Ammerudrapporten* as a strong criticism of the planning system, the article further states that the report is a 'vitally important reminder that OBOS and *Byplankontoret* [the planning office] were established to safeguard the interests of the

[112] 'Besteforeldre opptrer bare søndagspyntet i drabantbyene: Enighet om å legge større vekt på bo-miljøet', *Arbeiderbladet*, 22 October 1969, 1.: 'Kommunikasjonen mellom finansieringsinstitusjonene, politikerne, planleggerne, byggherrene og borettshaverne må utbygges raskt. Vi må sette i gang konkret arbeid for utformingen av tiltak som kan skape større generasjonsblanding. Det å skape større fleksibilitet kan allerede nå stilles opp som en konkret målsetting. Få ting er så bestemmende for hvordan hele vårt samfunn skal se ut, og for hvordan menneskene skal utvikle [seg], som boligen og måten vi løser boligproblemene på. Den oppgaven å engasjere bredere folkegrupper i debatten om hvordan boligmiljøene skal se ut, er derfor en demokratisk utfordring av første rang'.

housing applicants, not the opposite'. The article puts special emphasis on a statement made by Oslo's director of city planning, Erik Rolfsen: in the radio broadcast *Østlandssendingen* on 25 August, Rolfsen supposedly admitted that 'earlier regulation projects have never been evaluated to generate experience that can contribute to new projects.' Instead, Rolfsen explains, experiences from other countries have been used. According to the article's author, such practice would lead to more Ammerud-projects.[113] In other words, the international influence would create more of the same, inferior modernist architecture and planning. Rolfsen's quote was reprinted verbatim in an editorial on *Ammerudrapporten* in *Aftenposten* on 13 September 1969.[114]

The article 'We build in delirium' emphasised that participation not only means direct involvement in processes, but also distribution of information about decisions, as well as sociological research to get information about those on the waiting list for housing. The background is that 'it does not really pertain to the few to judge if the many should also decide. It's the many who in reality have the right to decide if the few have the mandate for it.'[115] The article emphasises the failure of static planning, and asserts that in order to be able to achieve long-term and provisional goals, differentiated and changing needs must be met by flexible solutions. *Aktuell* emphasised the situation as a democratic problem to be solved with a different type of planning, while Faaland and others were looking for some authority to blame, preferably from the social-democratic side of politics. In contrast to the knowledge in formal processes, the article understands the essence of *Ammerudrapporten* as a call to connect to the experiences of ordinary people, also apparent in *Aktuell's* later article about mass housing, 'Hus til tusen' (House for a thousand).[116]

In some cases, *Ammerudrapporten* was interpreted as evidence of spatial planning's suffering from a lack of foresight. In *Aftenposten* on 20.

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[113] Kjell Sande, 'Ammerudrapporten – hva så?', *Aftenposten*, 9 September 1969.: 'den påkrevde påminnelse om at OBOS og Byplankontoret er opprettet for å ivareta de boligsøkendes interesser, ikke omvendt'. Quote by Erik Rolfsen: 'tidligere reguleringsprosjekter aldri er blitt efterprøvet med tanke å vinne erfaring som kan komme nye prosjekter til gode'.

[114] 'Ammerud-rapporten (editorial)', *Aftenposten*, 13 September 1969.

[115] See Winther, 'Vi bygger i ørska', 32.: 'Det tilkommer egentlig ikke de få å få avgjøre om de mange skal få være med å bestemme. Det er de mange som egentlig har rett til å bestemme om de få har mandat til det.'

[116] Berit Eriksen, 'Landets største boligblokk: Et hus til tusen', *Aktuell*, 1971.

November 1969, Kåre Willoch from *Høyre* emphasises the *State's obligations to Oslo.* As a background, he mentions two studies that he sees as related: One study, according to Willoch, showed that a significant part of Oslo's population would like to live and work in a small town or in the countryside. The other study, *Ammerudrapporten*, showed many unsolved problems that emerged not because a larger urban setting is necessarily worse than a small town or the countryside, but because society has not yet managed to solve the specific problems characteristic of a large city. He claims that

> we can today confirm that significant mistakes were made in the design of the larger housing areas constructed after the war, the so-called satellite towns. The contemporary Oslo area is not so much the product of coincidental, uncoordinated development as it is the result of many instances of lacking foresight and ill-considered layouts.[117]

In other words, the conservative Willoch does not believe that the satellite town problem is due to suboptimal planning organisation (and coordination) or because building is carried out haphazardly and with insufficient knowledge, as the social democrat Reiulf Steen proposes. According to Willoch, the environmental issues – his interpretation of *Ammerudrapporten* – are problems of concrete design and planning's general inability to foresee future trends and developments. In this statement, then, there lies a dismissal of long-term planning as a professional technology, opening for other approaches to planning, or rather, urban development. Both the conservative Willoch and Labour's Steen seem to think that the planning system is too rigid and static, and both argue for more flexibility. Both see the critique embedded in *Ammerudrapporten* as an indication that planning principles did not change when society changed, which poses a problem for the relationship between planning and the welfare state and calls for more flexibility in planning.

[117] See 'Staten bør gi Oslo en bedre behandling', *Aftenposten*, 20 November 1969.: 'Vi kan idag fastslå at det har vært gjort vesentlige feil ved utformingen av de større boligområder som har vært reist efter krigen, de såkalte drabantbyer. Oslo-området av idag er ikke så meget produktet av tilfeldig og ukoordinert utvikling, som det er resultatet av manglende fremsyn og dårlig gjennomtenkte planløsninger i flere tilfelle.'

Power and politics in planning

An interview with the expert planner Per Andersson appeared in *Aftenposten* on 4 October 1969; in it, *Ammerudrapporten* was specifically addressed. Andersson had been director of city planning in the city of Stavanger from 1956 to 1962. He then founded the planning consultancy Andersson and Skjånes, which became a leader in Norwegian planning. He was chair of the board for *Norsk institutt for by- og regionsforskning* from 1963 to 70, when he became professor of spatial planning at *Nordiska institutet för samhällsplanering* (Nordplan). In the interview, Andersson emphasised that planners are civil servants who should not take political sides, but should leave the responsibility for politics to the politicians.[118]

The title of the article, 'Planners suggest, politicians decide', likewise indicates a resolved and idealised relationship of power in planning and politics, but it also alludes to the sociologist Stein Rokkan's then-recent analysis of the distribution of power in post-war Norway: 'Votes count, but resources decide' – which states that power is not limited to the formal democratic systems of an hegemonic, centralised welfare state, but to competing interests in a corporatist welfare state, including the power of media.[119] The title inverts Rokkan's message however, and says that power resides in formal democracy, where the planner is only a neutral technician. Consequently, Andersson's apolitical position stands in contrast to that of Sæterdal and Hansen, who see planning as political due to class antagonism, and also differ from Rokkan's analysis, which reveals that planning is a political activity because power is already distributed across society.

Andersson argues that the most interesting part of the Ammerud report is its criticism of the decision process, and concurs with the report's assertion that planning is not democratic enough: 'It is certainly astonishing how few individuals have decisive influence, and how little internal interaction there is between them'. Andersson states that while sociological research is necessary to understand the shared needs of many rather than individual needs, he still finds it an issue of greater concern that many important political decisions are made without proper

[118] Einar Lindberget, 'Planleggerne foreslår, politikerne avgjør', *Aftenposten*, 4 October 1969.
[119] Stein Rokkan, *Norway: Numerical Democracy and Corporate Pluralism*, Chr. Michelsen Institute for Science and Intellectual Freedom Publikasjon, No. 227 (Bergen: Chr. Michelsens institutt, 1966).: 'Stemmer teller, men ressurser avgjør'.

research and documentation.[120] He believes in (rational) research and documentation for the common good rather than any discussion about political conflicts of interest. In this, he argues for the separation of 'neutral' planning and the welfare state, or in other words, between urban planning and the *plan* as theorised by Negri. This separation of politics and planning indeed supports the supposed political 'neutrality' of *Generalplanen for Oslo*.

By 1969, there were a number of planning theories that questioned planning as a politically neutral and future-oriented practice. Incremental planning, transactive planning and advocacy planning formed critiques of different aspects of the rational or synoptic planning and suggested modifications or reactions to its rationality and central control of problems and solutions.[121] Introduced by Charles Lindblom, incremental planning was a response to the problem of flexibility in planning and the impossibility of foresight. Criticising the supposedly scientific method of rational planning, Lindblom states that such planning is only possible in the face of small and simple problems.[122] In 'The Science of Muddling Through', Lindblom formulates a theory for what happens in real-world progress: A development in small steps, a series of actions with no large goal in sight. While incremental planning can be seen as purely pragmatic criticism, it certainly also has political consequences, by describing a form of laissez-faire attitude towards the societal development, with its apparently limited view of the future, dealing with the immediate here and now. Incremental planning seems better suited to deal with the unexpected – and crisis management such as the welfare state. Indeed, it can be supported by Tafuri's criticism of a static architectural ideology, in contrast to a dynamic welfare state: incrementality helps planning be more dynamic.

Other planning theories had been proposed to solve the problem of democracy in planning through participation and planning methods that deal with the legitimacy of planning or support from the people.

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[120] Lindberget, 'Planleggerne foreslår, politikerne avgjør'.: 'Det er da også fantastisk hvor få personer det er som har avgjørende innflydelse, og hvor liten innbyrdes kontakt de har.'

[121] Barclay M. Hudson, Thomas D. Galloway, and Jerome L. Kaufman, 'Comparison of Current Planning Theories: Counterparts and Contradictions', *Journal of the American Planning Association* 45, no. 4 (1979): 387–98.

[122] Charles E. Lindblom, 'The Science of "Muddling Through"', *Public Administration Review* 19, no. 2 (1 April 1959): 79–88.

Ammerudrapporten emphasised the interests of different societal groups, especially the weakest groups – those that tend to lose against stronger groups and their interests. Here, other types of criticism of the authoritarian synoptic planning are relevant, such as transactive and advocacy planning. Transactive planning is based on direct interaction with people who are affected by the planning. The information and knowledge that serve as the foundation for the planning are based more on dialogue than on rational investigations and data analysis, which is the case for the typical synoptic rational planning.[123] In response to the criticism that claims that synoptic planning ignores the political dimension and appeals almost exclusively to reason, Eric Reade proposes a less positivist definition of planning.[124] In a sense, this is a way to take diverse social and political interests into account. However, while built on the understanding that planning cannot be done from a neutral position as regards values, as synoptic planning generally assumed, advocacy planning is a mostly theoretical direction of planning. It addresses the problem of power and seeks to alleviate power asymmetries by designating advocates to secure the interests of those who are unable to do so themselves.

Sæterdal and Hansen suggest a better, knowledge-based planning process, divided into four phases. The first phase is programming with needs/demands with representatives of the inhabitants, professionals and planners and identification of overlaps (i.e. common interests) for optimal distribution of resources. The second phase is the project involving professionals, decisions, priorities, alternatives and documentation/justifications for choices. The third phase is the political case-work. The system amounts to a *distribution* of the right to decide, with real participation, democratization, and – crucially – possibly a need for new organizational forms. The fourth phase is plan validation, with feedback, systematic verification, and experience acquirement.[125] This model appears to try to do many things, outlining a role for planners that involves both the handling of large volumes of diverse information and its analysis, and also functions as an adjudicator and advocate for weak groups.

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[123] Hudson, Galloway, and Kaufman, 'Comparison of Current Planning Theories', 389.
[124] Eric Reade, 'If Planning Is Anything, Maybe It Can Be Identified', *Urban Studies* 20, no. 2 (Mai 1983): 159–71.
[125] Sæterdal and Hansen, *Ammerud 1*, 162.

The programme statement from the OAF board and Kanal subgroup – which includes Sæterdal and Hansen – emphasised the political nature of architecture and planning:

> As architects and planners, we are a part of distributing the resources the community has at its disposal at any given time, although the formal responsibility for the major issues is with the politicians. It is time we acknowledge the scope of our work: that in reality we make a number of decisions that are of great importance to society; that we conduct politics.[126]

Planning as the distribution of resources is important in the discussion of participation in *Ammerudapporten*, and it has implications for the architectural profession. As Sæterdal and Hansen state: 'We must work to clarify our own position in the society in which we live, we must wake up to social consciousness, and we must become aware of our responsibilities.'[127]

The architect in crisis

Aftenposten interviewed Mjelva and Norseng in November of 1969. The article states that 'we had requested an interview after all the uproar surrounding *Ammerudrapporten*'.[128] Asked to respond to Sæterdal and Hansen's critique, Mjelva replied that to be honest, he was angry, and did not consider their work a research report, but merely personal impressions and critical notes lacking supporting evidence. Nevertheless, he responds to the main points of their critique. Whilst concurring that research and earlier experiences should be fundamental, Mjelva redirects the criticism of lack of coordination and cooperation to the internal municipal organisation of planning. He considers it impossible to incorporate the dweller into the planning process, as the dweller is still

[126] Christensen et al., 'Programerklæring', 61.: 'Som arkitekter og planleggere er vi med på å fordele de ressurser samfunnet til enhver tid rår over, selv om det formelle ansvar ligger hos politikerne i de store saker. Det er på tide at vi erkjenner rekkevidden av vårt arbeid, at vi i realiteten tar en rekke avgjørelser som har stor betydning for samfunnet, at vi driver politikk.'

[127] Christensen et al., 61.: 'Vi må arbeide for å klargjøre vår egen situasjon i det samfunnet vi lever i, vi må våkne til sosial bevissthet, og vi må bli klar over vårt ansvar.'

[128] Sv. B., 'Totalprosjektering intet Sesam, Sesam...', *Aftenposten*, 22 November 1969.'Vi hadde bedt om et intervju efter alt oppstyret omkring Ammerudrapporten'.

an unknown factor during the planning phase. In a similar way, he dismisses the question of making the dwelling flexible and accommodating unknown future users and uses. In block flats in particular, everything is locked by the construction system, and consequently the promise of flexibility in architecture is a hoax.[129] Defending himself, Mjelva personifies the architect in crisis as increasingly restricted by regulations, rules and systems while being attacked for illegitimately exercising authority: simultaneously impotent and too powerful.

The previous year, the Norwegian architectural theoretician and editor of the journal *Byggekunst* Christian Norberg-Schulz had warned against what he called ultracrepidarian architectural practice, referring to the proverb 'a cobbler should stick to his last'. He describes a current 'masochistic self-criticism' among some architects, and cautions that this criticality may undermine the profession of architecture:

> Today, we must really be first-class specialists if society is still going to have use for us. The solution is therefore not to become amateurs in *other* areas, such as sociology and ecology, but to become better *architects*.[130]

Norberg-Schulz thus maintained that the architect's *only* justification is being a good form-giver. His editorial was illustrated with a plan drawing of Paolo Portoghesi's *Casa Bevilacqua* in Gaeta (1964-1972) and refers to another of his projects, the extension of the parliament building in Rome. Norberg-Schulz believes the extension as deserving of the label '*geometria della libertà*' (geometry of freedom) and states that 'Portoghesi's project thus presents one of the most advanced attempts to find new architectural footing.'[131] For Norberg-Schulz, Portoghesi is exemplary of how architects need to contribute to improvements through *design*. In his book on Portoghesi and Gigliotti, entitled 'On the Search for Lost Architecture', he states that both Portoghesi's Casa

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[129] See B.: 'Slik som denne sak av og til fremstilles, virker det som det rene folkebedrag'.
[130] Christian Norberg-Schulz, 'Bli ved din lest', *Byggekunst: The Norwegian Review of Architecture*, no. 1 (1968): 1.: 'Idag må vi virkelig være førsteklasses spesialister, hvis samfunnet fortsatt skal ha bruk for oss. Derfor er ikke løsningen at vi blir amatører på *andre* områder, slik som sosiologi og økologi, men at vi blir bedre *arkitekter*.'
[131] Norberg-Schulz. 'Portoghesis prosjekt presenterer således et av de mest avanserte forsøk på å finne nytt arkitektonisk fotfeste.'

Bevilacqua and the extension to the parliament express *genius loci*.[132] In his critique of architectural ideology in 1969, however, Tafuri concludes that 'there can be no proposals of architectural "anti-spaces" that will solve the crisis that architecture is in'. Significantly, 'anti-spaces' is the translation of the Italian *controspazi*, which Tafuri originally used to allude to the journal *Controspazio*, founded in 1966 by the same Paolo Portoghesi that Norberg-Schulz promotes as a saviour of architecture.[133] Clearly, Tafuri completely dismisses Norberg-Schulz' claim that the architect's contribution to society comes from architectural freedom that can be found in the exercising of form.

Ammerudrapporten clearly sides with Tafuri. Sæterdal and Hansen state that 'A combined lack of formal requirements from the architects and an uncoordinated team of planners led to *formal order* and a focus on architecture as artistic work instead of user needs or demands.[134] This problem, they argue, becomes more serious with the lack of knowledge about the user, as 'when the actual needs have been unknown, the developments have been based on the architect's own assumptions and then fixed with plans, construction systems and standardized equipment due to the lower price for bulk purchases'.[135] Not only is this criticism of the architect's activity as an illegitimate wielding of power, it is criticism of the distribution of values by the wrong criteria. Sæterdal and Hansen criticise the architect for the tendency to focus on order and spirituality rather than on broader social issues, and in addition, speculatively exploiting politicians' lack of planning expertise:

> The professionals have decided to get the plan approved and try to give the city council the fewest possible chances to influence this decision […]. The professionals and experts are not politically accountable; they represent a narrow professional group's specialised vision. It is therefore

[132] See Norberg-Schulz' book on Portoghesi for discussions on the solutions of an architectural crisis and presentations of Portoghesi's projects. Christian Norberg-Schulz, *Alla ricerca dell'architettura perduta: Le opere di Paolo Portoghesi, Vittorio Gigliotti 1959 – On the Search for Lost Architecture: The works of Paolo Portoghesi, Vittori Gigliotti 1959-1975* (Roma: Officinia Edizioni, 1975), 28, 46, 66; Revised and extended edition: Christian Norberg-Schulz, *Le architetture di Paolo Portoghesi, Vittorio Gigliotti – The works of Paolo Portoghesi, Vittorio Gigliotti*, 2nd ed. (Roma: Officinia Edizioni, 1982).
[133] Tafuri, 'Toward a Critique of Architectural Ideology', 33, 35 See also the translator's footnote 28.
[134] Sæterdal and Hansen, *Ammerud 1*, 69.
[135] Sæterdal and Hansen, 108, 114.

> […] not consistent with democratic values that they have a real power and influence over the planning.[136]

The Ammerud report instead asked for what is essentially a reflexive practice: 'It is important that we become aware of the architect's role, what values he represents and will administer, and what he does not think about'.[137] This is clearly a different type of architect than the expert in *form* prescribed by Norberg-Schulz. Sæterdal and Hansen argue that architects need to be able to deal with the participation of users, and consequently extends the role of architects towards sociology.

Mjelva commented on Ammerudrapporten again, this time in his own article in *Aftenposten* in April 1970. In it, he argues that everyone could agree on the report's correctness in criticising the lack of services and functions in the satellite town, which mean that the satellite town does not form a complete living environment, but he believes the cause of the problem to be that the planner has had too *little* influence and power to enforce his ideas. In *Byggekunst* he criticises what he describes as the 'astonishing conclusion' of the report: 'that the planner should be blamed for the sins of the politician'.[138] His general assessment of Sæterdal and Hansen is consequently one of complete dismissal of them as architects or planners:

> No-one will claim that mistakes have not been made in the construction of the Ammerud-town. There are a number of things that could and should have been done better. But there is a huge gap between professional and sober constructive criticism and this dilettantish and strangely aggressive gibberish.[139]

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[136] Sæterdal and Hansen, 84.: 'fagfolkene har besluttet seg for å få planen vedtatt og prøver å gi bystyret færrest mulige sjanser til å påvirke denne beslutningen […]. Fagfolkene og ekspertene er ikke politisk ansvarlige, de representerer en snever faggruppes spesialiserte syn. Det er derfor […] ikke forenlig med demokratiske verdier at disse har en reell makt og innflytelse over planleggingen'.

[137] Sæterdal and Hansen, 70.

[138] Mjelva, 'Ammerudenga – Ammerudfaret', 226.

[139] See Håkon Mjelva, 'Ammerud-rapporten', *Aftenposten*, 15 April 1970.: 'ingen vil påstå at det ikke er [gjort] feil ved byggingen av Ammerud-byen. Det er opptil flere ting som kunne og burde vært bedre. Men fra en faglig og edruelig [konstruktiv] kritikk til dette [dilettantiske] og merkelig aggressive lirum-larum, er et kjempegap.'

Mjelva's harsh verdict can be understood as a defensive reaction to a total devaluation of the architect. He takes strong issue with what he believes to be a mythologization of the user, who – apparently, according to the Ammerud report – has the solutions to all of the problems of planning. Noting that Sæterdal and Hansen criticise planning and administration as authoritarian processes which needs more involvement of consumer organizations of various kinds,[140] Mjelva finds a contradiction between their use of 'ultra-socialist ideas' and their notion of a user perspective that smacks of consumer society.[141] Mjelva sarcastically implies that the authors of the Ammerud report are neither (proper) architects or researchers. He welcomes constructive criticism, he says, but:

> Instead you are served an astounding collection of impertinent comments from two novices in the planning profession who from self-made, rather twisted, criteria slaughter absolutely everything thought or done in connection with the city district Ammerud. Statements and interviews are clearly edited with the conscious purpose of deriding everyone responsible.[142]

Sæterdal and Hansen's response to Mjelva appeared in *Aftenposten* on 25 April 1970. Dismissing Mjelva's claim about 'self-made, rather twisted criteria', Sæterdal and Hansen refer to the then-current international focus on participatory planning in USA and Britain, specifically mentioning the 1969 July issue of the *Journal of The American Institute of Planners*, where we find Sherry R. Arnstein's seminal article on the participation ladder.[143] In it, Arnstein states that citizen participation is citizen power, so that, in other words, participation is a redistribution of power. Furthermore, Arnstein notes that there is a critical difference between the empty ritual of participation and having the real power to affect the outcome of a process. Martin Rein's article on social planning, concerning drawing legitimacy for planning from consumer preference,

[140] See Sæterdal and Hansen, *Ammerud 1*, 161–62.
[141] Mjelva, 'Ammerudenga – Ammerudfaret'.
[142] See Mjelva, 'Ammerud-rapporten'.: 'Istedet får man her servert en utrolig samling impertinente kommentarer fra to nybegynnere i planleggingsfaget som ut fra selvlagede ganske forskrudde kriterier slakter absolutt alt som er tenkt og gjort i forbindelse med bydelen Ammerud. Uttalelser og intervjuer er klart redigert i den bevisste hensikt å henge ut alle ansvarlige.'
[143] Sherry R. Arnstein, 'A Ladder of Citizen Participation', *Journal of the American Institute of Planners* 35, no. 4 (1 July 1969): 216–24.

also appears to have influenced the Ammerud report.[144] When Rein quotes Davidoff, the resemblance to Sæterdal and Kanal's oft-used statement on planning as distribution of values is obvious:

> It is not for the planner to make the final decision transforming values into policy commitments. His role is to identify distribution of values among people, and how values are weighed against each other.[145]

This identification of values appears to be what Sæterdal and Hansen consider relevant knowledge in planning. They also refer to a report by the Committee on Public Participation in Planning, formed by the Ministry of Housing and Local Government, Scottish Development and the Welsh Office. Known as the Skeffington report, prepared by Arthur Skeffington MP and the Ministry of Housing and Local Government, this report was published by HMSO in 1969.[146] It is considered one of the most important documents in the history of post-war British urban planning,[147] and concentrates on how planners can increase the possibilities for participation. Special emphasis is placed on the planners' duty to inform the general public as well as anyone directly affected by the plans.

Sæterdal and Hansen consequently argue that their perspective has a solid basis in international planning discourse, while Mjelva is trying to present his own subjective position as a professional, objective truth. Importantly, they add a new aspect to participation that has nothing to do with planners catering to objective or subjective needs or wishes, but concerns power and autonomy:

> Participation has a value in itself, regardless of what this means for good/bad design as judged by planners. The opportunity to shape one's own environment, to influence, change and develop it, is fundamental

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[144] Martin Rein, 'Social Planning: The Search for Legitimacy', *Journal of the American Institute of Planners* 35, no. 4 (1 July 1969): 233–44.
[145] Paul Davidoff and Thomas A. Reiner, 'A Choice Theory of Planning', *Journal of the American Institute of Planners* 28, no. 2 (1 May 1962): 108; Rein, 'Social Planning', 234.
[146] A.M Skeffington, Great Britain, and Committee on Public Participation in Planning, *People and Planning: Report of the Committee on Public Participation in Planning* (London: H.M.S.O, 1969).
[147] Phil Child, 'People and Planning: Report of the Committee on Public Participation in Planning (The Skeffington Committee Report) with an Introduction', *Planning Perspectives* 30, no. 3 (3 July 2015): 484–85.

> for human safety. […] Being secure means participating in steering the development, as opposed to being a victim of the decisions of others. Any authoritarian planning therefore reduces other people's possibility for personal development.[148]

When Mjelva presented the curved blocks in the architectural review *Byggekunst* in late 1970, the Ammerud report had already greatly affected the discourse of architecture and satellite town in professional circles as well as in the public media. The presentation appears as both a defensive response to and counterattack on the report. Mjelva now describes the report and the discourse following it as a 'mythologization of the user':

> For an entire year, people have been kept captivated with these simple, gripping and easily understandable, but actually vague allegations that have very effectively weakened the already faltering faith in the architect.[149]

When Sæterdal and Hansen speak of participation – prioritised over generalised, objective or technocratic knowledge – it is an ideological statement. Sæterdal and Hansen's idea of knowledge is a knowledge from below; the people as a source of power, actualised in the present. In the introduction to *Byggekunst*'s thematic issue on participation in 1971, of which Sæterdal and Tore Brantenberg were guest editors, they write that the short-term goal for participation as it was described in *Ammerudrapporten* is to work for reforms, and that architects 'in each building task solidarize ourselves with the excluded groups and not first and foremost with our formal clients.' The radical long-term goal, however, is to

> work for changes in the political and economic system, changes in the power relationships in society. In practice this means that we put

[148] See Anne Sæterdal and Thorbjørn Hansen, 'Ammerudrapporten', *Aftenposten*, 25 April 1970.: 'Medvirkning har verdi i seg selv, uansett hva dette betyr for god/dårlig utforming efter planleggernes vurdering. Mulighet til å forme sine egne omgivelser, til å påvirke, endre og utvikle dem er grunnleggende for et menneskes trygghet. […] Trygghet er å være med på å styre utviklingen, i motsetning til å være et offer for andres beslutninger. Enhver autoritær planlegging reduserer derfor andre menneskers mulighet for utfoldelse.'
[149] Mjelva, 'Ammerudenga – Ammerudfaret', 125.: 'Et helt år har man holdt alt folket i ånde med disse enkle, fengende og lettfattelige, men i virkeligheten uklare påstander som allerede meget effektivt har redusert den fra før vaklende tiltro til arkitekten.'

> political considerations before professional ones. Professional competence is not a goal in itself, but a means to, through political change, arrive at a society in which building tasks are determined by the people and not by capital.[150]

As Sæterdal and Hansen mention in the summary of *Ammerudrapporten*, the larger issues of societal structures are not addressed in the report.[151] Nevertheless, with reference to Sæterdal and Brantenberg's long-term goal for participation, it would be a mistake to understand the report merely as narrow criticism of planning or of housing. The reception of the report bears certain similarities to the reception of Tafuri's critique of architectural ideology. Both have been interpreted narrowly in terms of architecture and planning, whilst both criticise a system of power – in both cases the welfare state is seen as advanced capitalism. As with Tafuri's criticism of architectural ideology in *Contropiano*, *Ammerudrapporten* has been interpreted as a dismissal of (a certain type of) architecture and planning, rather than as an analysis of power and class. The real crisis of architecture in both cases has to do with its potential role in challenging the current system of power on behalf of, or possibly as part of the people.

The deep conflicts of the architect's role point to contradictions in the idea of power and impotence in the practice of architecture and its position as part of the larger structures and frameworks of the welfare state. As Tafuri states, 'the search for an alternative within the structures that condition the very character of architectural design is indeed an obvious contradiction in terms.'[152] What Tafuri means is that the practicing architect cannot avoid the structures of capitalism: he cannot create social conditions that the capitalist state does not already allow. The architect working for the welfare state – be it Mjelva or anyone else – consequently falls into a trap of centring on form when trying to solve larger problems with the tools of architecture's ideologies. Tafuri

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[150] Anne Sæterdal and Tore Brantenberg, 'Tema: Medvirkning', *Byggekunst: The Norwegian Review of Architecture*, no. 4 (1971): 121.: 'arbeide for endringer av det politiske og økonomiske system, forandringer av maktforholdene i samfunnet. Dett vil i praksis si at vi lar politiske hensyn gå foran de faglige. Faglig kompetanse er ikke et mål i seg selv, men et middel til gjennom politisk endring å oppnå et samfunn der byggeoppgaver gis av folket og ikke av kapitalen.'

[151] Sæterdal and Hansen, *Ammerud 1*, 160.

[152] Tafuri, *Architecture and Utopia*, 181.

describes this as a constant problem in the history of modern architecture.[153]

The solution for Italian workerism lay in utilising the autonomous power of the people.[154] *Ammerudrapporten* exercised a radical perspective on participation, which, whilst never explicitly referring to autonomist ideas, contains ideas that align with those of Italian workerism, argues for the people as a creative force and an autonomous power – i.e., that drives productive development – and forces capital to respond with defensive and repressive measures. With its critique, *Ammerudrapporten* – like Negri – reveals that the welfare state's internal organisation and coordination as a total system fails to function in many ways. The report shows that the planning (of satellite towns) is not flexible enough to absorb changes in society and working effectively for capital; Tafuri also noted this. In short, Sæterdal and Hansen describe a situation of imperfections in *the plan* that workerism or autonomism would theorise into opportunities for 'power from below'. However, in place of such theorisations of workers or the people as an autonomous power, the perspective of *Ammerudrapporten* is rather a more modest 'solidarity with the people'.

By reframing the history of the politics of planning behind the satellite towns, *Ammerudrapporten* reintroduces contemporary contradictions and conflicts, and the report in effect questions the very notion – or ideology, as Tafuri would term it – of progress that underlies the welfare state, planning and architecture. Sæterdal and Hansen emphasised concrete 'here and now' needs before abstract, generalised future needs. Indeed, this was a rewriting of both planning – as political – and of history itself, as the report activated the present in a history of crisis, in contrast to the post-war focus on the future. As a class struggle against the plan, it also reframed planning as welfare into an issue of power to the people, where participation is in itself welfare.

The architectural historian Pier Vittorio Aureli argues that Tafuri's contribution to *Contropiano*, 'Toward a Critique of Architectural Ideology', with his emphasis on ideological critique failed to propose an alternative, and thus was unsuccessful in contributing to the political

[153] Tafuri, 14.
[154] Day, 'Strategies in the Metropolitan Merz', 33.

purpose of *Contropiano*.[155] Ammerudrapporten and the discourse it generated displays a similar shortcoming. Despite the political engagement, Sæterdal and Hansen's ideological stance, typical for the critique of modernist planning of the time, offered few practical solutions: it included no counterplan.

The contrast between *Ammerudrapporten*'s bold statements and the limitations experienced when processes of participatory planning were initiated in later satellite towns is considerable.[156] In addition, the report is an amalgam of influences and ideas, not all of which are compatible or can be reduced to a political agenda of class power. Such shortcomings, complexities and contradictions in the report opened up for simpler and more immediate interpretations and assessments of the satellite town as a *place*, no doubt forged by the repeated use of bleak images of repetitive mass housing in *Ammerudrapporten* and the criticism of satellite towns that ensued.

In essence, the effect of *Ammerudrapporten* was consequently that of a nebulous satellite town problem represented by alienating housing blocks that, as it was phrased on the front of the Ammerud paperback edition, 'rise towards the sky'. This simplifying visual critique of a building typology overshadowed specific contradictions and struggles *against the plan*, for participation and power in the economic planning of centres, the politics of housing environments and the social organisation in communities and institutions. One set of contradictions and struggles that was particularly hidden from view were the economics of the satellite town centre, the topic of the next chapter.

[155] See Pier Vittorio Aureli, *The Project of Autonomy: Politics and Poetics within and against Capitalism* (New York: Temple Hoyne Buell Center for the Study of American Architecture, Princeton Architectural Press, 2008), 48–49.

[156] See for example the reports on participation processes in Jens Bjørneboe, 'Brukernes medvirkning på Skjetten', *Byggekunst: The Norwegian Review of Architecture* 53, no. 4 (1971): 135–37; Alf Bastiansen, 'Beboernes medvirkning på Romsås', *Byggekunst: The Norwegian Review of Architecture*, no. 4 (1971): 140.

3
Welfare as consumption

> Retail is of central importance in all of society's efforts to sustain economic growth […]. The profitability requirement means that business owners and staff in the retail trade will usually support an economic system that ensures continued sales growth; i.e., an economic growth policy. The conflict with resource- and pollution-conscious consumers therefore becomes political.[1]

In 1976, *Norsk Produktivitetsinstitutt* (Norwegian Productivity Institute) published *Planlegging og etablering av detaljhandelsbedrifter: en håndbok* (Planning and establishment of retail: a handbook). According to the retail handbook, structural changes in consumption create dilemmas for consumer welfare, which in turn becomes issues of conflict between the three different groups of public authorities, consumers and businesses.[2] In satellite towns, there was a lack of shops and services, inadequate local access because of centralisation, and consumption dominated over social and cultural welfare programmes. The retail handbook mentions the Romsås Centre, which opened in 1975, as an alternative type of centre that would address such problems of consumer welfare from 'a critical perspective'. Contrary to the typical, business-oriented satellite town centre, Romsås Centre was intended to be governed by the local

[1] Borg, *Planlegging og etablering av detaljhandelsbedrifter*, 18.: 'Detaljhandelen har en sentral betydning i hele samfunnets innsats for å opprettholde den økonomiske vekst […]. Lønnsomhetskravet fører til at bedriftseiere og personalet innen varehandel vanligvis vil støtte et økonomisk system som sikrer fortsatt omsetningsøkning, dvs. en økonomisk vekstpolitikk. Konflikten med de ressurs- og forurensingsbevisste forbrukere blir derfor av politisk art.'

[2] Borg, 17.



9. Cover of *Planlegging og etablering av detaljhandelsbedrifter: en håndbok*.

inhabitants themselves, in order to ensure that their interests were prioritised higher than business interests. Since the 1980s, however, the management of the alternative Romsås Centre has become problematic. In 2013, Oslo's city development council stated that

> For several years, the Romsås Centre has performed poorly both commercially and as a social and cultural meeting place for the people of Romsås. […] efforts have been made to investigate solutions to renew the centre and to bring to it a more business-oriented content that is better adapted to local needs.[3]

Romsås Centre was conceived of as part of what the 1950 *Generalplan for Oslo* called a system of local centres; in the 1960 revision of the general plan it was called a *sub-centre system*.[4] This system was an interconnected network of settlements, each hierarchically organised with the housing arranged around local centres that were to contain shops, services and workplaces. A politically coordinated production system of affordable housing for everyone was already in place and arrangements had been made for land acquirement, technical infrastructure provision, rent regulations, standards, financing institutions, distribution and tenure.[5] Conversely, the development of the plan for sub-centres was not secured through a system comparable to that of housing.[6] The planning

[3] Oslo kommune, Byråden for byutvikling to Byutviklingskomiteen, 'Notat til bystyrets organer: Spørsmål fra Anders Røberg-Larsen (A) - konseptvalgutredning for Romsås senter', Memo, 18 March 2013.: 'Romsås senter har i flere år fungert dårlig både kommersielt og som sosial kulturell møteplass for befolkningen på Romsås. […] det [er] arbeidet med å utrede løsninger for å fornye senteret og gi det et mer forretningsmessig innhold som er bedre tilpasset lokale behov.'

[4] See Rolfsen, *Generalplan for Oslo*, 7–8; Oslo Byplankontoret, *Oslo: planlegging og utvikling*, 32.

[5] For the history of the development of Norwegian post-war housing policies and the organisation of housing production, see Annaniassen, *Nå bygger vi den nye tid*; Jardar Sørvoll, 'The Politics of Cooperative Housing in Norway and Sweden' (Oslo and Akershus University College of Applied Sciences, 2013).

[6] The lack of a system for *sub-centres* is apparent in the superficial treatment of the organisation of shops in the 1950 *Generalplan for Oslo*, and in the description of the difficulty of allocating resources for other purposes than housing in the 1960 revision of the plan. Notably, in *Dokument nr. 46*, the economic plan that accompanied the *Generalplan for Oslo*, municipal budgeting focussed almost exclusively on housing and its supporting technical infrastructure. See Rolfsen, *Generalplan for Oslo*, 44–45; Oslo

authorities left much of the design, construction and financing of shops to market forces and private initiatives, and the resulting shopping centres are seldom included under the label welfare state architecture. Correspondingly, while post-war shopping centres and consumption have become a central topic in architectural history, they are often contrasted to welfare programmes.[7] The relationship between welfare and consumerism has instead been elucidated as a contradiction and a transition phase from notions of community centres associated with the goals of the welfare state and consumption-based centres associated with neoliberalism.[8] It has also been argued that this transition phase for satellite towns centres was the root of anti-consumerist critique and the rise of the critical consumer.[9] Common to these accounts is the notion of a troubled relationship between welfare state goals and consumption, where consumerism – represented by the seductive architecture of the large shopping centre – is portrayed as an ethical failure that threatens the welfare in a social democracy.

In this chapter, I instead argue that consumption is an integral and essential part of the welfare state, as a source of development, economic innovation, modern culture and importantly, the distribution of power. Because of its crucial role in the physical materialisation of this societal system of welfare as consumption, the satellite town centre is accordingly equally central as an architecture of the welfare state. This position on consumption is based on a reinterpretation of Manfredo Tafuri's 'Toward a Critique of Architectural Ideology', in which Tafuri makes clear references to Antonio Negri's article in the first issue of *Contropiano* entitled 'La teoria capitalistica nel '29: John M. Keynes' ('Keynes and the

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Finansrådmannen, *Dokument nr. 46*; Oslo Byplankontoret, *Oslo: planlegging og utvikling*, 58.

[7] For example, establishing the post-war centre as a *contrast* to the state-led policies of the post-war welfare state: Gosseye and Avermaete, *Shopping Towns Europe*, 3; and the conflict between shopping and welfare programmes in the centre in Mattsson, 'Where the Motorways Meet: Architecture and Corporatism in Sweden 1968'.

[8] Mattsson, 'Where the Motorways Meet: Architecture and Corporatism in Sweden 1968'; Janina Gosseye, 'Milton Keynes' Centre: The Apotheosis of the British Post-War Consensus or the Apostle of Neo-Liberalism?', *History of Retailing and Consumption* 1, no. 3 (2 September 2015): 209–29; Gosseye, 'Milton Keynes' Centre: The Apotheosis of the British Post-War Consensus or, the Apostle of Neo-Liberalism?'; Gosseye, '"Uneasy Bedfellows" Conceiving Urban Megastructures'.

[9] Mack, 'Hello, Consumer! Skärholmen Centre from the Million Programme to the Mall'.

Capitalist Theory of the State Post-1929').[10] However, Tafuri not only uses *the plan* in reference to Negri's first article.[11] He also repeatedly uses the word *cycles*, a central concept in Negri's article in the second issue of *Contropiano*, entitled 'Marx sul ciclo e la crisi' ('Marx on Cycle and Crisis'), an analysis of crisis based on *Business Cycles* by the economist Joseph Schumpeter.[12] Crucially, this reinterpretation links the notion of crisis not only to the welfare state project as the *plan* for progress, production and welfare, but also to capital, which creates profit and welfare through the cycles of innovation and creative destruction, centring on businesses' role in the welfare state.

In his analysis in the first issue of *Contropiano*, Negri explained that John Maynard Keynes diagnosed the 1929 crisis as a result of too little demand, or in other words, insufficient consumption.[13] The reason was that the working class had not been understood as a basis for demand; they had not yet been socially constructed as *consumers*. The Keynesian *plan*, however, was a new type of economic equilibrium that would position mass consumption – and the working class as consumers – as a central factor in the economy of the welfare state. Since the great crisis of 1929 was caused by an excess of supply, Keynes' cure would be to increase the demand from the working class and so increase consumption. An essential part of Negri's argument is that since consumption depends on income, there needs to be an equilibrium or balance between wages – determined by negotiation between employer and employee – and an economic policy that creates a propensity to

[10] Negri, 'La teoria capitalistica nel '29: John M. Keynes'; Negri, 'Keynes and the Capitalist Theory of the State Post-1929'.
[11] The concept of 'the plan' originally comes from Mario Tronti's 1962 article '*Il piano del capitale*' published in the journal *Quaderni Rossi*, a predecessor to *Contropiano*. See Aureli, 'Intellectual Work and Capitalist Development: Origins and Context of Manfredo Tafuri's Critique of Architectural Ideology', 18, 23.
[12] Note that Tafuri does not actually cite '*Marx sul ciclo e la crisi*'. However, when he later mentions Schumpeter in 'Lavoro intellettuale e sviluppo capitalistico', published in *Contropiano* in 1970 (the first part of the article is published as the third chapter of *Progetto e utopia*, published in English as *Architecture and Utopia*, 1976), his reference is instead to Negri's '*La teoria capitalistica nel '29: John M. Keynes*', where there is no mention of Schumpeter. See Antonio Negri, 'Marx sul ciclo e la crisi', *Contropiano*, no. 2 (1968): 247–95; Negri, 'Marx on Cycle and Crisis'; Manfredo Tafuri, 'Lavoro intellettuale e sviluppo capitalistico', *Contropiano*, no. 2 (1970): 242, 248; Tafuri, *Architecture and Utopia*, 52, 62.
[13] Negri, 'Keynes and the Capitalist Theory of the State Post-1929'.

consume.[14] The welfare state policy of consumption is thus both an instrument for capital to create economic balance and avoid crisis, as well as leverage for reinstating labour power, since the worker's new, pivotal role as a mass consumer is an argument in favour of demanding higher wages, in order to facilitate increased consumption. Negri emphases that Keynes' cure is not a static equilibrium, but a dynamic plan of constant readjustments, since 'the problem is never resolved, but only postponed.' The economic policy of the welfare state must consequently

> dictate a continual revolution of incomes and of the propensity to consume, which will maintain global production and investment and will thus bring about the only form of political equilibrium that is possible - which will only be effective if it is prepared to take on board all the risk and precariousness of a balance of power that is and remains open-ended. This, then, is how we can sum up the spirit of the theory of effective demand: that it assumes class struggle, and sets out to resolve it, on a day-to-day basis, in ways that are favourable to capitalist development.'[15]

According to *Contropiano's* workerist position of 'within and against', this *open-ended*, prominent power position of consumers would mean that it is possible to counteract – and eventually overthrow – capitalism through class struggle. In his article 'Marx on Cycle and Crisis' however, Negri dismisses as an illusion the belief that the working class constitutes a real force against the capitalist mode of production that in the long run will create 'revolutionary subversion'.[16] In effect, Negri thus abandons the workerist position of *Contropiano*; his article ends with a note stating that 'due to fundamental differences related to the magazine's political stance, Antonio Negri will leave the editorial board with this issue'.[17] Negri's position shifted with his reconceptualization of crisis, as he replaces the Keynesian model where the key to progress is to *avoid* crisis

[14] Negri, 28.
[15] Negri, 28–29.
[16] Negri, 'Marx on Cycle and Crisis', 77–78.
[17] See the original article, Negri, 'Marx sul ciclo e la crisi', 295.: 'Per sostanziali divergenze relative alla collocazione politica della rivista, Antonio Negri lascia con questo numero la direzione.'

with a Schumpeterian model in which crisis is instead *intrinsic* to progress.[18] The key term here is *cycle*:

> in Keynes, then, development seeks to be an alternative to crisis; in Schumpeter, development is seen in a new way, as subsuming all phases of the cycle, and thus development includes crisis and uses it to further the process of the cycle.[19]

The consequence of this shift is that the workerist struggle is impossible within the capitalist system, which not only uses crisis to reinvent itself to enable new growth, but in the same operation transforms the very framework for negotiations and for class struggle. The reason, Negri argues, lies in the capitalist logic; the constant conflict over the profit of production between the working class and capital, with the effect that the economic cycle will tend to stagnate.[20] However, with reference to Schumpeter, Negri describes that when stagnating, 'the cycle is negating the whole capitalist rationale of the economic process, inasmuch as it eliminates profit, eliminates the qualitative innovation implicit in profit, and eliminates capitalist progress.'[21] Capital will consequently try to restore profit, innovation and capitalist domination – and this is the crucial part of Negri's argument – by reinventing its own structures by *using* the crisis and by the same operation increasing its own power and reducing the power of the working class. The result is a description of an economic system where capital actively pursues crisis, and where

> development and crisis act in dialectical unison, to present a picture of capitalism obliged continually to reinvent and reconstruct the balance of forces, obliged continually to seek conflict and confrontation as the means whereby to reactivate the economic cycle.[22]

While the Keynesian model of progress through steady growth opens for power to workers, the Schumpeterian model – in which progress and crisis are united as disruptive innovation – subsumes consumer resistance

[18] Negri, 'Marx on Cycle and Crisis', 48, 53.
[19] Negri, 57.
[20] Negri, 67.
[21] Negri is referring here to Joseph A. Schumpeter, *Business Cycles*, vol. 1 (New York; London: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1923), 15–23, 42–45.
[22] Negri, 'Marx on Cycle and Crisis', 72.

into its cycles of development. The only option left for worker's resistance, Negri proclaims, is revolution when capitalism is at its weakest – which is when it is reorganising – at the time of crisis.[23]

While Tafuri emphasises that his critique 'does not pretend to have any "revolutionary" aim',[24] integrating Negri's shift from *the plan* to *cycle* in the interpretation of Tafuri's analysis has two other major consequences. Crucially, one consequence is that instead of understanding Tafuri's critique of architectural ideology as an analysis of architecture's role in Keynesian policies as *the plan* for economic growth with *the state* as the focus, I interpret Tafuri's critique as an analysis of architecture's role in the Schumpeterian business *cycles* with *capital* as the focus. In terms of the welfare state compromise, this is a shift from the perspective of the state – as representing the welfare state as a whole – to the perspective of capital as one part of the welfare state compromise. Another consequence concerns Tafuri's use of crisis in his analysis. Rather than seeing the possibilities for architecture in terms of the continuous workerist struggle *within and against* the *plan*, where the worker class is an essential element and therefore holds a position of power, that hope appears to be lost when the struggle is against *business cycles* that work *with* crisis instead of *avoiding* crisis.

The retail handbook as critique

Norsk Produktivitetsinstitutt did not plan, build or manage centre projects, but was instead a research facility and learning arena for actors in centre planning and retail, and described tendencies, challenges and solutions in their publications. The retail handbook was an important part of this activity, written by Asbjørn Borg supported by an advisory board whose members represented market research, financing, the consumer cooperative, trade unions and urban research; additional advice came from several government ministries.[25] The retail handbook

[23] Negri, 80–81.

[24] Tafuri, *Architecture and Utopia*, ix.

[25] See Borg, *Planlegging og etablering av detaljhandelsbedrifter*, preface. The advisory board consisted of *Fondet for markeds- og distribusjonsforskning*, *Bergen Bank*, *Norges kooperative landsforening*, *Norsk handelsstands forbund* and *Norsk institutt for by- og regionforskning*. The additional advice was provided by *Handels [og sjøfarts]departementet*, *Kommunal og arbeidsdepartementet*, *Miljøverndepartementet* and *Forbruker- og administrasjonsdepartementet*.

did not contain any original material, but instead focussed on disseminating previous research to a broader audience that comprised a number of actors from the public and private sectors, including ministries, state financing institutions, municipalities, single merchants, wholesalers, chain stores, private banks and credit institutions, entrepreneurs, architects and other consultants.[26] The stated intention of the retail handbook was to act as guidance for all those involved in the planning and establishment of retail businesses. Based on the intentions, authorship and audience of the publication, *Norsk Produktivitetsinstitutt* sees the problems and contradictions of consumption from the economic perspective of retail businesses: what Negri would call the point of view of capital.[27]

The problems of welfare as consumption thus appear in the retail handbook as a contradiction between large, centralised retail units and decentralised accessibility and service in terms of *velferdstap eller velferdsvinning* (welfare loss or welfare gain).[28] In the retail handbook, *Norsk Produktivitetsinstitutt* sees this problem as a result of the structural development of the economy, caused by the economic growth policy of the welfare state – indeed what Negri, referring to Keynes, calls *the plan*.[29] In the retail handbook, the state is criticised for creating welfare problems on its own, as its policies for growth create centralisation and urbanisation, which contradicts welfare goals, and furthermore because state policies negatively affect business profit, making it difficult for businesses to fulfil *their* societal tasks of providing material welfare to the population. With this statement, *Norsk Produktivitetsinstitutt* argues that the welfare of consumers would improve if left to businesses without state interference.

The retail handbook's presentation of the historical development of retail can be read as a narrative of the development of this contradiction: on the one hand there are state-led policies for structural developments –

[26] Borg, 7–8, 65–66. The sources used in the *retail handbook* include publications by *Norsk Produktivitetsinstitutt, NIBR* and the Danish *Institut for Centerplanlægning*, the consumer cooperative, private sector retail organisations, and state administration in the form of reports to the parliament.

[27] See Negri, 'Marx on Cycle and Crisis', 81; Negri, 'Marx sul ciclo e la crisi', 292. Negri emphasises the importance of the *point of view*, whether the problems of advanced capitalism are seen from the perspective of capital (*il punto di vista capitalistico*) or the perspective of workers (*il punto di vista operaio*).

[28] Borg, *Planlegging og etablering av detaljhandelsbedrifter*, 12–13.

[29] Negri, 'Keynes and the Capitalist Theory of the State Post-1929'.

the Keynesian *plan* – and on the other hand responses in the form of business innovations – the Schumpeterian *cycles*. In the retail handbook, as in as other publications by *Norsk Produktivitetsinstitutt*, the historical development of retail is divided in two main phases. From 1953 to 1963, there was a consolidation phase during which there were increases in turnover, employment and the number of businesses. This was followed by a second phase from 1963 to 1973, characterised by a trend towards fewer, but larger businesses, the development of new market segments, the introduction of self-service and the expansion of the range of commodities.[30] In the retail handbook, *Norsk Produktivitetsinstitutt* sees these innovations of retail as businesses' direct response to the conditions set up by the state. These innovations align with what Negri, referring to Schumpeter, describes as the basis of business cycles.[31] In other words, the historical development of the problem of welfare is set up as a conflict and interplay between the growth policy of the state and the innovations of capital: between the Keynesian *plan* and the Schumpeterian *cycles.*

According to the retail handbook, the size of businesses is of great interest in this development history, since 'there seems to be a connection between enterprise size and negotiating power, planning ability and capacity, and ability to influence the environment.'[32] In other words, the development of retail since 1963 served to both shift focus towards the private sector and increase the power of businesses that could grow and innovate; this corresponds precisely to Schumpeter's focus. In a broader perspective, this development can also be understood in terms of the creation of profit and accumulation of power – not only over other businesses, but over the state and the population as workers and consumers; Negri describes this as 'capitalism obliged continually to reinvent and reconstruct the balance of forces'.[33]

The notions of welfare loss or welfare gain describe the consequences of the innovative transformations of consumption by retail businesses.

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[30] Borg, *Planlegging og etablering av detaljhandelsbedrifter*, 12. The retail handbook uses the Norwegian term *bransjeglidning*. A term often used in the context is *disruptive innovation*.

[31] Negri, 'Marx on Cycle and Crisis'.

[32] Borg, *Planlegging og etablering av detaljhandelsbedrifter*, 13.: 'det synes å være sammenheng mellom foretaksstørrelse og forhandlingsstyrke, planleggingsevne og kapasitet, og evne til å påvirke omgivelsene.'

[33] See Negri, 'Marx on Cycle and Crisis', 72.

On one side, these transformations increase welfare loss, as the customer has fewer stores from which to choose, must travel longer distances, and experiences less personal service in the shop as well as fewer home deliveries of goods. On the other side, the same developments also generate welfare gain through a broader and deeper product range and lower prices than what had been possible with many smaller units.[34] Elsewhere, *Norsk Produktivitetsinstitutt* describes the problem of welfare gain and loss as a contradiction between two ideologies of welfare as consumption, protecting vulnerable consumers on the one hand and ensuring the most efficient consumption systems on the other hand.[35] The retail handbook however describes a conflict between the three different groups of public authorities, consumers and businesses in the planning of retail businesses.[36] In other words, it constructs the problems of centres as a conflict between the parts of the welfare state compromise; i.e., state, civic society and capital and their respective welfare perspectives.

The state's policy for economic growth is elucidated as the historical background and the contemporary structural framework for the developments in retail. For the state, the welfare aspect of consumption lies both in its role in creating nationwide economic growth and in the material welfare of individual consumers.[37] The policy for growth, *Norsk Produktivitetsinstitutt* argues, led to a gradual transformation of society as a whole, causing a strong relative growth of service industries in the public and private sectors together with policies for industrial growth that favoured large units, with centralisation and urbanisation as a result. The economic planning of the state was based on district policies, with subsidies to industry and businesses in the districts together with active efforts to reduce the pressure for centralisation.[38] These policies were later supplemented with policies to limit the negative aspects of the economic growth; these included the 1965 planning law, environmental policies, policies for the restricted use of resources and preservation, and policies

[34] Borg, *Planlegging og etablering av detaljhandelsbedrifter*, 12–13, 16.
[35] Andreas Lund and Max Petersen, *Utvalg for handelssentrer: beretning om virksomheten 1972 og 1973* (Oslo: Norsk institutt for by- og regionforskning, 1974), 3.
[36] Borg, *Planlegging og etablering av detaljhandelsbedrifter*, 17.
[37] Borg, 13.
[38] Borg, 56–57. According to the retail handbook, future district policies will also include retail by establishing subsidies for small business with the aim to maintain a minimum of service to consumers in remote areas.

for the local physical and social environment. Crucially, *Norsk Produktivitetsinstitutt* claims that state regulations may have negative effects on innovation and will thus have negative consequences on the main welfare functions of retail.[39]

For businesses, the provision of consumer welfare is conditioned by their own profit. The most important factors to consider for businesses are turnover and the constant adaptation of product ranges to consumer demands. According to the retail handbook, businesses have a narrow perspective of profit because their profitability has been negatively influenced by state intervention; it consequently criticises the state's economic policy of attempting to fight inflation by frequently introducing price- and profit regulation, since 'such measures have a series of negative side effects that mostly affect disadvantaged consumers.'[40] The retail handbook claims that the increasing cost that results from inflation combined with tight price controls can only be countered by rationalisation and effectivity measures from retail businesses. The result is longer travel distances, more traffic, and greater consumer sacrifices. The profitability requirements mean that decentralised shopping becomes harder to achieve, as a consequence of concentration of retail into increasingly larger retail units.[41]

The paradox, according to the retail handbook, is that the state policies for welfare eventually create welfare loss for consumers: the structure development resulting from this profitability requirement conflicts with political goals of avoiding centralisation and maintaining existing settlement patterns – as well as the concern for weak consumer groups. Clearly, this is a claim that consumer welfare would improve without state price regulation and taxing of retail, and the retail handbook is thus a critique of Keynesian interventionism as damaging to welfare.

In its publications, *Norsk Produktivitetsinstitutt* claims to be placing the consumer in the centre. However, according to the retail handbook, the businesses' main goal is to satisfy consumer needs by providing ease of shopping, appropriate quality and price, and adequate product range. Thus, when the retail handbook states that consumers are a diverse group, it is merely referring to the fact that there are variations in how

[39] Borg, 14.
[40] Borg, 15.: 'Slike tiltak medfører en rekke bivirkninger som stort sett rammer de ressurssvake forbrukerne.'
[41] Borg, 16.

consumers perceive ease and comfort of shopping, as well as acceptable prices and an adequate product.[42] This type of diversification is comparable with Negri's theorisation of the politics for creating a propensity to consume as a source of consumer power, where he sees the differences in wages as an argument for demanding higher wages.[43] In contrast to this enabling of empowerment, the retail handbook's differentiation between consumers is a retail instrument for tailoring consumption to multiple consumer groups. The differentiation is thus an exercise of power, possibly to the effect of 'neutralising the political potential' of the working class, as Negri would call it, but in this case as consumers, not producers.[44]

In describing the consumer as a *passive* recipient and retail business as the *active* agent who adapts to as well as influences and forms the consumer, *Norsk Produktivitetsinstitutt* sees the consumer from a business perspective. Retail is the primary force in this social construction of the consumer based on material needs, as it

> participates in the work of introducing new products and product variations and stimulates increased material consumption. This side of the retail business is part of the social mechanism that makes it possible to achieve the political objective of economic growth.[45]

The retail handbook, however, suggests possible alternatives. One is in the consumer co-operative, which has been associated with the hegemony of the Labour party in the post-war years. The retail handbook states with some scepticism that 'in our country the consumer co-operative tries to let the consumers decide what is offered.'[46] In what appears to contradict *Norsk Produktivitetsinstitutt*'s ideology of market-based consumption, the Romsås Centre is seen as an attempt to put ideas of consumer-led centres into practice and challenge market forces.

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[42] Borg, 14.
[43] Negri, 'Marx on Cycle and Crisis', 28.
[44] Negri, 10.
[45] Borg, *Planlegging og etablering av detaljhandelsbedrifter*, 15.: 'Den deltar i arbeidet med å introdusere nye produkter og produktvarianter for forbrukerne og stimulerer til økt materielt konsum. Denne side ved detaljhandelens virksomhet inngår som et ledd i den samfunnsmekanisme som gjør det mulig å oppnå den politiske målsetning om økonomisk vekst.'
[46] Borg, 21.: 'I vårt land forsøker forbrukerkooperasjonen å la forbrukerne bestemme over tilbudet.'

According to the retail handbook, retail is a part of the planning of a satellite town, and in some cases – such as Romsås – consumer considerations are part of the planning. Nevertheless, it reiterates that while profitability is no longer the ultimate goal in these cases, it is still a framework condition for economic viability.[47] In Romsås, a political resolution was made for the centre to be administered as a whole. This then became a grounds for extensive local government of the centre, as several of the functions in such a centre must be governed locally, such as the community centre. While planning with business economic goals (profit) has been the norm, in some cases centres have been planned by the municipality or housing co-operations; the centre of Romsås is one such case.[48]

The consumer-led alternative

The Romsås Centre was built between 1973 and 1975 as the heart of the satellite town of Romsås, which was in turn constructed between 1969 and 1974. Both the satellite town and centre were planned by the architect group *Romsåsteamet* (the Romsås team).[49] As a model satellite town, Romsås has often been narrated as the ultimate attempt of the planners and architects to solve the problems criticised in earlier satellite towns, e.g. the lack of central buildings for commercial, social and cultural purposes, inefficient process coordination, inadequate solutions to deal with increased car traffic, and insufficient provisions for the inhabitants' needs due to an absence of participation planning.[50] A significant part of this critique was that in earlier satellite towns, housing blocks were often built long before the centres that would service them; in the Romsås project, there was emphasis on service functions and housing being built simultaneously. In contrast to earlier satellite centres,

[47] Borg, 19.
[48] Borg, 44.
[49] *Romsåsteamet* consisted of Alex Christiansen, Trygve Kleiven, Randi Klippgen, Olav Holm, Alf Halvorsen, Nils Rosland and Alf Bastiansen. Alex Christiansen, *Alex Christiansen arkitektkontor A/S: 30 år 9000 boliger*, 1985, 5.
[50] The principal critique was the Ammerud report; see also Chapters 1 and 2 of this thesis. See Sæterdal and Hansen, *Ammerud 1*; Bull, *Å bo i drabantby*; Gulbrandsen, *Å bo på ett rom i blokk*; Hansen and Sæterdal, *Ammerud*; See also Sven Erik Svendsen, 'Romsås: Et forsøk på å skape den ideelle drabantby', *Fremtid for fortiden*, no. 3/4 (2002): 68–77.

the Romsås Centre was planned to contain all necessary service functions.

The Labour press newspaper *Arbeiderbladet* describes *Romsåsteamet* as a group of young planners opposed to retail prognoses. The newspaper cites the team leader, architect Alex Christiansen, as stating that retail no longer believed in small convenience stores in new housing areas. In turn, according to Christiansen, this had an effect on research into prognosis and store planning, leading to the development of increasingly larger stores. As a result, shopping had become more cumbersome and time-consuming for the housewife, and the elderly and unwell, having lost nearby shops and services, could be forced out of their homes and into institutions.[51] In other words, Christiansen argues in support of the social welfare effects of local access to consumption. His main points are that planners must stand on the side of those with the least amount of power and be critical of the calculations and prognoses of retail. In other words, architects must side with workers and consumers against capital. At Romsås there are three significant organisational measures to address this problem: the spatial distribution of local shops, the co-planning character of the main centre, and the principal organisation for the consumer-led shop.

Romsås' planners prioritised local access to shops by decentralising centre functions to the five housing neighbourhoods at Romsås. The satellite town was planned for strict traffic separation, and crucially, in the transition points between vehicle and pedestrian traffic in each neighbourhood, the planners had invented an infrastructural concept that they called *bilbrygger* (lit. car-piers), adjacent to which there were to be local service points containing shops, kiosks, small businesses and childcare centres.[52] From the point of view of housing co-operations, these were small service hubs for social and commercial service.[53] From the perspective of the retail trade, these were service kiosks, an innovative new type of shop which would be tested at Romsås. As a typology, the service kiosk is a successor to the small convenience store, a shop typology disappearing in Sweden at the time as the development shifted

[51] 'Unge planleggere går på tvers av handelens prognoser: Nærbutikkene vil stå klare for "nybyggerne" på Romsås', *Arbeiderbladet*, 1 April 1970.
[52] Romsåsteamet, *Forslag til samplanlegging av Romsås senter*, 1970, 4.
[53] Finn Henriksen et al., *Medbestemmelsesrett, fleksibilitet, miljø, naturvern og standard: stikkord for og utfordring til en debatt innen boligsamvirket* (Norske boligbyggelags landsforbund, 1970), 12–13.

10. Model of Romsås Centre. Cover of *Forslag til samplanlegging av Romsås senter*.

towards larger and larger shops.[54] Whether these designs could be considered inventions of social welfare or innovative shop concepts for welfare in terms of consumption was a question of perspective.

The 1973 revised regulatory plan defined the main Romsås Centre as a co-planned centre.[55] This new notion of planning was based on a 1970 proposal developed by *Romsåsteamet* entitled *Forslag til samplanlegging av Romsås senter* (Proposal for co-planning of Romsås Centre).[56] Because consumption was being decentralised to the neighbourhood service points, minimal commercial content was planned; instead the social and cultural activities were meant to dominate.[57] Indeed, as a whole, Romsås

[54] See Ruth Bjørneboe, '75-årsjubilanten lover utvidede service-ytelser', 24 April 1970. The statement is from an interview with Harry Schierning, leader of *Oslo Kolonialkjøpmenns Forening* (Oslo Colonial Grocers Association).
[55] 'Endret reguleringsplan med reguleringsbestemmelser for Romsås senter, del av gnr. 96, bnr. 36' (Oslo byplankontor, 1973), Saksnummer 197356934 - Reguleringssak, Plan- og bygningsetatens arkiv.
[56] See Romsåsteamet, *Forslag til samplanlegging av Romsås senter*, 1; 'Samplanlegging nytt begrep i Oslos utbyggingspolitikk', *Arbeiderbladet*, 16 December 1968.
[57] Romsåsteamet, *Forslag til samplanlegging av Romsås senter*, 4.



11. Romsås Centre diagram. From *Forslag til samplanlegging av Romsås senter*.

was not primary planned as a commercial centre, but as a centre for all functions and services that were needed for the population. The principle of co-planning was intended to ensure a coordinated use of the functions in the centre through optimal utilisation of the interior spaces across traditional boundaries and interests. The architecture was based on principles of flexibility to accommodate many and shifting functions and aimed to answer directly to the new social politics with decentralisation and co-operation. In other words, the welfare needs of the residents appear more important than the needs of the retail trade: the focus was to be on service, not consumption.

A prerequisite for this arrangement was that the Romsås Centre was politically governed. The proposal for the revised regulatory plan was made by the lawyer Per Aavatsmark, a politician from *Sosialistisk Folkeparti* (The popular socialist party) and the leader of the planning and building committee for the Romsås Centre. With a national social reform came a policy for the coordination of health and social services,



Vegger i stue, soverom og entré skal tapetseres. Av anbudsmessige og rasjonelle grunner vil beboernes valg av tapeter skje innen et begrenset antall tapettyper, som tas ut av arkitektene i samråd med OBOS. Hver enkelt beboer vil få tilsendt et særskilt rundskriv angående valg av tapet, når tidspunktet for innflytting nærmer seg.
Himlinger i kjøkken og våtrom vil bli malt. I øvrige rom vil himlinger bli grenget.
Innervegger utføres som lette vegger med gipsplater på begge sider.
Leilighetene får klesbod inne i leilighetene på omkring 3 m², matbod i kjeller og en egen sportsbod på terreng nær inngangen eller i disp. kjellerrom.
I foreldresoverom i 4- og 3-roms leiligheter vil det bli satt opp 2 garderobeskap og 1 hylleskap. I de store barnesoverom vil bli satt opp 1 garderobeskap og 1 hylleskap. I de små soverom vil bli satt opp 1 garderobeskap med plass til et tilleggsskap.
Vindusparti i stue får et fast innlistet isolerglass og et koplet sidehengslet vindu, bortsett fra leilighetstype D 13 og D 14 som får fast vindu i stue og luftemulighet via sidehengslet vindu i soverom eller gjennom balkongdør. Soverom får koplet, horisontalhengslet svingvindu og/eller koplet, sidehengslet innadslående vindu. Underetasjer får fast innlistet isolerglass med sidehengslet, utadstående luftevindu.
Kjøkken får koplet, horisontalhengslet svingvindu.
Samtlige innvendige dører er glatte, finerte med Limba-finér. Dører til hovedbalkonger blir koplet, utadslående med glass.
Alle leiligheter får full elektrisk oppvarming, og det vil bli levert og montert panelovner i samsvar med det utregnede varmebehov.
Leilighetene ventileres ved et mekanisk ventilasjonsanlegg med utsuging fra kjøkken og W C/bad, og med friskluftilgang gjennom spaltevinduer i vinduenes overkarmer. Det mekaniske og inngreulerte ventilasjonsanlegg tillater ikke montering av private avtrekksvifter.
Det vil bli montert antenner for radio og fjernsyn. Videre vil det bli gjort klart for telefontilkopling, ved at rør for telefonledning legges fram til entré.

Balkonger
Alle leiligheter får en hovedbalkong på ca. 12 m², eller en oppholdsplass på terreng utenfor stuen. Alle 4- og 3-roms og noen 2-roms leiligheter får en luftebalkong på ca. 2,5 m².

12. *Bilbrygger* and service point in one of the housing cooperations. From the OBOS brochure *Røverkollen borettslag, Romsås*. Vol. 1974:1. OBOS, 1973.

and Oslo's first health and social centre would be at the Romsås Centre.[58] It was determined that Romsås' borough council would govern the Romsås Centre, and demands were even made that private businesses should be subject to political control.[59] In its ambitious political programme, the Labour party at Romsås requested political control over both the municipal and business sections of the centre, suggesting a substantial housing service programme in the centre and proposing that the new health and social centre of Romsås should work actively to counteract alienation in the satellite town.[60]

In the plan for the allocation of shops in the Romsås Centre, a requirement was that the spaces should be dimensioned based on the actual *needs* of the satellite town and not business-centric calculations of profitability. In earlier satellite town centres, space was let out to two supermarkets so that they could compete; here, rather than being driven

[58] Herborg Handagard, 'Romsås-senteret blir et viktig forsøk: Sosial bistand og helsetjeneste under samme tak for første gang', *Arbeiderbladet*, 8 July 1971.
[59] 'Bydelsutvalget vil styre Romsås senter', *Arbeiderbladet*, 10 October 1973.
[60] 'Arbeiderpartiet på Romsås legger fram et omfattende bydelsprogram', *Arbeiderbladet*, 29 October 1973.

13. Romsås Centre. Photograph by Teigens fotoatelier, 1977. DEXTRA Photo, Norsk Teknisk Museum. Licenced under CC BY.

by competition, the way in which shops were run should be determined by democratic inhabitant influence. The proposal advised that the selection of trades and types of shops in the centre should be subject to careful consideration regarding which shop pattern would best serve inhabitants' needs. The larger supermarket in the centre was expected to cooperate with smaller convenience stores located in the neighbourhoods of Romsås. Inhabitants could shop for basic items locally, and also place delivery orders from the central supermarket. The result was what the retail handbook described as a centrally-located consumer cooperative supermarket with extensive inhabitant influence and privately-owned local convenience stores.[61] Combining centralisation and decentralisation of consumption and service, in cooperation with both the consumer cooperative and private sector retail, Romsås was an alternative as a middle ground between the parts of the welfare state compromise.

[61] Borg, *Planlegging og etablering av detaljhandelsbedrifter*, 20.



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Romsas

This new community of 2600 dwellings, 12 km north-east of the centre of Oslo is fairly typical of the larger schemes financed by the Husbank. The site (75 hectare) has six neighbourhoods spread around the brow of a hill that overlooks Oslo's main industrial valley. The site is heavily wooded and very rocky—conditions that made servicing and road-building costs expensive. In addition, the site is served by a new link into Oslo's metro.

Romsås is big, bland and colourless. Only inside the functionalist Romsås centre does any positive potential emerge. This is a building to observe from the inside.

The flurry of the street traders' stalls on the main concourse is a marked contrast to the wide, deserted terraces outside. The building houses a reception centre for the new community, a school, shops, sporting facilities, youth club, geriatric centre, lifts to the metro and a basement garage where there are regular bus services to the city. The main concourse also has a post office, bank, cafeteria and hairdressers. The sitting areas have become a place where school drop-outs congregate, particularly in winter.

Architects for the development were Romsas-teamet, a team created within the Husbank.

Main circulation level in Romsas Centre.

Key

SPORTS CENTRE
1 void over gym
2 gallery
3 store
4 void over pool

YOUTH CLUB
5 vestibule
6 kitchen
7 club leader
8 large hall
9 club room
10 toilets
11 music room
12 group room
13 store

RECEPTION AND PUBLIC AREAS
14 spaces for hiring out
15 ladies hairdresser's
16 reception centre
17 bank
18 post office
19 manager
20 office
21 cafeteria
22 meeting/reception room
23 gents hairdresser
30 lifts to metro and other levels

GERIATRIC CENTRE
24 director
25 director's assistants
26 reception
27 physiotherapy
28 activity therapy
29 rooms for hiring out

Gallery between circulation area and overlooking swimming pool.

Site plan showing location of neighbourhoods and Romsas Centre.

14. *Architects' Journal* presents Romsås Centre. 'At a Glance Visits Norway: Romsas'. *Architects' Journal* 164, no. 32 (August 1976): 256–57.

Research on centre planning

The retail handbook represented the aggregated research on the retail planning that the planners of Romsås challenged, yet it had little to say about wider-reaching urban consequences, architectural questions and planning considerations. The retail handbook suggests that there had been too little interaction between the physical planning of centres and the work in *Norsk Produktivitetsinstitutt*. In other words, there appeared to have been a lack of integration between research, businesses, and the physical planning and construction of satellite town centres. This is particularly puzzling since efforts had been made to integrate these areas of knowledge in a specific research institute thirteen years earlier.

On 23 August 1963, *Norsk Produktivitetsinstitutt* had held a conference at the restaurant Holmenkollen in Oslo to discuss the formation of an institute for centre planning.[62] The invitation to the conference explains that there had in recent years been a number of calls for a Norwegian organ for the planning of shopping centres, which would perform tasks similar to those of the Danish *Institut for Centerplanlægning* (ICP) 'which had already successfully solved large tasks' since its inception in 1959.[63] The leader of ICP, the architect John Alpass, had recently visited Oslo to present the organisation and function of the Danish institute.[64] The conference was organised on the initiative of *Oslo Kjøpmannsforening* (the Oslo merchant association).[65] The participants represented the Oslo planning department, trade organisations, NGOs, building research institutes, the consumer cooperative, and technical consultants. The new institute was intended to address the problems created by ongoing, substantial structural changes in consumption patterns and systems in Norway, especially the threats to the existing retail trade from the existing *co-operative model* and large international retail chains. The 1963 conference for centre planning consequently introduced a discourse on the structural consequences of an

[62] 'Norsk institutt for senterplanlegging?', *Aftenposten*, 17 June 1963.
[63] Bjørn Vidar, 'Opprettelse av et institutt for senterplanlegging' (Norsk produktivitetsinstitutt, 16 August 1963), 36 Institutt for senterplanlegging, Norsk forening for bolig- og byplanleggings arkiv.: 'som allerede har løst store oppgaver på en tilfredsstillende måte.' See the archive of Norsk bolig- og byplanforening (NBBF).
[64] Ole Julian Eilertsen, ed., *Skandinavisk butikksenterkonferanse. Oslo mai 1961* (Oslo: Norsk Produktivitetsinstitutt, 1961).
[65] Minutes from the conference distributed to the participants. The Archive of Norsk bolig- og byplanforening (NBBF).

emerging consumer society, consisting of larger organisational complexes with multiple infrastructures, technologies, regulations and actors, which can be described as a social construction of infrastructural consumerism.[66]

Norsk Produktivitetsinstitutt was an obvious choice of venue for discussing the problem of structural changes in consumption, given its role in economic development in the post-war years. The institute had been established in 1953 as an extension of the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) to implement the Marshall Plan's economic help in the reconstruction of Norway. The institute also cooperated with the European Productivity Agency.[67] The agency's mandate was to revolutionise production systems using US productivity politics to depoliticise social and economic issues: welfare should be created not through class struggle, but by economic growth.[68]

In return for the financial help, countries had to Americanise. An implicit political function of the requirement was the counteracting of developments of a socialist economy in European welfare states. Norway was a great supporter of the agency; this was probably a result of its wartime economic setbacks and a conviction that Norway needed to learn from others, especially the Anglo-Saxon countries.[69] The establishment of the Norwegian institute for productivity was thus a political turn from seeing national economic growth as essential for

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[66] For the theorization of infrastructures, systems and complexes in the context of urban geography, see Graham and Marvin, *Splintering Urbanism*; see also Thomas P. Hughes, 'The Evolution of Large Technological Systems', *The Social Construction of Technological Systems: New Directions in the Sociology and History of Technology*, 1987, 51–82; and Reinhold Martin, *The Organizational Complex: Architecture, Media, and Corporate Space* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2003).

[67] The Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) emerged from the Marshall Plan and was established in 1948 to work for the reconstruction of Europe. OEEC was superseded in 1961 by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), a worldwide body. The European Productivity Agency existed from 1953 to 1961; although the name is often abbreviated as EPA, the full name is used here to avoid confusion. For a contemporaneous presentation of the agency from the Norwegian point of view, see Petter Andr. Nordby, 'Det Europeiske Produktivitetsinstitutt', *Sosialøkonomen*, no. 8 (October 1959): 9–10; For the origin of NPI, see Christian Erlandsen, *Norsk Produktivitetsinstitutt gjennom de første ti år* (Oslo: Norsk Produktivitetsinstitutt, 1963).

[68] Bent Boel, *The European Productivity Agency and Transatlantic Relations 1953-1961* (Museum Tusculanum Press, 2003), 12, 250.

[69] Boel, 233, 240–41.

welfare, as was the basic tenet of Keynesianism and in the common programme in 1945,[70] to a American economic perspective which saw business innovation as the source of welfare. The welfare state economy would be Schumpeterian, based on competition for profit involving innovation and creative destruction.

The central question addressed at the conference was definition of the operational scope of the new research institute. Representatives from the retail trade wanted to focus on the restructuring challenges that their members faced, while other participants stressed that the new institute should also study the physical planning of centres, including social and cultural functions.[71] The main threat experienced by the retail trade were the systems represented by the co-operative sector and the large international companies such as the Swedish EPA, established in Sweden in 1930. Around 1960, advertisements had appeared in the conservative Oslo newspaper *Aftenposten* to tempt Norwegians in the Oslo region to travel across the border to Sweden and shop at EPA stores.[72] At the same time, newspapers discussed EPA and other possible foreign investors in Norwegian retail as threats.[73] The consumer cooperation, which had started as a consumer-owned and profit-sharing alternative to the traditional capitalist trades, had recently rationalised its large structure and introduced self-service shops in Oslo. Both *consumption models* were consequently more modernised than the relatively traditional and conservative Norwegian retail trade, which still consisted predominantly of small shops and businesses.

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[70] See the common programme for post-war reconstruction: Smitt Ingebretsen et al., *Arbeid for alle: De politiske partienes felles program (blåboka)*.

[71] The functions mentioned were cafés, restaurants, public offices, institutions and services. The participants came from every relevant organisation and sector. According to the minutes of the conference arranged by the Norwegian Productivity Institute in 1963, the participants were: Scheel and Holtan from *Norges Handelsstands Forbund*, Haugen, Hørthe, Stranden and Aalmo from *Norges Kooperative Landsforening*, G. Gresvig, L. Nielsen, A. Pettersen, S. Stoesen, Ottesen, E. Schrøder, Muggerud, Løvset from *Oslo Kjøpmannsforening*, H. Kobbe, N. Haugstvedt, Bjergsrud, M. Pedersen from *Oslo Byplankontor*, Bonnevie, Myklebost, Olimb from *Norsk Bolig- og byplanforening*, Bailley Nielsen from *Forskningsrådenes Fellesutvalg*, S. E. Lundby from *Norsk byggforskningsinstitutt*, Andersson, Skjånes from *Konsulentfirma Andersson og Skjånes*, K. B. Andersen from *Konsulentfirma Knut B. Andersen*, Dalen, Vidar and Omholt from *Norsk Produktivitetsinstitutt*. *Oslo Samvirkelag*, *Distriktenes Utbyggingsfond*, and *Den Norske Ingeniørforening* were invited, but were not represented in the conference.

[72] 'EPA', *Aftenposten*, 6 December 1963.

[73] Norwegian economic policies were changed to allow foreign investments.

In the area of trade and consumption, the first years after the Second World War had in effect been a continuation of war rationing systems. Traditional merchants blamed the particularly strict Norwegian state-led consumer goods rationing and trade regulation from 1945 to 1953 for inhibiting a natural market development and putting the merchants at a disadvantage compared to the consumer cooperation and the development of innovations in consumer markets and systems in other countries. Earlier the same year, the leader of *Oslo Kjøpmannsforening* Knut Gresvig expressed the need to re-evaluate the structure of the process in its entirety, from production to consumption, asserting that as a latecomer, Norway had the advantage of learning from other countries' successes and failures. Gresvig mentioned the need for a transition to larger shopping units and larger concentrations, urging private sector actors to rationalise and begin to cooperate with industry, wholesale and retail.[74] At the conference, the representatives of the merchant association presented a modified suggestion for statutes that showed the difference in perspective clearly: all mentions of 'centre planning' in the suggestion were replaced with 'retail trade planning', and 'retail trade types' was substituted with 'retail trade businesses.' Furthermore, they added, the institute should evaluate infrastructural conditions that would impact the composition and locations of businesses. In other words, they proposed a specific business-perspective rather than a centre-typology perspective and emphasised the infrastructures and systems surrounding these entities. Or in other words still: a Schumpeterian perspective.

The conference did not result in any self-contained institute for centre planning in Norway, however. The reason was that *Norges Teknisk-Naturvitenskapelige Forskningsråd* (Royal Norwegian Council for Scientific and Industrial Research) was already planning a new committee with a broader scope, namely that of urban research.[75] The research on centres was instead organised as a *Fagutvalg for handelssentre*, a sub-committee of the new committee *Utvalg for byforskning* as a

[74] See Knut Gresvig, 'Brytningstid i detaljvarehandelen', *Radio TV Handel og service, Organ for Norske Radio/TV-handleres Landsforbund*, 5 April 1963.

[75] See Øyvind Thomassen, *Herlege tider: norsk fysisk planlegging ca. 1930-1965*, Skriftserie fra Historisk institutt (trykt utg.) nr 18 (Trondheim: Historisk institutt, HF-fakultetet, NTNU, 1997), 438; Norges teknisk-naturvitenskapelige forskningsråd, *Årsberetning 1963* (Oslo: J. Petlitz boktrykkeri, 1964), xvii–xviii. *Norges Teknisk-Naturvitenskapelige Forskningsråd* (Royal Norwegian Council for Scientific and Industrial Research) was inaugurated by the Norwegian Parliament in 1946 and merged with four other research councils into *Norges Forskningsråd* (The Research Council of Norway) in 1992.

collaboration between *Norsk Produktivitetsinstitutt, Norges Handelsstands forening* and *Norges kooperative forening*.[76] Arguably, this organisation model was part of a strategy to secure funding for *Utvalg for byforskning* by including the trade organisations.[77] The significant economic contribution from the trade organisations probably steered the research in the direction of their interests; i.e., the business perspective. In the development of Norwegian production and consumption, the difference in interest notable in the 1963 conference would further develop as a genealogy of discord between systems of consumption and the spatial planning and architecture of centres.

A small megastructure: Romsås Centre

When translating the ambitions for the Romsås Centre into a spatial solution, the sources were found in the history of centre architecture. Romsås is both a criticism and a continuation of the architectural principles of neighbourhood community centres of the 1950s and the international modern shopping centre developed in what the retail handbook calls the second phase of structural development. Car rationing ended in Norway in 1960, and a dramatic increase in car ownership and traffic followed – from then on, the main problem of urban planning was road infrastructure.[78] The ideals and ideas for the centres of the 1950s no longer seemed to answer the challenges of the new urban reality of increased traffic and consumption. In Sweden, the Årsta Centre was criticised for being based on a set of romantic and obsolete ideas of a community that were unrealistic strategies for dealing with modern lifestyle, traffic and consumerism. An unprecedented number of cars reportedly flooded Lambertseter, the first satellite town in Oslo.

The 1960 successor to the 1950 *Generalplan for Oslo* was dismissed as insufficient for dealing with the planning of road infrastructure, and in the 1960s several study trips to the USA and other countries were undertaken to prepare a very radical transport analysis for Oslo.[79] In

[76] Norges teknisk-naturvitenskapelige forskningsråd, *Årsberetning 1965* (Oslo: J. Petlitz boktrykkeri, 1966), 108–9.
[77] Thomassen, *Herlege tider*, 438.
[78] See Even Smith Wergeland, 'From Utopia to Reality: The Motorway as a Work of Art' (PhD thesis, Oslo, Oslo School of Architecture and Design, 2012), 213.
[79] See Oslo Byplankontoret, *Transportanalysen for Oslo-området*.

1962, the American architect Victor Gruen visited Oslo. A participant at CIAM 8 and the architect behind the Southdale centre and several other early American shopping centres, Gruen had also published books that argued the need to create centres to alleviate urban crisis caused by sprawling cities.[80] In his Oslo lecture, he warned Norwegian planners and architects against copying typical American shopping malls and extensive road infrastructure in their upcoming attempts to deal with the increased traffic and consumption.[81]

Gruen was not the only international influence for the Norwegian architects and planners of centres in 1962. Hugh Wilson, chief architect and planning officer of the Scottish Cumbernauld New Town, also visited Oslo and held a lecture on the work with this new centre.[82] Cumbernauld was a new invention in the development of New Towns – in the words of the architectural historian John R. Gold, a 'complete town centre designed as an architectural megastructure.'[83]

The Cumbernauld Centre became an important part of Norwegian architectural discourse. The architect journals *Arkitektnytt* and *Byggekunst* reviewed Cumbernauld as a forward-looking model for new centres, emphasising it as a great improvement over earlier New Towns, especially the traffic separation and the achievement of urbanity.[84] The planning of Cumbernauld 'seems largely to have brought the functions of the city centre to an architectural synthesis.'[85] Norwegian newspapers described Cumbernauld as an 'ideal city for motorists' and 'the first city-machine

[80] Victor Gruen, *Shopping Towns USA: The Planning of Shopping Centers* (New York: Reinhold Pub. Corp, 1960); Victor Gruen, *The Heart of Our Cities: The Urban Crisis: Diagnosis and Cure* (London: Thames, 1965); Victor Gruen, *Centers for the Urban Environment: Survival of the Cities* (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1973).
[81] Per Cappelen, 'Victor Gruen in Oslo', *Arkitektnytt*, no. 17 (1962): 251; Gunnar Lönn, 'Detaljhandel og trafik', *Arkitektnytt*, no. 17 (1962): 252–53; Dag Rognlien, 'Hvem har rett?', *Arkitektnytt*, no. 17 (1962): 252–53.
[82] Garry Christie, 'Cumbernauld New Town', *Arkitektnytt*, no. 16 (1962): 235.
[83] John R. Gold, 'The Making of a Megastructure: Architectural Modernism, Town Planning and Cumbernauld's Central Area, 1955–75', *Planning Perspectives* 21, no. 2 (1 April 2006): 109–31.
[84] Christie, 'Cumbernauld New Town'; Gullik Kollandsrud, 'Senteret i Cumbernauld New Town', *Byggekunst: The Norwegian Review of Architecture*, no. 5, appendix (1963): 17–18.
[85] Kollandsrud, 'Senteret i Cumbernauld New Town', 18.: 'synes langt på vei å ha brakt bysentrets funksjon til en arkitektonisk syntese.'

in Europe […] where one takes the full consequences of the car-age'.[86] In 1964, 45 Norwegian architects, planners and politicians visited British New Towns, and in the report Cumbernauld is described as 'a new type of compact urban environment based on the successful combination of several known principles.' The reporting emphasised the dense centre and the consequent separation of traffic with a system of pedestrian routes.[87] In later publications, Cumbernauld was cited as an exemplary city centre for a small town,[88] a physical organisation of social politics as it ensured accessibility to public goods *and* nature,[89] and it was interpreted as a reaction against the open urban form of earlier satellite towns, instead creating a more urban character with a clear form that stood out in the landscape.[90] The substantial media coverage shows that Norwegian architects, planners, politicians and the general public were fascinated by Cumbernauld.

At the time, the realisation of centres in Norway was both less spectacular and less ambitious than in Cumbernauld. The relationship between the main city centre and the satellite town centre had already been formalised in the sub-centre system of the *Generalplan for Oslo* in 1950 and its revision in 1960; the problem however was that in terms of spaces assigned for consumption, this plan was passive and static, in contrast to the dynamic development of retail. The retail handbook notes that the public planning of retail normally has a general character, and it is primarily governed by the state's welfare motives. In practice, this results in the plan reserving sites for mercantile activities without any specification, market analysis, consumer needs or other societal aspects,

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[86] See 'Idealby for bilister bygges i Skottland', *Aftenposten*, 16 November 1962; Per Bratland, 'Den første by-maskin i Europa', *Arbeiderbladet*, 15 June 1963.: 'Idealby for bilister' and 'Den første by-maskin i Europa [...] der man tar de fulle konsekvenser av bilalderen.'

[87] Hans-Kjell Larsen, 'Byplanene', *BD-orientering: Meldinger fra boligdirektoratet*, no. 1 (1965): 12–13; Elin Conradi, 'Townscape – eller boligmiljøets detaljerte utforming', *BD-orientering: Meldinger fra boligdirektoratet*, no. 1 (1965): 16–17.

[88] Gullik Kollandsrud, 'Arealanvendelsen i våre byer', in *Byen og samfunnet*, by Erik Brofoss et al. (Oslo: Pax, 1966), 96.

[89] Ås sosialistiske studentlag, *Bolig og samfunn: Et debattopplegg utarbeidet av Ås sosialistiske studentlag* (Oslo: Pax Forlag AS, 1969), 79.

[90] Magne Bruun, *Boligområder: forelesninger* (Ås: Institutt for hagekunst, Norges landbrukshøgskole, 1970), 27.

and it is left up to business economic interests to determine which retail businesses will appear in the areas.[91]

The lack of centre planning was not due to a lack of interest. Erik Rolfsen, the director of city planning in Oslo between 1947 and 1973 and the person responsible for the 1950 plan, had devoted special attention to the topic. In an article in the architectural journal *Byggekunst*, he reported both from his study trip to the centres of several large European cities and from the 1950 International Federation for Housing and Town Planning (IFHTP) Congress of the same year, where the centre was an important theme.[92] As part of the Norwegian CIAM group PAGON in 1951, Rolfsen presented a project for a local civic centre for the Oslo satellite town Tveita at the eighth meeting of *Congrès Internationaux d'Architecture Moderne* (CIAM) in Hoddesdon, England.[93] With the theme 'the heart of the city', the meeting focused exclusively on the urban core as a meeting place.[94] For CIAM, the 1951 meeting represented a change in focus from the idea of the functional city to civic and cultural ideals of the centre. According to one speaker, the architect Josep L Sert, carefully organised centres were needed as a reaction to capitalist forces in the urban environment, which as 'hearts of the city', should help reverse the trend of uncontrolled, speculative growth that destroys old city centres through decentralisation and land speculation that is damaging to cities and the stability of civic values.[95] Jaqueline Tyrwhitt, a central figure in CIAM as well as in IFHTP, characterised PAGON's project for Tveita as being conceptualised 'in the

[91] Borg, *Planlegging og etablering av detaljhandelsbedrifter*, 20, 47; Asbjørn Borg, 'Butikker planlegges i blinde', *VG*, 8 June 1976; See also Rolfsen, *Generalplan for Oslo*, 44.
[92] IFHTP was founded by Ebenezer Howard in 1913 to disseminate the idea of Garden Cities globally, and still exists as IFHP. For Rolfsen's account of the 1950 congress and the study trip, see Erik Rolfsen, 'Storbysentra i Vest-Europa', *Byggekunst: The Norwegian Review of Architecture*, no. 12 (1950): 229–35.
[93] Håkon Mjelva et al., *Town District Tveten*, 1951, Collage på lerret, 84,0 x 201,5 cm, 1951, NAMT.ako061, Stiftelsen Arkitekturmuseets samling.
[94] Tyrwhitt, Sert, and editors, *The Heart of the City*; Rolfsen, 'The Heart of the City, CIAM'.
[95] Josep Lluís Sert, 'Centres of Community Life', in *The Heart of the City: Towards the Humanisation of Urban Life Congrès Internationaux d'Architecture Moderne: CIAM 8.*, ed. Jaqueline Tyrwhitt, Josep Lluís Sert, and E. N. Rogers (London: Lund Humphries, 1952), 6.

same vein of thinking as the new American out-of-town shopping centres, but more dynamically organised'.[96]

The aspirations of civic values at the eighth CIAM congress can also be found in the ideas for the centre of Lambertseter, Oslo's first satellite town, inaugurated in 1958. The architect – Frode Rinnan – had been influenced by the Swedish centre of Årsta, which he praised in a 1954 article in *Byggekunst*. He described Årsta with enthusiasm as a self-sufficient town and a realisation of the idea of the local centre as a collective meeting place.[97] Rolfsen, however, describes the function of the local centre as only fulfilling basic needs for a population that belongs to the labour- and commercial market of the larger city. In other words, there was to be a certain hierarchical distribution of functions in the system. In Rolfsen's *Generalplan for Oslo*, the system of centres was simply presented as a spatial diagram without any notions about the dynamic development of economic growth and innovation. The diagram showed a hierarchical system of consumption, but devised statically by zoning; the main city centre was supposed to be primarily dedicated to commercial content, while the satellite towns were to fulfil only the daily needs of the housing areas.

In the period after 1963 that *Norsk Produktivitetsinstitutt* called the second phase of the structural development of retail, new types of satellite town centres were planned and built. Compared to the early centres of Lambertseter and Veitvet (1958), these centres appeared to concentrate more on dynamic aspects of traffic and consumption than on stabilising communities. Linderud (1968) and Tveita (1970) satellite town centres were relatively small and aimed to serve a limited, local population, but still represented innovations when compared to earlier centres. Both Linderud and Tveita were designed by the architect Frithjof Stoud Platou, who had studied architecture at ETH Zurich under Karl Moser and Siegfried Giedion from 1922 to 1926, and economy in Zürich and London. Early in his career, he had worked in the offices of Erich Mendelsohn and the early Norwegian functionalist Lars Backer. After the Second World War, Platou's office grew to be one of the largest in Norway. Platou saw the practice of architecture as a business; this was a contrast to the ideological agenda of Erik Rolfsen,

[96] Jaqueline Tyrwhitt, *Society and Environment: A Historical Review* (Routledge, 2015), 67.
[97] Frode Rinnan, 'Week-end i Årsta sentrum', *Byggekunst: The Norwegian Review of Architecture*, no. 1 (1954): 13–19.

Frode Rinnan and other planners and architects who had been linked to the Labour party and its social-democratic politics since the 1930s.

When Linderud Centre was inaugurated in 1968 it was the first car-based centre in Norway, spatially organised around the separated movements of the car and the pedestrian, with elevated walkways above the car park and straight and curving ramps leading down to the basement, which featured a built-in car service centre. When Tveita Centre opened in November 1970 as Norway's first indoor shopping centre, its comfortable shopping environment – accessible almost directly from the underground station – became a hit.[98] Tveita was supposed to parallel the earlier centre of Lambertseter with a cinema, a restaurant, a community centre and shopping space. The plans also mentioned the need for a post office, a bank and a service station for cars.[99] In the 1960 plan, the diagrammatic layout for Tveita Centre still resembled the 1951 CIAM project, but between 1960 and 1963 the plans for the centre and the housing areas at Tveita were changed to accommodate the increasing number of cars.[100] In the OBOS leaflet for the Tveita satellite town published only three years later, the layout was completely changed. Instead of building on the design from the CIAM 8 proposal that was in line with the open space layout with an exterior shopping street built at the Lambertseter Centre, Tveita Centre was now illustrated as a closed shopping centre, without a cinema and with only a small community centre on the second floor. Another notable change was the number of parking spaces, which had tripled in the three years; there were now eight times as many as in the Lambertseter plan.[101] The historical development of the Tveita projects and plans is a clear indicator of the changing situation of car ownership, which had a significant effect on the satellite

[98] 'Supert senter på Tveita med overbygget torgareal', *Aftenposten Aften*, 18 November 1970.
[99] Frode Rinnan and Olav Tveten, *Tveita: en forstad til Oslo: 6. km. fra sentrum, 9000 innbyggere* (Oslo kommune ved byplankontoret, 1960), 8.
[100] See Rinnan and Tveten, *Tveita*; *Tveita En Ny Bydel i Oslo* (OBOS: Oslo bolig- og sparelag, 1963).
[101] A comparison of the parking space estimates in three plans/documents for satellite towns in Oslo: *Tveita En Ny Bydel i Oslo*, 4–7; Rinnan and Tveten, *Tveita*; Frode Rinnan, *Lambertseter: en forstad til Oslo med 10000 innbyggere* (I kommisjon: Cappelen, 1950).

town layouts.[102] It also shows the increasing focus on consumption in the satellite town centres.

Romsås appears both as a critique and a continuation of earlier centres. The Romsås planners did not follow the same general spatial principles for consumer base as Tveita, which had been planned with a strategic position in a larger housing area, outside the satellite town of Tveita itself. Nor did the plan for Romsås conform to the location strategy of Linderud, the strategic placement in the new road infrastructure – a strategy shown in its most extreme variation in the Swedish Skärholmen Centre, located 'where the motorways meet'.[103] Nevertheless, with its indoor environment, radical traffic separation and location on top of the underground station, Romsås was a further development of both Linderud and Tveita, whilst it also reintroduced the community aspect of the first satellite town centres.

In its aspirations for co-planning, it would also appear that Romsås took clues from Cumbernauld. According to Gold, the concept of the Cumbernauld megastructure can be seen as an avantgarde utopianism within architectural discourse, and megastructures were also argued to offer solutions to the mundane problems of land use and property development and facilitate urban concentration by 'heaping up' urban functions while avoiding conflicts between them.[104] While it is difficult to find avantgarde utopianism in the Romsås Centre, its concept of co-planning was motivated by precisely the ambition to aggregate functions to create a form of social urbanity. This concept of co-planning, incommensurable with modernist zoning of functions, even necessitated revision of the 1968 zoned regulation plan for Romsås in 1973 to allow multi-use of the site.[105] In 1976, the architectural historian Reyner Banham presented four principles that characterise Cumbernauld as a megastructure, and arguably, Romsås conforms to all of them: the concentration of all the social facilities of a city, monumentality and a comprehensive traffic solution, but also 'a symbolic promise of

[102] For the provision for parking spaces in the plans for the Tveita centre, see F. S. Platou, *Tveten shoppingsenter, situasjonsplan, tegn. nr. 151*, 27 April 1968, scale 1:500, 27 April 1968, Saksnummer 196802462, Plan- og bygningsetatens arkiv.
[103] Mattsson, 'Where the Motorways Meet: Architecture and Corporatism in Sweden 1968'.
[104] Gold, 'The Making of a Megastructure', 113.
[105] 'Endret reguleringsplan med reguleringsbestemmelser for Romsås senter, del av gnr. 96, bnr. 36'.

extendability and performance of indeterminacy that it cannot deliver in real life.'[106] Perched on a hill like a monument, Romsås was planned as a cluster of urban functions within a networked and strictly separated traffic structure. There were also ambitions of flexible co-use and transformation, but these do not appear to have gone according to intention.[107]

Like Tafuri and Francesco Dal Co, Banham argues that Corbusier's Obus plan for Algiers is the precursor for architectural megastructures.[108] In Tafuri's analysis however, the Obus plan also had a more significant role as the ultimate example of 'architecture as the ideology of the plan', built on 'maximum conditioning' combined with a 'maximum of freedom and flexibility' and the 'total involvement of the public'.[109] These aspirations are also recognizable in the intentions for the Romsås Centre. When the megastructure was reintroduced through the centre of Cumbernauld, and on a smaller scale, with the Romsås Centre, the ideology of the plan had been replaced by the reality of the plan: the welfare state. Tafuri's critique of architectural ideology could therefore be aimed at these centres as futile attempts to generate new social conditions while being immersed in the reality of the plan as the welfare state.

However, when Gullik Kollandsrud describes the ambition for the Cumbernauld megastructure in *Byggekunst*, he mentions another relationship, namely that between the megastructure and Schumpeterian cycles of progress and crisis:

> It has been found financially advantageous to build a permanent building with demountable furnishings rather than providing temporary buildings that always create mediocre environments, or to accept the

[106] Reyner Banham, *Megastructure: Urban Futures of the Recent Past* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1976), 168–72.
[107] For a description of the ideas of co-use and flexibility between programmes, see Romsåsteamet, *Forslag til samplanlegging av Romsås senter*, 20, 24, 27.
[108] Banham, *Megastructure*, 7–8; Manfredo Tafuri and Francesco Dal Co, *Modern Architecture*, trans. Robert Erich Wolf, History of World Architecture (New York: Harry N. Abrams, 1979), 372.
[109] Tafuri, 'Toward a Critique of Architectural Ideology', 26; Tafuri, *Architecture and Utopia*, 134–35.

> normal cycle of growth and decay with subsequent social and economic decomposition.[110]

By this account, the architecture of the Cumbernauld Centre is engaged in what Tafuri would call an attempt to 'redeem the formlessness of the city of profit-ruled consumption'[111] caused by cycles of innovation and creative destruction, which, according to Schumpeter, is the actual source of profit and thus welfare. Mirroring the welfare state's attempt to suppress and incorporate crisis, the planners of Cumbernauld – and Romsås – apparently dismissed the crisis-inducing Schumpeterian cycles and instead aimed to incorporate social and economic crisis through internal flexibility in an all-encompassing scheme.

Spaces of business cycles

With the introduction of Schumpeter's business perspective, architectural spatial *inventions* are made obsolete not only by the reality of the plan, but also by the spaces of innovation as the reality of *cycles*. At *Norsk Produktivitetsinstitutt*, the research and planning of consumption became largely innovation-based planning by businesses. The social democratic modernisation vision of the welfare state, with general growth and structure models, was overshadowed by American models, which were based in organisation, technology and profit in the individual business.[112] In other words, the Keynesian model for progress – as opposed to crisis – was replaced with the Schumpeterian model for business cycles combining crisis and progress.[113] This perspective entailed that anyone seeking profit had to innovate, and that innovation was the centre of economic change, as well as of any form of progress and welfare.

According to the business historian Thomas McCraw, 'Schumpeter, unlike most economists, places heavy emphasis on the role of marketing

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[110] Kollandsrud, 'Senteret i Cumbernauld New Town', 18.: 'Man har funnet det finansielt fordelaktig å bygge en permanent bygning med demonterbar innredning framfor å skaffe temporære bygninger som til enhver tid skaper middelmådige omgivelser, eller å akseptere den normale syklus med vekst og forfall med påfølgende sosial og økonomisk nedbrytning.'

[111] Tafuri, 'Toward a Critique of Architectural Ideology', 20.

[112] Even Lange, ed., *Organisert kjøpekraft: forbrukersamvirkets historie i Norge* (Oslo: Pax forlag, 2006), 294.

[113] Compare with Negri, 'Marx on Cycle and Crisis'.

in mass consumption, and in the economic growth itself.'[114] Schumpeter underscored that all changes in consumer habits are caused by the entrepreneur, whose task it is to tell the consumers what they need. This took different forms in the private sector, the state model and the consumer cooperative.

In the private sector, many commercials were typically directed towards the housewife, who was constructed as the strong and competent *Minister of Finance of the Home*, responsible for modernisation and increased productivity of housework. This rendered necessary household technology and consumption-based households. One example of the development of this culture were *husmorfilmene* (the housewife-films). Between 1953 and 1972, 28 of these 'informative commercials' mixed with entertainment segments by media celebrities were produced. In contrast to earlier portrayals of the female and the home as the traditional and passive opposite of dynamic masculine modernity, these films portray a close connection between economic production and the home as the frontier for a promising and prosperous future.[115] Consequently, the dwelling became a site of integration between consumption systems and lived space. However, the strengthening of the role of women in the family and the society did not challenge a classic gender model with a male provider, and with consumption as the foundation. These commercials are examples of the effective schooling of the consumer-housewife to participate in the consumption systems, and to make use of the innovations and new technologies offered – for example the home freezer as part of a freezer-system that acts as part of an unbroken chain between the home and fisheries.[116]

Although its intention was to inform about products rather than advertise, the state-financed magazine *Forbrukerrapporten* (The consumer report) nevertheless supported consumption by focussing on making good consumer choices *within* a consumption society. The report was

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[114] Thomas K. McCraw, 'Schumpeter's Business Cycles as Business History', *Business History Review* 80, no. 2 (2006): 73, 243; Schumpeter, *Business Cycles*, 1:243.

[115] The idea and initiative for *husmorfilmene* were Swedish. The films were produced by *IF Informasjonsfilm* as a pendant to the Swedish *Husmorfilmer AB*, which produced similar films in Sweden from 1952 to 1976. See Anne Marit Myrstad, 'Lattervekkende inkompetanse: om en seiglivet maskulinitetsform på skjerm og lerret', *Norsk medietidsskrift*, 2007, 210.

[116] One of the films presented the freezer system. See also Terje Finstad, 'Varme visjoner og frosne fremskritt. Om fryseteknologi i Norge, ca. 1920-1965' (PhD thesis, NTNU, 2011).

published by *Forbrukerrådet* (The consumer council), an independent, state-financed administrative body established in 1953 with the purpose to work for the benefit of consumers. In 1972, the consumer information programme series *Forbrukermagasinet – i søkelyset* aired. The series was a collaborative effort between *Forbrukerrapporten* and the national broadcast NRK. In the second instalment of the series, *Forbrukerrapporten's* editor Øistein Parmann argued against the environmental movement as a growing 'youth movement of anti-consumers' proclaiming that consumption society and environmental preservation were incommensurable:

> We do know that economic prosperity is dependent on purchasing power, and not only that, but also purchasing willingness […], and the question is, then, can we have the cake and eat it too? Can we keep the prosperity and social benefits we have created whilst simultaneously reducing or eliminating all of the problems we have created at the same time? To this, the young reply: 'no, we have to radically reduce consumption'; those of us who are a bit older, we say: 'let us try to salvage both, both the prosperity and the liberation of ourselves from the downsides of this prosperity'.[117]

As the third alternative to the private sector and state model for installing consumer culture, the consumer cooperative supposedly had the wider interests of the consumer in mind, rather than advocating either profit through innovation as a basis for welfare or policies of economic growth for creating welfare through prosperity. The marketer Erik Dammann was working in advertising with the consumer cooperative as a client, and upon learning about the history of the cooperative as siding with poor consumers who were exploited by greedy merchants, he found that while the principal idea was unchanged, in practice the differences between the consumer cooperation and the rest of the consumer market

[117] See 'Forbrukermagasinet: I søkelyset (2)' (NRK, 17 January 1972), 5'20''-6'40''.: 'Vi vet jo at økonomisk velstand er avhengig av kjøpekraft, og ikke bare det, men også kjøpevillighet [...], og spørsmålet er da, kan vi få i både pose og sekk? Kan vi opprettholde det vi har skapt av velstand og sosiale ytelser, og samtidig redusere eller eliminere alle de problemer vi samtidig har skapt? Her svarer de unge: "nei, vi må sette forbruket radikalt ned", vi litt eldre, vi sier: "la oss forsøke om vi kan redde begge deler, både velstanden og fri oss fra baksiden av denne velstanden"'.

were minimal.[118] He believed that market competition had made the cooperative like its competitors. Dammann declared that this was the reason why he suggested an advertising campaign to communicate to consumers that the cooperative – unlike other business actors – is concerned about the population's long-term interests.

A common brand – the *S*-symbol – should function as a guarantee that the consumer was the first priority, and should be established through an enormous commercial- and information campaign, with façade design for 2200 shops, packaging, publishing, internal information and education.[119] Nevertheless, a different take on the reasons for the common brand for the consumer co-operation was that it was a strategic offensive against the anticipated competition from chain stores in the future.[120] As Dammann saw it, the campaign quickly turned out to have lost its ideological content. He later concluded that new values would not automatically create lower consumption and a weakening of the present capitalist system, but rather quite the opposite: the capitalist system shapes the ideas and desires of people, and consequently their consumption.[121] In other words, what needed reassessment was not ideologies, but the capitalist systems of consumption.

As presented in the retail handbook, the systems of consumption are primarily motivated by profit generated through innovation. In *The Theory of Economic Development*, Schumpeter's describes five types of innovation: the development of a new product or variant, new methods of production or sales of a product, the opening of a new market, new sources of supply, and new industry structure.[122] Within the specific field of retail, *Norges Handelsstands Forbund* describes innovations in sales, organisation, technology, shop typology and other consumption-creating measures.[123] Considering the business models of EPA and the consumer

[118] Erik Dammann, *Kontraster: beretning om et mangfoldig liv* (Oslo: Aschehoug, 2005), 58–59.
[119] Dammann, 60.
[120] Lange, *Organisert kjøpekraft*, 321–22.
[121] Dammann, *Kontraster*, 197.
[122] McCraw, 'Schumpeter's Business Cycles as Business History', 239; referring to Joseph A. Schumpeter, *The Theory of Economic Development.* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1934), 72–73, 84–102.
[123] Fritz Hodne, *God handel: Norges Handelsstands Forbund gjennom 100 år* (Oslo: NHF, 1989), 303–10.

cooperative of concern at the 1963 conference, they were each built on several types of these types of innovations.

EPA's concept was affordable mass consumption. The great EPA invention was the modern low-price chain store, inspired by the American 'five-and-dime' store. The history of EPA is a history of a new form of consumption based on modern standardization and mass production, where the logical consequence of development is that the rationalization of production demands a similar rationalization of consumption.[124] The chain stores were components in systems of standardisation and mass production, with standardised prices, standardised and mass-produced commodities, large storage spaces and low costs.[125] This contribution by EPA to the science of mass consumption was inherited from the American F. W. Woolworth Company, which, with the variety store, modernised sales to consumers by simplifying the tasks of the sales clerk. The modernization consisted of the open display of wares and open announcement of prices in a limited number of price categories.[126] In other words, this established standardised mass consumption, which possibly also introduced a new type of relationship between the people making the transactions; 'the earlier negotiation [was] replaced by institutional calculation'.[127] Large storages and low delivery costs were necessary to enable such systems. EPA bought goods directly from factories, not through wholesale. This new culture of consumption also made possible new seductive techniques and spaces for consumption.

The consumer cooperative was based in ideology: the struggle to establish a consumer-led organisation of consumption in modern economies. The aspiration was to create an alternative to the dominant form of economic organisation where labour forces stood against capital in the struggle of power and economic surplus, which is the classic conflict of interests in Marxist analysis. The consumer cooperative wished to avoid class conflict by creating a middle ground of consumer-

[124] Cecilia Fredriksson, 'Ett paradis för alla. Epa mellan folkhem och förförelse' (1998), 51.
[125] Fredriksson, 49.
[126] Traditionally, wares were kept behind the desk of the shop and only brought to the customer on request. The price was determined through haggling, where code numbers for the wares informed the shop assistant about the limit of profit on the sale. The consumption process was time consuming. See Fredriksson, 48.
[127] Fredriksson, 50, 56.

led consumption between state-led and capital-led consumption.[128] The innovations of the cooperative were linked to economic structural changes, consumer culture, the ideology of including the larger population in the economic development, and organisational development.[129] The principles of the consumer cooperative in the 1960s were rational storage, self-service shops, few actors and systematised procurement of goods, and branding strategies.[130]

The innovations by the traditional merchants, the consumer cooperative, and the EPA chain store model had economic, political, cultural and spatial consequences, effectively creating large technological systems of consumption.[131] The innovations were results of historical struggles and crisis, both as competition between individual shops, chains, consumption ideologies and, as the retail handbook emphasises, as a consequence of state policies for economic growth that create the framework and restrictions. Crucially in this context, the retail businesses developed consumption systems that generated new spatiality regardless of any centre planning by architects.

In addition to innovation, another important concept coined by Schumpeter is 'creative destruction', which is caused by the innovative process. Due to the lack of a coordinating effort, retail innovation was often ahead of and in opposition to architecture, to the point where business innovation engendered acts of creative destruction for architecture. Instead of the Tafurian contradiction between architecture as the ideology of the plan and the reality of the plan which makes architecture superfluous and reveals its static nature, this is a contradiction between the architectural ideology of the plan and business *cycles* that not only makes architecture superfluous, but by creative destruction threaten to destroy any social structure set up.

These developments of innovations and creative destructions are not *ideological* – built on social goals – but the result of competition on the same capitalist market. The worry of the traditional trade is precisely that it would become a victim of such destruction; this was a reason why the consumer cooperative had previously met significant resistance from private businesses, which explicitly aimed to defeat the cooperative. Whilst the cooperative succeeded in this competition, the ideas of a

[128] Lange, *Organisert kjøpekraft*, 35.
[129] See Lange, 15–17.
[130] Lange, 294–95.
[131] Hughes, 'The Evolution of Large Technological Systems'.

separate cooperative sector were nevertheless abandoned in the late 1960s.[132] Through the dynamics of competition, the practical *functioning* of the consumer cooperative had become the same as the general market sector. There were the same types of large-scale structure and distribution systems, operating according to the same economic dynamics. Furthermore, creation of the propensity to consume was no longer Keynesian, helping to create growth for the sake of the planning of the economy as a whole, but Schumpeterian business-driven development that effectively placed crisis and destruction at the centre.

Anti-consumerism

The Romsås Centre was planned and built at a time when anti-consumerist critique was on the rise. When the retail handbook dismisses the conflict with the resource- and pollution-conscious consumer as a political conflict, it is obviously because this questioning of economic growth as a driver for welfare is incompatible with the state- and business perspective that is the retail handbook's very justification. The planning of Romsås Centre, however, contained aspects of anti-consumerism and the critique of economic growth in its dismissal of business prognosis and the insistence on limiting the role of consumption in the Romsås Centre.

Internationally, the stagflation crisis – the combination of inflation of costs and economic stagnation – was an important driver for awareness that continued progress cannot be taken for granted. When the global oil crisis hit Norway in 1973-4, it revealed that material welfare and consumption culture were ultimately dependent on sizeable energy consumption. As a result, the oil crisis not only exposed the vulnerability of energy systems, but also served as a warning that the economic growth and consumption could not continue. This economic crisis is consequently often used to explain changes in social welfare state policies, since they could no longer be afforded.

In 1969 however, the first Norwegian offshore drilling rig *Ocean Viking* discovered the oil field Ekofisk in the North Sea, and Norway was now on its way to becoming an oil nation independent of imports. A 1974 report to the parliament discussed what the oil economy would mean for the future of Norwegians, stating that the state should use the

[132] Lange, *Organisert kjøpekraft*, 348.

earnings to create a qualitatively better society.[133] In his 1976 New Year's speech, the prime minister Trygve Bratteli referred to the international economic crisis, but emphasized that while production was reduced in the OECD countries, Norway's production continued to increase due to active Keynesian countercyclical politics.[134] The prospect of wealth called for a plan to transform oil into welfare, which, whilst an essential prerequisite for the future development of the Norwegian economy, also tied the future of the Norwegian welfare state firmly to the continued growth of oil production and consumption.

In 1972 there was a national referendum for Norwegian participation in the European Economic Community (EEC) that ended with the majority voting against membership.[135] The result of the referendum was a fragmentation of the political left, and represented a tremendous defeat for the Labour government led by Bratteli. The movements against EEC-membership were based on arguments that recognised a conflict between EECs centralised politico-economic systems and Norwegian local democracy: in the context of production and consumption, this constituted a discrepancy between the increasingly hegemonic spatiality of globalised consumption systems and the local context of the Norwegian producers and consumers. Discussions about which principles would further the economic welfare of Norway mirrored discussions about larger consumption systems; on the one hand, large-scale systemic economic creators of welfare as the foundation of the welfare state, and on the other hand local, concrete distribution of consumption to meet demands of equal access, diverse needs and social aspects of the transactions involved in consumption.

The EEC debate was consequently a question about the welfare effects of structural modernisation in the form of a centre and periphery-debate, where resistance to Norwegian membership in the EEC was linked to criticism of modern society and a defence of rural districts and traditional lifestyles. With the now-legendary book *Hva skjer i Nord-Norge* (What's happening in Northern Norway) in 1966, the social scientist Ottar Brox criticised the destruction of traditional communities

[133] Finansdepartementet, 'St. meld. nr. 25. (1973–74) Petroliumsvirksomhetens plass i det norske samfunn', Report to the parliament, 15 February 1974, 6.
[134] See 'Statsministeren taler: Trygve Bratteli 1976' (NRK, 1 January 1976).
[135] The abbreviation EEC for The European Economic Community was used by those opposed to Norwegian participation; while those in favour of participation called it *EF*. It is presently known as the European Union, EU.

and ways of living that followed the modernisation of Norway.[136] One example he cites is a community that silently avoids modernisation and the welfare state by resisting innovations and rejecting mainstream society and its values – being better off by failing 'to make claims for benefits which the welfare society would have been obliged to obtain on demand.'[137] According to Brox, the reality for many communities is that 'when one accepts the gifts of the welfare state, one simultaneously accepts the eviction order'.[138] The reason is that a negative consequence of modernity is the necessary investment in technological and organisational systems that dramatically alter social structures.

The topic also arose during the architectural conference on concentrated or dispersed development in 1965, where Central Bank Governor Erik Brofoss, who had a crucial role in the economic planning of post-war Norway, held a lecture about economic growth and structural changes. He stated that the question of where people should live, and if and how tendencies of centralisation should be counteracted, were economic issues.[139]

There was another type of critique from the environmental movements. International concern about an environmental crisis had been growing since Rachel Carson's *The Silent Spring* in 1962, in which she argued that when we poison our environment, we also poison ourselves.[140] Demonstrations against transforming waterfalls into power sources for industry in Aurlandsdalen in 1969 and in Mardøla in 1970 introduced civil disobedience into the Norwegian environmental movement.[141] In 1972, the first United Nations Conference on the

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[136] Ottar Brox, *Hva skjer i Nord-Norge?: en studie i norsk utkantpolitikk* (Pax, 1966).
[137] Ottar Brox, '"Avvisning av storsamfunnet" som økonomisk tilpasningsform [1964]', in *Tid for samfunnsforskning: artikler fra Tidsskrift for samfunnsforskning gjennom 25 år*, ed. Dag Gjestland, Willy Martinussen, and Mariken Vaa (Universitetsforlaget, 1984), 72.: 'stille krav om goder som velferdssamfunnet ville ha vært forpliktet til å skaffe dem på forlangende.'
[138] Brox, 80.: 'Når en tar i mot velferdsstatens gaver, tar en samtidig imot utkastelsesordren.'
[139] Erik Brofoss, 'Bosettings- og lokaliseringspolitikk', in *Byen og samfunnet*, by Erik Brofoss et al. (Oslo: Pax, 1966), 10–44.
[140] Rachel Carson, *Silent Spring* (Boston: Houghton Miffin, 1962); Rachel Carson, *Den tause våren*, trans. Torolf Elster (Oslo: Tiden, 1963).
[141] Sigmund Kvaløy, 'Mardøla, miljøvern og maktspill', in *Øko-katastrofe*, by Paul Ehrlich, trans. Brynjulf Valum (Oslo: Grøndahl & Søn, 1971), 153–62.

Human Environment was held in Stockholm,[142] and the book *The Limits to Growth*, published in Norwegian the same year, created an awareness that the whole growth paradigm that had been fundamental to the prosperity and welfare was ultimately unsustainable from an ecological system perspective.[143]

That same year, Erik Dammann, who was moving away from advertising, published *Fremtiden i våre hender* (*The Future in Our Hands*), a fervent critique of consumerism in western societies.[144] The philosopher Arne Næss wrote the book's foreword; he had been the one to introduce the concept of deep ecology, as a contrast to the traditional, shallow ways of thinking about the environment.[145] He argued that the problems of the western world could not be fixed by mere reform, but that society instead needed to go through a deep ecological crisis and change its fundamental structures and consumption behaviour:

> The destructions are evoked by a deeply anchored production and consumption ideology: Closely associating progress with the accumulation of material objects around ourselves, and closely associating well-being with passive convenience paired with large and conspicuous material consumption.[146]

Significantly, both Næss and Dammann argue that the development of an entirely new lifestyle would be necessary to solve the problems of

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[142] For a critical analysis of the UN Conference in Stockholm, see Felicity D. Scott, 'Woodstockholm', in *Outlaw Territories: Environments of Insecurity/Architectures of Counterinsurgency* (New York: Zone Books, 2016), 115–66.

[143] Donella H. Meadows et al., *The Limits to Growth; a Report for the Club of Rome's Project on the Predicament of Mankind* (New York: Universe Books, 1972); Donella H. Meadows et al., *Hvor går grensen?: MITs forskningsrapport om verdens fortsatte vekst*, trans. Egil A. Kristoffersen (Oslo: Cappelen, 1972).

[144] Erik Dammann, *Fremtiden i våre hender: om hva vi alle kan gjøre for å styre utviklingen mot en bedre verden* (Oslo: Gyldendal, 1972); Erik Dammann, *The Future in Our Hands: What We Can All Do towards the Shaping of a Better World* (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1979).

[145] Arne Næss, 'The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement. A Summary', *Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy* 16, no. 1–4 (1973): 95–100.

[146] Arne Næss, *Økologi og filosofi: et økosofisk arbeidsutkast*, 3rd ed. (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1972), 4.: 'Ødeleggelsene er fremkalt ved en dypt forankret produksjons- og konsumpsjonsideologi: Det foretas en nær identifisering av fremskritt med opphopning av materielle gjenstander omkring oss, og nær identifisering av trivsel med passiv bekvemhet parret med stort og synlig materielt forbruk.'

consumer society.[147] Like Negri, they see no possibilities of system reform, but instead argue for the necessity of a revolution. In contrast to Negri however, Dammann claimed that a revolution in an *affluent* society could not be based on Marxist theories that theorised class struggle as workers demanding power from capital to have their material needs met. He argued that in a welfare society of economic growth, the process of demanding wages and increased consumption would only strengthen the expansion of capital.[148] Consequently, change had to be motivated by other values than the material, and this lifestyle had to be supported by other structures. Dammann suggested a new type of 'lifestyle city', which was presented in the architectural journal *Byggekunst* in 1976. The idea was a utopian small town as 'a harmonic unity directed towards more humanistic goals, without the need for "reparation-institutions", to correct the errors already made' by the present 'competition society'.[149] Romsås – with its ambition of containing all such institutions set up to compensate for the ills created by economic development – was clearly not this type of utopia, as it was based on an acceptance of the present structures of the welfare state. The planners of Romsås just wanted to contain, regulate and balance them.

Against the centre

Aavatsmark, the leader of the planning and building committee for Romsås, was not only important in developing the idea of the co-planned centre and organising the realisation of that idea; he was also one of the strongest opponents to the development of the large shopping

[147] Arne Næss, *Økologi, samfunn og livsstil* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1974); Georg Borgström, Erik Dammann, and Arne Næss, *Ny livsstil: om folkeaksjonen Fremtiden i våre hender: med rapport fra åpningsmøtet* (Oslo: Gyldendal, 1974); Erik Dammann, *Ny livsstil - og hva så ? Om samfunnsutviklingen fra en ny og bedre livsstil til en ny og bedre verden* (Oslo: Gyldendal, 1976).

[148] Erik Dammann, *Revolusjon i velstandssamfunnet* (Oslo: Gyldendal, 1979); Erik Dammann, *Revolution in the Affluent Society*, trans. Louis Mackay (London: Heretic Books, 1984); Dammann, *Kontraster*, 176.

[149] 'La oss planlegge livsstilbyen', *Byggekunst: The Norwegian Review of Architecture*, no. 3 (1976): A42.: 'en harmonisk helhet som er innrettet mot mer menneskelige mål – og hvor vi ikke behøver å bygge inn alle de kostbare "reparasjonsinstitusjoner" som trengs der feilene allerede er begått.'

centre project at Vaterland, located centrally in Oslo.[150] In 1968, Aavatsmark had the idea to organize *Et sted å være* (A place to be) as a counter-action to the commercial sales fair *Teenage Fair* in Oslo. A momentous anti-consumerist event at the time, it has been called the first large youth demonstration in Norway.[151] The fair had already been arranged in Stockholm and Copenhagen, but had been met with protests and demonstrations against capitalism and consumerism; the fair had to be cancelled in Stockholm as a result.[152] The magazine *Forbrukerrapporten* criticised the plans for the Teenage Fair, quoting the American consumer advocate Ralph Nader, who stated that 'for commerce and industry, those between the ages of 16 and 22 represent an excellent group of gullible consumers to sell goods to'.[153] In quoting Nader, who was famous for demonstrating that the American car industry prioritized profit over consumer safety,[154] the magazine warned not only about the creation of pressures for consumption, but that the companies involved had profit in mind, not the welfare of the teenage consumer. The counter-fair could make use of the abandoned Vaterland school.[155] The school was scheduled for demolition to make room for the Vaterland complex; when the Teenage Fair was eventually cancelled, this became the new target of the protest movement *Et sted å være*.

A 1961 plan describes the main idea of Vaterland as the new main shopping centre for Oslo.[156] Platou was hired as architect, and *Den Norske Creditbank*, one of Norway's largest corporate banks, was behind the project. As a main shopping centre, Vaterland represented expectations of an economic growth that would inevitably come, but it was also based on an urban functional segregation that assigned the special functions of shopping centres and offices to the city centre by

[150] See for example 'Vaterland-saken avgjøres i kveld av Oslo bystyre', *Aftenposten*, 23 September 1965.
[151] Tove Solbakken, 'Et sted å være : en kulturhistorisk studie av aksjonen ved Vaterland skole Oslo 1969' (UiO, 2010), 7.
[152] Solbakken, 28.
[153] 'Du som er en messe verdt', *Forbrukerrapporten*, 1969.: 'For handelen og industrien representerer de som er mellom 16 og 22 år gamle en fortreffelig gruppe lettlurte forbrukere å selge varer til'.
[154] See Ralph Nader, *Unsafe at Any Speed* (New York: Grossman Publishers, 1965).
[155] 'Teenage Fair får konkurrent', *Dagbladet*, 7 February 1969.
[156] For the design process of the Vaterland complex, see Mirza Mujezinović, 'The Architecture of the Urban Project' (PhD thesis, Oslo, The Oslo School of Architecture and Design, 2016).

zoning.[157] This development was clearly in line with the 1950 and 1960 general plans as a main centre connected to the system of sub-centres, and the Vaterland project was fiercely defended by Erik Rolfsen.[158] Indeed, the 1950 *Generalplan for Oslo* stated that in the Oslo centre, there were possibilities for business expansion in three main areas that were dilapidated and due for redevelopment. Vaterland was one of these areas.[159]

Et sted å være grew into a large demonstration with many subgroups and events. One of them was the socialist architect group *Kanal*, which claimed that planning had become an undemocratic practice that functioned only for the benefit of technocracy and capitalist systems.[160] Two of the architects behind the planning of Romsås Centre were Sven Erik Svendsen and Jan Carlsen, also part of the *Kanal* group.[161] *Kanal* described Vaterland as extreme centralisation that only served the interests of capital, and they organised an urban planning debate where they asked 'who owns the city, and who should own it?'[162] Arguing that the monstrous shopping centre was based exclusively on the evaluation of profitability, *Kanal* called for the consideration of social goals.[163] Crucially, the architect group argued that urban planning questions of this type could not be treated as spatially isolated issues, since the development of Oslo would affect Norwegian districts, and the commercial development of the city centre influenced the possibilities for multi-purpose centre development in the satellite towns:

> We need a broader offer in the residential areas both in terms of stores, service businesses and social institutions. In competition with the giant

[157] Francis Sejersted, *Hvem kan redde City? Vaterland-prosjektet 1954-1979*, Arbeidsnotat 21 (Senter for teknologi og menneskelige verdier, Universitetet i Oslo, 1990), 2.
[158] Erik Rolfsen, 'Politikk og byplan', *Arbeiderbladet*, 2 June 1969.
[159] Rolfsen, *Generalplan for Oslo*, 84.
[160] For a (biased) report from a central *Kanal*-member, see Jan Carlsen, 'Kanal-historien 2. Kampen om Vaterland', *Arkitektnytt*, no. 2 (1992): 31–21.
[161] In addition to *Romsåsteamet*, the architects Jan Carlsen, Liv Eli Rønning, Sven Erik Svendsen, Finn Sunde and Ivar Aandahl participated in the 1970 proposal for the Romsås Centre. See Romsåsteamet, *Forslag til samplanlegging av Romsås senter*, 1.
[162] 'Hvem eier byen og hvem bør eie den?', *Dagbladet*, 18 April 1969.
[163] 'Vaterland som gigantisk kjøpesenter', *Dagbladet*, 19 April 1969.

> centre at Vaterland, such a vitally important development in the city's periphery will be impossible.[164]

The Vaterland project was abandoned in 1972. Jan Carlsen, a central member of *Kanal*, later claimed that the protests had stopped the project, and that it was a victory for anti-capitalist and anti-consumerist struggle.[165] The architect Håkon Mjelva however retorted that the project had been stopped because of a report from the Danish *Institut for Centerplanlægning* (ICP).[166] The Danish institute had become involved in the evaluation of the Vaterland project in 1971, as Platou found that in Norway there was no institutional environment that integrated the knowledge from architecture and economy as a basis for urban planning and could evaluate the profitability of a project of this scale. In 1972, the Danish institute criticised the plans for the enormous shopping centre and instead suggested that other programmes with an emphasis on cultural activities be integrated. This second plan was not seen as economically sustainable by the investors, however.[167]

The cancellation of Vaterland was thus not a result of the consumers' demonstration of power, but a result of capital's own calculations of profitability. According to the historian Francis Sejersted, ICP's evaluation of the plan for Vaterland articulated the dilemma of economic planning: should it follow the tendency – of retail trade moving from the centre to the city periphery – or trust that the tendency could be changed with the construction of a great urban centre to, as Sejersted formulates it, 'save the city', and re-establish the dominant role of the main city centre?[168] Sejersted describes the Vaterland protests by *Kanal* and others as general change of mentality that often translates to a focus on the physical environment.[169] Implicitly, he criticised the protesters for lacking a more profound understanding of the structural economic

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[164] Inger Beaty-Pownall et al., 'Derfor må vi si nei til Vaterland', *Dagbladet*, 26 April 1969.: 'Vi trenger et utvidet tilbud i boligområdene både i form av butikker, servicebedrifter og sosiale institusjoner. I konkurranse med gigantsenteret på Vaterland, vil en slik livsnødvendig utbygging i byens utkantstrøk være umulig.'
[165] Carlsen, 'Kanal-historien 2. Kampen om Vaterland'.
[166] Håkon Mjelva, 'Fra et skjevt fyrtårn', *Arkitektnytt*, no. 6 (1992): 98.
[167] According to Sejersted, the critique of the Vaterland project was a cooperation between ICP and NIBR (Norwegian institute for city and regional research) Sejersted, *Hvem kan redde City? Vaterland-prosjektet 1954-1979*, 7–20.
[168] Sejersted, 17.
[169] Sejersted, 10.

systems, as they reacted primarily to visible and concrete architecture. With Sejersted, one could say that the protests were directed against the architecture of the large centres as a scapegoat for capitalism.

Tafuri's critique of architectural ideology, however, is not directed against such scapegoats as Vaterland, but against the suggested alternatives: naïve remedies of balanced solutions with compensating programmes, discernible both in the alternative project of Romsås, the revised project after the Danish report from ICP, and the reactions to the absence of social and cultural programme planning in the Swedish Skärholmen development.[170] Tafuri sees such remedies as attempts to solve society's problems with architectural means – a position he shares with Erik Rolfsen, apparent from his comment to the protests against the Vaterland project.[171] Tafuri's critique thus instead would denounce Romsås –Vaterland's antithesis – as a reintroduction of the ideology of the plan in several ways. In contrast to the mention of the conflict of 'the resource- and production- conscious consumers', the retail handbook presents Romsås as a consumer-led alternative *within* retail innovation.[172] As Romsås does not propose a utopian or revolutionary alternative, it is not anti-consumerist, but simply an attempt to create a balance between forces. Aavatsmark and *Romsåsteamet* had a political agenda as a *compromise* between the political, economic and social forces, but retail planning and the architectural development of centres were not coordinated, causing architecture to miss out on realistic economic planning. As a small megastructure, Romsås attempted to counter the cycles of growth and decay with architecture, but as part of, and with the use of, the systems that it sought to challenge. Tafuri dismisses what he describes as the utopia of the satellite town, a mix of avant-garde and nostalgic ideas, because it does not change what happens in the centre of the city and urban areas of production.[173] Furthermore, on the level of the Keynesian plan or the welfare state, the Romsås Centre as the ideology of the plan is static compared to the dynamism of the plan. In the welfare state, the satellite town centre becomes not a subject, but an object of the *plan*.

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[170] Mattsson uses the concept of corporatism for the welfare state compromise. See Mattsson, 'Where the Motorways Meet: Architecture and Corporatism in Sweden 1968'.
[171] Rolfsen, 'Politikk og byplan'.
[172] Borg, *Planlegging og etablering av detaljhandelsbedrifter*, 18, 19, 44.
[173] Tafuri, *Architecture and Utopia*, 109.

When including Negri's perspective in the analysis however, Romsås must be seen not only as an object of the plan, but of *cycles*. For Schumpeter and *Norsk Produktivitetsinstitutt*, what creates welfare for the consumer is not economic growth, but profit – through competition, innovation and creative destruction.[174] Not only did the planners and politicians behind Romsås attempt to oppose the growth policies and centralisation tendencies of the *plan*, they also attempted to suppress the business dynamics of innovation and creative destruction. For Tafuri, the countering of these forces is indeed an illusion, since the cycles of production and consumption subsume any attempt at an alternative, and 'the consumption process extends to infinity'.[175] In the quest to be an alternative within the welfare state, Romsås becomes an architectural ideology of the *plan* without the economic foundation, ignoring the dynamics between the state policy of economic growth, worker-consumers arguing for higher wages and capital's pressure to innovate, rationalise and increase productivity. In other words, the alternative dismisses the whole mechanism of the welfare model of the social democratic welfare state compromise which it depends upon.

Associated with capital in the welfare state compromise and not commonly thought of as constituting welfare, while still essential in the welfare state's economic foundation and consumer welfare, the role of consumption and the centre in the satellite town is problematic and contradictory. This role stands in particular contrast to the monumental history of welfare state housing, where architects heroically addressed an enormous housing crisis, building new infrastructures, organisations and systems, as central actors deeply integrated with the political agenda of the welfare state. This history is the topic of the following chapter.

[174] Borg, *Planlegging og etablering av detaljhandelsbedrifter*, 18.
[175] Tafuri, 'Toward a Critique of Architectural Ideology', 29.

4
The politics of the housing environment

> In recent times it has become increasingly clear that the problems people have in connection with their housing situation are largely not related mainly to the dwelling itself, but to the housing environment.[1]

Efforts to provide housing for everyone have been central in the history of the post-war welfare state – a history that ended in the deregulations around 1980 with an increase of private homeownership, the retracted role of the state, and market-led construction and housing distribution.[2] Critics have construed this change as the demise of welfare state polices and the rise of neoliberalism, caused by the ideological dismissal of state-led social agendas for housing and mass housing architecture.[3] Present-day proclamations of a housing crisis and the insistence that high housing prices exclude a large part of the population from accessing adequate housing are often based on the conviction that the ideology of market logics, in contrast to the previous welfare state ideology, is what creates social inequality. They consequently lament the fall of past social

[1] Kommunal- og arbeidsdepartementet, 'St. meld. nr. 76 (1971–72) Om boligspørsmål', 5.: 'Det er i den seinere tid blitt stadig mer klart at de problemer folk har i forbindelse med sin bosituasjon, i stor grad ikke er knyttet spesielt til selve boligen, men til boligmiljøet.'

[2] For the history of the Norwegian 'age of social democracy', see Francis Sejersted, *Sosialdemokratiets tidsalder: Norge og Sverige i det 20. århundre* (Pax, 2005), 288; also in English translation, see Sejersted, *The Age of Social Democracy*; Furre, *Norsk historie 1905-1990*, 225.

[3] See for example Forrest and Murie, *Selling the Welfare State*; Norman Ginsburg, 'The Privatization of Council Housing', *Critical Social Policy*, 29 June 2016.

housing policies and call for new heroic efforts similar to the past achievements in social housing.

In this chapter, I challenge these histories of an ideological transition from housing success to crisis and downfall and instead unfold a story of political uses of histories of housing crisis through an analysis of the parliamentary report 'St. meld. nr. 76 (1971–72) Om boligspørsmål' (On housing questions) – also known as *Boligmeldingen* (the housing report) – and the satellite town of Romsås, built 1969–1974. Addressing a new type of housing crisis related to the housing environment in satellite towns instead of the housing unit itself, *Om boligspørsmål* has been described as 'a social democratic climax'.[4] As the first satellite town to implement *samplanlegging* (co-planning) to ensure integrated planning of the total housing environment, Romsås embodied the apex of the construction of large housing areas.[5] As parts of the established success story of welfare state housing, *Om boligspørsmål* and Romsås are both subject to political uses of history.

Unravelling the political uses of history depends on contesting established histories of great achievements. In Manfredo Tafuri's elucidation of the historical 'project', he identifies the necessity, but also the struggle for history to continuously question its own constructions and confront established truths. In *The Sphere and the Labyrinth*, Tafuri – indirectly – introduces *satire* as an approach to this task by referring to Michel Foucault's interpretation of Friedrich Nietzsche's three uses of history in 'On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life' and Karl Marx' satirical work *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*.[6]

Based on this Foucauldian interpretation of Tafuri, in this chapter I use the 1972 film comedy *Norske byggeklosser* to contest conventional histories of housing.[7] *Norske byggeklosser* is a caricature of the middle-

[4] See Reiersen, *De tusen hjem*, 271–72; Annaniassen, *Nå bygger vi den nye tid*, 2:259–60; Annaniassen, 'Vendepunktet for "den sosialdemokratiske orden": 1970-tallet og boligpolitikken'.

[5] 'Samplanlegging nytt begrep i Oslos utbyggingspolitikk'; Romsåsteamet, *Forslag til samplanlegging av Romsås senter*.

[6] See Tafuri, *The Sphere and the Labyrinth*, 4, 7.

[7] Pål Bang-Hansen, *Norske byggeklosser*, Widescreen/Super 16, Satire (Merkur Film, EMI-Produksjon A/S, 1972). The film has screened internationally as 'House-Building Norwegian Style' and 'Norwegische Bauklötze'.



15. Cover of the parliamentary report 'St. meld. nr. 76 (1971–72) Om boligspørsmål'

class flight from the satellite town as it portrays the troubles of a family with two children pursuing the dream of building their own private home.[8] The family is soon confronted with an array of antagonist characters that seem to conspire to turn the dream of a home into a nightmare, embodied in a unified political, economic and societal system as a multiple-role but one-faced nemesis of the would-be house builders. Crucially, ten of the characters in the film were named after ministers in the Norwegian Labour government between 1971 and 1972, alluding to the political reality of the time.[9]

While a contemporary critic described the film as 'completely devoid of deeper meaning',[10] the title sequence's dedication to Henrik Wergeland (1808–1845) suggests another interpretation.[11] Wergeland was a Norwegian author, public debater, newspaper editor and national archivist, but the dedication is likely to Wergeland as an author of several satirical farces that ridicule Norwegian society's powerful and elite, criticising corruption, careerism, civil servant arrogance, egoism and materialistic desire. Wergeland claimed that while his satires were written

[8] The protagonist couple's names – Ingrid and Olav Femte – were a reference to Olav V (spoken *Olav den femte*), the Norwegian king from 1957 to 1991 with the epithet *Folkekongen* (the People's King).

[9] There are references to politicians in the Labour government between 1971 and 1972: the carpenter *Trygve*, named after Prime Minister Trygve Bratteli; the housing entrepreneur *Kleppe*, named after Minister of Trade and Shipping and Acting Minister of Industry Per Kleppe; the neighbour *Højdahl*, named after Minister of Social Affairs Odd Højdahl; the electrician *Steen*, named after Minister of Transport and Communications Reiulf Steen; the building inspector *Berrefjord*, named after Minister of Justice Oddvar Berrefjord; the antiques dealer *Gjerde*, named after Minister of Church and Education Bjartmar Gjerde; the plumber *Cappelen*, named after Minister of Foreign Affairs Andreas Cappelen; the banker *Christiansen*, named after Minister of Finance Ragnar Christiansen; the police officer *Norli*, named after Minister of Local Government and Labour Odvar Norli; the garden consultant *Treholt*, named after Minister of Agriculture Thorstein Treholt; and the police officer *Valle*, named after Minister of Family and Consumer Affairs Inger Louise Valle. In addition, the victim of housing crisis *Seip* is named after the minister of local government and labour from the previous coalition government, Helge Seip of the social liberal party *Venstre*. For the actors, see Lars Thomas Braaten, Jan Erik Holst, and Jan H. Kortner, eds., *Filmen i Norge: norske kinofilmer gjennom 100 år* (Oslo: Gyldendal, 1995), 296.

[10] Knut Bjørnskau, 'Spøk og spenning av bra klasse', *Aftenposten*, 15 February 1972.: 'Fullstendig blottet for dypere mening, er "Norske Byggeklosser" til gjengjeld til sine tider ordentlig morsom.'

[11] See the dedication introducing the film's title sequence: Bang-Hansen, *Norske byggeklosser*, 1:15.

under an alias and not realistic portrayals, they are more honest and direct in their criticism than his other work.[12] The one-dimensional caricatures in these satirical farces are not intended as critical portrayals of historical persons, but are instead a satire of power.[13] Similarly, *Norske byggeklosser* does not satirise individual ministers, but the social environments and political institutions of the Norwegian welfare state in the early 1970s, which in the film, far from ensuring housing for everyone, stand between the people and their dreams of a home. A farcical satire of Norwegian public administration, bureaucracy and social conventions,[14] this film is the connection between Norwegian post-war housing politics: the housing crisis as the object of research; and the destabilisation of political uses of history by using satire: crisis as the research approach for this chapter.

Furthermore, Tafuri' elucidation of the historical project is used to support the analysis. In his critique of uses of history, Tafuri describes established histories of past great efforts as 'words that are petrified and hard as stones' constructing apparently impenetrable *monuments*.[15] In

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[12] Henrik Wergeland wrote his satirical farces under the pen name *Siful Sifadda*. See Rolf Nyboe Nettum, *Fantasiens regnbuebro: Siful Sifaddas farser og andre essays om Henrik Wergeland* (Oslo: Cappelen, 1992), 91–92.

[13] Nettum, 68.

[14] A recurring thematic in the work of the director Pål Bang-Hansen was how the common man is subjected to abuse by bureaucracies and governmental systems. See Øivind Hanche, Gunnar Iversen, and Nils Klevjer Aas, *'Bedre enn sitt rykte': en liten norsk filmhistorie* (Oslo: Norsk filminstitutt, 1997), 68; For Bang-Hansens statement on the film, see Gunn E. Schmidt, Oliver Tukec, and Jan Langlo, *100 norske filmer du må se* (Oslo: Orion, 2008), 106. In addition to the references to housing problems discussed in this chapter, *Norske byggeklosser* serves as a prism for Norwegian society in the early 1970s as it contains references to several other contemporary political and public discourses which can be interpreted as confrontations between the government and the people. These confrontations include the reference to *pendlerproblemet* (the commuter problem), where workers cannot find housing in the Oslo area and are forced to commute, represented in the film by the carpenter and commuter *Trygve*; the strict management of speed controls by '*Mosseveiens skrekk*' or 'the nemesis of speeders' Gunvor Moland, represented in the film by police inspector *Valle*; the attempts to prohibit rally motorsports by Minister of Transport and Communications Reiulf Steen, represented in the film by the electrician Steen (who competes in the Monte Carlo Rally instead of finishing his job); and the debate about where to locate the new national airport and its consequences for the population (in the final scene the neighbour Højdahl reveals that the airport will be located at exactly the site of the Femte family's new home).

[15] Tafuri's notion of 'words that are petrified and hard as stones' is a reference to Nietzsche's *Aurora*. See Tafuri, *The Sphere and the Labyrinth*, 7.

this description, he builds on Nietzsche's concept of the use of monumental history to re-establish the peaks of historical development in the present. This amounts to treating a past period as canonical examples for the present and distorting history by ignoring its unique circumstances.[16] In commenting of Nietzsche, Foucault reframes the present use of monumental history as parodic and farcical.[17]

Another use of history problematised by Tafuri is the temptation of a search for the unity of history – through archetypes – as the false recognition of 'an eternal return of the same' in an attempt to rediscover ourselves.[18] He builds on what Nietzsche calls antiquarian history; turning the past into a mere subject of scholarly immersion, creating the illusion of a continuous history leading back to an origin to serve as a source for present identity as it 'tries to conserve for posteriority the conditions under which we were born.'[19] Foucault argues that actual history is discontinuous and does not reveal any continuity between past and present, and the attempt to establish an identity by antiquarian history thus instead disconnects us from ourselves.[20] For Foucault, this creates a comical result, as a parodic dissociation of identity.

As the opposite of the search for a continuous unity of history, critical history contrasts the present with the past. Nevertheless, Tafuri warns that while critical history constitutes a will for knowledge, it does not achieve a universal truth, but instead 'dissolves the unity of the subject'.[21] With this notion of unity, Tafuri refers to Nietzsche, who argues that critical history rejects the past to create the new, but also rejects the notion that the past was a necessary part of the evolutionary process that created the present.[22] Foucault relabels critical history as sacrificial history, since this use of history sacrifices the real sources of knowledge in the critical judgement of the past based on present truths.[23]

The common factor of Tafuri's references from Foucault and Marx is that they suggest the notion of *satire* in exposing the inner structures of the crisis of object and meaning in history. Especially Marx's satirical

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[16] Nietzsche, 'On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life [1874]', 67–72.
[17] Foucault, 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History [1971]', 160–61.
[18] Tafuri, *The Sphere and the Labyrinth*, 3–5.
[19] Nietzsche, 'On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life [1874]', 72–75.
[20] Foucault, 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History [1971]', 161–62.
[21] Tafuri, *The Sphere and the Labyrinth*, 3–5.
[22] Nietzsche, 'On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life [1874]', 75–77.
[23] Foucault, 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History [1971]', 162–64.

essay – where 'Bonaparte', according to Tafuri, can contain everything because of its emptyness – serves as an example of an analytical approach that reveals fictional unities that conceal multiple, contradictory meanings.[24]

Broadening the housing question

In the beginning of *Norske byggeklosser*, the protagonists Olav and Ingrid Femte and their two small children visit the prospective site of their new home in a residential area of single-family houses. In an idyllic scene, Ingrid plays with her children among the trees and bushes on the still undeveloped plot. Exploring the natural surroundings, one of the children asks: 'Mum, is this mushroom edible?' Ingrid imagines life in the family home: 'I can have the kitchen down here, so I can stand and see the kids playing. Surely, it will be absolutely incredible.'[25]

The scene is a vivid expression of how the Femte family aspires to improve their lives by leaving the housing block and the satellite town environment, which was criticised at the time as unsuitable for families with small children. Housing blocks were spurned as they resulted in too many children in each block entrance, making the playgroups too large. The blocks were also claimed to separate the mother and housewife in her flat from her children on their playground. Satellite town environments were seen as artificial and sterile.[26] As the ultimate negation of this description of the satellite town environment, the housing plot scene is a condensed – and parodic – image of middle-class sheltered family life, with its integration of the housewife's homely sphere and the outdoor play area of the children in the natural and idyllic site of the dream home-to-be.

In the seminal *Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*, the sociologist Gøsta Esping-Andersen argues that the cultural preferences of the middle class were decisive in the social-democratic welfare regime. While the

[24] Tafuri, *The Sphere and the Labyrinth*, 7.

[25] See Bang-Hansen, *Norske byggeklosser*, 3:30.: 'Mor, er denne soppen spiselig?', 'så kan jeg ha kjøkkenet her nede, og så kan jeg stå og se ut mens ungene leker. Det må da bli helt utrolig.'

[26] See Tore Lange, *Høyhus som bolig: Living in High Rise Housing. With Special Reference to Children Under 5*, Særtrykk (Oslo: Norsk byggforskningsinstitutt, 1972); 'Stortingstidende (1972–73)', 1973, 2247–79.

16. Ingrid Femte imagines life in the family home. Still photograph from *Norske byggeklosser*.

Anglo-Saxon countries became residual welfare states because they were not able to win over the middle class,

> the Scandinavian model relied almost entirely on social democracy's capacity to incorporate them into a new kind of welfare state: one that provided benefits tailored to the tastes and expectations of the middle classes, but nonetheless retained universalism of rights.[27]

Accordingly, the cultural preferences and economic interest of the middle class has important consequences for housing politics. With its simple and familiar dialogue, the scene with the Femte family at the site of their prospective home exemplifies the assumption of middle-class cultural preferences for single-family detached housing as the reason that many families chose to move from Oslo's satellite towns to the neighbouring municipalities.[28] The historical context for this situation was that post-

[27] Gøsta Esping-Andersen, *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*, 1 edition (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1989), 31.

[28] This assumption of the reasons for the middle class flight was central in the so-called *Holmliadebatten* (the Holmlia debate) in Arkitektnytt, see Mette Sjølie, 'Holmliadebatten. Om Oslos boligbehov', *Arkitektnytt*, no. 17 (1973): 369, 371; Gullik

war housing construction had alleviated the severe housing shortage crisis, but the prioritisation of housing construction had sacrificed investments in the housing environment. In the context of a societal transformation to a growth economy with rising wealth – but also rising prices and costs – the general expectations of the population had become higher, and the environmental shortcomings of the new housing areas of the satellite towns were no longer tolerated.

The problems of the housing environment were addressed in the 1972 parliamentary report *St. meld. nr. 76 (1971–72) Om boligspørsmål* (On housing questions). Parliamentary reports are documents from the government to the parliament that contain topics that are not yet final propositions, but inform about state activities or suggest future policies. *Om boligspørsmål* suggested a significant reform of earlier housing policies through the reorganization of housing finance and the new focus on the housing environment.[29] Itself a critique of post-war housing, the report states that the housing policies of the time were creating social problems especially related to increasing living expenses due to inflation and environmental problems with regard to the spatial urbanisation patterns in particular.[30] *Om boligspørsmål* contained a reconsideration of the financing of housing construction due to inflation and tighter budgets, but the report's central theme was criticism of post-war housing areas' social environments, suggesting a turn in housing policy from the quantitative goal of producing the greatest number of housing units to a qualitative goal of creating socially satisfactory housing environments.

The content of *Om boligspørsmål* was prepared in close collaboration between several agencies. The welfare state financing institution for housing, *Husbanken* (The State Housing Bank), provided some of the supporting material. The Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Research (NIBR) had prepared a comprehensive report of housing environment on behalf of the Ministry of Local Government that formed an appendix to the parliamentary report.[31] Previous reports on

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Kollandsrud, 'Målsetningen for Holmlia-utbyggingen: Svar til Mette Sjølie', *Arkitektnytt*, no. 19 (1973): 418–19.

[29] Kommunal- og arbeidsdepartementet, 'St. meld. nr. 76 (1971–72) Om boligspørsmål', 5.

[30] Kommunal- og arbeidsdepartementet, 24. The report suggests reforms, but 'mainly of economic/financial types.'

[31] Kommunal- og arbeidsdepartementet, 203–4; Tor Bysveen and Norsk institutt for by- og regionforskning, *Service i boligområder: en oppdragsrapport (01130) til Kommunal- og arbeidsdepartementet* (Oslo: NIBR, 1971). The research report is an appendix to the

housing environments and satellite towns, including *Ammerudrapporten*, were also used as the basis for the report.[32] Based on this research, the parliamentary report argues that there were four major causes for the housing problems of the time, namely: the use of modern principles of planning housing areas; historical and contemporary political regulations, financial setups and increased costs; the focus on infrastructural economic and technological rationality; and the lack of financing models for service institutions and culture in the housing areas.[33] *Om boligspørsmål* consequently broadens the housing questions beyond the narrow goal of increased mass housing production that had dominated previous policies.

Presenting *Om boligspørsmål* to the public, the Minister of Local Government and Labour Odvar Norli proudly announced the parliamentary report as 'the most significant change in our housing policy since *Husbanken* was established in 1946.'[34] In comparing the new report to the historical welfare state achievement of *Husbanken*, Norli used history to emphasise the renewed effort of the Labour party in housing.

Contradicting Norli's claims of a Labour-initiated monumental change, significant parts of the housing policies had been prepared before the Labour party had taken office in the change of government in March 1971. Work on the parliamentary report had started under Per Borten's previous four-party centre-right coalition government, which had to leave office before the report was completed.[35] The principal content of the policies for both equalisation loans and housing environments had already been established when Helge Seip from the social liberal party *Venstre* was minister of local government and labour in the coalition government.[36] Trygve Bratteli's Labour-government presented the report

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parliamentary report (203–283). Published in 1971, it was an environmental survey of six different residential areas by NGI (Nasjonalforeningens gerontologiske institutt), NBI (Norges byggforskningsinstitutt), and NIBR (Norsk institutt for by- og regionsforskning).

[32] Reiersen, *De tusen hjem*, 271.

[33] Kommunal- og arbeidsdepartementet, 'St. meld. nr. 76 (1971–72) Om boligspørsmål', 15–16.

[34] Norli's statement is quoted in 'Jevnere boutgifter', *Arbeiderbladet*, 17 April 1972.: 'den mest omfattende endring i vår boligpolitikk siden Husbanken ble opprettet i 1946.'

[35] Reiersen, *De tusen hjem*, 271–72.

[36] Annaniassen, *Nå bygger vi den nye tid*, 2:246, 257–58; The previous parliamentary report on housing was Kommunal- og arbeidsdepartementet, 'St. meld. nr. 63 (1967–

to the Parliament only a year after they had taken office.[37] The Labour party's work with the report was hurried; the reason for the haste was that the Labour party aimed to 'use it as a carrot' to persuade voters in the coming referendum to vote for Norwegian participation in the EEC.[38]

Thus arises the question of the relationship between the principal and ideological intentions with *Om boligspørsmål* and its actual function as part of pragmatic political strategies. Housing was one of the most important political questions for voters in post-war Norway, and the development of housing policies was consequently essential in the search for political power. There was competition between political parties from right to left to attract voters, and in practice this included attempts to define the housing problem so as to confirm the validity of party ideology. Behind the political ideologies then was politics as a negotiation of power, in the form of political strategy and rhetoric to claim ownership of popular reforms that might win over voters and gain power through pragmatic *realpolitik*.[39] The content of the parliamentary report is therefore necessarily subject to strategic and pragmatic uses of history in the pursuit of power.

The claim of great change supported by a reference to monumental history consequently appears to be pragmatic political rhetoric. As such, the announcement becomes doubly parodical, as it fictionalises the present as a recreation of the past and instrumentalises the past to serve a political function in the present. Crucially, Norli and the Labour party's monumental claims of previous and new great efforts constituting significant changes in housing obscure the reality of the political and tactical use of history in the pursuit of power.

Such use is apparent in the parliamentary report's main claim to novelty: that it broadens the housing question and perceives the political problems of regulations, financial setups and living expenses in a wider

68): Om bolig- og byggespørsmål', Parliamentary report, 19 May 1968; Helge Seip, 'Aktuelle problemer i norsk boligpolitikk', *Sosialøkonomen*, no. 3 (1967): 55.

[37] Kommunalkomitéen, 'Innst. S. nr. 331. (1971–72) Innstilling fra kommunalkomitéen om boligspørsmål', 5 June 1972; 'Stortingstidende (1971–72)', 1972, 3489–3523.

[38] A historical account that suggests this use of the report is Reiersen, *De tusen hjem*, 272; Annaniassen, *Nå bygger vi den nye tid*, 2:263.

[39] The German concept of *realpolitik* from the 18th century is used here in the meaning of politics based on pragmatic considerations of power instead of ideologies and principles. See also Tafuri's use of the concept in Tafuri, 'Toward a Critique of Architectural Ideology', 30.

societal perspective. The parliamentary report declared that the issues of living expenses, housing finance and housing subsidies were not addressed adequately in Seip's earlier parliamentary report,[40] and stated that 'it is now obvious that the high living expenses in new housing contributes to creating social problems.'[41] The remedy is a 'proposal of a more comprehensive reorganization of the housing financing arrangements and housing allowances.'[42]

Although many of these policies were not new, *Om boligspørsmål* can be asserted as a climax of social democratic equalisation ideology because it placed these policies into a larger system.[43] However, despite the broadened perspective of the parliamentary report, political considerations of the context of economic inflation, and plans for increased efforts in other welfare areas than housing, the new cross-sectoral housing policy would paradoxically have to be funded by redistribution *inside* the housing sector:

> A major problem for housing policy is that in the years to come it may be difficult within the limits of the Norwegian economy to provide the means to finance a sufficient number of housing units outside the housing sector itself, and to do so on a level at which housing expenses are affordable for households with ordinary incomes, and at the same time provide funds to cover other housing policy tasks. This is linked to the strong demands for increased efforts, which now apply in a wide range of areas, not least in the social and health sectors. A starting point would rather be that the funds to be used for such housing policy purposes must be provided within the housing sector itself.[44]

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[40] See Kommunal- og arbeidsdepartementet, 'St. meld. nr. 63 (1967–68): Om bolig- og byggespørsmål'.

[41] Kommunal- og arbeidsdepartementet, 'St. meld. nr. 76 (1971–72) Om boligspørsmål', 5.: 'Det er nå tydelig at de høye boutgiftene i nye boliger bidrar til å skape sosiale problemer.'

[42] See Kommunal- og arbeidsdepartementet, 5.: 'forslag om en mer omfattende omlegging av ordningene for boligfinansieringen og bostøtten.'

[43] Annaniassen, *Nå bygger vi den nye tid*, 2:261–64.

[44] Kommunal- og arbeidsdepartementet, 'St. meld. nr. 76 (1971–72) Om boligspørsmål', 44.: 'Det er et hovedproblem for boligpolitikken at i de årene som kommer kan bli vanskelig innen de grenser som vil gjelde for norsk samfunnsøkonomi å skaffe tilveie utenfor boligsektoren selv, midler for å finansiere et tilstrekkelig antall boliger, og det på et grunnlag som gir dem boutgifter som er rimelige nok for husstander med vanlige

The specific instruments for this comprehensive reorganization of housing financing arrangements and housing allowances were called *utjevningslån* (equalisation loans). The intention with these loans was to reduce inhabitants' expenses during the first years in new housing, based on a redistribution of resources, meaning that the reduction of expenses in new housing stock was funded by increasing expenses in older housing stock. In addition, *Om boligspørsmål* introduces selective policies for means tested housing allowances to replaces earlier universal policies, together with grants based on the size of the flat and changes in loan terms and property taxes.[45] Nevertheless, this policy for financing reform was a continuation of the minority perspective in Seip's previous parliamentary report, and therefore neither new nor primarily a social democratic Labour party product.[46]

The common factor of the equalisation loans and the other financial arrangements was the social targeting and differentiation, in contrast to earlier universalist approaches. The new financial arrangements prioritised those who were worst off, but also considered the diversity of financial ability rather than the diversity of needs. Paradoxically, an effect of a Labour government broadening the housing question was the fragmenting of housing, which no longer aimed for a universalism that *included* the middle class to legitimise the welfare state policies and thus transformed and limited the notion of solidarity between classes.

In contrast to these policies of fragmentation, *Om boligspørsmål* proposes the housing environment as a new unity for social integration. The environment of satellite towns was the main target of the parliamentary report as it specifically states that one of the most important problems concerned the lack of service institutions and common public measures in these larger, new housing areas around the larger cities. While the development of these areas concentrated on constructing homes to cover housing deficits and housing demand, schools, social institutions, communal spaces and other services were built late or not at all. An important aspect of the critique was the

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inntekter, og samtidig midler til å dekke andre boligpolitiske oppgaver. Dette har sammenheng med de sterke krav til økt innsats som nå gjør seg gjeldende på en lang rekke områder, ikke minst innen sosial- og helsesektoren. Det vil derfor snarere være et utgangspunkt at de midler som skal nyttes til slike boligpolitiske formål må skaffes tilveie innenfor boligsektoren selv.'

[45] Reiersen, *De tusen hjem*, 273–75.

[46] Reiersen, 273.

satellite town mismatch between the physical planning of communities and the political and social organisation of the same communities; the claim was that the planners' interest in creating physically well-defined neighbourhoods was not followed by facilities and institutions to ensure a collective foundation in common endeavours, since the idea of a local community is undermined in the absence of organizational structures to mirror the physical structures.[47] This is seen as especially unfortunate in the new satellite towns, where the need to create the physical conditions for generating a community is particularly important, as residents have yet to form community ties.[48]

Om boligspørsmål signals that what was originally planned as positive qualities for the welfare of the population had turned into problems. Rational use of municipal technical infrastructure had been prioritised to offer affordable housing, with the consequence that the housing construction was in the periphery of the large urban areas as large developments. Welfare state requirements of spatiality, vegetation and recreation areas further increased the distances from the main city centre, while the principles of zoned planning created large distances between different functions in the city. The negative results were the increasing, largely unforeseen car traffic, which created a series of problems that were exacerbated by the long distances, and the lack of social infrastructure since housing construction took place far from existing urban structures. Furthermore, financial arrangement and administrative responsibility for service institutions was lacking.[49]

In its complete dismissal of the spatial pattern of satellite towns, *Om boligspørsmål* is a critique of the post-war housing policies that consciously prioritized the construction of housing units more highly than providing living environments. Interestingly, the parliamentary report connects this critique of housing environment and community to the typology of the housing block. It also goes on to claim that while modern and easily maintained, block flats offer fewer possibilities than small houses for diverse sets of activities in the home. Despite noting that block typologies are less costly than high-density low-rises (row houses and atrium houses), which are in turn more costly per unit than individual houses, the report states that:

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[47] See Kommunal- og arbeidsdepartementet, 'St. meld. nr. 76 (1971–72) Om boligspørsmål', 12.

[48] Kommunal- og arbeidsdepartementet, 13.

[49] Kommunal- og arbeidsdepartementet, 16.

> from this analysis, it is reasonable to draw the conclusion that one saves significantly by building high-density low-rise dwellings instead of individual houses. The savings from building blocks instead of dense low-rises appears to be much less, and the construction of high-rises does not appear to have any specific advantages.[50]

The importance of housing typologies is emphasised in the further political process of the parliamentary report. In the recommendations dated 5. June 1972, the Local Government Committee underlines that it is important to plan for a systematic mix of housing with different sizes, standards and design, as well as to avoid 'category housing' and isolation of specific groups.[51] Varied housing typologies are consequently suggested to counteract homogeneous areas with unbalanced social composition, and the use of physical planning and architecture is suggested to solve complex social and political questions. In the broadening of the housing question, the practical solutions are primarily sought through improving the housing environment by introducing a combination of services and housing typologies.

The Local Government Committee argues that the problem of creating better housing environments – discussed in Chapter 6 of the report – raises questions of a scope so large that it demands a separate political process.[52] The parliamentary negotiations on *Om boligspørsmål* are therefore limited to the questions of financing and regulation in the report.[53] The separate recommendation on the housing environment was consequently made later – on 14. March 1973 – followed by parliament negotiations on Chapter 6 on 22. March.[54] The housing environment policy was endorsed unanimously in Parliament, and during the negotiations, it was remarked that the cross-political agreement in the case was unusual.[55]

In the research report on housing service that served as a basis for *Om boligspørsmål*, and in the negotiations in Parliament on *Om*

[50] Kommunal- og arbeidsdepartementet, 32.
[51] Kommunalkomitéen, 'Innst. S. nr. 331. (1971–72) Innstilling fra kommunalkomitéen om boligspørsmål', 629.
[52] Kommunalkomitéen, 626, 635.
[53] 'Stortingstidende (1971–72)'.
[54] Kommunal- og miljøvernkomitéen, 'Innst. S. nr. 187 (1972–73) Innstilling fra kommunal- og miljøvernkomitéen om boligspørsmål Kap. 6 Tiltak for bedre boligmiljøer', 14 March 1973.
[55] 'Stortingstidende (1972–73)', 2274.

boligspørsmål's Chapter 6 on the housing environment, the satellite town of Romsås is presented as an example where these ideas are already being realised.[56] The process of this realisation – despite being constructed as a history of monumental effort itself – appears under closer scrutiny to be a site of a Tafurian 'battle' between interests, in contrast with the unusual agreement in the parliamentary debates.[57]

Ideas and realisations at Romsås

The locations – the housing environments – in *Norske byggeklosser* are as important as the characters, and the Femte family's flight from the satellite town plays out in real-life places. The scenes from the family's new home were filmed at the actual building site of a house under construction in a municipality near Oslo. This house appears as a typical *husbankhus* (lit.: housing bank house), the commonly used label for the housing types adapted to the criteria for obtaining a building loan in *Husbanken*.[58] All of the scenes from the satellite town from which the Femte family were moving were filmed at a four-storey housing block built in the early 1960s in the Oslo satellite town of Bogerud.[59]

A common criticism of existing satellite towns such as that in *Norske byggeklosser* was that they had become lifeless dormitory towns. In one of the scenes outside this housing block, Olav Femte leaves the satellite town by car while his wife and child wave goodbye from the window, as a parody of these dormitory town gender roles.[60]

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[56] See the mentions of Romsås in Kommunal- og arbeidsdepartementet, 'St. meld. nr. 76 (1971–72) Om boligspørsmål', 271; 'Stortingstidende (1972–73)', 2252, 2278.

[57] See Tafuri, *The Sphere and the Labyrinth*, 8.

[58] The house is located in Vestbyveien 80, Drøbak. It is close to the actor Rolv Wesenlund's own, house, which had been recently built, and he reports having used those experiences for his improvisations in the film. See Petter R. Iversen, 'Wesenlunds byggekloss', *Nå*, no. 15 (1972): 20–21.

[59] The satellite town scenes were filmed at Martin Linges vei 15 – the director Pål Bang-Hansen's address in 1971 when the film was produced. The housing block is part of the plan for the area 'Bogerud felt C', and was planned and built by OBOS and USBL. See *Oslo adressebok 1971/72*, vol. 93, 3 (Oslo: Adresseboka, 1971), 571; 'Martin Linges vei 13–15–17 – Blokk 3 – Boligblokk', 1 January 1961, Saksnummer 196103480 – Byggesak, Plan- og bygningsetatens arkiv.

[60] This scene has affinities with the portrayal of the 1960s gender roles in the satellite towns in popular film comedies. See Bang-Hansen, *Norske byggeklosser*, 8:00; Øyvind Vennerød, *Støv på hjernen*, Comedy (Contact Film A/S, 1959); Øyvind Vennerød, *Sønner av Norge kjøper bil*, Comedy (Contact Film A/S, 1962).

17. The building site of Femte's house. Still photograph from *Norske byggeklosser* (1972).

18. The satellite town housing block. Still photograph from *Norske byggeklosser* (1972).

The planners in *Romsåsteamet* (the Romsås team),[61] led by the architect Alex Christiansen, declared that the new satellite town of Romsås would constitute a turn away from the 1960s dormitory town.[62] The history of the planning of Romsås is one of the extraordinary efforts to address this problem by simultaneously continuing and reforming the housing production of the welfare state in 'an attempt to create the ideal satellite town.'[63]

The ambition for Romsås was based in analysis and critique of the planning of satellite towns to date. In 1971, Christiansen had co-edited the report *Store boligprosjekters problematikk* (The problematics of large housing projects).[64] In the report, Christiansen criticises the predecessor of *Om boligspørsmål*, the 1968 parliamentary report on housing *St. meld. nr. 63 (1967–68) Om bolig- og byggespørsmål* (On housing and construction questions) for mainly focussing on quantity and economy, and not quality and environment, which he claimed was necessary in the planning of housing areas.[65] Addressing the problem of dormitory towns, Christiansen criticises zoning and large distances between urban functions, which makes it difficult for women to participate in working life and leaves children to grow up in isolated environments that are disconnected from society; in addition, the large distances between housing and work led to increased car use.[66] This did not mean, however, a dismissal of large housing projects. Christiansen stated that while large housing projects had their special challenges, they also had extraordinary potentials.

> Because of their size, the large projects enable coordinated planning based on a societal holistic view, an economical, rational and resource-

[61] *Romsåsteamet* consisted of Alex Christiansen, Trygve Kleiven, Randi Klippgen, Olav Holm, Alf Halvorsen, Nils Rosland and Alf Bastiansen. Christiansen, *Alex Christiansen arkitektkontor A/S: 30 år 9000 boliger*, 5.
[62] Jon Kojen, 'Bort fra sovebyen: Romsås – ny forstad for 8000 mennesker', *Arbeiderbladet*, 2 March 1968; Frode Christiansen, 'En bydel som vil fungere annerledes: Vekk fra sovebyen', *Arbeiderbladet*, 20 March 1973.
[63] See Svendsen, 'Romsås: Et forsøk på å skape den ideelle drabantby'.
[64] See Alex Christiansen et al., *Store boligprosjekters problematikk: vurdering av og kommentarer til problemer som spesielt knytter seg til utvikling og gjennomføring av store boligprosjekter*, Arbeidsrapport (Oslo: Byggtjeneste, 1971).
[65] Christiansen et al., 56–57.
[66] Christiansen et al., 51–52.

> saving production – and a transparent, integrated and efficient operation.[67]

With this statement, Christiansen emphasised the potential of planning and architecture for solving societal problems, and apparently Romsås would demonstrate how real societal problems could be solved in actual space.[68] Romsås was narrated as the ultimate attempt by planners and architects to solve the problems identified in criticism of earlier satellite towns in reports and mass media, such as a lack of central buildings for commercial, social and cultural purposes, inefficient process coordination, inadequate solutions for increasing car traffic, and insufficient accommodation of inhabitants' needs due to a lack of participation planning.[69] The ambition was to ensure that Romsås had the environmental qualities that earlier satellite towns had been missing, and *Romsåsteamet* consequently addressed exactly the problems noted in *Om boligspørsmål*, but through the means of physical planning and architecture. Christiansen emphasised a new trend for the planning of integrated and flexible housing environments:

> In today's debate on housing there has been more and more interest in the immediate surroundings of the home, and what kind of environment we create the basis for in the planning of our new housing areas. We are becoming aware that the very foundation of our planning is wrong, we should not build *housing areas* at all – we should build *urban districts* with a versatile distribution of housing, workplaces and buildings for service and recreation.[70]

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[67] Christiansen et al., 94.: 'På grunn av sin størrelse muliggjør de store prosjektene en koordinert planlegging ut fra et samfunnsmessig helhetssyn, en økonomisk, rasjonell og ressursbesparende produksjon – og en oversiktlig, integrert og effektiv drift.'

[68] *St. meld. nr. 76* mentions Romsås as a project where housing service is important. See Kommunal- og arbeidsdepartementet, 'St. meld. nr. 76 (1971–72) Om boligspørsmål', 271.

[69] *Ammerudrapporten* has often been seen as a general critique of the idea of building new communities in the form of satellite towns, and as having influenced the planning of Romsås. See Sæterdal and Hansen, *Ammerud 1*; Hansen and Sæterdal, *Ammerud*; Bull, *Å bo i drabantby*; Gulbrandsen, *Å bo på ett rom i blokk*.

[70] See Alex Christiansen, 'Planlegging av integrerte boligmiljøer', *Sosialøkonomen*, no. 1 (January 1972): 33–34.: 'I dagens boligdebatt har interessen mere og mere samlet seg om boligens nærmeste omgivelser og hva slags miljø vi legger grunnlag for ved planleggingen

The concept of neighbourhoods constituted the main structuring principle of Romsås together with a differentiated traffic system to create a large and central car-free area for recreation and play. Neighbourhoods units, as inherited from Anglo-American planning discourse, are an idea for planned communities offered to the inhabitants as systems that were supposed to contain the population in ideal quantities and with a mix of different social groups, forming stable social units to stimulate social interaction, with community functions designed to structure inhabitants' lives.[71] Indeed, the neighbourhood unit has been described as the organisation of life for the welfare state.[72] When Romsås was planned, this idea of designing a community for inhabitant interaction had transformed into the concept of *boservice* (dwelling service).[73] The argument was that the establishment of dwelling service was needed to replace lost solidarity in modern life. The notion of *housing environment* thus becomes the perfect architectural ideology of the welfare state compromise.

An essential task of the architects of Romsås was to solve the problem of lacking social life that had caused the satellite towns to become dormitory towns. The design approach was to emphasise the establishment of workplaces, housing service, and inhabitant participation in the planning, in accordance with the research behind *Om boligspørsmål*.[74] One especially complex problem that the Romsås team attempted to solve concerned the undesired consequences of imbalanced social composition. Earlier satellite towns were characterised by a dominance of young families with small children, while schools, neighbourhoods, and services were adapted to a subset of the average

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av våre nye boligområder. Vi er etterhvert klar over at selve grunnlaget for vår planlegging er galt, vi skulle ikke bygge boligområder i det hele tatt – vi skulle bygge bydeler med en allsidig fordeling av boliger, arbeidsplasser og lokaler for service og rekreasjon.'

[71] See Perry, 'The Neighborhood Unit'; and the discussion of the critique of the neighbourhood unit in Mumford, 'The Neighborhood and the Neighborhood Unit'.

[72] Kerstin Bohm, *Grannskapstänkandet i svensk stadsplanering*, vol. 1982:13, Meddelande (Stockholm: Nordiska institutet för samhällsplanering, 1982), 136.

[73] The components of the plan were presented in the sales brochures for the six *borettslag* (housing cooperatives) of Romsås, see OBOS, *Ravnkollen borettslag, Romsås*, vol. 1972:5 (OBOS, 1970); OBOS, *Orremyr borettslag, Romsås*, vol. 1972:1 (OBOS, 1971); OBOS, *Emanuelfjell borettslag, Romsås*, vol. 1972:2 (OBOS, 1972); OBOS, *Tiurleiken borettslag, Romsås*, vol. 1972:3 (OBOS, 1972); OBOS, *Røverkollen borettslag, Romsås*, vol. 1974:1 (OBOS, 1973); OBOS, *Svarttjern borettslag, Romsås*, vol. 1974:2 (OBOS, 1973).

[74] Bysveen and Norsk institutt for by- og regionforskning, *Service i boligområder*.

population. The imbalance was dynamic, so over time there were successive massive needs for kindergartens, primary schools, secondary schools and activities for teenagers. The architects' approach to this problem was to design and organise housing and housing service as structures for flexibility and multiuse that could adapt and change functions over time to span the unbalanced social composition of inhabitants.

All of these ideas were incorporated into the plans for the satellite town of Romsås, which were approved in 1968 and realised between 1969 and 1974.[75] Despite the measures for flexibility, the realised 'ideal satellite town' of Romsås appears as a large homogenous architectural project because of its singular construction principle and single housing typology. Enduring and unchanging over time, Romsås is monumental in a traditional sense.[76] This effect of monumentality is further emphasised through its physical size; a town of about 8000 inhabitants in 2600 flats appears as one architectural *object* as it is separated from other urban areas with its visual unity: all of the façades in the entire satellite town were clad in a cheap, grey, fire resistant, watertight, light and modern composite sheet material trademarked Eternit, as in *eternity*. It appeared that the planners of Romsås had indeed achieved a higher level of unity for solving societal problems with architectural means.

The concrete history of the planning process of Romsås contradicts this ideological narrative of holistically fulfilled potential. The architects' attempts to solve the environmental problems of the satellite towns had initially materialised in plans for an alternative to the housing typology and spatial character of the typical satellite town in the form of a small rural-looking settlement of high-density, low-rise housing. In 1966 – just one year before the final plan of Romsås was formally approved with 2600 dwelling units – there were only 1390 dwelling units in the plan. Moreover, unlike the five- to eight-floor housing blocks in the built project, this earlier plan comprised one- to two-storey row houses and

[75] 'Den nye Romsåsplan enstemmig godkjent', *Arbeiderbladet*, 7 July 1967; 'Ny Romsås-plan for å få billigere boliger: Plass til 2500 leiligheter i stedet for tidligere 1350', *Arbeiderbladet*, 22 June 1967; 'Billigere og flere boliger', *Arbeiderbladet*, 22 June 1967; 'Romsåsplanen i formannskapet i dag: Plass til ca. 2600 leiligheter, variert bebyggelse, intimt miljø', *Arbeiderbladet*, 8 February 1968.

[76] The unchanging nature of Romsås is emphasised by Kirsten Danielsen, 'Et forsøk på å beskrive det foranderlige', *Norsk sosiologisk tidsskrift* 1, no. 06 (8 November 2017): 453–69.

ROMSÅS

Romsås-teamet:
Arkitekter MNAL
Alex Christiansen
Trygve Kleiven
Randi Klippgen
Olav Holm
Alf Halvorsen
Nils Alm Rosland
Alf Bastiansen

Romsås er en gammel gård ved Trondheimsveien rett øst for Grorud, 12 km nordøst for Oslo sentrum. Romsåsbyen er bygget på gårdens skogarealer, terrenget er tildels meget bratt. Grunnen er fjell i dagen på store strekninger, og det ble drevet en rekke steinbrudd her fra 1880 til 1930.

I 1962 ble det laget en disposisjonsplan for Romsås skog som foreslo en flytting av byggegrensen mot Lillomarka til kote 300, og utnytting av et 900 mål stort areal til boligbygging og tilhørende anlegg.

Etter at planen ble vedtatt ble det utarbeidet en reguleringsplan for 1200 boliger, hvorav 800 i 3—4 etasjers blokker og 400 i småhus. Det ble forsøkt mest mulig å bevare skogen, slik at bebyggelsen ble liggende i rydninger omsluttet av sammenhengende skogteiger.

Kjøreveiene ble prosjektert med vanlig kommunal standard for veibredder og stigningsforhold. Det differensierte trafikksystem det ble lagt opp til, krevet forholdsvis mange broer og underganger.

For det videre planleggingsarbeidet ble området delt i fire deler, og bebyggelsesplaner og prosjekteringen av boligene for hver del ble overlatt de arkitekter som senere dannet Romsås-teamet. Høsten 1966 var så å si samtlige boliger anmeldt, og an-

19. Monumentality of Romsås. Presentation by *Romsåsteamet* in *Byggekunst: The Norwegian Review of Architecture* 57, no. 4 (1975). Photography by Frits Solvang.



Medarbeidere for boliger og supplementsbygg:
arkitekter
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Walter Odnes
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Erling Hjelle MNAL
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Jan Borgersen NIL
Solveig Lonne Christiansen NIL
Per-Ola Oredsson

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budsmaterialet var ferdig for en stor del av bebyggelsen.
Arkitektene var bare engasjert til å lage bebyggelsesplaner og prosjektere boliger. Hovedveier, vann og kloakk ble planlagt av de kommunale etater. Våren 1967 ble det klart at kostnadene for disse anlegg ble så høye at de umuliggjorde en belåning i Husbanken, og OBOS ba arkitektene omarbeide reguleringsplanen, slik at grunnlagsinvesteringene kunne senkes radikalt.

Planen

Våren 1967 blo det utarbeidet en reguleringsplan for 2600 boliger i 3—8 etasjes oppdelte blokker.
Kjøreveisystemet ble forenklet til én ringvei rundt hele området, og bebyggelsen ble konsentrert til gangveier innenfor ringveien, omkring et stort indre friareal. Dette ga et enkelt og klart differensiert trafikksystem med få broer og underganger.
Reguleringsplanen ble denne gang utført som en flatereguleringsplan. Vedtektene gjorde det mulig å bebygge arealene utenom boligområdene med bygg til offentlige formål, uten å avsette egne tomter på et tidlig tidspunkt. Planen har vist seg å være meget hensiktsmessig og tilpasningsdyktig overfor endringer, og nye anlegg har kunnet innpasses uten vanskeligheter.
Med den valgte bebyggelsesform var det ikke lenger mulig å gjemme husene i skogen. Silhuetten og fjernvirkningen ble viktig.
Vi valgte å løse opp bygningsmassene i små enheter. Hver enhet inneholder to leiligheter pr. etasje og varierer fra 3—4 til 6—8 etasjer.
Den enhet som ble valgt, ga så mange muligheter til variasjon at vi mente den kunne gjentas over hele området uten at virkningen ble stereotyp. Gjentagelsen ga et godt grunnlag for rasjonell og økonomisk bygging, men vi mener også at den gir bebyggelsen en sammenheng som kan gjøre at beboerne lett kan identifisere seg med hele den nye bydelen.
Ellers var vi i en tidlig fase opptatt av den konsentrerte bebyggelse i kontrast til friarealene, uterommet langs gangveiene, plassdannelsene mellom husene og de supplementsbygg som kunne bringes inn for å berike dette miljøet.

Gjennomføring

Det ble tidlig i planleggingen klart at en koordinering av prosjektering, anlegg og drift var nødvendig for en akseptabel økonomisk gjennomføring. Arkitektene deltok derfor med prosjektering og oppfølging av alle tekniske hovedanlegg for å sikre at reguleringsplanens hovedidé ble fulgt.

Situasjon 1 : 7000

20. Area plan of Romsås with distinct neighbourhoods. Presentation by *Romsåsteamet* in *Byggekunst: The Norwegian Review of Architecture* 57, no. 4 (1975).

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Byggherre:
OBOS, Oslo Bolig- og Sparelag.
Konsulenter:
Byggeteknikk: Multiconsult A/S
VVS og elektroteknikk: OBOS
Hovedentreprenør: Fagbygg A/S

Foto: Frits Solvang.

I den forbindelse ble det gjort forsøk på å forenkle de tekniske hovedanlegg ved minsking av kjøreveibredde, enkle overvannsystem uten hovedledninger i veien, rimelig belysningsutstyr osv. I stedet ønsket vi å gi hovedgangveiene så høy standard som mulig. De skulle ha god belysning og overflate, og alle tekniske hovedanlegg med korte uttrekk fra boligene. Vi ønsket å gå adskillig lenger enn det som nå er gjennomført, og det forelå forslag om en oppvarmet gangvei i prefabrikerte betongelementer og isolerte grunne grøfter.
For å koordinere de tekniske arbeidene ble det i kommunal regi avholdt regelmessige «anleggsgruppemøter» mellom de forskjellige kommunale og statlige etater, hvor også entreprenøren, byggherren og arkitektene deltok.

Adkomst
Grorudbanen går inn i tunnel ved Grorud senter og Romsås stasjon ligger omlag 40 m ned i fjellet med heis- og rampeforbindelse til boligområdet. Fra tunnelbanestasjonen skal det på ringveien gå matebusser til de forskjellige boligområdene. Det er videre fra ringveien adkomst til bilbrygger og parkeringshus, og bare nods- og servicekjøring er tillatt inne i boligområdene.
Gjennom området går det to turveidrag inn i marka, og forøvrig er det lagt et gangveinett som knytter sammen boligområdene og de forskjellige tjenestetilbudene (daghjem, skoler, lekesentre, butikker og senter).

Boliger
Romsås er oppdelt i seks områder eller borettslag, og størrelsen på hvert enkelt lag varierer fra 220 til 660 leiligheter.
Ca. halvparten av leilighetene er utformet slik at de ved enkle ombygninger kan tilpasses bevegelseshemmede. Likeledes er inngangspartier, heiser og dører beregnet på rullestol.
Boligene er gruppert i tun, med innganger, boder, nærlekeplasser og oppholdssteder for voksne og barn. Produksjonsformen med skinnegående kraner og fundamentering på sprengstein ga store horisontale flater utenfor alle innganger, og ettersom underetasjene i stor utstrekning ble brukt til boligformål og matboder ble boder til sportsutstyr e.l. flyttet ut i tunet. Hovedgangveien går gjennom tunene og langs denne ligger kvartalslekeplasser og parktantehus. Overalt innen bydelen, som nå har 7500 innbyggere, funksjonerer trafikksystemet, og området er et sikkert oppholdssted, spesielt for barna.
Den relativt store variasjonen i bygningsmassene bryter ned målestok-

21. The housing environment. *Above image*: a Romsås service point. Presentation by *Romsåsteamet* in *Byggekunst: The Norwegian Review of Architecture* 57, no. 4 (1975). Photography by Frits Solvang.


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ken og bidrar sammen med lave bygninger og boder på bakkenivå til at uterommene blir aktive bruksområder med mange brukbare plasser for opphold og lek.

Bosupplement
Foreløbig er fire av i alt fem skoler bygget, og det gjenstår likeledes å bygge to av syv daginstitusjoner. Endel skole- og daginstitusjonsfunksjoner blir inntil videre ivaretatt av generelle bygg, som på et senere stadium kan gi rom for lettere industri, kontorer e.l. Byggene er regulert til næringsvirksomhet og er foruten brukt til undervisningsformål også vært midlertidig postkontor, helsestasjon og pendlerhotell. De har, fordi de lett både kan bygges og endres, løst mange plassproblem i en bydel, hvor aldersforskjellen er skjev og behovene mange og vekslende.
Foruten en stor dagligvareforretning i senteret er det flere steder i boligområdene plassert mindre butikker. Disse var i byggeperioden benyttet av entreprenøren som kantiner og kontorer.
I senteret som er samplanlagt, vil det foruten butikker av forskjellige slag bli innpasset sykehjem og helsestasjon, skole og ungdomsklubb, bibliotek og idrætsanlegg med svømmehall, boliger bl.a. for trygdede og bevegelseshemmede, resepsjon og bank/postkontor, kommunekjøkken, kafeteria og møtelokaler.

For å få bydelen til å funksjonere har arkitektene og OBOS drevet informasjonsarbeide på forskjellige måter, og OBOS har hatt innflyttingsvertinner fast ansatt for å ta seg av nyinnflyttede beboeres problem. Sekretariatet for plan- og byggekomiteen for Romsås senter, som også legger opp driften og koordinerer alle offentlige anlegg, har med lederen Per Aavatsmark og midl. senterforvalter Per Kr. Larsen, også i stor grad drevet effektivt informasjonsvirksomhet ved å arrangere Romsås-dager, trimaksjoner og en dugnad hvor flere tusen frukttrær og bærbusker ble plantet.

22. The housing environment. Presentation by *Romåsteamet* in *Byggekunst: The Norwegian Review of Architecture* 57, no. 4 (1975). Photography by Frits Solvang.

small three- to four-storey blocks.[77] The newspaper *Arbeiderbladet* described this first project as enabling two thousand families to turn 'back to nature', with a project reminiscent of houses hidden in the woods.[78] Similarly, the conservative newspaper *Aftenposten* wrote that living at Romsås would be 'like living in the forest.'[79] As such, the project was a distinct critique of and an alternative to the typical 1960s satellite town.

The dramatic change of plans between 1966 and 1967 has been attributed to the welfare state's institutional and organisational structure for production. The non-profit cooperative housing corporation OBOS and its entrepreneur Fagbygg were accused of acting as a conservative force against the architects' radical plans. A contemporary report on the process describes OBOS – a hybrid between a public and a private organisation – as overriding both Oslo Municipality and the architects, affecting political goals as well as the planner's intentions.[80] The changed plans for Romsås were thus presented as a conflict between the planner's attempt to materialise the new political and architectural intentions for an integrated housing environment, and the preferences of OBOS, which were based on extensive experience throughout the post-war period and favoured continuing with proven methods.

The abandonment of 'living in the woods' and the return to the satellite town model was instead, paradoxically, a consequence of Romsås' natural environmental qualities. Already in 1963, when the project was first presented, newspapers noted that the terrain was both beautiful and difficult to build on.[81] Indeed, the site of Romsås was outside the designated building area delimited in *Generalplan for Oslo* and violated its economic principle of building on the easiest land to

[77] 'Sterkt småhusinnslag i Romsåsbebyggelse', *Arbeiderbladet*, 13 October 1966; 'Første boligpulje på Romsås er byggemeldt: 210 leiligheter i rekkehus og blokker', *Arbeiderbladet*, 21 November 1966; '30 rekkehus på Romsås', *Arbeiderbladet*, 28 November 1966.
[78] 'To tusen OBOS-familier skal "tilbake til naturen": Hus i skog vil prege Romsås-feltet som også vil bli utstyrt med taubane', *Arbeiderbladet*, 26 September 1962.
[79] 'Tiltalende Romsåsplan', *Arbeiderbladet*, 6 February 1964; '"Som å bo inne i skogen" i 1200 Romsås-leiligheter', *Aftenposten*, 8 June 1964.
[80] Otto Berg et al., *Tre boligområder i Osloregionen*, Nordplan: grupparbete, 1970/71:6 (Nordiska institutet för samhällsplanering, 1971), 51–53.
[81] 'Vanskelig Romsås-terreng nyttes til 2000 boliger', *Arbeiderbladet*, 8 May 1962.

keep costs down.[82] Cost inflation in the late 1960s made this violation still more problematic, and the cost per housing unit became too high to qualify for funding from *Husbanken*. The very pragmatic reason for the change was thus the costs related to basic infrastructure and preparation of the hilly site for construction.[83]

The monumentality and unity of Romsås, then, came as a result of the production logics pragmatically utilised to attempt to solve structural societal problems, such as rational building construction, mass production, experiments and innovations in construction principles and materials, rather than architectural or political ideological intentions of a housing environment.[84] The blocks with their Eternit façades, characterised as 'the aesthetics of tight budgets', were indeed monumental, despite the architects' futile attempt to fragment the building volumes for Romsås to preserve the appearance of a village in the woods. What indeed appears physically as a unit and has been pronounced a monument of the welfare state was the undesired and pragmatic result of the project being squeezed between conflicting issues of 'socially responsible rent', economic inflation, and the site's hilly terrain.

Behind the apparent monumentality of Romsås as a single, large architectural effort was thus architectural ideology's failure to respond to the crisis of the housing environment as described in *Om boligspørsmål*. It is the analysis of the construction of space, in this case Romsås, as a site of a Tafurian 'battle' between interests that reveals the character of this failure.[85] In the histories of Romsås, the changed plans are evidence of the limitations of architectural ideas and ideology in the confrontation with economic and political reality. What is revealed is the *realpolitik* behind political ideology, as well as what might then be called the '*realarchitektur*' behind architectural ideology – an architecture that limits itself to responding to given circumstances. In the case of Romsås,

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[82] 'Enighet om salg av 140 mål tomt', *Arbeiderbladet 1964*, 14 December 1964; Rolfsen, *Generalplan for Oslo*, 61.

[83] 'Reguleringsplan for Romsås, del av gnr. 96 bnr. 36 m. fl.' (Oslo byplankontor, 1968), Saksnummer 196801219 – Reguleringssak, Plan- og bygningsetatens arkiv.

[84] Jon Kojen, 'Romsås er et resultat av betydelig produksjonsteknisk utvikling: Nye fundamenteringsmetoder har gjort mulig sosial boligbygging i et svært kupert terreng', *Arbeiderbladet*, 2 April 1973.

[85] For the notions of ideology versus the construction of space as a site of battle, see Tafuri, 'Toward a Critique of Architectural Ideology', 31–33; Tafuri, *The Sphere and the Labyrinth*, 8.

these were the piecemeal and tactical dealing with the inherited, overarching framework of the welfare state and the homeownership policy.

The origin of the homeownership policy

The lazy carpenter and commuter *Trygve* is a central character in *Norske byggeklosser*. Throughout the film, he is an obstacle to finishing the house, making time-consuming mistakes or taking breaks while pretending to be working.[86] Trygve appears unfazed about missing the promised date of completion for the house, as he knows that the delay is unexceptional: 'it's the same from house to house, that is what housing production is.'[87] As mentioned above, the character is named after Trygve Bratteli, the Labour party prime minister from 1971 to 72.[88] In 1972 Bratteli signed *Om boligspørsmål*, but his place in the history of housing policy is based on his famous statement in Parliament in 1951, constructed as the origin of the unique Norwegian welfare state homeownership policy, the cross-political agreement of *eierlinja* (lit.: the ownership line):

> For me, this is a matter of principle, and I want to make it absolutely clear. In modern society, there are certain areas where private business is in operation, and others where private business is no longer in operation, or where it is under liquidation, and I, for my part, do not accept the ownership of other people's homes as an area for private business.[89]

The references to Bratteli's statement as an origin of welfare state social policy constructs the first post-war years as an era of great achievements

[86] Bang-Hansen, *Norske byggeklosser*, 11:10, 19:30, 22:00, 46:30, 59:10, 1:04:40.
[87] Bang-Hansen, 22:00–22:45.: 'det er det samma fra hus til hus det der, det er det som er boligbyggingen.'
[88] Bratteli had himself worked as a carpenter in the periods 1928–1933 and 1940–1942, before his war-time concentration-camp imprisonment in Germany and post-war engagement in national politics.
[89] 'Stortingstidende (1951) Innst. S. nr. 46', vol. 7a, 1951, 455.: 'For meg er dette et prinsipielt spørsmål, og jeg vil gjøre det tindrende klart. I det moderne samfunn er det visse områder hvor det drives privat næringsdrift, og andre hvor det ikke lenger drives privat næringsdrift, eller hvor den er under avvikling, og jeg for mitt vedkommende godtar ikke som et område for privat næringsdrift det å eie andre menneskers hjem.'

23. The carpenter Trygve. Still photograph from *Norske byggeklosser*.

from which to learn. For those lamenting the fall of welfare state housing due to the deregulations of the 1980s, the function or use of this history corresponds with Nietzsche's description of monumental history: a reminder that 'greatness that once existed was in any event once *possible* and may thus be possible again'.[90] Tafuri, interpreted through Foucault and Marx' satire, turns this use of history into farce, parodying the monumental history's construction of arguments to *make housing great again* in an attempt to recreate or reinstitute housing as a social project.

There are, however, three main explanations that point to older historical preconditions of the Norwegian homeownership policy. One is that this preference for homeownership is the result of an egalitarian tradition of small-scale agricultural and industrial production, and the uniquely Norwegian pre-modern, small-scale individual land ownership judicially based in an ancient allodial title that still survives as *odelsloven*.[91] This history of traditional egalitarianism nevertheless understates the existence of rural social inequality. Poor *husmenn*

[90] Nietzsche, 'On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life [1874]', 69.
[91] See for example Erling Annaniassen, 'Norge – det socialdemokratiska ägerlandet', in *Varför så olika? Nordisk bostadspolitik i jämförande historiskt ljus*, by Erling Annaniassen and Bo Bengtsson, 2006, 166; Jardar Sørvoll, *Norsk boligpolitikk i forandring 1970–2010*, vol. 7 (Oslo: Norsk institutt for forskning om oppvekst, velferd og aldring, 2011), 196.

(cotters), a significant part of the rural population, did not own their farming land, and while ensuring that rural property ownership was not concentrated in a few hands, the effect of *odelsloven* was the conservation of existing economic relations.[92] Thus, the history of homeownership as a continuous success history of egalitarianism integrated in Norwegian identity is a fiction used to legitimise the contemporary homeownership.

The homeownership policy has also been interpreted as rooted in class conflict, specifically as a reaction against the speculative and unstable housing market in Oslo in the late 19th century, when the majority of the population, including the middle and upper classes, rented their dwellings from private landlords.[93] Characteristic for this period were low-quality speculative tenement blocks, a volatile market with insecure investments for landlords, and a lack of housing or insecure housing tenure for the labour class. This explanation appears to be the historical precondition for Bratteli's principal statement, which in its critique of profit on housing was an attack directed against the large landlords.[94] Nevertheless, Bratteli's statement does not explicitly propose homeownership, only that the home should not be an object for profit for landlords or inhabitants.[95] Instead, Bratteli emphasises that those living in housing blocks should also experience *eierglede* (ownership joy).[96] As a compromise, he thus combines a history of class struggle with a tradition of ownership through the block typology.

The third explanation is that homeownership policy developed gradually as a result of giving primacy to the development of the housing cooperation sector after the Second World War because of earlier

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[92] See Eirik Magnus Fuglestad and Erika Palmer, 'Land Ownership and Distribution: Modeling the Relationship to Property Law in the Norwegian Case', *Journal of Rural Studies* 72 (1 December 2019): 11–22.

[93] Lars Gulbrandsen, *Boligmarked og boligpolitikk: eksemplet Oslo* (Universitetsforlaget, 1983), 17–18.

[94] See Annaniassen, 'Vendepunktet for "den sosialdemokratiske orden": 1970-tallet og boligpolitikken', 163; Jardar Sørvoll, *Fra totalreguleringsambisjoner til markedsstyring: Arbeiderpartiet og reguleringen av boligomsetningen 1970–1989* (Oslo: Norsk institutt for forskning om oppvekst, velferd og aldring, 2008), 21; Sørvoll, *Norsk boligpolitikk i forandring 1970–2010*, 7:197; *Landsmøtet 1949: Protokoll* (Det Norske Arbeiderparti, 1950), 96.

[95] The observation that Bratteli does not specifically advocate homeownership is also made by Einar Annaniassen in Annaniassen, 'Vendepunktet for "den sosialdemokratiske orden": 1970-tallet og boligpolitikken', 163.

[96] 'Stortingstidende (1951) Innst. S. nr. 46', 455.: '*eierglede*'.

negative experience with high costs and lacking continuity in building construction with publicly-owned housing for rent.[97] While the experience from the late 19th century in Oslo showed the terrible consequences of an entirely market-based housing system, the experience from municipal attempts in social housing – especially in the 1920s and 1930s – was that the housing projects became too expensive for the working class and that continuous production could not be achieved. Choosing a housing system based on the cooperative sector can be seen as a middle ground between market-based and state-based housing systems, a fitting materialisation of the welfare state compromise. However, there were also politically strategic motivations for this choice, as the Labour party wanted to avoid the role of public landlord, which would mean potentially coming in conflict with its own electorate and consequently jeopardising its own political power.[98]

Behind Bratteli's statement as an origin of homeownership, there is thus a combination of historically inherited traditional-judicial, political-ideological and pragmatic-institutional structures. Crucially, each of these structures themselves constitutes different uses of history. Constructing homeownership as a tradition appears as antiquarian history. Since this homeownership identity depends on the construction of a fictional connection to an idealised past, holding on to homeownership as something uniquely Norwegian paradoxically disconnects the present from the past, and consequently alienates us from our history and ourselves. The explanation based on class conflict represented in Bratteli's statement is a use of critical history that sacrifices the real history of conflict, as it interprets the history of the late 19th century housing crisis and class conflict through the social democratic perspective of welfare state class compromise and thus emphasises agreement, not struggle. Furthermore, when Labour actively avoids a direct association with class struggle in its avoidance of the landlord role, it is hindering the construction of a monumental history of housing becoming contaminated by the reality of actual conflicts of interest.

What Labour's social democratic uses of history thus help construct is the image of the welfare state's system for housing production as one of

[97] Annaniassen and Bengtsson, *Varför så olika?*; Sørvoll, *Norsk boligpolitikk i forandring 1970–2010*, 7:196–97; referring to Sejersted, *Sosialdemokratiets tidsalder*, 288–89; Jardar Sørvoll, 'Norsk boligpolitikk 1970–2015: Sosialdemokratiets såreste punkt?', *Arbeiderhistorie*, 2016, 193.

[98] See Sørvoll, 'Norsk boligpolitikk 1970–2015: Sosialdemokratiets såreste punkt?', 193.

the most successful parts of the 'the age of social democracy'.[99] This housing system was based on a triangular model with financing and standards from the state, planning and facilitation from municipalities, and development and management from the private and cooperative sector. In the case of Oslo, the triangular model was an arrangement between *Husbanken*, the building and management companies – especially the non-profit cooperative management company OBOS – and the public land owner Oslo Municipality.[100] Husbanken was founded in 1946 and provided publicly subsidised loans, with loan terms based on dwelling standards and project cost limits and a politically regulated rent level. OBOS, founded in 1929, built and distributed housing according to waiting lists and transferred the ownership to the local housing cooperatives. Oslo Municipality bought land in the urban periphery, prepared it for the building of satellite towns by providing basic infrastructure, and leased it to the housing cooperatives. This model aimed to reduce costs and facilitated continuous, rational and non-profit production of housing to conform with the social housing policies of the welfare state.

Husbanken currently no longer offers general subsidies of housing construction, but instead provides selective instruments for housing allowance for specific groups. Changes in municipal policies put an end to land subsidies, and subsidies for housing were directed at disadvantaged groups. The private sector took over the role of municipalities in the procurement of land for housing.[101] OBOS is no longer non-profit, but operates in the housing market like any other private sector entrepreneur. It is clearly the labelling of this present housing system as neoliberal and unjust that has inspired stories of welfare state housing that glorify the past.[102] When it comes to housing politics, the Labour party's rhetoric is often directed at an idealised past in which these welfare institutions had their original form rather than the

[99] See for example Sørvoll, 187, who refers to; Furre, *Norsk historie 1905-1990*, 225, 322; Sejersted, *Sosialdemokratiets tidsalder*, 288; Sejersted, *The Age of Social Democracy*; Cupers, *The Social Project*, 2014.
[100] For the history of Husbanken, OBOS and the housing policy of Oslo Municipality, see Reiersen, *De tusen hjem*; Per Nestor, *Boligpolitikken og OBOS gjennom 50 år (1929–1979)* (Oslo: OBOS, 1979); Hansen and Guttu, *Oslo kommunes boligpolitikk 1960-1989*.
[101] Sørvoll, 'Norsk boligpolitikk 1970–2015: Sosialdemokratiets såreste punkt?', 188, 192.
[102] Sørvoll, *Norsk boligpolitikk i forandring 1970–2010*, 7:44–45.

contemporary state of housing.[103] These idealisations of a monumental past serve as both nostalgic ruminations and a call for action to restore the social aspirations of past policies and institutions.

Another contemporary use of this history of welfare state housing is to legitimise the present-day focus of homeownership as a prevailing success story by claiming that it is rooted in tradition and still part of a long-standing homeownership policy of the welfare state. To legitimise its present market-based incarnation, OBOS attempts to connect the present with the past, constructing the current housing market and its own position in it as part of a continuous history that supports Norwegian homeownership identity.[104] The success of homeownership is also cited as the reason for the relatively well-kept Norwegian satellite towns.[105] The seemingly continuous history of homeownership is thus used to make the present deregulated housing market appear positive and natural, rooted in Norwegian cultural identity and historical social democratic policies.

Curiously, these uses of the history of housing avoid mention of the historical discontinuities and crises in the very meaning of homeownership and the legal and institutional frameworks for housing. One such discontinuity is constituted by the deregulations of the 1980s, by which time there had already been a mental shift in the meaning of cooperative homeownership. The political scientist Lars Gulbrandsen describes that in the speculative and volatile housing situation in Oslo in the late 19th century, there was a simple contradiction of economic and political interests between a few landlords and many tenants. Politically, the liberal conservative party *Høyre* was challenged with aggregating the interests of both landlords and tenants, while the Labour party could simply concentrate on tenants' interests. This simple class contradiction eroded as a result of welfare state housing production and the homeownership policy during the post-war period, and politicians across the political spectrum fought for the same voters. For *Høyre*, it became

[103] Sørvoll, 'Norsk boligpolitikk 1970–2015: Sosialdemokratiets såreste punkt?', 204.
[104] See the interpretation of the history of social housing by the current CEO of OBOS: Daniel Kjørberg Siraj, '90 år med boligbygging', *OBOS-bladet*, 2019.
[105] See for example Ingar Brattbakk and Thorbjørn Hansen, 'Post-War Large Housing Estates in Norway – Well-Kept Residential Areas Still Stigmatised?', *Journal of Housing and the Built Environment* 19, no. 3 (2004): 311–332; Thorbjørn Hansen and Ingar Brattbakk, *Endringsprosesser i norske drabantbyer*, vol. 6–2005, Byggforsk skriftserie (Norges byggforskningsinstitutt, 2005).

advantageous to argue for policies that eased the housing tenure mobility from tenants via cooperative ownership to private ownership, as this would help increase their own voter base by playing on homeowners' interest in the free disposition of their property. For the Labour party, it became harder to aggregate the interests of a diminishing number of tenants and an increasing number of cooperative owners.[106] Gulbrandsen argues that the homeownership policy produced inhabitants that developed private ownership interests and saw pragmatic personal advantages in voting for liberal conservative politics, thus retroactively transforming the meaning and function of the homeownership policy.

As a policy that favoured the middle class – as the universalist social democratic welfare state according to Esping-Andersen must do – how social was post-war housing policy? By inverting this history of monumental effort, the satire of the lazy carpenter Trygve in *Norske byggeklosser* forces the questioning of what *appears* as an ideological and principal effort for social housing, but which due to its principal ideologies of universalism not only failed at helping those who struggled the most, but even exacerbated inequality. Arguably, it also created the groundwork for private ownership and liberal conservative housing policies. The Labour party still needed to give the *impression* of protecting the interests of workers – as the carpenter Trygve *pretended* to be working. Bratteli's statement itself emerges as overly principal and pompous, itself a parody.[107] Furthermore, present-day reference to his statement in the call for action functions as uses of monumental history that turns his political statement into a farce. The continuous history of a successful *eierlinje* resembles Nietzsche's criticism of antiquarian history that replaces real, actual complexities and discontinuities with the illusion of continuity and identity, with the function of legitimising the arrangements at hand rather than attempting to truthfully represent history.

As monumental simplifications of history, the origin of the homeownership policy and the triangular organisation thus resembles what Tafuri calls a fictional unity. In this fictional unity, the rhetoric of constant housing crisis was a strategy in the political struggles and negotiations of power, and other parties challenged the Labour party in the area of housing. In the search for power, politicians have made *use* of

[106] Gulbrandsen, *Boligmarked og boligpolitikk: eksemplet Oslo*, 10–15.

[107] See Foucault's interpretation of Nietzsche's monumental history: Foucault, 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History [1971]', 160–61.

history by defining and redefining what is understood by 'housing crisis' in such a way that the political party's own ideological and principal position appears as the correct answer. Behind the discourse of any type of housing crisis, there are thus multiple strategies and tactics for using housing crisis in the political endeavour to secure power.

Political uses of housing crisis

When the construction of their new home is – apparently – nearing completion, the Femte family advertises their current block flat sharehold for sale. Olav Femte collects the responses at the offices of the newspaper Aftenposten: a postbag with 736 letters. Opening the letters at home, he jokes about the sad stories of housing distress, to which Ingrid Femte responds: 'Don't you understand anything, don't you understand that – this is one great tragedy?'[108]

She argues compassionately that if they can afford to move from a cooperatively owned flat to a privately owned house, they can afford to show solidarity with those who still have no place to live. Consequently, in the next scene the Femte couple visits the Seip family, one of the respondents to their advertisement. In a parody of victims of a housing crisis, Seip lives in an absurdly small tent at a campground. Seip and Femte make a deal that the flat will be sold at the listing price, with no large amount paid under the table, and the Seips will move in at the planned completion date of the Femte's home, which will later create significant problems for the Femte family when both the building schedule and budget for their new home is exceeded.[109]

In *Store boligproblemers problematikk* (The problematics of large housing projects), Christiansen stated that 'the concept of [housing] distress was undoubtedly appropriate immediately after the war, but is now only a political slogan.'[110] In other words, he noticed the political use of the history of crisis. *Norske byggeklosser* is a satire of this phenomenon through its reference to a story of the 1950s housing crisis in Oslo, which was the real-life equivalent of Seip's small tent and the fictional storyline of the postbag of letters. In 1950, Leif Brattested and

[108] Bang-Hansen, *Norske byggeklosser*, 24:40.: 'skjønner du ingenting du da, skjønner du ikke at – dette er en eneste stor tragedie?'
[109] Bang-Hansen, 26:30.
[110] Christiansen et al., *Store boligprosjekters problematikk*, 62.: 'Begrepet [bolig]nød var utvilsomt på sin plass umiddelbart etter krigen, men er i dag kun et politisk slagord.'

24. Parody of housing crisis: Ingrid Femte finds Seip's tent. Still photograph from *Norske byggeklosser*.

his wife had been unable to find a home, and to investigate the rental market, Brattested put a mock advertisement for a flat for rent in Aftenposten, with the text 'Bed-sitting room for rent due to relocation. Box No. "4261 Affordable."'[111] The over one thousand replies he received told real stories of terrible living conditions in the early 1950s.[112] It is the reuse of this crisis in the political discourse of the 1970s that *Norske byggeklosser* satirises.

Fittingly, the character *Seip* is named after one of the best-known strategists in housing politics, the politician Helge Seip from the social liberal party *Venstre*. As minister of local government in Borten's coalition government, he had signed the parliamentary report that preceded *Om boligspørsmål*, *St. meld. nr. 63 (1967–68) Om bolig- og byggespørsmål,* which stated that 'everyone should be able to allocate a good dwelling in a good living environment within an expenses framework that is in a

[111] See the classified advertisement: 'Hybelleil. tilleie på. g. a. flytning.', *Aftenposten*, 14 August 1950. Full text: 'Hybelleil. tilleie på. g. a. flytning. Bill. mrk. "4261 Rimelig".'
[112] The letter collection is held in the Norwegian State archive, see 'Bolignød i Oslo – Brevsamling fra Leif Brattested', August 1950, SAO/PAO–0283, Statsarkivet i Oslo.

reasonable proportion to income'.[113] In what was a critique of the Labour party, he claimed that the speed of construction at the time was not enough to eliminate the housing shortage. In the 1965 election, when the Labour party lost the political hegemony they had had since 1948, Seip earned votes with his promise of 40 000 new homes per year.

Seip's conceptualisation of the housing crisis is different from the conceptualisation of a housing crisis caused by capitalist exploitation that appears to lie behind the statement of Bratteli and the housing policies of the Labour party. In a 1967 article about problems of Norwegian housing policies, Seip attempts to redefine the Labour perspective on housing as departing from housing understood as a *crisis of poverty*, which has now become a *crisis of affluence*.[114] While the crisis of poverty is caused by the general lack of resources, the crisis of affluence comes as a result of unevenly distributed economic growth. Seip's conceptualisation of crisis is not a new thought however, as it builds directly on the sociologist Johan Vogt's ideas from 1953.[115] For Seip however, Vogt's ideas mean that while advantageous for the majority, the universalist housing policies and rising standards and expectations still left out a great part of the population. Seip's definition of crisis supports his suggestions of a solution to the crisis that dismisses earlier solutions to the housing crisis through standardisation and rationalisation, as this is no longer accepted by the voters:

> One might say that a certain opposition has gradually developed towards the tendency to uniformity necessarily follows when setting up a housing program with norms, state banks and a relatively strict control of standard costs.[116]

Instead, he suggests a nuanced offer of housing in terms of size, quality and price, and an emphasis on housing environment. Referring to the composition of housing types, Seip emphasises freedom of choice over standardisation, defining the crisis of wealth as a result of increasingly higher uniform standards which are not affordable for everyone, so that

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[113] See Kommunal- og arbeidsdepartementet, 'St. meld. nr. 63 (1967–68): Om bolig- og byggespørsmål'.: 'Alle skal kunne disponere en høvelig bolig i et godt bomiljø innenfor en utgiftsramme som står i et rimelig forhold til inntektene.'
[114] Seip, 'Aktuelle problemer i norsk boligpolitikk', 49, 56.
[115] Johan Vogt, *Intervju med fremtiden* (Oslo: Aschehoug, 1953).
[116] Seip, 'Aktuelle problemer i norsk boligpolitikk', 50.

diversification of housing is a necessity. Further, he argues for targeting of housing subsidies and thus a change from general public support directed to the housing unit to need-based support directed towards specific families. Another measure of targeted equalisation was the suggestion to balance housing costs between older and newer housing.[117] In arguing for accepting smaller flats for those with less means, he suggests that housing services may function as compensation for what will be lost for this part of the population, and asks if child day-care institutions – originally a measure for improving the housing environment and creating more freedom of choice for mothers – can compensate for smaller flat size.[118] However, behind this rhetoric of 'freedom of choice' and 'compensations' lies the acceptance of structural inequality.

The satire of *Norske byggeklosser* reminds that when the housing crisis rhetoric is still prevailing in 1972, it is a farcical reuse of tragedy corresponding to Marx' quip that 'Hegel observes somewhere that all the great events and characters of world history occur twice, so to speak. He forgot to add: the first time as high tragedy, the second time as low farce.'[119] Marx's message was that history often reproduces itself and re-uses earlier events as caricatures.[120] Satirising the exaggerated discourse of crisis, *Norske byggeklosser* places one of the most successful agitators of crisis, Seip, in housing crisis himself. However, Seip is an antagonist disguised as a victim. When Ingrid speaks of 'one great tragedy', it is not only a parody of the contemporary political use of the history of an earlier, serious housing crisis, but of Femte's naïve acts of solidarity with Seip and the acceptance of his history of crisis without questioning its structural causes. For throughout *Norske byggeklosser*, there is a sense of the oppressive system of welfare capitalism that deceives the general population.

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[117] Seip, 55.
[118] Seip, 50.
[119] Karl Marx, 'The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte', in *Marx's Eighteenth Brumaire: (Post)Modern Interpretations*, ed. Mark Cowling and James Martin, trans. Terrell Carver (London: Pluto Press, 2002), 19.
[120] Terrell Carver, 'Imagery/Writing, Imagination/Politics: Reading Marx through the *Eighteenth Brumaire*', in *Marx's Eighteenth Brumaire: (Post)Modern Interpretations*, ed. Mark Cowling and James Martin (London: Pluto Press, 2002), 120–23.

Housing crisis in welfare capitalism

Ending the idyllic scene at the housing plot in the beginning of *Norske byggeklosser*, the entrepreneur Kleppe closes the deal and becomes the contractor of Femte's new home. As a final touch, Kleppe gives Femte a small Monopoly house, telling him that the game piece is a guarantee of the house they will get.[121] It soon becomes evident however that this symbolic gesture is instead an opening move in a game that Femte is destined to lose. Throughout the film, Kleppe always keeps game pieces in his hand and makes references to the Monopoly game, such as 'I always follow the rules of the game. Do you not play Monopoly, Femte?'[122] Schooling Femte in the rules and strategies of the game, Kleppe argues that 'money just generates taxes – no, *trade* is the thing – you should play more Monopoly, Femte.'[123] The harsh reality of this emphasis on trade becomes clear when, under pressure to finish the house without the necessary funds, Femte is forced to accept several trades favourable for Kleppe but unfavourable for Femte himself.[124]

The character Kleppe is named after the Minister of Trade and Shipping Per Kleppe, and the many references to the Monopoly game suggest the dominance of capitalist logic in housing. The promises of following the rules – for Monopoly and capitalism – are not reassuring, since these rules support the game's objective: to bankrupt all opponents by acquiring real estate and charging rent.[125] The portrayal of Femte and Trygve's inability to confront Kleppe can thus be translated to a system critique; a satire of the Norwegian people – the civil society – and the

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[121] Bang-Hansen, *Norske byggeklosser*, 4:45.

[122] For references to the Monopoly game, see Bang-Hansen, 22:05, 31:40 and 58:10. 'Ja, jeg følger alltid spillereglene, jeg – ja, spiller De ikke Monopol da, Femte?'

[123] Bang-Hansen, 1:08:30.: 'Penger blir det bare skatt av – nei, *bytte*, det er tingen – skulle spille litt mer Monopol De, Femte.'

[124] See Bang-Hansen, 1:08:30, 1:25:30, 32:00.

[125] Originally, the Monopoly rules were just one of two possible sets of rules in Monopoly's predecessor, the pedagogic Landlord game, which was created with the aim of disseminating ideas of landownership systems that counteracted capitalist speculation. The main set of rules, inspired by Henry George, supported the game objective of equal distribution of wealth; the game was won by ensuring, through cooperation, that every player got an equal share. Nevertheless, it was the second rule set of *Monopoly*, originally meant as a pedagogic warning about the destructive social dynamics of unrestrained capitalism, which gained popularity and became the well-known board game. See Mary Pilon, *The Monopolists: Obsession, Fury, and the Scandal Behind the World's Favorite Board Game* (New York: Bloomsbury USA, 2015), chap. 1.

25. Kleppe (left) watches while Ingrid and Olav Femte examine the Monopoly house. Still photograph from *Norske byggeklosser*.

political system's inability to confront capitalist exploitation in the housing production of the welfare state.

Norske byggeklosser's satire is thus a critique of the failed post-war ambitions for housing due to the continued power of capital in the welfare state compromise. The background for Bratteli's 1951 statement was that the housing problem is caused by the capitalist exploitation of tenants. The task for Labour's housing policy was consequently to try to remove housing from the capitalist profit cycles. Nevertheless, from the point of view of classic Marxist critique, the Labour party response is too narrowly conceptualised, as it addresses only the exploitation of tenants by landlords and not the whole capitalist system. As Friedrich Engels had argued, the housing problem cannot be solved within the capitalist system, as it is merely a symptom of omnipresent class contradictions.[126] The Marxist capitalist critique is thus a dismissal of Bratteli's 1951 statement, and instead sees the housing question in a comprehensive

[126] Friedrich Engels, 'The Housing Question', in *Marx and Engels Collected Works 1882–89*, by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, vol. 23 (International publishers, 1991), 317–91.

perspective according to which the chronic housing crisis is unavoidable in the welfare state as an instance of advanced capitalism.[127]

Behind *Om boligspørsmål* there is a Marxist or socialist critique of capitalism, most notably in *Ammerudrapporten*, which was a source for the parliamentary report.[128] Co-author of *Ammerudrapporten* Anne Sæterdal also contributes with a critique of capitalism in *Store boligproblemers problematikk*. There, she argues that the large cities are best understood as pressure areas with a concentration of capital and power, characterised by economic growth and a lack of housing, and she claims that housing production is a precondition for continued economic growth and ever higher consumption. Sæterdal warns that this development is naturalised in the arguments of the need for more housing,[129] and she thus criticises that the notion of housing crisis is used to legitimise capitalist exploitation, resulting in social crisis.

Similar criticism appeared in mass media. The television play entitled *Hjelp* (Help) explains that the housing crisis experienced by individuals has larger structural causes in the nationwide pressure for economic centralization, an effect of the growth policies of the capitalist welfare state.[130] In the TV-series *Boliger* (Housing), one of the programmes argued that what determines the price of housing are the contradictions of competition and capitalist profit, not political intentions and systems.[131] The factors are rent levels, instalment terms, conditions and systems; costs increasing proportionally with land utilization because of land speculation; contradictions of interest between the profit of sometimes monopolising manufacturers of building materials and

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[127] For a Marxist theorisation of the Keynesian welfare state as an instance of advanced capitalism, see Negri, 'Keynes and the Capitalist Theory of the State Post-1929', 25–29.

[128] See especially the introduction to *Ammerudrapporten*. Sæterdal and Hansen, *Ammerud 1*.

[129] Anne Sæterdal, '2.2 Lokalisering', in *Store boligprosjekters problematikk: vurdering av og kommentarer til problemer som spesielt knytter seg til utvikling og gjennomføring av store boligprosjekter*, by Alex Christiansen et al., Arbeidsrapport (Oslo: Byggtjeneste, 1971), 70, 72.

[130] Egil Kolstø, 'Hjelp', *Fjernsynsteateret* (NRK, 22 August 1972); Ludwig Iversen, 'Politisk TV-teater om sosialhjelp: Storbynæringene som syndebukker?', *VG*, 22 August 1972.

[131] One of the programme's hosts, Bjørn Nilsen, describes that parts of the series were based on Marxist analysis, and consequently emphasised the conflict of interest between classes in a system critique of capitalism and the welfare state model of harmony and cooperation. See Bjørn Nilsen, *NRK – makthavernes monopol* (Oslo: Gyldendal, 1975), 29.

components and entrepreneurs building as cheaply as possible; and competition strategies between construction companies. The consequence is a failure of the political ideology of providing housing without profit.[132] This Marxist critique emphasises not only that housing is structurally determined by welfare state capitalism, but that housing production has a structural role in the national economy, as the construction industry is a flexible mechanism used by the state to regulate the combined national expenses, which creates uneven employment and difficulties with continuous rational operation.[133]

Thus, the Marxist critique points out that housing has several conflicting functions or uses in welfare state capitalism, of which the mere provision of homes is only one. The use of housing as a fundamental need or use value is in conflict with the use of housing as a commodity or exchange value. The economic function or use of housing as a source of potential profit for a diverse set of actors involved in housing production conflicts with the use of the large housing construction sector as a regulation mechanism in the national economy as part of Keynesian politics for economic stability and avoidance of economic crisis. There is even the paradoxical use of housing crises in the politics of economic planning, where a housing crisis in centralised areas is used as an argument to implement large-scale provision of housing as a solution and consequently perpetuate the capitalist development pattern of centralisation. In various ways, these functions underlie different uses in *realpolitik*, where housing and the rhetoric of housing crisis are used to appeal to the narrow, pragmatic interests of the electorate.

The Marxist critique here provides a total perspective of housing, where a housing crisis is a symptom of the capitalist system that determines all of the uses of housing. As a critique that expands the housing question to the whole of society, these examples of socialist- or Marxist thought take issue with the uses of housing crises in the political hegemonic ideological discourse and *realpolitik*, where the housing crisis discourse becomes a political tool to continue capitalism. But even this critique had its own political function, which was to extend the question

[132] Ellen Aanesen, Eva Brustad, and Bjørn Nilsen, 'Hvorfor blir hus så dyre?', *Boliger: Serie i 6 deler om bolignød og boligpolitikk* (NRK, 7 May 1973).
[133] Aanesen, Brustad, and Nilsen, 18:30.

of housing to a principal question of capitalist critique and thus serve as an argument for a radical response: a politics of crisis.[134]

One response is the revolutionary Marxist one, which emphasises that the housing crisis cannot be solved within the housing sector, but only by replacement of the capitalist economic system. This constructs the past and present crisis of housing as the result of previous failed welfare state housing policies. The history of housing is constructed merely as part of an all-encompassing, profit-seeking capitalist scheme, which – like the game in *Norske byggeklosser* – counteracts any principles and ideologies of a just housing system. While this fits the early capitalism as described by Marx, and in a more limited perspective the housing situation in Oslo in the late 19th century, it is a generalisation of the power relationship between capital and worker. While such a 'vulgar' Marxism appears as a critical history that simplifies past struggles in its search for knowledge and justice, it is also a kind of antiquarian history as it constructs the housing crisis as a generalised chronic crisis under capitalism. This is a generalization that, whilst criticising the alienation created by capitalism, creates a dissociation from history in itself.

Another response is a radical socialist one, in the form of a search for ways to organise social life in contrast to the large welfare state systems. A critique of growth policies, centralisation, scale, consumption and the alienation that these capitalist modernisation processes are argued to cause, this radicalism entailed a new focus on the social environment as the construction of direct relationships and new solidarity instead of abstract relationships through money.[135] Instead of entering into direct conflict with capitalism, the approach can be characterised as trying to establish alternative societies, avoiding or escaping capitalism. The logical consequence is the planning of smaller communities, smaller-scale buildings, and emphasis on the social and the natural – certainly also a background for *St. meld. nr. 76* and especially the first ideas of a community in the forest at Romsås.

The architect Sigrun Kaul, – like Christiansen, the leader of the Romsås team and the authors of *Bo i glade grender* (Live in happy

[134] A politics of crisis was recently suggested by Peter Marcuse and David Madden, who argue that the housing crisis cannot be solved with minor political shifts. See Peter Marcuse and David Madden, *In Defense of Housing: The Politics of Crisis* (London; Brooklyn, NY: Verso Books, 2016).

[135] For money relationships, see Karl Marx, *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy*, trans. Ben Fowkes, vol. 1 (London: Penguin Books in association with New Left Review, 1990).

hamlets) – argues for small, socially close-knit living environments, as communities based on 'a new way of cohabitation'.[136] These have to be different from the satellite towns, since

> if they are still like the satellite towns, with long distances to services, workplaces and so-called centre functions, if they are to be inhabited by families where the father leaves for work in the morning and the mother stay at home with housework and child care, if they are still satellite towns, dormitory towns, then nothing has been won.[137]

In these new communities, focus on the housing environment replaces the previous focus on the housing unit.[138] Kaul specifically asks for a housing environment that will work as structural rationalisation of the tasks of the housewife.[139] She criticises the contemporary built-in service provided by the housewife in each dwelling, and questions that every household has its own bubble with a complete set of services. Seip's suggestion that the housing environment compensate for the reduced quality of the dwelling is supported by Kaul's questioning of the nuclear home.[140] Both Kaul and Seip argue for a community-based home, which also opens for reforming – and reducing – the quality criteria for the individual housing unit, instead prioritising the housing environment as the new unity for welfare state housing.

A new fictional unity

As the ultimate antagonist in *Norske byggeklosser*, the neighbour Højdahl has both the final word and the last laugh.[141] Omnipresent and omniscient, Højdahl appears throughout *Norske byggeklosser*, making

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[136] See Wenche Terjesen and Inger Ullern, *Bo i glade grender: en bok om samliv, bo-service og nærmiljøer* (Oslo: Gyldendal, 1973).
[137] Sigrun Kaul, 'Det er innholdet – ikke formen – som er utslagsgivende', *Forbruker-rapporten*, 1973.
[138] An important reference for this discourse is the Danish sociologist Ingrid Gehl. See Ingrid Gehl, *Bo-miljø*, vol. 71, SBI-rapport (København, 1971).
[139] See Christiansen et al., *Store boligprosjekters problematikk*, 51–52.
[140] Seip, 'Aktuelle problemer i norsk boligpolitikk', 50.
[141] See the final scene where Højdahl is a television reporter for the evening news and informs Femte that the government has decided to locate the new national airport exactly where Femte has built the family's new home, making all their struggles futile. Bang-Hansen, *Norske byggeklosser*, 1:28:00–1:29:30.

26. The neighbour Højdahl (left) ridicules Olav Femte. Still photography from *Norske byggeklosser*.

scathing comments about the Femte family's every action, especially regarding their naïve compassion and solidarity with the housing crisis victim Seip. Højdahl – envious, complacent and with a level of *Schadenfreude* that could qualify as pure evil – is indeed the opposite of Ingrid Femte's naïve solidarity, kindness and gratitude. This is manifested in a scene outside the housing block where Højdahl ridicules Olav Femte for the lack of economic sense inherent in his solidary act of selling the family's flat at the regulated price: 'you – what are you going to do with – are you going to do with all those bills in your post box? [*laughs*] Oh yes, we laughed terribly when we saw those [*laughs*].'[142]

Appropriately named after the Minister of Social Affairs Odd Højdahl, the neighbour Højdahl represents the social environment in *Norske byggeklosser*. His character serves to ridicule the adherence to solidarity with those without housing in the post-war welfare state's housing policy, in a satire of the naivety of the Norwegian people represented by Ingrid and Olav Femte, who fail to achieve the necessary cynicism in a competitive society. Despite the ideology of solidarity

[142] See Bang-Hansen, 42:20–44:00.: 'Du – hva har du tenkt å gjøre med – har du tenkt å gjøre med alle de regningene i postkassa di da? [*laughs*] ja, vi lo fælt når vi så dem, gitt [*laughs*].'

behind the welfare state's triangular model based on universality, standards and continuity of production, the real history shows a social and political complexity that has the effect of transforming policies for solidarity into a generator of inequality. The monumental and antiquarian histories of a cross-political unity of *eierlinja* obscure the real history of conflicting interests and contradictory results of politics.

Højdahl can also be seen as a satire of the belief in the solidarity between the inhabitants of post-war satellite towns based on the ideas of neighbourhoods. The egoistic and envious neighbour Højdahl is the antithesis of the social ambitions for the satellite town. The satire points to the illusions of solidarity in a capitalist society that gives no rewards for it, and to the lacking social infrastructure. The faults of the housing environment can be attributed to the welfare state housing policies of *eierlinja* and the triangular model, which were prompted in solidarity with those without housing. In the concrete spaces of the satellite town, the block typology, mass production and the lack of social services are consequences of prioritising solidarity, which resulted in a housing environment crisis; the solidarity between those with and without housing was limited in the housing sector, and also limited to the housing unit. As a result, the physical social housing environment was sacrificed, and thus the possibilities for developing social bonds and solidarity in these new communities were limited.

The housing environment policy in *Om boligspørsmål* appears to rectify this sacrifice by prioritising the development of solidarity in new communities whilst at the same time reinforcing – through a new interpretation – solidarity with those without housing. In the new unity of the housing environment, the contradictory but apparently similar solutions of Seip and those of the socialist type can be combined. However, a more comprehensive interpretation of Højdahl's scathing comments as a general satire of any possibility of solidarity in the capitalist welfare state, including the rectification through the concept of the housing environment, makes any kind of solidarity a farce. It suggests that *Om boligspørsmål* also represents a strictly limited form of solidarity, based on trade-offs, in its attempt to establish an alternative to the alienation of capitalist society without confronting its structures. What is not addressed by any of these notions of solidarity is a general type of solidarity that functions both across sectors and society and

addresses deep structural injustice.[143] Avoiding any Marxist or other structural analysis of the housing question, the politically neutral concept of the housing environment is a way of expanding the problem of housing without confronting capitalism.

The housing environment therefore becomes the ultimate, but farcical, spatial realisation of the welfare state compromise, which – with its ability to absorb everything into itself because of its lack of ideology, opens up for a multitude of uses in *realpolitik* and '*realarchitektur*'. As a complex compound, the housing environment is an empty concept that, like the empty word 'Bonaparte', can contain everything because in itself it is nothing.[144] When the housing environment is a new cross-political unity that replaces the former cross-political unity of *eierlinja*, it constitutes a new fictional unity in a distinctive spatial turn of welfare state housing. The *Norske byggeklosser* satire reveals the vision of the environment as equally monumental and naïve. Idealistic and ideological, the unity of the environment obscures the conflicts of interests, the battles that go beyond the specific community, injustices of a global character that, when reduced to the concrete place, are fragmented, neutralised, defused, or rendered harmless.

In the next chapter I will investigate the housing environment further, but from a different perspective than the political discourse. Based in social and psychological perspectives that arose in a report on the housing environment of the satellite town of Stovner in 1975, the neighbourhood unit is analysed through the contradictions between state institutionalised housing service, community environment and the family. As such, it engages other and sometimes new voices that are seldom heard.

[143] See the critique in Kolstø, 'Hjelp'; Ellen Aanesen, Eva Brustad, and Bjørn Nilsen, 'Må vi alltid ha bolignød?', *Boliger: Serie i 6 deler om bolignød og boligpolitikk* (NRK, 14 June 1973).
[144] Tafuri, *The Sphere and the Labyrinth*, 7.

5
A battle of civil society

> In Stovner, one of Oslo's newest city districts, there are many children – up to 11–12 years old – who do not know the name of their thumb, the days of the week or the seasons of the year. They are ignorant of when they are born, and they have a poor concept of where they live. A number of children seem to have lost the ability to learn to read, write and do maths, and they will probably become almost illiterate. Their problems often seem inaccessible and impervious to known treatment methods.[1]

In 1975, the magazine *Sinnets helse* published a special issue entitled *Barn i krise* (Children in Crisis). The publication used the Oslo satellite town of Stovner, built in 1967–74, as a study case, and thus came to be known as *Stovnerrapporten* (the Stovner Report). Its introduction – which opened with the above quote – characteristically linked ominous descriptions of *children in crisis* with the welfare state and the environment of the satellite town by criticising 'the planning of society that allows entire urban areas to be built and put into use without

[1] The quote appears in the editor's introduction to *Stovnerrapporten* and in the first article in *Romsåsrapporten*, see Terje Gammelsrud, 'Skal vi snakke høyt om det?', *Sinnets helse: Tidsskrift for mentalhygiene*, [Stovnerrapporten] Barn i krise, no. 5 (1975): 3; 'Saken anses som ferdig behandlet', *Sinnets helse: Tidsskrift for mentalhygiene*, [Romsåsrapporten] Rapport fra Oslo, Barn i krise 2, no. 5 (1976): 4.: 'På Stovner, en av Oslos nyeste bydeler, fins mange barn – opp til 11–12 år gamle – som ikke kjenner navnet på sin tommelfinger, ukedagene eller årstidene. De er uvitende om når de er født, og de har dårlig begrep om hvor de bor. En rekke barn ser ut til å ha mistet evnen til å lære å lese, skrive og regne, og de vil sannsynligvis komme til å bli noe bortimot analfabeter. Deres problemer virker ofte utilgjengelige og upåvirkelige av kjente behandlingsmetoder.'

concern for conditions fundamental to the human existence'.[2] The media coverage of *Stovnerrapporten* attached a stigma to Stovner, and in a second special issue of *Sinnets helse*, entitled *Barn i krise II* but known as *Romsåsrapporten*, the stigma extended to encompass the satellite town Romsås.[3]

Research and news reports still refer to the two reports as historical causes of stigma, but they hardly address the content of the reports.[4] Characteristic for the discourse on Oslo satellite towns is the contrast between a negative media portrayal and accounts by inhabitants who defend the satellite towns.[5] Thus, the problem of the satellite town is addressed through the notion of territorial stigma.[6] The challenges of outsiderness are consequently to be solved by defending and safeguarding area reputation, with place branding, brand management, and design for aesthetic attractiveness, as well as the instruction of inhabitants – explicitly or implicitly – to speak highly of the area and the school.[7]

In this chapter, I challenge such discourses of territorial stigma and the often-debated dichotomy of media critique and inhabitant pride. I argue that in a discourse that constructs the issue as primarily an image-

[2] Gammelsrud, 'Skal vi snakke høyt om det?': 'den samfunnsplanlegging som tillater at hele bydeler kan bygges og tas i bruk uten hensyn til elementære betingelser for menneskelig tilværelse.'

[3] Gammelsrud, 1976.

[4] See for example: Øyvind Holen, *Groruddalen: en reiseskildring*, 2. utg. (Oslo: Cappelen Damm, 2016); Olav Elgvin, Jon Rogstad, and Sarah Fossen Sinnathamby, *Rurbane møter: deltakelse og samhold blant ungdom og kvinner på Stovner*, FAFO-rapport (trykt utg.) 2013:02 (Oslo: Fafo, 2013), 15.

[5] See Kjersti Gakkestad, 'Romsås – en stigmatisert bydel? En studie av territoriell stigmatisering: medias rolle og konsekvenser for beboerne' (Hovedfagsoppgave, UiO, 2003); Brattbakk and Hansen, 'Post-War Large Housing Estates in Norway – Well-Kept Residential Areas Still Stigmatised?'; Kirsten Danielsen and Ada Ingrid Engebrigtsen, 'Stovner – problemområde eller lutter idyll? Om forholdet mellom statistikk og erfaring', *Tidsskrift for velferdsforskning* 17, no. 3 (2014): 27–40.

[6] For more on territorial stigma, see Loïc Wacquant, 'Territorial Stigmatization in the Age of Advanced Marginality', *Thesis Eleven* 91, no. 1 (November 2007): 66–77; Loïc Wacquant, Tom Slater, and Virgílio Borges Pereira, 'Territorial Stigmatization in Action', *Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space* 46, no. 6 (June 2014): 1270–80.

[7] Examples of aesthetic improvements are the 'lamp' at Haugenstua, the 'tower' at Stovner, and the underpass at Ammerud: See Per-Øystein Lund, *Innsatser i utsatte byområder: Erfaringer fra Groruddalssatsningen* (Oslo kommune, 2014), 63.



27. Cover of *Stovnerrapporten*.

problem, the complex challenges related to conflicts of interests and political struggles are obscured by the overarching task of managing territorial stigma. To analyse these discourses hidden beneath the stigma dichotomy, I apply an interpretation of Tafuri's elucidation of a history of the present, focussing on his critique of Foucault's genealogies.

For Foucault, the power relationship in a strong welfare state is only possible because of the subjugations, training, and surveillance that disciplines have already produced and administered. Foucault here speaks of different systems of controlling, policing, punishing, and exiling those who challenge power dominance. Thus, in the welfare state, there is no single source of power, since it functions through the disciplinary

techniques of capitalism, inherited from disciplines.[8] In a critique of simple anti-statism, Foucault notes that without a single source of power, there cannot be only one source of resistance.[9] To contest overall discourses and address distributed power, Foucault selects the materials of his genealogies from different knowledges that hegemonic discourses have suppressed: the forgotten histories of professional expertise of struggles combined with the local citizen's subjugated, singular and local knowledges of fights and battles. The genealogies are thus 'the coupling together of scholarly erudition and local memories', which unified constitute a 'historical knowledge of struggles' for use in contemporary tactics of resistance.[10] In response, Tafuri announces that

> Power is itself plural: it runs through and cuts across social classes, ideologies, and institutions. On this we can still agree with Foucault: a single locus of Great Refusal does not exist; only from within systems of power can the mechanisms of power be known.[11]

Foucault describes how diverse government programmes, such as welfare and new educational techniques, come from the penal system, and he calls this expansion of disciplinary control from total institutions of prisons and asylums to the entire social network a 'carceral archipelago'.[12] This network – a *dispositif* – is a site of conflict. The elements have no fixed internal relationships; institutions – such as the school – are not instances of power in themselves; they are instead arenas for struggles.[13] Importantly, in his critique of Foucault, Tafuri argues for extending the analysis of power to include how *several* different discourses collide in physical space:

> But if Power – like the institutions in which it incarnates itself – 'speaks many dialects,' the analysis of the 'collision' among these dialects must then be the object of historiography. The construction of a physical

[8] Foucault, *Society Must Be Defended*, 38–39. See also the editor's comment, 277.
[9] Foucault, *The Will to Knowledge: The History of Sexuality* [1978], 1:95.
[10] Foucault, *Society Must Be Defended*, 8.
[11] Tafuri, *The Sphere and the Labyrinth*, 5.
[12] Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 298–99.
[13] See Knut Ove Eliassen, *Foucaults begreper* (Scandinavian Academic Press, 2016), 104.

> space is certainly the site of a 'battle': a proper urban analysis demonstrates this clearly.[14]

Tafuri refers to the battles between architects and other institutions and actors in planning and design processes of space. However, similar struggles also take place in the social construction of space, as collisions between multiple welfare state institutions and the local community space of the satellite town. In the following, I investigate such collisions or battles between the satellite town, neighbourhood unit and school and the historical institutional emergence of pedagogics, psychology and social work through the discourses of *Stovnerrapporten* and *Romsåsrapporten*. These discourses, the combination of scholarship and the knowledge of the people of Stovner are the histories of conflicts and contradictions in the systems of the welfare state – between and inside communities and institutions – and constitute what Foucault calls 'the subjugated knowledge of local discursivities', which are often not heard.[15] I analyse this history, not through Foucault's concept of genealogies, but using Tafuri's concept of crisis as a framework for the collisions of discourses in the construction of social space.

The conflicting roles of school and neighbourhood

Located at the northern border of the Oslo Municipality, the satellite town Stovner was planned for about 30 000 inhabitants and was thus significantly larger than earlier Oslo satellite towns.[16] The area was laid out in *Tokerudplanen*, which was approved in 1966.[17] This plan was a result of an architectural competition announced by an entrepreneur from the private sector, Olav Selvaag, in 1960.[18] Stovner is divided into several areas; the largest of these is *Vestli*, planned by Selvaag and built

[14] Tafuri, *The Sphere and the Labyrinth*, 8.
[15] Foucault, *Society Must Be Defended*, 10–11.
[16] From Lambertseter, the first Oslo satellite town, to Romsås, the size of satellite towns has been around 10 000 inhabitants. See for example Rinnan, *Lambertseter*; Kojen, 'Bort fra sovebyen: Romsås – ny forstad for 8000 mennesker'.
[17] 'Tokerud - Reguleringsplan for området mellom Trondheimsveien - kommunegrensen mot Skedsmo og Hovedbanen - 19.09.1966 - S-1352, Saksnummer 196601316 - Reguleringssak', 19 September 1966, Plan- og bygningsetatens arkiv.
[18] 'Nordens arkitekter skal regulere ny by på Tokerud: Selvaag innbyr til konkurranse', *Arbeiderbladet*, 9 September 1960.

28. Fossumsletta neighbourhood with Vestli on the left. Photography by Fjellanger Widerøe, 1972. Oslo Byarkiv. Licensed under CC BY-SA.

between 1967 and 1974 as the pinnacle of Selvaag's rational housing production effort.[19] The signature housing typologies, consisting of terrace blocks and pyramid blocks terraced on two sides, were allegedly employed to combine the advantages of the housing block and the individual house.[20] The other areas comprised by Stovner are the Forsheimer and Haugenstua areas with blocks built by the cooperative housing company USBL, the areas of Lower Stovner and the Stovner housing cooperative with terrace housing built by the cooperative housing company OBOS, and the old and new detached houses in the area of old Stovner.

The focus area of *Stovnerrapporten* – the community *Fossumsletta* – was built by the private entrepreneur Nils Stiansen.[21] Oslo Municipality

[19] Jon Skeie, *Bolig for folk flest: Selvaagbygg 1920-1998* (Tano Aschehoug, 1998), 226.
[20] Skeie, 224. Vestli was designed by the architects Anne Tinne, Mogens Friis, Bjørn Langmo and Olav Thorsnes.
[21] In the official plans, Fossumsletta is called '*Tokerud – felt G*'. See 'Fossum nedre - Reguleringsplan og bebyggelsesplan for Tokerud - felt G - Karl Fossums vei - Vedtatt

owned the land and leased it to Stiansen. The architect was L. Skjelbred.[22] In contrast to Selvaag's terrace and pyramid blocks, the housing blocks at Fossumsletta are simple prismatic volumes. The layout consists of five three-storey blocks, fourteen four-storey blocks, and four nine-storey blocks. Some of the blocks are organised to form open courtyards, others have a linear configuration that follows the natural contours of the site. In the area plan, small circles placed between the blocks or in the open courtyards denote playgrounds. The primary school Smedstua, featured in *Stovnerrapporten*, is located to the south of Fossumsletta and is part of *Haugenstua skoleanlegg*, designed by Paul Cappelen and Torbjørn Rodahl. According to the City Heritage Authority, Smedstua is one of only nine open schools built in Oslo between 1968 and 1972.[23] It has an open and flexible 'learning landscape' in low 1–2 storey buildings organised around atriums.

The school and the community have a specific interrelation in the planning of satellite towns. The *Generalplan for Oslo* prescribed that post-war Oslo was to be organised through smaller social units based on the ideas of the neighbourhood unit, which according to the American planner Clarence Stein had become an internationally accepted basis for the design of new communities.[24] Lewis Mumford was central in spreading the idea, and his famous book *The Culture of Cities* was largely an argument for designing smaller communities as alternatives to large cities.[25] Nonetheless, Clarence Perry's seminal 1929 article published in *Regional Plan of New York and Its Environs* is considered as the origin

15.06.1967 - S-1401, Saksnummer 196701337 - Reguleringssak', 15 June 1967, Plan- og bygningsetatens arkiv.

[22] Skjelbred had been employed in the office of Erling Viksjø in the H-block project in the government quarter. See Erling Viksjø, 'Det nye regjeringsbygget', *Byggekunst: The Norwegian Review of Architecture* 41, no. 1–5 (1959): 1.

[23] Oslo kommune Byantikvaren to Oslo kommune Plan- og bygningsetaten, '102/1123 - Smiuvegen 255 og 257 - Smedstua og Haugenstua skole - uttalelse til riving av skolebygninger', 15 January 2014, 201315123 - Byggesak, Plan- og bygningsetatens arkiv; Kari Funderud, *Åpen skole: blinkskudd eller bomskudd?* (Oslo: Aschehoug, 1975), 44–45.

[24] Clarence S. Stein, 'Towards New Towns for America', *The Town Planning Review* 20, no. 4 (January 1950): 353.

[25] Lewis Mumford, *The Culture of Cities*, Reprint edition (London: Secker & Warburg, 1946).

SMEDSTUA SKOLE



Barneskole, åpnet	:	1971
Planlagt for	:	18 klasser
Ved undersøkelsen	:	25 klasser
Bruttoareal	:	3554 m²
Åpent areal	:	1 x 780 m²
		1 x 300 m²

Skoleåret 1973/74 hadde skolen sju klasser mer enn den var beregnet for. For å imøtekomme det økte behovet for rom, ble samlingssalen, nr. 20 på tegningen, innredet til landskap for tre klasser, fysikksalen ble brukt av én klasse, og tre klasser ble plassert i et provisorium.

I de første årene hadde alle 9 klassene i landskapet, nr. 5, én inngang og én garderobe sammen. Det ble i 1973 bygd en ny inngang og en ny garderobe i tillegg. Disse forandringene er ikke merket av på tegningen.

Ved årsskiftet 1974/75, etter at undersøkelsen ble gjort, ble det bygd tre lukkede rom inne i det største landskapet, nr. 5. Disse rommene, som hver er på ca. 35 m², blir først og fremst brukt til undervisning av hele klasser, men også som arbeidssted for grupper av elever. Det ble samtidig bygd enda en ny garderobe.

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29. Smedstua School, analysed in Funderud, Kari. *Åpen skole: blinkskudd eller bomskudd?* Oslo: Aschehoug, 1975.



30. Smedstua School, plans. From Funderud, Kari. *Åpen skole: blinkskudd eller bomskudd?* Oslo: Aschehoug, 1975.

of the neighbourhood unit concept.[26] Crucially, Perry emphasised that local democracy and belonging to community and school in the neighbourhood unit would foster closer social relationships. He thus argued that the size of the school and the school district should define the size of the neighbourhood community, and that the school should function as its social centre.

The 1950 General Plan for Oslo described the principle of the internal composition of the future satellite towns as following the neighbourhood unit concept, grouping housing around playgrounds, kindergartens, small shops, and fundamentally, schools. The plan emphasised that the government agencies of social services must guide the physical planning, but still stated that housing should be organised in groups of one- to two thousand persons with the *same social standard*, whilst age and family size should vary. The school district should comprise four- to six housing groups that should vary according to income groups, to ensure that the school contained the social diversity necessary to be a true democratic centre.[27] These guidelines, including the social mix, were in accordance with the original neighbourhood unit idea and followed Perry's suggestion from 1929 for school districts of five to ten thousand inhabitants.[28] Despite criticism, the establishment of local communities in the form of the neighbourhood unit was still the guiding planning principle when Stovner and Romsås satellite towns were built in the early 1970s.

Perry was strongly influenced by American planning discourses and interest groups when devising the idea of the neighbourhood unit.[29] Still, his fundamental concept of *community* came from pioneers in the relatively new academic field of sociology. Perry refers to the American

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[26] See Mumford, 'The Neighborhood and the Neighborhood Unit'; Perry, 'The Neighborhood Unit'.

[27] Rolfsen, *Generalplan for Oslo*, 40.

[28] Perry, 'The Neighborhood Unit', 567, 569, 572.

[29] Perry's formula for the neighbourhood unit concept has been described as a product of the influences of the Russell Sage Foundation (amelioration of social problems through planning and community design), the sociologist Charles Horton Cooley (the neighbourhood as incubator for social interaction), the Settlement House Movement (parks and open spaces), the Community Center Movement (the school as community centre for social, political and physical activities) and the Garden Cities Movement (discouraging through-traffic). See Larry Lloyd Lawhon, 'The Neighborhood Unit: Physical Design or Physical Determinism?', *Journal of Planning History* 8, no. 2 (3 February 2009): 111–32.

sociologist Charles Horton Cooley for his ideas about communities.[30] Furthermore, Cooley owed much to the work of the German sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies, who is considered the first proper German sociologist and is known for his theory on the distinction between the traditional, direct and lasting social relationships of *Gemeinschaft* and the modern, abstract, temporary and institution-based relationships of *Gesellschaft*.[31] The neighbourhood unit concept can thus be seen as an instrument to reinstate the closer social bonds that were found in Gemeinschaft, counteracting the alienation caused by the fleeting encounters in the modern, capitalist city. The neighbourhood unit can be described as a small, idealised community with all social groups and functions constructed around the child and the family; this ambition is evident in the American film *The City* – an advertisement for the neighbourhood unit concept.[32] According to the social theorist Christopher Adair-Toteff,

> Tönnies formulated laws of the life of humanity according to which all original, affect-based community went through an irreversible process of rationalisation toward a calculating, commercial society of egoists […] and his *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft* became popular among the educated bourgeoise who sought erudite expressions for irrational longings for a declining patriarchy.[33]

While the concept of the neighbourhood unit had initially emerged in an interplay between planners and sociologists, when the idea was put to use in planning after the Second World War, it was, seemingly paradoxically, criticised by the sociologist.[34] In 1948, Denmark's first professor in sociology, the German Theodor Geiger, criticised that the concept of the

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[30] Clarence Perry, 'The Rehabilitation of the Local Community', *Social Forces* 4, no. 3 (March 1926): 558; Clarence Perry, 'City Planning for Neighborhood Life', *Social Forces* 8, no. 1 (1 September 1929): 98.
[31] Tönnies' idea of *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* first appeared in publication in 1887. See Dirk Schubert, 'Transatlantic Crossings of Planning Ideas: The Neighborhood Unit in the USA, UK, and Germany', in *Transnationalism and the German City* (Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2014).
[32] Steiner and van Dyke, *The City*.
[33] Christopher Adair-Toteff, *The Anthem Companion to Ferdinand Tönnies* (Anthem Press, 2016), 34, 37.
[34] Richard Dewey, 'The Neighborhood, Urban Ecology, and City Planners', *American Sociological Review* 15, no. 4 (August 1950): 502.

neighbourhood unit had a prominent position in planning literature despite its lack of support in sociological research. He claimed that urban planners accepted sociology only when it confirmed their ideas and became upset if sociologists warned that their plans were built on a misguided critique of modern society.[35] His main argument against this planning principle was that neighbourhood units were unsuitable for encouraging democratic activity, as the essential institutions and functions of modern society had outgrown the small place-bound communities.

Oslo's head of planning Erik Rolfsen defended the neighbourhood unit against Geiger's criticism pragmatically, arguing that everyone agreed that rational spatial planning was needed, and that the neighbourhood unit was the best model currently available. He noted that sociologists had neither provided the data the planners requested to determine the sizes and spatial relationships of playgrounds, schools and neighbourhoods, nor had they provided alternative models for new urban developments.[36] Indeed, planners had already established their professional practices based on old sociological theories. The neighbourhood unit was imbedded into a planning profession that appeared impervious to the new sociological insights of the modern welfare society as based on institutions instead of communities.

The discussions reveal a conflict within the discipline of sociology. Geiger, with his research on modern institutions, belonged to a lineage that includes Simmel and Weber. Together with Tönnies, they were of the first generation of German sociologists who aimed to address the problems of modernity – but with contrasting approaches. In 1973, Tafuri described the urban materialisation of this conflict in sociology as the contrast between the *Siedlungen* as an early instance of neighbourhood unit settlement and part of a 'global anti-urban ideology', and the chaos of the modern capitalist metropolis:

> The settlement was thus to be an oasis of order, an example of how it is possible for working-class organisations to propose an alternative model of urban utopia. But the settlement itself openly set the model of the

[35] 'Geiger Mot Mumford'.
[36] Rolfsen, 'Sosiologi og byplan'.

> 'town' against that of the large city. This was Tönnies against Simmel and Weber.[37]

Crucially, the contradiction in sociology and urban models also appears in the contrast between the role assigned to the school in the neighbourhood unit – as a physical realisation of the welfare state – and the development of the school as a welfare state institution. In practice, satellite towns as primary sites for the expansions of the modern welfare institutions of Simmel and Weber are in contradiction with satellite towns – in the form of neighbourhood units – as sites for a realization of Tönnies' sociology. The school in the satellite town is thus an important arena in which Tafuri's contradiction of 'the town' against the city is played out.

Importantly, this contradiction was exacerbated in the post-war years by the parallel development of the school institution and the satellite town neighbourhoods which had the schools at their centre. The Norwegian welfare institution of the school was administered centrally according to the principle of *enhetsskolen*, a standardised, state-led education for all of society based on democratic and egalitarian ideology.[38] The school institution was seen as a central instrument for the welfare state in providing equal opportunities and being a democratic foundation, as it provided everyone with the same experience of society. *Enhetsskolen* can thus be said to constitute the very core of the post-war social democratic order, as its central tenet is that everyone should have the same possibilities, regardless of their background.[39] On this foundation, Norwegian schools were standardised, centralised and expanded during the 1950s and 1960s. In 1969, *enhetsskolen* was extended to nine years as the realisation of the cross-political ambition since 1945 to coordinate and standardise schooling. In that same year, the inclusion of the law for special schools was introduced into the law for primary schools. This inclusion can be seen as part of the

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[37] Tafuri, *Architecture and Utopia*, 119.

[38] *Folkeskulen* had already been established in 1889 as a common school for every child over seven years of age, and with *enhetsskolevedtaket* in 1920, this school was standardised as a seven-year *enhetsskole* (unitary school). Teachers and the school became central socio-cultural factors before World War II. The background for this emerging standardised school system was national, democratic and egalitarian ideology. See Olav Rovde, 'Lærarane: I kamp for skulen og standen', in *Profesjonshistorier*, ed. Rune Slagstad and Jan Messel (Oslo: Pax forlag, 2014), 352.

[39] Rovde, 346–47.

development of a unitary school for everyone, as it included children with different functional variations in the ordinary schools – and it also meant an increase of special pedagogues and extra teachers to accommodate the integration.[40] The consequence of this social democratic historical school development is the strengthening, standardising and centralisation of the school institution – and thus the weakening of the bond between the school and the local community.

There were, however, also tendencies of a reaction to this development of standardisation and centralisation. Unlike the earlier normative and binding plans, the 1974 new educational plan *Mønsterplan 74* was an indicative plan, and it can thus be seen as a decentralisation and diffusion of power in the school. The 1974 educational plan indicated a local and differentiated curriculum instead of the state-wide, unified curriculum of the traditional normal plan. In contrast to earlier instrumentalism and dissemination of knowledge, this new plan focussed on individual development – the child's independent thinking and critical assessment, accepting conflict as part of the education. *Mønsterplan 74* was based on radical ideas of wellbeing and sound learning environments;[41] the architecture and pedagogical principles of the open school fit into these ideas.[42] Within this perspective of decentralisation, the integration of children who would otherwise be in special schools was in accordance with the line of thought of individual and local adaptation of the learning curriculum. The contradiction between the roles of the school – as a centralised institution and community centre – was thus reflected in internal conflicts in the school. These conflicts are a critical backdrop for the events in the discourse of *Stovnerrapporten*.

Children in crisis I – *Stovnerrapporten* and its precursor

The title of the introduction of the Stovner report poses a rhetorical question: 'should we speak about it out loud?'[43] Crucially, neither the 'it'

[40] See 'Lov av 13. juni 1969 om grunnskolen: med endringer, sist ved lov av 13. juni 1975', § 8 Spesialundervisning (1976).
[41] Kirke- og undervisningsdepartementet, *Mønsterplan for Grunnskolen (M74)* (Oslo: Aschehoug, 1974), 28.
[42] See Alfred Oftedal Telhaug, 'Åpne skoler – utvikling og status i dag', in *Skolebygget som instrument for gjennomføring av mønsterplanen ('SIGMI')* (Trondheim: s.n., 1979), 47–48.
[43] Gammelsrud, 'Skal vi snakke høyt om det?'

nor the 'we' in the title are self-evident; the report contains variegated perspectives on the problems for the school and the environment from the different professions involved – which also speak on behalf of other groups. One such group is the civil society represented by the inhabitants of Stovner; they did not have a voice in *Stovnerrapporten*, but they did in its precursor, the report *Stovnerboere spør stovnerboere* (Stovner dwellers ask Stovner dwellers).[44] This earlier report describes the area as a place of interest for several official instances, institutions and professions, but strongly rejects the general impression of satellite town dwellers as unresourceful in every way:

> The planners also have a purely abstract relationship to the inhabitants. We are not viewed as human beings but as planning objects – as a passive population of inhabitants that forms a base for public communications, and that consumes schools and other non-productive investments. The population is defined as a burden on public budgets.[45]

The authors of *Stovnerboere spør stovnerboere* argue that such an abstract and negative view of the satellite town population is dangerous and exacerbates the inhabitants' feeling of powerlessness without improving their conditions. The report instead emphasises the possibilities that lie within the area's population for activity, belonging and participation.[46] The survey consequently maps the population by assessing their life situations in terms of strains, wishes, and needs, but importantly, also their resources such as occupational knowledge and skills.[47] *Stovnerboere spør stovnerboere* was thus an argument for the community, from the community.

A critical finding of this survey is the lower-than-the-average age of mothers and consequently the higher-than-the-average number of small children at Stovner, which the authors believe has to do with the

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[44] See the press release: Anne Lise Refsum, 'Undersøkelse blant 10000 Stovner-boere', *Dagbladet*, 6 November 1971.

[45] Odd Aksum et al., 'Stovnerboere spør stovnerboere: En undersøkelse om res[s]urser, behov og Stovner sentrum', Arbeidsrapport nr. 1, April 1972, 2.01.: 'Planleggerne har også et rent abstrakt forhold til beboerne. Vi ses ikke på som mennesker men som planleggingsobjekter – som en passiv befolkning som bor og danner trafikkunderlag for offentlige kommunikasjoner og som forbruker skoler og andre ikke-produktive investeringer. Befolkningen blir definert som en belastning på de offentlige budsjetter.'

[46] Aksum et al., 2.01, 2.02.

[47] Aksum et al., 3.01.

allocation of housing. In contrast to the usual assignment of housing via the cooperative housing companies' waiting list, the majority of housing assignments at Stovner were through the municipality, often on social-medical indications, which suggests that many inhabitants were struggling in different ways before even arriving in Stovner. It also meant that Stovner failed to adhere to the guidelines for social diversity for neighbourhood units laid out in the 1950 *Generalplan for Oslo*.[48] Nevertheless, particularly striking among their findings is that the inhabitants who experience the greatest strains and pressure are also the ones who show the greatest interest in participating in local politics and action groups, and in more information and services. The report suggests dissatisfaction and wishes for change as the cause for those confronting more challenges engaging more actively in their situation.[49] In the area of Fossumsletta there was an especially high concentration of this social group that faced struggles,[50] and who also seemed determined to do something about their problems.

As a voice from the people themselves, *Stovnerboere spør stovnerboere* represents those who are often not heard – what Foucault calls 'what people know'. In contrast, the contributions to *Stovnerrapporten* come from the school and the field of psychology as representatives of professions and welfare institutions. In other words, they represent what Foucault calls 'erudite knowledge'.[51] Nevertheless, rather than appearing scholarly and balanced, the presentation of *Stovnerrapporten* as a whole conveys a distinct tone of urgency in the face of acute crisis. The table of contents comprises the titles of the contributions; together they constitute a short story. Under the title 'Theme: Children in crisis', one testimony that 'I cried every day and felt sick on the way to school' appears to cause the issuing of 'A school's plea for help'. The background for the problem appears to be that 'Most children get inadequate help', with the consequence of creating 'Illiterates in welfare-Norway', since already '40% of the pupils were weak readers'. In conclusion, one is

[48] See Rolfsen, *Generalplan for Oslo*, 40.
[49] Aksum et al., 'Stovnerboere spør stovnerboere: En undersøkelse om res[s]urser, behov og Stovner sentrum', 4.33–4.34, 4.39, 4.59–4.60.
[50] See Table K, Aksum et al., 4.09, 4.32.
[51] Note that my use of 'erudite knowledge' in the meaning of professional knowledge differs from Foucault's use in the meaning of scholarly knowledge. See Foucault, *Society Must Be Defended*, 10–11.



behov for spesiell hjelp. Men det tins sikkert fortsatt en del som vi ennå ikke har oppdaget. Siste skoleår rakk skolens tverrfaglige råd bare å diskutere hjelpetiltak for 50 av disse elevene. Veldig mye må derfor gjøres på sparket — uten skikkelig vurdering av hvilke tiltak som er best skikket i hvert enkelt tilfelle.

For Smedstua skole betyr dette at det allerede er i gang en utstrakt integrering, men uten det nødvendige minimum av ressurser. Fra skoleadministrasjonen er det hevdet at Smedstua har lagt opp til en integrering av et omfang som det ikke fins dekning for i budsjettet. Til det vil jeg si at det ikke er skolen som har valgt å ville ha alle disse vanskeligstilte elevene. Det er vi-keligheten som er slik. Integreringen går automatisk. Barna begynner på normalskolen, og fordi hjelpeapparatet er så dårlig utbygget, tar det lang tid å påvise og fange opp de barn som trenger spesiell behandling. Lærerne oppdager nok tidlig at det er noe galt, men de får sent hjelp til å diagnostisere problemet, og de får sent hjelp til å søke om nødvendige hjelpetiltak.

Situasjonen for Smedstua skole er alvorlig og dyster, men jeg tror ikke den er håpløs. Betingelsene for at tilstanden kan bedres er imidlertid at det stilles til rådighet en del ekstra ressurser, og at skoleopplegget forandres slik at det tar utgangspunkt i elevenes virkelighet. ■

Camilla Voss er skolepsykolog ved Stovner distriktskontor på Stovner. Hennes distrikt omfatter blant annet Smedstua skole.

12

Hvem er jeg-

Tegnet av jente, åtte år.

Analfabeter i velferds-Norge

Av Anne-Marit Duve

— Det ser ut til at store grupper barn på Stovner kan komme til å bli noe dortimot analfabeter. En rekke barn synes å ha mistet evnen til å lære å lese, skrive og regne. Deres problemer virker utilgjengelige og upåvirkelige av kjente behandlingsmetoder.

— Jeg tror ikke jeg tar munnen for full når jeg påstår at et skremmende antall av Stovner-områdets barn må regnes som pedagogiske risikobarn, skriver psykolog og barnepsykiatrisk spesialpedagog, Anne-Marit Duve i denne artikkelen.

Jeg er som barnepsykiatrisk spesialpedagog i det siste halvåret blitt oppmerksom på Stovner-områdets store pedagogiske problemer. Jeg har tatt til behandling et ganske stort antall Stovner-barn med skole- og lærevanskeproblemer, og har også drevet aktiv oppsøkende virksomhet på Stovner.

De lærevanskeproblemene jeg ble konfrontert med syntes å være ekstremt alvorlige. Jeg har i min tidligere praksis ikke opplevd problemer av tilsvarende art og omfang.

Det var særlig to forhold ved barnas lærevanskeproblemer som var påfallende.

For det første så problemene ut til å være absolutt massive. Barn i tiårsalderen sto lærevanskeproblemer simpelt hen på nullpunktet. Den læring som man kunne se konturer av, var aldri av en slik karakter at den ble sittende, og vi fant hos disse barna ingen vanlig lagring og overføring av læring. Tall, bokstaver og kombinasjoner så ut til å være ukjente og nye hver gang barna ble konfrontert med dem.

For det andre syntes problemene å være utilgjengelige og upåvirkelige av kjent metodikk. Psykoterapi, barnepsykiatrisk spesialpedagogikk, fysioterapi, logopedisk hjelp og annen spesialomsorg så ut til å være uten nevneverdig virkning.

Vanlig og utbredt fenomen

Jeg trodde først at det bare var noen få, enkelte barn som var i denne alvorlige situasjon, men jeg har etter hvert truffet på så mange slike tilstander at jeg til en viss grad tør å si at dette er et mer vanlig og utbredt fenomen enn hva man skulle tro. Jeg må tilstå at det har vært et menneskelig sjokk, men også en enorm pedagogisk utfordring å møte denne læremessige nød i et så stort omfang.

Slikkprøver har vist at det ikke er noe unormalt med barnas intelligens. Deres intelligensfunksjon er intakt, men det ser ut til å være inntruffet en tilstand der lærevenen er rammet nærmest fundamentalt. Det virker som om en rekke barn har mistet evnen til å lære helt nødvendige og grunnleggende ferdigheter som lesning, skrivning og regning.

Åndelig mangelsykdom

Jeg mener å ha dekning for å si at

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Figure 31. The drawing *Hvem er jeg* and Anne-Marit Duve's article *Analfabeter i velferds-Norge*. From *Stovnerrapporten*.

looking at 'An environment that promotes passivity, vandalism and defeat'.[52]

These foreboding titles are accompanied by illustrations comprising three children's drawings. While these are left unexplained, they allude to the concurrent use of child drawings in psychological analysis.[53] On the front of the magazine issue is a child drawing with the word *drøm* (dream), depicting a person sleeping in a bed and dreaming that a terrible giant is destroying a tall housing block. The title of the special issue – *Barn i krise* (Children in crisis) – is strategically positioned next to the sleeping person. A caption-less child's drawing of two human figures illustrates the article 'I cried every day and felt sick on the way to school'. Accompanying the article on illiterates is a drawing with the words *hvem er jeg* (who am I) written across it in large letters.[54] Beneath this journalistic attention-grabbing however, there are several different

[52] Gammelsrud, 1975, 2.: The original Norwegian titles are; 'Jeg gråt hver dag og var kvalm på veien til skolen', 'En skoles bønn om hjelp', 'De fleste barn får utilstrekkelig hjelp', 'Analfabeter i velferds-Norge', '40% av elevene var lesesvake' and 'Et miljø som innbyr til passivitet, hærverk og nederlag'.

[53] The Norwegian psychologist Helga Eng was a pioneer in the study of mental development using children drawings, see Helga Eng, *Barnetegning: fra den første streken til farvetegningen*, 2. utg. (Oslo: Cappelen, 1959).

[54] The drawing 'dream' on the front is by a fourth-grade boy, and the drawing 'who am I' is by an eight-year-old girl. See Gammelsrud, 1975, front, 2, 6, 12.

professional statements, which, when analysed, tell a more complex and contradictory story.

An overwhelmed school blames the environment

The first two articles in *Stovnerrapporten* come from the teaching profession and the school institution represented by the school Smedstua. The two anonymous teachers behind the article 'I cried every day and felt sick on the way to school' describe disheartening everyday classroom experiences of struggles with discipline and feelings of shortcomings. They claim that the problems are due to a shortage of institutional resources and lack of cooperation from the parents. They lack support both from the leading psychiatric clinic *Nic Waals Institutt*, the school psychology team, and the school's internal resources. They also suggest that the parents are insecure and in denial about the problems, which keeps them from allowing their children to be assessed by the school psychologist or from consulting a psychologist clinic like *Nic Waals Institutt*.[55] The teachers still admit, however, that social, organisational and pedagogical adaptations made with school resources had already helped.[56]

Eli Aanjesen's 'A school's plea for help' made a central contribution to *Stovnerrapporten*.[57] Aanjesen was the principal of the open school of Smedstua from 1971, and it is in this capacity that she writes in *Stovnerrapporten*.[58] She participated in the school action to support the implementation of *Mønsterplanen 74*,[59] thus positioning herself on the side of the internal institutional conflict that promoted wellbeing, social environment and local adaptations, which is also linked to the ambitions for the open school concept. From 1963, she was a pedagogical supervisor in the Oslo school with a special task for both social and

[55] 'Jeg gråt hver dag og var kvalm på veien til skolen', *Sinnets helse: Tidsskrift for mentalhygiene*, [Stovnerrapporten] Barn i krise, no. 5 (1975): 4–7.
[56] See 'Jeg gråt hver dag og var kvalm på veien til skolen'. The teachers admit that while one child had been transferred to a special school, reducing the number of children in each class, improving the relationship to the parents and redirecting internal teaching resources led to much improvement.
[57] Eli Aanjesen, 'En skoles bønn om hjelp', *Sinnets helse: Tidsskrift for mentalhygiene*, [Stovnerrapporten] Barn i krise, no. 5 (1975): 8–10.
[58] Rune Andersen, 'Åpen skole', *Arbeiderbladet*, 17 November 1973.
[59] 'Skoleaksjon 74: Mønsterplanens gjennomføring', *Arbeiderbladet*, 15 May 1974; Kirke- og undervisningsdepartementet, *Mønsterplan for Grunnskolen (M74)*.

natural environment.[60] Her engagement in education was already apparent in her participation in the resistance during the German occupation of Norway in the Second World War. As the editor of the illegal communist newspaper *Den norske kvinne* (The Norwegian Woman) from 1942 to 1943,[61] she supported Norwegian teachers' organised refusal to teach the Nazi curriculum, emphasising the importance of school for society.[62] The clear frontlines of this war history ideological school crisis, however, stand in great contrast to the complex crisis of Smedstua school in 1975.

Aanjesen describes the situation as a tragedy and warns of a school which creates more likelihood for failure than for learning and self-respect. This crisis, Aanjesen argues, is a problem that does not diminish if one does not speak about it, and, as mentioned earlier, her question '*skal vi snakke høyt om det?*' (should we speak about it out loud?) is merely rhetorical. She understands the unwillingness to speak out about the problems in the satellite town; there is a fear among professionals that drawing attention to social inequality by describing the different social compositions, milieus, housing typologies and allocation criteria could create stigma and a perception of inhabitants as second-rate humans. Aanjesen nevertheless argues that stigma is created with the use of a moralistic perspective where the individuals are to blame for their problems. If responsibility is instead placed with society, this problem will be avoided. Thus, she does not only direct her critique at the school administration, but at society as a whole and the total environment.

The way in which Aanjesen places the responsibility on society at large is a reference to *Stovnerboere spør stovnerboere*. She argues that 'some of the difficulties that have to arise when one pushes so many people together without possibilities for solving their problems.'[63] At Stovner there was a high concentration of families whose housing allocations were based on social criteria, meaning that a majority of the population

[60] 'Utkast om berikelse av det ytre miljø på Bøler levert', *Arbeiderbladet*, 2 May 1970; 'Miljølære inn i grunnskolen', *Dagbladet*, 27 August 1971.
[61] Hans Luihn, *Den frie hemmelige pressen i Norge under okkupasjonen 1940-45: en fortellende bibliografi*, Nasjonalbibliotekets skrifter 1 (Oslo: Nasjonalbiblioteket, 1999).
[62] Eli Aanjesen, 'Den norske kvinne', *Den norske kvinne*, June 1942, 2 edition; Eli Aanjesen, 'Vær på vakt! Når det blir gjort angrep på oppdragelsen', *Den norske kvinne*, August 1942, 3 edition.
[63] Aanjesen, 'En skoles bønn om hjelp', 9.: 'en del av de vanskelighetene som må oppstå når man presser så mange mennesker sammen uten at de har muligheter til å løse sine egne problemer'.

had been struggling economically even before moving in, the average age of mothers was unusually low, there were many young children, and there were many households with two or more working family members. Aanjesen adds that the Fossum neighbourhood not only had the largest share of struggling families but also the worst school situation: children had to change schools many times, which is a great strain, considering the many pre-existing problems – creating anxiety and aggression that was quickly directed against the school. Aanjesen's analysis of the situation was that the crisis of Stovner resulted from economic inequality together with Oslo's housing distribution system. In contrast to the inhabitants' report however, which emphasises resources and interests, she – possibly inadvertently – depicts the population as passive victims of the welfare state system and the environment. When she broadens the issue to avoid stigmatisation, she effectively defines it as an environmental problem and thus opens for the social construction of a territorial stigma instead of individualised stigma. Crucially, the system critique from the school institution – represented by Aanjesen and the anonymous teachers – implies that the total environment causes the problems they experience in the school.

Still, they argue that the solution is to be found in institutions and psychological treatment, and beneath the generalising critique of the system are the specific struggles of the Smedstua school. One aspect not mentioned by the teachers is that the coordination of special education schools and *enhetsskolen* following the 1975 law revision also created additional complex tasks and responsibilities for the school system, which had to involve other professions, notably psychologists.

Diagnosing a welfare-induced mental disease

The second profession – and welfare institution – to speak out in *Stovnerrapporten* are psychologists. In the article 'Most children get inadequate help', school psychologist Camilla Voss describes the severe work overload on her team of one psychologist and one social worker. She reports that this is the reality of the integration of children with special needs in ordinary schools. Without securing the necessary resources, the schools do not receive the vital support from psychological specialists for identifying and diagnosing children and applying for the

necessary aid. She concludes that extra resources are needed and that the school organisation must adapt to the reality of the integration policy.[64]

Voss' pragmatic critique is the source of the first half of the introductory quote, and the second half comes from the system critique by the psychologist Anne Marit Duve in her article entitled 'Analfabeter i velferds-Norge' (Illiterates in welfare-Norway). Duve's article strongly emphasised the severity and incomprehensiveness of the learning problems that she reported having encountered, for which psychotherapy, child psychiatric special pedagogy, physiotherapy, speech therapy and other specialised methods were apparently without effect. Since the children were of normal intelligence, she proposed that there exists a widespread failure in the ability to learn; she referred to this as 'a new spiritual deficiency disease in the wake of the welfare society'.[65]

Duve refers to English and American research for this 'disease' caused by a psychologically confusing and unstable environment in which the child cannot organize her mental, emotional and intellectual life. Duve warns of civilisation problems that not only exist in developing countries but even inside the modern welfare state. She does not see this as a paradox; she argues that the welfare state indeed causes these problems.

Earlier, Duve and her husband had criticised the welfare state with even more intensity, claiming that modern society causes distress that is not physical and material but rather concerns spirituality and consciousness. Duve's arguments has affinities with those of the architectural theorist Christian Norberg-Schulz, who dismisses politicised discourses of social and economic structures, and instead emphasises that the environment crisis is a *mental* problem, and that 'the real disease of our time is an almost extinct emotional life'.[66] Indeed, Norberg-Schulz had investigated the psychology of environment and children's learning through their experiences of the environment since his

[64] Camilla Voss, 'De fleste barn får utilstrekkelig hjelp', *Sinnets helse: Tidsskrift for mentalhygiene*, [Stovnerrapporten] Barn i krise, no. 5 (1975): 10–12.
[65] Anne-Marit Duve, 'Analfabeter i velferds-Norge', *Sinnets helse: Tidsskrift for mentalhygiene*, [Stovnerrapporten] Barn i krise, no. 5 (1975): 14.: 'en ny åndelig mangelsykdom i velferdssamfunnets kjølvann'.
[66] Norberg-Schulz, 'Fra gjenoppbygging til omverdenskrise', 201–2.

1965 thesis *Intensions in Architecture*.[67] His seminal work *Genius Loci* contains references to psychological research.[68]

The Duve couple argued that the welfare state with its bureaucracy and systems has not led to real democracy; instead, the pressure placed on families by housing politics, housing blocks, shopping centres and institutions has led to a double exploitation; in Duve's words, 'the welfare state has raped us – and we rape the welfare state to the best of our ability.'[69] For Duve, the modern welfare society is also to blame for an alienating environment for children.[70] In *Stovnerrapporten*, Duve thus dramatically asserts that the welfare state has a human responsibility to address these problems, regardless of the cost.

As a psychologist, Duve was herself part of struggles inside the profession. Historically, the Norwegian psychology profession belonged to the university and academia, 'where mental hygiene and therapy were originally absolutely not part of the profession.'[71] A central figure here was Harald Schjelderup, who transitioned from physics to psychology after the Second World War; he saw psychology as a promising field, due to diverse illnesses produced by war experiences that could not be explained with genetic explanations.[72] This phase of psychology focussed on stress-induced anomalous human behaviour. Later, a central argument for the committee for a new education of psychologists was the strong practical need and demand for psychology as a profession and institution. Psychology should provide psychological tests to ensure the right person for the right job, intelligence testing for the diagnosis of both highly gifted children and those with functional variations, and

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[67] See Christian Norberg-Schulz, *Intentions in Architecture* (Cambridge Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1965).

[68] See Christian Norberg-Schulz, *Genius Loci: Towards a Phenomenology of Architecture* (London: Academy Editions, 1980), 190–91.

[69] See Anne-Marit Duve and Arne Duve, *Tanker til tiden* (Oslo: Psychopress, 1968), 150, 154–55.: 'Velferdsstaten har voldtatt oss – og vi voldtar velferdsstaten etter beste evne.'

[70] Anne-Marit Duve, 'Fremmedgjøring', in *Barn*, by Kari Bruun Wyller, Anne-Marit Duve, and Thomas Chr Wyller, Motforestillinger 4 (Oslo: Gyldendal, 1978), 11–22.

[71] According to Håvard Friis Nilsen, 'Psykologene: Universitetsfaget som ble en klinisk profesjon', in *Profesjonshistorier*, ed. Rune Slagstad and Jan Messel (Oslo: Pax forlag, 2014), 450.

[72] Schjelderup's first publication was a case study of a woman speaking in tongues when under stress. This woman was the coming psychiatrist Nic Waal, who after being admitted as Schjelderup's student became a representative of 'the new psychology', and eventually founded her own institute for children psychiatry, *Nic Waals institutt*, referred to in *Stovnerrapporten*. See Nilsen, 457, 461.

psychological testing of military personnel. In addition to these technical qualifications for testing in the arenas of work-life, military and school, there was an emphasis on the clinical aspect, based on the need for psychologists in the Norwegian health service, recommending teamwork cooperation between psychiatrists, psychologists, and social workers. This clinical perspective also pointed to child psychology as a growing field.[73]

Psychology thus had two roles that were at least partly contradictory. One was the instrumentalised role in the different areas of the welfare state, as an institution that served as part of a sorting system of individuals based on testing, with a focus on the individual, detached from the environment. The other was as a partner in on-site teamwork, in real places and in the context of communities and families. A historical foundation for both, however, was psychology's task of focussing on human behaviour under stress.

Duve appears as a staunch critic of modern institutions through her descriptions of how humans respond to modern alienation and coldness. Duve's generalised critique of modernity is also a critique of institutions, including the institution of psychology. It thus appears paradoxical that she also suggests providing more resources to these institutions to fix the problem. However, together with the psychiatrist and institution-founder Nic Waal, Duve had developed the concept of *den kliniske pedagog* (the clinical pedagogue) as a cross-institutional role in child welfare based on respect and collaboration with professionals and institutions outside psychiatry, including social workers, psychologists, physicians and environmental therapists.[74] The solutions she suggested – increased resources in the form of smaller classes, more teachers, child psychiatric and school psychological professional teams that could provide immediate help – were clearly resources that supported her own practise and perspective.

In her critique, Duve advocates for the close, personal relationships of the family. Duve was part of the 'mother-turn' in child welfare in the Nordic countries after the Second World War. Referring to research in England and USA, she based her use of attachment theory on the essential mother-child relationship, which was put forward in her book

[73] Nilsen, 467.

[74] The concept of *den kliniske pedagog* (the clinical pedagogue) exists only in Norway and Britain, where Irene Caspari developed a similar concept. See Irene E. Caspari, *Troublesome Children in Class* (Routledge & K. Paul, 1976).

Det første leveårets psykologi (The Psychology of the First Year of Life).[75] There was a similar use of attachment theory in Denmark.[76] These ideas were characterised by a high degree of scepticism towards welfare institutions and an emphasis on the vital role of the mother in child welfare. Duve suggested that no child should be introduced to day-care or pre-school institutions before four- to five years of age.

This use of attachment theory was dismissed by a group of feminist psychologists who with the 1973 book *Myten om den gode mor* (The Myth of the Good Mother) had criticised the 'mother-turn' for systematically counteracting a growing feminist movement by naturalising the role of the woman as the primary caretaker. Feminist readings at the time included Friedrich Engels' *The Origin of the Family*,[77] and the main message in this genealogy of the social institutions of capitalism was that no existing forms of social organisation are preordained. The feminist reaction to Duve illuminated the specific relationship between the welfare state and gender equality, since women's liberation was in practice dependent on the welfare state institutions taking over some of the child welfare tasks that had to a large degree been the domain of women.[78]

The authors of *Myten om den gode mor* also criticised the scientific foundation of Duve's claim, arguing that it was based on misunderstood or misapplied American research. They emphasised than the mother is not alone in being able to create stable environments for child upbringing.[79] There was thus a conflict between Duve as a representative for institutional critique from within the institution of psychology and the feminist psychologists defending welfare institutions. Nevertheless, despite their disagreement, both are in agreement in their critique of the

[75] Anne-Marit Duve, *Det første leveårets psykologi* (Universitetsforlaget, 1972).
[76] Inger Bernth, *Institutionsbørn og hjemmebørn. Kontakt, stimulation og udvikling.* (København: Munksgård, 1972); Inger Bernth, *Institusjonsbarn og hjemmebarn: kontakt, stimulering og utvikling*, trans. Anne Skard (Gyldendal, 1976).
[77] Friedrich Engels, *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State [1884]*, trans. Ernest Untermann (Chicago, C. H. Kerr & Company, 1902).
[78] While some of these institutions – namely the schools – were prioritised in the post-war planning of satellite towns, day-care institutions were not. See Kirsti Ingebricson, Aase R. D. Andreassen, and Kirsti Ingebricson, eds., 'Kvinnefronten om barnehager', *Kvinnefront*, no. 3 (1976): 4.
[79] Hanne Haavind et al., *Myten om den gode mor* (Oslo: Pax Forlag AS, 1973).

satellite town environment as the manifestation of the different system issues that they criticise.[80]

Playground critique

The report's final article, 'An environment that promotes passivity, vandalism and defeat' conflates the complexity of the problems of the school and neighbourhood with faults in the physical environment, effectively becoming the conclusion of *Stovnerrapporten*. In contrast to the previous articles written by professionals representing institutions of pedagogics and psychology, the article is the joint work of the editor of *Sinnets Helse* Terje Gammelsrud, the architect Ivar Blomfeldt and the curator Rigmor Vesje. In outlining the history of the journalist profession, the scholar Magne Lindholm stressed Gammelsrud's strong engagement in presenting social issues to engage the general public, which also involved questionable journalistic methods:

> The editor of the magazine practised an extreme form of role mixing. He could act simultaneously as researcher, editor, communicator and activist. This was clearly expressed in the issue about the so-called *Stovnerrapporten*, which attracted considerable attention. He raised himself above all issues of impartiality. Such a thing could only be legitimised when the journalist portrayed himself as an activist in the service of the absolute good. The link between politics, personal experiences and a vaguely defined, infinitely good purpose also gave the social-critical journalism a strong element of moral reasoning.[81]

[80] For the feminist critique of satellite towns, see for example Ragnhild Haug, 'Kan vi bygge for likestilling', in *Kvinnens årbok 1976*, ed. Lise Faafeng (Pax, 1975), 49.
[81] Magne Lindholm, 'Journalistene', in *Profesjonshistorier*, ed. Rune Slagstad and Jan Messel (Oslo: Pax forlag, 2014), 263.: 'Redaktøren av bladet praktiserte en ekstrem form for rolleblanding. Han kunne opptre både som forsker, redaktør, formidler og aktivist på en gang. Dette kom tydelig til uttrykk i nummeret om den såkalte Stovner-rapporten, som vakte stor oppsikt. Han hevet seg altså over alle habilitetsproblemer. Noe slikt kunne bare legitimeres når journalisten framstilte seg som aktivist i et absolutt godes tjeneste. Koblingen mellom politikk, personlige opplevelser og et vagt definert, uendelig godt formål ga også den samfunnskritiske journalistikken et sterkt innslag av moralsk argumentasjon.'

Fossumfeltet på Stovner.

All lyd høres meget godt

Barn leker ikke lydløst. Latter, rop, bråk og gråt er en uunngåelig følge av barns virksomhet. Det er derfor viktig at lekeområder planlegges slik at lyd fra barnas lek blir til minst mulig sjenanse for de voksne beboere.

Borettslagets sandlekeplasser er plassert rett utenfor stuevinduene i lavblokkene, og det forekommer at de nærmeste naboer blir sjenert og uttrykker irritasjon over støy fra lekeplassen.

De akustiske forhold i tunene mellom blokkene er ikke gode. All lyd høres meget godt. Blokkenes plassering og form, samt materialet i fasadeplatene ser ut til å virke forsterkende på lyden. Lek med vanlig støynivå vil derfor ofte virke sjenerende, og de voksnes reaksjoner virker lett hemmende på leken.

Stadig frykt for trafikkulykker

Små barn har ingen mulighet til å forstå og passe seg for trafikkfarer, og

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32. The Fossum area, illustrating the article 'An environment that promotes passivity, vandalism and defeat' in *Stovnerrapporten*.

The article describes several physical factors that create an inferior environment for children, based on two earlier reports. The first one, by Gammelsrud and Hanne Frobenius, was published by *Forbruker- og administrasjonsdepartementet* in 1973, and had been presented to Oslo Municipality as a general demand for better living environments.[82] In *Forbrukerrapporten* (The Consumer Report), Gammelsrud and Frobenius' report is criticised by Lillegun Ording Sund, who was the chairwoman of *Norsk forening for bedre lekemiljø* (The Norwegian Association for Better Play Environments), as well as a social worker and

[82] Hanne Frobenius and Terje Gammelrud, *Barnet, leken og lekeplassen: en utredning om kommunale lekeplasser for barn fra syv til fjorten år* (Forbruker- og administrasjonsdepartementet, 1973).

a trained youth worker.[83] She criticises the subjective assertions of the playgrounds that they have studied, and the exaggerated suggestions of aggressive, inhibited and disharmonious children who are supposedly in need of psychological treatment: 'some children are foster children, children of divorced parents and the like, but they are not for that reason mentally damaged.'[84]

The second report on playgrounds was initiated by the inhabitants of Stovner and carried out by the authors of the article in *Stovnerrapporten*.[85] Using Fossumsletta as a test site, the report was used actively to challenge the municipality to act at Stovner, and was referenced in the news as such.[86] It is evident that Gammelsrud's dramatic language was meant to serve as an activist call to action. In mass media, this playground research was used for the residents' fight to improve the environment.[87] The report intended to change the concrete public investments in a specific housing area and therefore demanded a sensationalist approach to a narrowly defined space. In this, the report does not neutrally describe a problem, but instead formulates and constructs a problem strategically to achieve a desired response.

Similarly to these two reports, the final article in Stovnerrapporten uses crisis in a call for action, presenting a series of arguments also known from *Ammerudrapporten*. These arguments correlate the problems in the area to physical attributes that result from architecture and physical planning: there are too many children, so playgroups do not form; buildings with more than four floors mean that children have less outdoor time; one-sided flats do not allow for contact between the flat and the playground, so parents and children alike become insecure and nervous. The article describes the outdoor area as monotonous and

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[83] 'Barnet dårligst ut ved planlegging av miljøet', *Arbeiderbladet*, 4 June 1973.
[84] Norsk forening for bedre lekemiljø and M. Eckersberg, 'Enighet om lekeplassbehov, men ikke om metodene', *Forbruker-rapporten*, 1974.: 'Noen barn er fosterbarn, skilsmissebarn og lignende, men de er ikke av den grunn mentalt skadde'.
[85] Kåre Tarjem, 'Fossumsletta-undersøkelsen: Barnas behov kolliderer med "voksne" oppfatninger', *Dagbladet*, 26 September 1974.
[86] 'Krav om bedre bo-miljøer: Fossumsletta borettslag utfordrer Oslo kommune', *Aftenposten*, 29 January 1975, 10.
[87] Sissel Benneche Osvold, 'Miljø – hva er det?', *Dagbladet*, 29 January 1975; Sissel Benneche Osvold, '500 barn og fire sandkasser: Forsøk med utvikling av bedre lekemiljø på Stovner', *Dagbladet*, 29 January 1975; 'På Fossumsletta er det få barn som leker ute! Undersøkelser viser nedslående resultater', *Arbeiderbladet*, 29 January 1975; Tone B. Jamholt, 'Lekemiljøet sjokkerende dårlig i flere bydeler', *Arbeiderbladet*, 30 January 1975.

unchangeable, with building orientations and materials creating adverse local weather conditions and acoustic environments in which child play is both unsheltered as well as disturbing to other inhabitants. Other problems are the danger of traffic accidents, a lack of common indoor space for children, a lack of social interaction between adults in the area, and vandalism as a logical consequence of the forgotten youth. In conclusion, the authors warn, there is a constant risk for physical and mental damage which calls for immediate action.[88]

This strategy for gaining attention for a seemingly obvious good cause by calling it a crisis is characteristic for *Stovnerrapporten* as a whole, and it was enabled by the editorial synthesis of the diverse contributions in *Stovnerrapporten*, where the focus was on the most alarming aspects. The introductory quote synthesises the two contributions by Duve and Voss, and also utilises Aanjesen's 'should we speak about it out loud?'. By concluding with the focus on the physical environment however, Gammelsrud helped synthesise school environment, learning environment, mental environment, institutional environment, play environment and housing environment into one: a critique of the total physical environment of the neighbourhood in the satellite town. Gammelsrud strategically used the expert voices to support his own activist endeavour to improve the physical space on behalf of the inhabitants, with the consequence that *Stovnerrapporten* removes nuances to emphasise a general crisis.

The Stovner stigma

Gammelsrud's methods were successful in drawing attention. *Stovnerrapporten* was debated on national television and in hundreds of articles in national and regional newspapers across Norway. This mediation displayed different – and contradictory – explanations for the nature and possible causes of the crisis and introduced additional agendas than those of the authors in the report. In contrast to the focus on the inhabitant's resources in *Stovnerboere spør Stovnerboere*, the repeated use of the word *poverty* in the television presentation of *Stovnerrapporten* is notable for creating a sense of absolute impoverishment:

[88] Ivar Blomfeldt, Terje Gammelsrud, and Rigmor Vesje, 'Et miljø som innbyr til passivitet, hærverk og nederlag', *Sinnets helse: Tidsskrift for mentalhygiene*, [Stovnerrapporten] Barn i krise, no. 5 (1975): 16–20.

33. Fossumsletta. Still picture from the television presentation of *Stovnerrapporten*.

> Poverty of impulses, poverty of experiences and the local environment, poverty in the environment in which children should play and develop are the main reasons pointed out in the report. The children bring this poverty with them into school, and then it may be too late.[89]

Stovnerrapporten was a call for action, and it concluded with a demand from the parents and the school which, beyond more resources for the Smedstua school, comprised the construction of a new school for the Fossumsletta community. According to the historian Bernt H. Lund, the goal was for the schools in satellite towns to be constructed at the same speed as housing; this goal was seldom achieved however, and provisional solutions were attempted, to which parents protested significantly. Lund saw the situation of Fossumsletta as an example that

[89] 'Stovner-rapporten' (NRK, 11 September 1975).: 'Fattigdom på impulser, fattigdom på opplevelser og nærmiljø, fattigdom i det miljø hvor barn skal leke og utfolde seg, er de hovedårsakene som rapporten peker på. Den fattigdommen tar barna med seg inn i skolen, og da kan det være for sent.'

such strong reactions led the municipality to allocate funds to new schools even if the problem was temporary.[90] Here, Lund aligns with the pragmatic and supposedly objective perspective on school institution capacity of the government bodies, which did not see the situation as a crisis.The parents, however, were concerned with the essential function of the school in the community.[91] In correspondence with Perry's theory of the neighbourhood unit, they demanded a school specifically for the Fossum neighbourhood.[92] Crucially, this demand had already been presented in the 1974 playground report;[93] with *Stovnerrapporten*, the playground report was justified anew. Aanjesen and Smedstua school called for a parent meeting at which the demands to the municipality could be presented. The parents and the school agreed that a strike would ensue if the municipality did not meet their demands.[94] The new school was constructed and opened in the autumn of 1976 as a direct result of the struggles.[95]

This cooperation between parents and school appears to be a realisation of community power in line with the neighbourhood unit idea, but in confrontation and struggle rather than in the idyllic harmony of the communities in Mumford's *The City*. The journalist Tone B. Jamholt supported these struggles and argued that *Stovnerrapporten* should not be a cause for despair, but rather a motivation to take up arms and lead to community initiatives. She argues that it is a question of what kind of society we want – a therapy-society or a living community – and maintains that in order to create the latter, simple measures such as a decrease of the number of children in

[90] Bernt H. Lund, *Beretning om Oslo kommune for årene 1948-1986* (Oslo: ProArk, 2000), 305.
[91] 'Foreldrene forsvarer skolen: samfunnet har ansvar for barna', *Dagbladet*, 15 August 1975.
[92] Else-Beth Roalsø, 'Usikker framtid for Stovner-barna', *Dagbladet*, 20 August 1975.
[93] 'Krav om bedre bo-miljøer: Fossumsletta borettslag utfordrer Oslo kommune'.
[94] 'Smedstua skole innkaller til foreldremøte', *Arbeiderbladet*, 20 August 1975; 'Der 12-åringer ikke kan lese: Stovner truet av lærerstreik. Avgjørende foreldremøte på Stovner i kveld', *Dagbladet*, 20 August 1975.
[95] 'Smedstua-lærerne utsetter streiken', *Arbeiderbladet*, 5 September 1975; 'Smedstua-lærere: Fossum må ha en ny 6-årig skole', *Arbeiderbladet*, 23 September 1975; 'Streik blant Smedstua-lærerne', *Klassekampen*, 15 October 1975; 'Fossum bygd på rekordtid – Åpner den med streik?', *Arbeiderbladet*, 11 August 1976.

each class are preferable to starting a cycle of expert involvement from psychological disciplines.[96]

In addition to this powerful alliance of school and community, there is a contrasting institutional union between psychology and the school.[97] In defending the school, the parents argue that the psychologists – represented by Anne Marie Duve – have made them realise that the cause of the 'spiritual deficiency decease' is the general housing environment.[98] In an interview, Duve stated that the learning ability of the children is influenced because 'architecture and technical design reflect on the children and affect them'. When asked what exactly affects the learning ability, Duve is quoted as responding: 'think about how it looks there. Stone and concrete', and adding: 'I think that regardless of how strong and healthy you are, such an architectural and technical design will affect you. All that concrete is inhuman, in my opinion.'[99] Duve's criticism of institutions thus merges with the parents' action for a neighbourhood school into generalised criticism of modernity reduced to a critique of the physical, concrete housing environment.

The critique of the physical environment also appeared as a claim that the problems at Smedstua school were partly a result of choosing to build an open school.[100] While Aanjesen rejected the idea that the open school may have been a cause of the problems,[101] she had earlier admitted that there were issues of noise affecting learning in the open school.[102] Indeed, the open school was a topic of discussion, and research suggested that while the open school encouraged greater well-being due to social interaction, it also resulted in lower levels of concentration

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[96] Tone B. Jamholt, 'Selvoppgivelse er ingen løsning - Vi går løs på problemene', *Arbeiderbladet*, 19 August 1975.
[97] Toril Grande, 'Stovner rammet av åndelig mangelsykdom: Her finnes 12-åringer som ikke kan skrive og lese', *Dagbladet*, 15 August 1975.
[98] 'Foreldrene forsvarer skolen: samfunnet har ansvar for barna'.
[99] Siri Horn, 'Barnas [lære]evne fungerer ikke', *VG*, 16 August 1975.: 'Tenk på hvordan det ser ut der. Stein og betong.', 'Jeg tror uansett hvor sterk og sunn man er, så vil en slik arkitektonisk og teknisk utforming virke inn på en. All betongen er umenneskelig, etter min mening.'
[100] Alfred Oftedal Telhaug and Pauline Baynes, *Åpne skoler i Norge*, trans. Anders Gynnild (Oslo: Didakta norsk utdanningsforlag, 1976), 71; Wilhelm Snartland, 'Uansvarlig med åpen skole', *Aftenposten*, 23 August 1975; Liv Grøttum, 'Når barn blir skadelidende', *Aftenposten*, 9 September 1975.
[101] Eli Aanjesen, 'Syndebukktenkning om Stovner', *Aftenposten*, 29 August 1975.
[102] Andersen, 'Åpen skole'.

because of noise; this was especially true for vulnerable children, such as those with special needs.[103] This discrepancy is not merely a practical question however, but an ideological one linked to the conflict of institution and community, between the traditional school of institutional, instrumental curriculum and the local, individual adaptation of the open school together with the 1974 educational plan, which prioritised community.

Aanjesen instead posed a generalised critique of the total environment in a presentation of *Stovnerrapporten* on national television:

> The problems we have presented are no different from what we have experienced before – from other satellite towns, from Lambertseter, from Bøler and from Ammerud – it is just that they have made this satellite town substantially larger. And the taller the blocks get, the closer they are put together, the more people that are squeezed together, the more difficult it becomes to live there.[104]

Thus, because of Aanjesen's focus on system critique, instead of addressing the particular parts of the learning environment that the school can directly affect – such as class size, teaching resources and pedagogical principles – she directed her attention at a general critique of modernity represented by the total environment of the satellite towns.

Stovnerrapporten was actively used in the political rhetoric of the election campaigns for the upcoming municipal council election at the time. The liberal conservatives of *Høyre* blamed the socialists in a crushing judgement over Labour party development policy.[105] In the conservative Oslo newspaper *Aftenposten*, the report was described as 'the hardest verdict of socialist housing policy to date', a policy that has caused 'environmental poverty'.[106] In the Labour newspaper *Arbeiderbladet*, the crisis described is interpreted as a result of urban

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[103] Funderud, *Åpen skole*, 115.

[104] 'Stovner-rapporten'.: 'Disse problemene som vi nå har lagt fram, de er jo ikke annerledes enn det vi har kjent dem fra før – fra andre drabantbyer, fra Lambertseter, fra Bøler og fra Ammerud – Det er bare at denne drabantbyen har de jo lagd så mye større. Og jo høyere blokkene blir, jo tettere de stilles sammen, jo flere mennesker som blir presset sammen, jo vanskeligere blir det å bo der.'

[105] 'Tragisk nød avslørt i Stovner-rapport', *Aftenposten*, 15 August 1975.

[106] 'Slett bypolitikk', *Aftenposten*, 20 August 1975.: 'den hårdeste dom over sosialistisk boligpolitikk som hittil har sett dagens lys', 'miljøfattigdom'.

34. 'And the taller the blocks get': Eli Aanjesen is interviewed in front of Smedstua School. Still picture from the television presentation of *Stovnerrapporten*.

growth and centralisation, an overemphasis on housing construction and a lack of political responsibility for living environments.[107] The political rhetoric of both sides thus came to support Aanjesen's critique of the total environment of satellite towns.

The entrepreneur Selvaag was critical of institutions' and politicians' blaming of the physical environment, claiming that holding the physical planning and architecture of satellite towns responsible showed 'an almost incomprehensible lack of understanding of cause and effect'. Selvaag maintained that the problem was not caused by the physical qualities, but in the distribution of dwellings: the concentration of disadvantaged families, caused by the housing policies of Oslo Municipality, was the cause of the problem.[108] A similar statement came

[107] Gunnar Stålseth, 'Stresspolitikk og Stovner-rapporten', *Arbeiderbladet*, 19 August 1975.
[108] 'Selvaag hårdt ut om Stovner – Kommunens politikere løftet ikke engang på øyelokkene', *Aftenposten*, 22 August 1975.: 'en nesten ufattelig mangel på forståelse av hva som er årsak og hva som er virkning'.

from a former municipal head of administration, who claimed that the problems were caused not by environments of housing blocks, but by a concentration of a specific type of people which meant 'bad homes – too many children'.[109] The psychologist Erik Larsen responded to such claims thus:

> In the debate after the arrival of the report from Stovner, experts have claimed that satellite towns like Stovner do not create problems as long as disadvantaged families are not gathered there. Such a claim is, in our opinion, completely devoid of psychological and social understanding and shows a complete lack of knowledge of how people and the environment influence and form each other.[110]

In contrast to the psychologist's focus on the environment's mental effect, the critics from the radical left see Stovner as the materialisation of the welfare state as advanced capitalism. The inhabitants are seen as prisoners of modernity, where a new type of structural poverty is caused by inhabitants becoming dependent on different complex systems of the welfare state and the satellite towns.[111] The Communist newspaper *Klassekampen* (The Class Struggle) describes Stovner as 'the slum of monopoly capitalism',[112] and sees the Smedstua teachers' fight as a struggle that concerns the working class as a whole and a revelation of the welfare myth of the new satellite towns.[113]

While pedagogues, psychologists, journalists and politicians were speaking out about the architecture and planning of Stovner, the architectural journals *Arkitektnytt* and *Byggekunst* were curiously silent on

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[109] Knut Eidem, 'Tidligere rådmann Schreiner: – Dårlige hjem – For mange unger – Galt å skylde på blokkbebyggelsen', *Dagbladet*, 19 August 1975.
[110] Erik Larsen, 'Alarmerende rapport fra Stovner', *Tidsskrift for Norsk Psykologforening*, no. 10 (1 October 1975): 1–2.: 'I debatten etter at rapporten fra Stovner kom er det blitt hevdet fra seriøst hold at drabantbyer som Stovner ikke skaper problemer, dersom man ikke samler vanskeligstilte familier der. En slik påstand er etter vår mening totalt blottet for psykologisk og sosial forståelse og viser en fullstendig mangel på kunnskap om hvordan mennesker og miljø påvirker og skaper hverandre.'
[111] A newspaper article that describes this structural poverty is Turid Melbye, 'Parkettgulv, vaskemaskin og fattigdom', *Arbeiderbladet*, 21 August 1975.
[112] 'Monopolkapitalismens slum på Stovner', *Klassekampen*, 27 August 1975.
[113] 'AKP(ml): Lærerne på Stovner har reist en viktig kamp som angår hele arbeiderklassen', *Klassekampen*, 3 September 1975.

the matter,[114] except when *Arkitektnytt* mentioned *Stovnerrapporten* in the summary of a lecture by the sociologist and criminologist Nils Christie in the Oslo Architect's Association (OAF).[115] In his 1975 book, *Hvor tett et samfunn* (How Close a Society), Christie had contrasted the modern society of institutions and loose social bonds with a premodern, close-knit community. Christie criticised modern institutions that remove agency and community ownership from the inhabitants and create detached and fragmented lives in which the individual lacks understanding of societal functions and is instead dependent on experts. In his book *Hvis skolen ikke fantes* (If Schools did not Exist), Christie argued for both de-professionalisation and deinstitutionalisation in the welfare state, as its institutions robbed the inhabitants of their agency. In this criticism, Christie described the school as an institution that separates children from the outside world.[116] The debate in the architect's association describes Stovner as a warning of what may happen in such an alienated society.

In the debate the city planner Solveig Skaare, according to *Arkitektnytt*, stated that crisis has hit Stovner although the professions and institutions had done nothing wrong by their own standards. As parts in the planning of Stovner, they have 'had their backs free, each in their own expertise'.[117] In the subsequent issue of *Arkitektnytt* Skaare argues that Stovner is an illustration of planner's helplessness in face of the fragmentation of planning, where professions disclaim responsibility for 'frightening environmental conditions'.[118] Furthermore, she accuses Christie of defeatism as his solution of a balance or compromise between

[114] Architects and planners were also silent in mass media. I have found only one instance where an architect takes part in the public discussion on Stovner in mass media: an interview with the architect Gullik Kollandsrud in an article that describes satellite town planning as a disaster. See Bernard Rostad, 'Planleggingen av våre storbyer en ulykke: Ingen må tro at tilfellet Stovner er enestående', *Dagbladet*, 21 August 1975.
[115] Dag Rognlien, 'Nils Christie i OAF', *Arkitektnytt*, no. 16 (1975): 337–38, 340.
[116] Nils Christie, *Hvis skolen ikke fantes* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1971); Nils Christie, *Hvor tett et samfunn?*, 2 vols (Oslo: København: Christian Ejlers' Forlag/Universitetsforlaget, 1975).
[117] Rognlien, 'Nils Christie i OAF', 338. The reference is to Solveig Skaare, a participant in the debate who reportedly claimed that everyone who had participated in the planning of Stovner 'hadde ryggen fri, hver i sin spesialitet'. She suggested local cooperation based on a Chinese, communist model.
[118] Solveig Skaare, 'Apropos Stovner f.eks...', *Arkitektnytt*, no. 17 (1975): 370.: 'skremmende miljøtilstander'.

institutions and community overlooks the cause of the problem: that capitalism has 'created specialist-robots in continuous competition and made us insecure and suspicious of each other'.[119]

The institutions of the *Gesellschaft* – in the welfare state – may have an alienating, disciplining function of instilling norms and defining otherness. However, through socialising and free play where children receive opportunities independent of their backgrounds, institutions simultaneously create free individuals and willing subjects to self-conduct, according to Foucault's elucidation of institutions as both liberating and controlling.[120] The small society or neighbourhood of the *Gemeinschaft* that Christie discusses indeed is a more understandable world, where the child learns by participating in society instead of being placed in institutions.[121] However, it also means that that the common interests of the community go before the individual's interests, which is oppressive in its own ways. For both Foucault and Christie, the school is a punitive institution in a carceral archipelago where the children are 'prisoners', essentially kept outside society. The school is thus a producer of outsiders, which contradicts both the unity school as a democratic introduction to larger society and the local school as an inclusion into the community.

This dilemma is also why Christie argues for a form of balance; in their extreme versions, neither of the alternatives are good.[122] However, it also serves as a background for Skaare's dismissal of the illusion of 'balance' in capitalist society. Skaare instead sees Communist China as a model for social integration based on people's own resources and abilities to change their life conditions. The contradiction between institution and community is consequently a struggle regarding the organisation of society, and in the case of the discourse of *Stovnerrapporten*, it has no clear frontlines.

Rather than becoming a principled discussion on the organisation of society, the nationwide mediation of the report created a stigma and social exclusion of people from Stovner. When the Stovner schools

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[119] Skaare, 371.: 'skapt spesialistroboter i stadig konkurranse og gjort oss utrygge og mistenksomme overfor hverandre.'
[120] See Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*.
[121] Christie, *Hvis skolen ikke fantes*.
[122] See Christie, *Hvor tett et samfunn?*; Christie also referred to Ernst Friedrich Schumacher, *Small Is Beautiful: Economics as If People Mattered* (London: Blond & Briggs, 1973).

wanted to acquire a site for children to go to summer school, there were protests from the would-be neighbours, who feared the problem-children from the satellite town.[123] The Stovner district elective body questioned the power of the media in the case, as its construction of a Stovner stigma became absolute and almost irreversible.[124] The media – and consequently the general public – associated the problem with a real place and the tangible results of the neighbourhood planning, although presented with the complex notions of criticism of welfare institutions or modern alienation. As a logical response to this crisis caused by media-created stigma, inhabitants arranged large protests to fight against 'the myth of Stovner'.[125] While they attempted to reclaim the story of their communities, this was also the beginning of the dichotomy of media stigmatisation and inhabitant pride.

In *Hvor tett et samfunn*, Christie also problematises the discourse on stigma in sociology, expressing compassion with those stigmatised while worrying that the stigma will itself lead to further problems, thus focussing the attention only on advantages of stigma reduction.[126] Christie however emphasises that stigma also has positive functions in society, and that these functions of stigma reveal information about the society, arguing that good society is a society in which stigma *works*; where it becomes vital for individuals to act in ways that do not create reactions that lead to stigma. Inversely, a bad society is one in which stigma is irrelevant. According to Christie, there are two extreme types of society: one is the modern institutional society where the stigma does not mean anything, since fleeting and abstract relations mean that actions have no real consequences. The other type is the traditional, tight-knit society in which the participants are evaluated continuously and no one escapes social control. Christie states that none of these extremes appear

[123] 'Skader kommunen, sier ordføreren: Stovner-aksjon en lei sak for Ringsaker', *Aftenposten*, 14 June 1976.
[124] Kjell Kristoffersen et al., '"Stovner-begrepet" og massemedienes ansvar: En redegjørelse fra Bydelsutvalg 26 – Stovner', *Aftenposten*, 14 June 1976.
[125] 'Til kamp mot myten om Stovner: 30 000 går til kamp for bydelens rykte', *Dagbladet*, 14 June 1976.
[126] With 'literature', Christie refers specifically to George Herbert Mead (1967) and notably, the American sociologist Charles H. Cooley (1902), who is also Perry's source for the ideas of communities, but his description may also apply to recent discourses of territorial stigma. See Christie, *Hvor tett et samfunn?*, 107–8.

particularly pleasant or functional, and he argues for a society in which there is a balance between traditional rigidity and modern dissolution.[127]

Christie's suggestion is along the lines of his general critique of institutions and experts that remove agency from communities. His 'Conflicts as Property'[128] has been seen as 'a foundational document for the restorative justice and "community empowerment" movements, both as a normative critique of expert power and as a sketch of alternatives to traditional criminal justice practices.'[129] In this text, he argues that institutions steal conflicts and transform them into professionalised relations, hindering citizen's participation in solving their own problems. This argument is similar to his critique of institutions in *Hvor tett et samfunn* and *Hvis skolen ikke fantes*, but the emphasis here is on the importance of ownership to conflict, which is translatable to the battle of civil society at Stovner. Interpreted in a *spatial framework*, this is the conflict between the abstract spaces of institutions and the concrete, lived spaces of inhabitants. Here, Christie is not only describing a struggle over what welfare is in terms of community or the state institutions, but of conflicts and stigma as property. Or, the ownership of crisis.

Children in crisis II – *Romsåsrapporten*

Romsåsrapporten appeared in 1976 and continued the discussion in *Stovnerrapporten*. When the editor and authors revived the debate with this new special issue, it was presented as a critique of the welfare state and of Oslo Municipality, which closed the Stovner case without trying to understand the deeper structural causes of the problems or recognising the situation as a crisis.

Similarly to in *Stovnerrapporten*, the very titles of the articles in *Romsåsrapporten* constitute a short story of crisis and urgency. The report opened with a summary of the events after *Stovnerrapporten*, entitled 'Stovner – The case is considered closed', but the problem persists; it is just hidden, since 'Romsås has kept silent about its social distress', and 'Every fifth sixteen-year-old is psychologically crippled', so 'How long

[127] Christie, 107–8.
[128] Nils Christie, 'Conflicts as Property', *The British Journal of Criminology* 17, no. 1 (1 January 1977): 1–15.
[129] Vidar Halvorsen, 'Nils Christie: "Conflicts as Property"', in *Foundational Texts in Modern Criminal Law*, ed. Markus Dirk Dubber, First edition (Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2014), 335.

35. Cover of *Romsåsrapporten*.

should it be denied that the situation is critical?'. Even in 'Tøyen – an older district in Oslo' there are serious problems, and still, 'The Child Welfare Services do not pay attention'.[130] The illustrations are two children's drawings and one photograph. On the front is a drawing of a three-storey housing block and a playground separated by a road. On the back is a drawing of a house in a sunny field with flowers, with the text 'her ønsker jeg og [sic] bo' (I want to live here). Finally, a sinister-looking photograph of Romsås looming above a dark forest accompanies the article 'Romsås has kept silent about its social distress'.

[130] Gammelsrud, 1976, 2.: The Norwegian titles are 'Stovner – [s]aken anses som ferdig behandlet', 'Romsås har tiet om sin sosiale nød', Hver femte sekstenåring psykisk invalidisert, 'Hvor lenge skal det benektes at situasjonen er kritisk?', 'Tøyen – en eldre bydel i Oslo' and 'Barnevernet følger ikke med'.

Romsåsrapporten explicitly addressed the topic of the territorial stigma that had emerged as a result of the previous report, as the discourse of crisis had created a new crisis of place image. With a small note in the beginning of *Romsåsrapporten*, the law student Torild Lien Utvik, an inhabitant of Fossumsletta, described how *Stovnerrapporten* made the satellite town Stovner infamous as an image of an environment hostile to children; she personally experienced the stigma of a whole neighbourhood being portrayed as future losers. The title of her note, 'Do you live THERE?' referred to the reaction of her fellow students upon hearing where she lived. Utvik argued that while many generalise what it means to be from Stovner, they are not willing to generalise across society to accept that these problems may exist elsewhere too. She requested a broader debate of the problems that modern planned society has caused for children, in a call to avoid stigma and generalisations by looking at the problem not as related to place, but as a structural societal problem related to politics, economy, ideology and social class. However, Utvik found it difficult to get her otherwise educated audience of law students to accept such complexity.

Unwillingness – or inability – to see beyond the specific place is also characteristic of the general discourse on Stovner. In *Romsåsrapporten*, this problem is addressed in several ways: one is by describing the circumstances as a general urban predicament rather than a problem associated explicitly with welfare state expansion in the form of satellite towns. In the article 'Every fifth sixteen-year-old is psychologically crippled', the psychiatrist Nils Johan Lavik argues that the mental health issues of youth and children are not limited to Stovner or to satellite towns, but are instead a general *urban* problem. The article is a summary of the authors' then-recent doctoral thesis, entitled *Ungdoms mentale helse* (The Mental Health of Youth).[131] Lavik states that increased urbanisation does not affect subjective symptoms, e.g. anxiety or depression, but significantly decreases the ability to master life. This manifests as drug addiction, asocial behaviour and maladjustment in the school situation. Lavik emphasises that there is little difference between the urban districts in Oslo, and that the satellite towns have the best results. Nonetheless,

[131] Nils Johan Lavik, *Ungdoms mentale helse: en empirisk-psykiatrisk undersøkelse av psykisk helse og tilpasning blant ungdomsskoleelever i et by- og bygdeområde i Norge* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1976); The thesis has been referred to as a central epidemiologic work, see Willy Pedersen, Henry Notaker, and Nils Johan Lavik, *Sykdom, sjel og samfunn: festskrift til Nils Johan Lavik* (Oslo: Pax, 1991).

mass media still transformed the message to focus on the distressingly large number of Romsås children who needed professional help from child psychiatrists.[132]

Romsåsrapporten also addressed the stigma by attempting to place responsibility and blame on the central welfare policies of state and municipality rather than on the local place. The report insisted that there was a system crisis that government bodies failed to recognise. The teacher Olav Hetland asked, 'When Oslo Municipality's school authorities refuse to admit that the condition is critical, it becomes almost a semantic discussion – how serious must the situation be before one can use the word crisis?'[133] He accused the welfare state of not showing sufficient will and ability to provide help and support to children and adults and not investigating whether there were similar problems in other parts of the city, and he maintained that they had not shown signs of actually wanting to *prevent* problems from worsening or recurring. Hetland asserted that the officially assumption seemed to be that it was an initial 'establishment issue' of satellite towns, which require some time to stabilize, and that there was a disregard for the generation of children that was affected. He emphasised the need for professional cooperation in the schools, especially on methods and after-school activities; in part, the question regards education and school buildings, but most of all, money.

Romsåsrapporten's system critique was also directed at welfare institutions. Pointing out that the children are the ultimate subjects of the welfare state – and that the crisis of children is thus a crisis of the welfare state – the article 'Barnevernet følger ikke med' (Child Welfare Services are not paying attention) built on the earlier report *Barnevernslov, barnevernsmyndigheter og planlegging av nærmiljø*.[134] In both report and article, Gerd Bekken presented children as an especially weak group in planning, one that cannot lay claims by itself. The article and the report concluded that the child welfare service institutions were not capable of participating in planning on children's behalf. As Bekken

[132] Anne Lise Johnsen, 'Drabantbybarna på Romsås - med uhyggelig rekord - 50 årlig til barnepsykiater', *VG*, 8 September 1976.
[133] See Olav Hetland, 'Hvor lenge skal det benektes at situasjonen er kritisk?', *Sinnets helse: Tidsskrift for mentalhygiene*, [Romsåsrapporten] Rapport fra Oslo, Barn i krise 2, no. 5 (1976): 11.
[134] Gerd Bekken, 'Barnevernet følger ikke med', *Sinnets helse: Tidsskrift for mentalhygiene*, [Romsåsrapporten] Rapport fra Oslo, Barn i krise 2, no. 5 (1976): 20, 23.

also noted in the underlying report: 'When one talks about preventive work today, it too often means the attempt to arrive at measures that can make it easier for children and youth to live in a society planned for adults […]'.[135] One challenge was what Bekken describes as 'watertight bulkheads' between the city planning office and the child welfare services.[136] She concluded there are few advocates for the interests of children, and those that existed did not have access to the physical planning processes.

Revealing the hidden problems

The production of stigma was also addressed by introducing two other areas in Oslo with similar problems, and the inner-city Tøyen was used as an example to show that the problem was not exclusive to the new satellite towns.[137] Nevertheless, the article 'Romsås har tiet om sin sosiale nød' (Romsås has kept silent about its social distress) came to define the discourse of the problem while creating an association to another satellite town – this gave the issue its colloquial name *Romsåsrapporten*.

The article's author, Tone B. Jamholt, was a journalist for *Arbeiderbladet* and a member of Oslo City Council, as well as of *barnevernsnemnda* (the Child Welfare Services Committee) and the Social District Committee for Romsås. Jamholt, who lived at Romsås herself, is the daughter of Trygve Bratteli from the Labour party; in 1976, he had just resigned as prime minister.[138] Crucially, she was also educated as a *sosionom* (social worker), and thus part of a welfare state profession

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[135] Gerd Bekken, *Barnevernslov, barnevernsmyndigheter og planlegging av nærmiljø*, Barn og bomiljø 12 (Oslo: Norsk institutt for by- og regionforskning: Norges byggforskningsinstitutt, 1976), 5.: 'Når en i dag snakker om forebyggende arbeid, mener en i alt for høy grad: å finne fram til tiltak som kan gjøre det lettere for barn og ungdom å leve i et samfunn planlagt for voksne […]'.

[136] Bekken, 'Barnevernet følger ikke med', 23.: 'vanntette skott'.

[137] The case of Tøyen is based on two research reports. See 'Tøyen, en eldre bydel i Oslo', *Sinnets helse: Tidsskrift for mentalhygiene*, [Romsåsrapporten] Rapport fra Oslo, Barn i krise 2, no. 5 (1976): 13–19; Sigrun Kaul et al., 'Bygata', NIBR report (Oslo: Norsk institutt for by- og regionforskning, 1975); Marika Kolbenstvedt, *Tøyenbarn forteller om sin bydel: en undersøkelse av lekemuligheter og skoleveg på Tøyen barneskole i Oslo*, Barn og bomiljø 11 (Oslo: Norsk institutt for by- og regionforskning, Norges byggforskningsinstitutt, 1975).

[138] Tone B. Jamholt lived in Ravnkollbakken 12² at Romsås. See *Oslo adressebok 1974/75*, vol. 96, 1 (Oslo: Adresseboka, 1974); *Oslo adressebok. 1976/77*, vol. 98, 1 (Oslo: Adresseboka, 1976).

Romsås har tiet om sin sosiale nød

Av Tone B. Jamholt

Romsås, Stovners nabodrabantby, har lenge vært framstilt som eksempel på vellykket planlegging og godt bomiljø. Men det er ikke blitt snakket om bydelens sosiale nød.

Til tross for at det i Romsås er sprøytet inn flere ressurser enn i noen annen norsk drabantby, opplever bydelen like alvorlige etableringsproblemer som for eksempel Stovner.

Utbyggingen av Romsås-byen har gått meget raskt. De første familiene flyttet inn ved årsskiftet 1970—71, og i september 1974 ble den siste av de 2 438 nye leilighetene tatt i bruk.

I dag bor om lag 8 000 mennesker i området, men alderssammensetningen er ekstremt skjev. 80 prosent av befolkningen er under 40 år. Bare 9 prosent er over 50! Mellom 1 500 og 2 000 av beboerne er barn under 7 år.

Romsås er på mange måter en «prøveklut» i moderne norsk drabantbyutbygging. For første gang ved utbygging av større boligområder er det lagt stor vekt på planleggingen av det ytre miljø. Mye av variasjonsrikdommen i det opprinnelige terreng er bevart, og kjørende og gående trafikk er strengt atskilt. For å oppnå mindre beboerenheter og dermed skape bedre forutsetninger for følelse av tilhørighet og trivsel, ble blokkene bygd opp omkring tun. Midt i boligområdet finnes et stort friareal.

I *Romsås senter* — et ikke-kommersielt senter som eies av kommunen — finner man alle viktige service-funksjoner som for eksempel helse- og sosialsenter, tannlege, bank, frisør og butikk.

Når alle barnehagene er ferdigbygd vil om lag 35 prosent av førskolebarna i området få et barnehagetilbud. Parktantetilbudet er imidlertid foreløpig langt mer beskjedent. Området har to kommunale lekesentra og en ungdomsklubb. I bydelen bor det mange initiativrike mennesker, og en rekke beboeraktiviteter blomstrer.

Men det er ikke alle de positive sider ved Romsås denne artikkelen skal handle om. Vellykket planlegging og menneskelig trivsel er beskrevet i utallige artikler og reportasjer om Romsås.

Sosiale problemer av alvorlige dimensjoner

Men dette er bare halve sannheten. Det lar seg nemlig ikke skjule at til tross for at det er sprøytet flere ressurser inn i Romsås-utbyggingen enn i noen annen drabantby-utbygging i Norge, så opplever bydelen like alvorlige etableringsproblemer som for eksempel Stovner.

På fire år skulle 8 000 mennesker flytte sammen, og hovedtyngden av disse menneskene er småbarnsfamilier. De sosiale problemene som har fulgt i innflyttingens kjølvann har store dimensjoner. For å illustrere problemets omfang kan nevnes at 10 prosent av husstandene på Romsås mottar sosialhjelp i løpet av ett år. Dette er omtrent det samme som på Stovner, mens prosenten for de mer etablerte bydeler ligger på 3—5.

Ingen andre av Oslos 16 sosiale distriktskontorer har en så ung klientmasse som Romsås. Omkring halvparten av klientene er fra 18 til 29 år gamle. 27 prosent av klientene er enslige forsørgere, og også dette er en oppsiktsvekkende høy andel.

Småbarnsfamilier i økonomisk uføre

Bare 7 prosent av klientene har somatiske sykdommer, 4 prosent har alkoholproblemer og 8 prosent har sysselsettingsproblemer. Romsås skiller seg således sterkt ut fra for eksempel byens sentrale områder, der alkohol- og sysselsettingsproblemer er mye mer

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36. 'Romsås har tiet om sin sosiale nød'. From *Romsåsrapporten*.

which had its origins in poverty relief, but by the time *Romsåsrapporten* came out, had become an important welfare institution.

A new social care bill in 1964 had constituted a shift from former poverty relief in the form of financial aid to also socially reintegrating people who had been in difficult situations back into society, through advice and guidance. The bill represented a change in attitude within social policy, from social assistance to social care, including rehabilitation, support for self-help and facilitation for social functioning. There was thus a need for a new type of competent professionals, and the skilled social worker was given an important role as personal advisor and supervisor. In 1966, social work as a profession and institution was strengthened by a longer education, the formalisation

of the professional title *sosionom*, and the establishment of *Rådet for sosialarbeiderutdanning* (Council of Social Worker's Education).[139] The development of social welfare included a new, comprehensive perspective on health that was manifested in health stations. Passed in 1972, the Health Station Act stated that health care centres should seek to promote children's physical and mental health.[140] This was part of a change in the focus on general mental health, introducing the extended definition of health as a condition of complete physical, mental and social comfort – not merely the absence of disease and defects. This health vision became the foundation for dealing with different social factors, including living conditions, environmental situations, economy and education as focus areas for the new health care stations after the health station law in 1972.[141] In Oslo, this coordination of medical and social services was tested at Stovner and Romsås.[142]

With these developments of social politics around 1970, it appeared that Norway was close to the goal for the social-democratic welfare state. However, an inner contradiction in the profession developed beneath the polices for strengthening social work as an institution and profession on the welfare state; this conflict was the result of the real-life experiences and community involvement of social work. In the local social offices, social workers oriented themselves towards ideological and political activism.[143] For these social workers, the 1970 book *Myten om velferdsstaten* (The Myth of the Welfare State)[144] became important as a fundamental critique of the welfare state system, which was significant for the radical discourse in social work. The book established that welfare could not hinder that the system – capitalism – produced new problems, and that the welfare state forgets certain weak groups, such as children. It

[139] Jan Messel, 'Sosialarbeiderne: I velferdsstatens frontlinje', in *Profesjonshistorier*, ed. Rune Slagstad and Jan Messel (Oslo: Pax forlag, 2014), 526–65.
[140] Borrik Schjødt and Arvid Skutle, 'Fremveksten av samfunnspsykologien i Norge: Fra kritisk korrektiv til et alternativ i posisjon', *Tidsskrift for Norsk Psykologforening* 50, no. 5 (7 May 2013): 412–18.
[141] Bjørnar Mortensen Vik, 'For barna og samfunnet: Psykologi, barneoppdragelse og sosialpolitikk i Norge, ca. 1900-1975' (Universitetet i Bergen, 2014), 204.
[142] Andersson & Skjånes, 'Samordning av den medisinske og sosiale service i Oslo. R2: Helse- og sosialsentra : forslag til opplegg av en forsøksordning', in *Samordning av den medisinske og sosiale service i Oslo* (Sandvika: Institutt for samfunnsplanlegging, 1971).
[143] Messel, 'Sosialarbeiderne: I velferdsstatens frontlinje', 537–39.
[144] Lars Gunnar Lingås, *Myten om velferdsstaten: søkelys på norsk sosialpolitikk: en antologi* (Oslo: Pax, 1970).

criticised the whole concept of welfare for focusing only on material growth and disregarding other aspects of life: Growth could create material welfare, but also spiritual distress.[145]

Within the discipline of social work, there was thus an internal contradiction between individual treatment based on institutional and psychoanalytic theory and the self-determination of the client – and the concrete situation where the social worker became a control mechanism of administration in the confrontation with clients in need of economic support. The very expansion of social welfare thus created its own critique. As a politically engaged social worker, journalist, politician and satellite town inhabitant, Jamholt was in the midst of these struggles within and across professions and communities.

A starting point for Jamholt was Romsås' status as a successful satellite town. A fundamental difference between Stovner and Romsås was that Selvaag and Stiansen did not attempt to build meeting places and create sense of belonging and well-being using architectural means. They wanted to provide good dwellings at low prices, and Selvaag claimed that the social composition of the satellite town's population was the most important factor for making it work as a community.[146] Unlike Stovner, Romsås was planned with a significant emphasis on the design and provision of housing service. Romsås used services and social arenas to address gender roles and to avoid the issues of the dormitory towns,[147] and because of the planners' high ambitions to create children's environments, it earned the epithet *barnas bydel* (the children's city district).[148] In a comment to *Stovnerrapporten* in 1975, Alex Christiansen, the leader of *Romsåsteamet* confidently invited a report that studies how children thrive in the neighbourhoods they had designed at Romsås.[149] The seemingly successful, ideal satellite town of Romsås should be well equipped to avoid social problems.[150]

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[145] This critique has affinities with Duve's notion of a spiritual deficiency disease. See Duve, 'Analfabeter i velferds-Norge'.

[146] Skeie, *Bolig for folk flest: Selvaagbygg 1920-1998*, 231–32.

[147] Romsås was also the site of the radical feminist theatre play 'Jenteloven'. See G. S., 'Jenteloven', *Sirene*, 1974.

[148] Tone B. Jamholt, 'Som en annen verden for barna', *Arbeiderbladet*, 30 March 1973.

[149] Kåre Tarjem, 'Arkitekt Alex Christiansen: Gjerne en Romsåsundersøkelse om hvordan barn trives her', *Dagbladet*, 11 November 1975.

[150] For the status of Romsås as an ideal satellite town, see Svendsen, 'Romsås: Et forsøk på å skape den ideelle drabantby'.

In her article on Romsås, Jamholt nevertheless reported an extremely skewed age distribution together with an unusual concentration of economically- and socially disadvantaged individuals created by the faults and contradictions in the welfare state housing distribution system.[151] She noted that the problematic situation engendered increased welfare needs in this new settlement, despite there having been more resources used in the Romsås-project than in any other satellite town in Norway. As causes, she referred both to the general economic situation in the 1970s and the social composition of Romsås. From the mid-1960s, inflation and high rents had caused a sharp increase in living expenses.[152] Most new inhabitants were of the same age, which would create a very varying need for welfare services as the children aged. Jamholt anticipated that there would first be an enormous need for kindergartens, then for schools and then youth clubs; she described these as 'shifting flood waves'.[153] It was predicted that this problem of unstable needs for housing services would potentially become a possible segregation problem where the solutions could either be found in national and regional politics or solved locally by physical design.[154]

While the architects behind Romsås attempted to solve the problem within the limitations of physical planning, involving design of temporary and flexible school and service buildings, Jamholt saw the problem as structural, with a situation where personal economic problems become the cause of many other problems, e.g. psychological problems, marriage problems and child care issues. The article thus appears as a criticism of the formal physical planning and architecture,

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[151] According to Jamholt, 80 percent of the population was under 40 years of age and only nine per cent was over 50, which constitutes an extremely young population – mostly families with small children. Ten per cent of households received social support, in contrast to the three to five per cent of 'the more established city districts'. About half of the recipients of social support were between 18 and 29 years, and 27 per cent were single parents, which Jamholt described as 'sensational'. The clients were typically not characterised by alcohol- and unemployment problems, but were families that struggled to make ends meet. See Tone B. Jamholt, 'Romsås har tiet om sin sosiale nød', *Sinnets helse: Tidsskrift for mentalhygiene*, [Romsåsrapporten] Rapport fra Oslo, Barn i krise 2, no. 5 (1976): 8–9.

[152] According to the historian Erling Annaniassen, the increase in living expenses was about 12-13% per year: Erling Annaniassen, *Tidene skifter. Boligsamvirkets historie i Norge*, vol. 3 (Gyldendal, 1996), 13.

[153] Jamholt, 'Romsås har tiet om sin sosiale nød'.

[154] Berg et al., *Tre boligområder i Osloregionen*, 83.

which, while ambitious, failed to address the requirements of actual social life and the deeper structural problems. Nevertheless, these aspects disappeared in the mediation of *Romsåsrapporten*. Instead of pointing out a societal system problem, the article grew to be used as evidence that not only Stovner but also other satellite towns – including the most ambitious of them, Romsås – had failed.

Collision and conflation of discourses

Stovnerrapporten and *Romsåsrapporten* act as meta-reports, aggregating several different types of reports that follow different schema and represent different and contrasting discourses. This analysis of the reports shows this complexity in a condensed form. The reports reveal a struggle between different definitions of crisis used in different power-agendas, inside the institutions – due to their roles as institutions in the welfare state and as community actors – and between them and communities. This complexity plays out as a battle of the discursive construction of space. Going beyond a display of what Tafuri calls a collision of dialects,[155] this battle constructs the satellite town as much more than the failed 'alternative mode of utopia' that Tafuri so readily dismisses. As a space where all new welfare policies are tested out, researched, debated and fought over, the satellite town has both political and analytical potential as a site of struggles – a site of crisis.

Nevertheless, in the critique of the welfare state and satellite town, the perspectives are both generalised and confused. The 1970s was a time of outstanding social welfare expansion with increased institutional ambitions, regulations and coordination of child welfare, but it was simultaneously a period of searching for alternatives to welfare institutions in the family and the community. Social and mental belonging and the battling of urban alienation are central themes to both the planning of satellite towns and the criticism of them in the Stovner- and Romsås reports. These themes take shape as more than conflicts between appropriate models for the social organisation of the democratic welfare state. There is no simple dichotomy of *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*, between 'the town' and the city, between community and institutions. *Stovnerrapporten* and *Romsåsrapporten* thus appear simultaneously as a criticism of institutions and as a strong call for more

[155] Tafuri, *The Sphere and the Labyrinth*, 8.

resources to institutions. Different professions in the welfare state with their institutions, regulations, systems, practises and discourses exacerbate the contradictions in the welfare state compromise itself.

Crucially, these discourses collide – as Tafuri would call it – in that their different notions of environments – school environments, learning environments, social environments and psychological environments – are all conflated into the notion of a physical environment as a materialisation of the systems criticised. The critical discussion about the organisation of society becomes confused when different forms of environments are conflated into a generalised, physical environment, then hijacked by mass media, with generalisations in the field of psychology and activist journalism becoming what defines the outcome.

Paradoxically, the system criticism – directed against the welfare state – ultimately aligned to stigmatise the local communities it attempted to save. The struggles and fights over society's social organisation thus became subsumed by a discourse of faults in the physical environment. Despite smaller victories such as the new school for Fossumsletta, the association of satellite towns with pathology were the results of the reports turning them into failed attempts of obtaining collective goals.

In the case of *Stovnerrapporten* and *Romsåsrapporten*, it would be incorrect to concur with Christie's claim that the institutions stole the conflict with the consequence of stigmatised communities. Instead, the chapter shows how, in accordance with Tafuri and Foucault, this discursive power moves through and across institutions. The realities of Foucault's statement that there is no single source of power, and nor is there one single source of resistance becomes evident. When – because of the conflation of the notion of environment – the target of the critique is singled out as a generalised welfare state system materialised in the total environment of the satellite town, what is overlooked is not merely details, but the very functions of the systems of the welfare state compromise and the satellite town. The implications of this central issue in this thesis will be discussed further in the next and final chapter.

6
Sites of crisis

Present-day area-based policies set out to prevent problems believed to be related to satellite towns as specific geographical localities. This emphasis on the place is evident in the quote from the 2016 programme statement for the area-based policy for Oslo's Groruddalen with which this thesis opened, which aimed to address a threat of crisis caused by *outsiderness* in 'the least attractive areas of a metropolitan city'.[1]

In this thesis, I have used three perspectives of the welfare state compromise as prisms that fragment the image of the place and reveal its contradictions, or in other words, put the notions of 'satellite town', 'environment', 'area' and 'site' in crisis. My analysis contests the focus on an image of the place that emphasises the specific area and its location-specific qualities and problems by displaying the historical fragmentations and conflicts not as isolated functions of the unique satellite town or the satellite town as urban typology, but as indications of more significant structural problems. Beneath the present-day critique of the satellite town lie fights and struggles within and between a multitude of social, psychological, economic, political and physical environments, as well as different systems, organisations and conceptualisations of welfare that go beyond the geographic location.

These multiple forms of critique of the satellite town and the welfare state have nevertheless – through crisis discourse – been conflated to a unitary image of place that conceals real complexities and contradictions

[1] Kommunal- og moderniseringsdepartementet and Byrådsavdeling for byutvikling, *Programbeskrivelse for Groruddalssatsningen 2017–2026*, 4–5.: 'de minst attraktive områdene i en storby'.

and the role of architecture *in* them.[2] The historical construction of this image – as analysed in the thesis – can be broken down into three parts. The illusion of the sub-centre as a local alternative exterior to the capitalist city and consumerist systems drew attention away from the contradictions between notions of welfare as consumption.[3] The fictional unity of the housing environment contained and concealed the contradictions caused by a political struggle over the rights to define problems and solutions in welfare state housing policies.[4] The notions of a total environment acted as a phenomenological and psychological generalisation of the place as a concept that obscures the contradictions of modern institutions and civil society.[5] The present-day notions of satellite town crisis are thus the product of a historical evolution of a crisis discourse which paradoxically drew attention away from the present struggles, conflicts of interests and contradictions, and redirected it towards *place*.

This development has created the foundation for the present-day spatial conceptualisation of social problems as territorial stigma and solutions to improve the image of the place and strengthen inhabitant pride. Additionally, the development of the fictional unity of the housing environment is part of the historical foundations for valuing housing primarily through its spatial context, enabling area-based policies to define good housing areas through market performance. Finally, through its focus on place, the development of illusions of the community-led centre as a favourable alternative to consumerism laid the foundation for a negative view of satellite towns as individual centres, as unfavourable enclaves with lack of economic participation. Combined in the social construction of the *unitary image of the satellite town*, these uses of history determine present-day discourses of satellite town crisis.

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[2] My use of the concept *unitary image of place* draws on Manfredo Tafuri's use of the terms 'the total landscape' and 'the unitary image' to describe Corbusier's Obus plan for Algiers as an architectural ideology of *the plan* – the capitalist welfare state – to be replaced by the reality of the plan. See Chapter 2 and Tafuri, *Architecture and Utopia*, 127–28.

[3] For the concept of 'sub-centres' see Chapter 3 and Oslo Byplankontoret, *Oslo: planlegging og utvikling*.

[4] For the concept of 'fictional unity' see Chapter 4 and Tafuri, *The Sphere and the Labyrinth*, 7.

[5] See Chapter 5 and Foucault, *The Will to Knowledge: The History of Sexuality* [1978], 1:95; Tafuri, *The Sphere and the Labyrinth*, 5.

Knowledge for alternative actions

By constructing crises as something arising from the satellite towns as physical *places*, these discourses block the path to envisioning alternatives. By using the three analytical devices to fragment the unities of the conventional conceptualisations of the welfare state, the satellite town, crisis and environment, I contest the present-day construction of satellite town crisis. Through contextual analyses of reports that are crucial parts of constructing the present-day dominant discourses, my research aims to contribute to the historical knowledge of the satellite town to make it relevant for the present. The analysis reveals the contemporary satellite town environment as a fragmented, contradictory, economic, political and social aggregate – as a product of contingent historical realities of struggles and fights.[6] The analyses thus contest the present uses of these reports: the speculative portrayal of a contrast between past problems and the current improved state of the areas in question, or the construction of past criticism as irresponsible and overwrought outcries of crisis that spurred the development of territorial stigma.

While the study of these reports is consequently a contribution to knowledge for alternative actions in itself, these histories may also be generalised to contribute to the research on welfare state architecture and approaches of architectural history and theory by contesting both the object of research – satellite towns as sites of crisis – and crisis as the research approach. As such, the thesis becomes a project of crisis, as it puts both the object of research and the research itself into crisis. What is vital for the production of knowledge for alternative actions thus is not only the contestation, but also the counteraction of the conventional history of satellite towns as sites of crisis. In other words: not only a critique of ideology is important, but also the proposal of a plan of action for another way of conceptualising the satellite town: a *counterplan*.[7] The thesis thus not only contests the present crisis discourse of satellite town environments by describing the complex history that

[6] This argument extends Tafuri and Foucault's justification of a history of the present as an analytical approach. See Tafuri, *Theories and History of Architecture*, 4, 123; Foucault, 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History [1971]'.

[7] In this combination of ideological critique and suggestion of a counterplan, I build on Pier Vittorio Aureli's outlining of the relationship between Tafuri's 'Toward a Critique of Architectural Ideology' and the agenda of the journal *Contropiano*. See Aureli, *The Project of Autonomy*, 48–49.

contradicts it, it also creates knowledge for alternative actions by describing the coincidences and contingences of this complex history's in contrast to the present-day discourse of crisis and environment. To enable this contestation *and* outlining of alternatives, the analysis of the contrasting conceptualisations of environments and the place, uses of crisis, and the specific tasks of architecture in the historical and present-day discourse is essential.

Place, environments and sites

There are spatial connotations to the concept of *outsiderness* as it used in the introductory quote to this thesis. *Outsiderness* is portrayed as a function of the geographical location, area or environment which carries a certain stigma, and the solution becomes the creation of attractiveness through image building and management. Part of area-based policies is to perceive housing quality as something that comes from the economic valuation of perceived area quality from a housing market point of view – measuring the *attractiveness* of housing.[8] The solution to such problems logically lies in constructing a positive place image as the opposite of the territorial stigma. The crisis of the satellite towns as a place – and the logical solutions to this crisis – has been enabled by a tradition that emphasises the unity of the physical place over other conceptualisations. This tradition and its criticism of the satellite town comes from notions of place in which the architectural theorist Christian Norberg-Schulz was central.[9]

Norberg-Schulz' critique of satellite towns' crisis is dependent on *how* he defines and understands 'place' and 'environment'. In his seminal *Genius Loci*, he states that 'a concrete term for environment is place', the place is the essence of environment.[10] For Norberg-Schulz, this contrasts with the modern concept of space, which he sees as a non-place that '[brings] a rationalistic, mechanistic concept of society to its extreme'.[11]

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[8] For the Oslo example, see Lund, *Innsatser i utsatte byområder: Erfaringer fra Groruddalssatsningen*, 3.

[9] Stenbro and Riesto, 'Beyond the Scope of Preservation?'; Mari Hvattum, 'Stedets tyranni', *Arkitektur N: The Norwegian Review of Architecture* 91, no. 4 (2009): 40–51.

[10] Norberg-Schulz, *Genius Loci*, 6.

[11] Norberg-Schulz refers to research on the non-physical aspects of the city. See Melvin M Webber, *Explorations into Urban Structure* (Philadelphia: Pennsylvania University Press, 1964).

He argues that 'the city as a defined "thing" has always been the form which made creative activity possible'; he calls this a 'milieu of possibilities'. [12] However, in narrowly focussing on the lack of *place* in a critique of the satellite towns, Norberg-Schulz does not address real social processes, but instead advances an abstract, phenomenological notion of place.

This emphasis of *the place* remains dominant in public discourse and architecture as well as in urban planning and urban design, including area-based policies.[13] The inherited notion of place determines how we still conceptualise what is missing in the satellite towns; how they must be improved by being turned into better *places*. This is precisely the framework for area-based policies: to make satellite towns conform to notions of place; to avoid outsiderness by inclusion in society at large by conforming to the idea of place.

The analyses show these notions of place in the making, but also the contradictions behind them. Beneath the discourse of the assumed lack of qualities of the particular place, are the economic, political and societal contradictions and struggles. Thus, to address the reality of satellite towns becomes a contestation not only of the concept of place, but of the limited architect's role advocated by Norberg-Schulz: the expert of form who should not engage in other fields, such as sociology, or propose a critique of power.[14] This includes the dismissal of counter-spaces: the attempt to rectify problems by architecture expressing *genius loci*.[15]

Crucially, the concept of place permeates the history of the satellite town. The conceptualisations of centres involve the place both in the original plans, the consumerist critique, and the present diagnosis of problems.[16] This focus on place and form lays the foundation for seeing housing in terms of a physical environment, rather than analysing the

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[12] Norberg-Schulz, 'Sted eller ikke-sted?'; see also: Norberg-Schulz, 'Environmental Crisis and Need of Place', 131.

[13] The architectural historian Mari Hvattum criticises the current focus on place in the tradition of Norberg-Schulz as 'the tyranny of place'. See Hvattum, 'Stedets tyranni'.

[14] See Chapter 2 and Norberg-Schulz, 'Bli ved din lest'.

[15] See Chapter 2 and Norberg-Schulz, *Alla ricerca dell'architettura perduta*, 28; Tafuri, 'Toward a Critique of Architectural Ideology'.

[16] See Chapter 3 and Rolfsen, *Generalplan for Oslo*; Oslo Byplankontoret, *Oslo: planlegging og utvikling*; Borg, *Planlegging og etablering av detaljhandelsbedrifter*; Kommunal- og moderniseringsdepartementet and Byrådsavdeling for byutvikling, *Programbeskrivelse for Groruddalssatsningen 2017–2026*.

contradictions and compromises of welfare state housing policy.[17] The outcome of *Stovnerrapporten* directly reflects Norberg-Schulz' description of the crisis of the total environment as a mental or psychological problem,[18] rather than related to conflicts of interest and symptomatic of power relationships and the distribution of social welfare. The analysis thus shows that the notions of place – both in the plans for the satellite towns and in the criticism of them – hinders conceptualisations of problems through other perspectives.

Alternative concepts to the image of the place must be found to contest these conceptualisations of problems and solutions; a prerequisite for this is the categorisation and redefinition of such different types of environments or sites. The consequence of this perspective may be seeing the area-based policies focus on *outsiderness* and a lack of affiliations with the larger society in a new light. When other relations than the spatial connections are foregrounded, it opens for other notions of satellite town crisis that include conflicts and societal critique. In this redefinition of satellite towns as contradictions, I extend on Tafuri, who argued that *Siedlungen* – the settlements that were precursors of the satellite town – were a combination of reactionary ideology and modern rationality. He argues that '*Siedlungen* were in large part contradictions that soon became more decisive than the means architecture had devised to control them.'[19] In other words, he describes architectural ideology as a failed crisis manager of the satellite town. In this, Tafuri acknowledges the fundamental contradictions of the satellite towns, but he only indirectly recognises that the satellite towns in practice are battlegrounds, and that there are thus great analytical potentials for a history of the present.

The notion of *sites* in this analysis suggests a conceptualisation of the satellite town that is not limited to the physical site, but that is also constructed from 'stories of logical possibilities and possible futures';[20] in other words, discourses that traverse society as the language for what is possible to imagine. I thus challenge the unitary image of place through

[17] See Chapter 4.

[18] This notion of the environment problem as a mental one can be clearly recognized in the arguments of the psychologist Anne-Marie Duve in *Stovnerrapporten*. See Chapter 5 and Norberg-Schulz, 'Fra gjenoppbygging til omverdenskrise'; Duve, 'Analfabeter i velferds-Norge'.

[19] Tafuri, *Architecture and Utopia*, 109.

[20] Reinhold Martin, Leah Meisterlin, and Anna Kenoff, 'The Buell Hypothesis', in *Foreclosed: Rehousing the American Dream*, by Barry Bergdoll and Reinhold Martin (New York: Museum of Modern Art, 2012), 22.

two opposite movements: fragmenting *and* connecting to an expanded context. From this perspective, the problems are not unique, image-related, or bound to a place, and the satellite towns are thus not sources of problems but contradictory nodes within the systems, organisations and institutions that traverse it. Rather than originating or residing in place, problems – and power – go through and across the space of the satellite town.

Uses of crisis

The present conceptualisation of the satellite town as the locus of outsiderness is not only based on a notion of place, but also involves specific uses of crisis. The threat of manifestations of *outsiderness* in the form of 'large-scale riots' and 'social unrest' in the 2016 programme statement for the area-based policy for Oslo's Groruddalen district undoubtedly created a sense of urgency and need for immediate action.[21] However, rather than creating conditions for creativity and construction of productive new alternatives, this rhetoric of crisis and threats to society arguably engenders conservativeness, reliance on habits, or the obvious – a wish to return to a former 'normality': the use of already established explanations and solutions that serve to legitimise policies which reinforce current economic and political systems and social relationships. What the state and municipality suggest through this crisis discourse is to attempt to *avoid the crisis* in order to evade its adverse effects, by 'counterbalanc[ing] the unfolding of situations similar to those in our neighbouring countries'.[22] In other words, the area-based policies aim to function as a kind of satellite town crisis management, as a place-based version of the continuous balancing act of the crisis management of the Keynesian welfare state.

The history of crisis discourse analysed in this thesis challenges this present-day conceptualisation of crisis both from the perspective of architecture and from the different perspectives of the welfare state compromise. From the architecture perspective, the crisis – of the satellite town as specific place and as a post-war planning project – is a

[21] For the fear of 'outsiderness', 'large-scale riots' and 'social unrest', see Kommunal- og moderniseringsdepartementet and Byrådsavdeling for byutvikling, *Programbeskrivelse for Groruddalssatsningen 2017–2026*, 4–5.

[22] Kommunal- og moderniseringsdepartementet and Byrådsavdeling for byutvikling, 4.: 'motvirke den type prosesser som har kunnet utvikle seg i våre naboland.'

conflation of the *plan*'s and planning's failure to respond to present needs and interests, as a crisis of democracy and distribution of power in the welfare state.[23] From the economic perspective, the centre crisis is conceptualised as a choice between different models for welfare as consumption and conceals another form of crisis: that domination of capitalist systems for consumption effectively renders spatial alternatives impossible.[24] The fictional unity of the housing environment – the answer to the crisis of the housing environment – contains and conceals the political uses of any housing crisis in power struggles.[25] The urgency of the crisis of the total social environment conceals the discourse of crisis of institutions and communities: the battle of civil society.[26]

For a study on the discourses of crisis, the notion of social construction is instead important for establishing different views on crisis and thus counteracting a 'unified' crisis. The essential questions that must be raised are *from where* is the crisis constructed, and *how* is it constructed. Different viewpoints and conflicts of interests determine the uses of crisis. These viewpoints include the different sides of the welfare state compromise; capital and economic crisis, the state and political crisis, civic society and social crisis, but also internal differences of class, institutions and social communities, as elucidated in Chapters 2–5.

The conflations to a crisis of *place* or *environment* are made possible by the conflated use of crisis as a system breakdown, which corresponds to Reinhart Koselleck's 'iterative period concept'.[27] This use entails conceptualising crisis as a critical point in time, which brings with it a sense of urgency requiring immediate action. In contrast, Koselleck sees continuous crisis – crisis as condition – as the normal state of modernity; struggles and fights over power and values are ongoing processes.

Tafuri uses both of these types of crisis without distinguishing them, which may result in confusion. When referring to the economic crisis of

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[23] See Chapter 2 and Sæterdal and Hansen, *Ammerud 1*; Negri, 'Keynes and the Capitalist Theory of the State Post-1929'; Tafuri, 'Toward a Critique of Architectural Ideology'.

[24] See Chapter 3 and Borg, *Planlegging og etablering av detaljhandelsbedrifter*; Negri, 'Marx on Cycle and Crisis'; Tafuri, 'Toward a Critique of Architectural Ideology'.

[25] See Chapter 4 and Kommunal- og arbeidsdepartementet, 'St. meld. nr. 76 (1971–72) Om boligspørsmål'; Foucault, 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History [1971]'; Tafuri, *The Sphere and the Labyrinth*.

[26] See Chapter 5 and Gammelsrud, 1975; Gammelsrud, 1976; Tafuri, *The Sphere and the Labyrinth*.

[27] Koselleck, 'Crisis', 371.

1929, it is in the meaning of a crisis event, a critical point in time and a system breakdown. When he argues for a concurrent crisis for architecture, his critique of architectural ideology makes it clear that the crisis of architecture is a modern crisis condition that has been evolving dialectically since the 18th century, and 1929 is only a determining moment at which this crisis condition can no longer be ignored.[28] 1929 is consequently not a crisis *event* for architecture, even if it is for the global economy. Tafuri involved crisis as a condition in his problematisation, attempting to steer the architecture institution away from the illusions of grandeur in being a driver for progress, thus freeing architecture to search for alternatives.

The elucidation of crisis enables further contestation of its uses. In the discourse of the satellite town as it is conceptualised in this thesis, the unified crisis *event* connected to the specific *place* thus tends to dominate crises as conditions.[29] I thus challenge the prevailing notions in the history of architecture and welfare of an crisis event in the form of an conflict between socialist and capitalist lifestyles or between active participants and passive consumers.[30] This is not so much a question of an ideological fight between participation and consumerism as of the technological and organisational development of welfare as consumption – a Schumpeterian crisis *condition* of creative destruction.[31] I challenge the explanations of housing crisis in architectural history, typically considered ideological since it is conceptualised as the confrontation between the welfare state's ideology of the collective and new ideologies of community and individualism – embodied in architectural typologies.[32] This is a contestation of the history that mourns the fall of a heroic period of social housing, as well as the opposite: those who celebrate the 1980s' liberation of the housing sector. Both types of histories construct the history of post-war housing as an ideological unity

[28] See Tafuri, 'Toward a Critique of Architectural Ideology'; Tafuri, *Architecture and Utopia*.

[29] Note that this tendency of merging multiple crises into a unified crisis is suggested as a contemporary phenomenon by the historian Helge Jordheim in his elucidation of Koselleck's crisis concept. See Jordheim, 'Krisetid: Introduksjon til en begrepshistorisk forståelse av krisebegrepet'.

[30] See for example Gosseye and Avermaete, *Shopping Towns Europe*, 10–12; Mack, 'Hello, Consumer! Skärholmen Centre from the Million Programme to the Mall'.

[31] See Chapter 3.

[32] See for example Cupers, *The Social Project*, 2014, xiii; Cupers, 'Human Territoriality and the Downfall of Public Housing', 178.

to be either acknowledged or rejected as such. Instead I emphasise the *Realpolitik* of continuous social construction of housing crisis as a modern condition.[33] Expanding on the research of Jennifer Mack and Thordis Arrhenius, who both describe histories of struggles and resistance, and Sven-Olov Wallenstein's and Gosseye and Heynen's notion of a crisis of the relationship between family, community and modern institutions,[34] I contest the notions of social crisis of the satellite town as an event of misalignment of economic growth and the development of social policies,[35] instead emphasising social crisis as a continuous condition of advanced capitalism.

In uncovering these economic, political and social uses of crisis, I challenge both the unified discourses of present satellite town crisis and the notions of crisis in the history of architecture and welfare. When analysed instead through the prisms of the welfare state compromise, uses of crisis emerge as discursive instruments in struggles of power. The development of a generalised crisis-discourse has been enabled by the insufficient distinguishing of the many meanings of crisis used in the criticism of satellite towns, with the consequence that they may be easily conflated into a single unified crisis. Through a broad focus on *power*, I thus challenge the typical notions of a crisis of the architectural institution in the history of architecture and welfare.[36]

One aspect is uncovering the multiple crises behind the notions of a unified satellite town crisis. Another aspect however is contesting the notion of a unified crisis and creating alternative conceptualisations of crisis as a knowledge foundation for alternative responses to *specific*

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[33] See Chapter 4.

[34] See Mack, 'Hello, Consumer! Skärholmen Centre from the Million Programme to the Mall', 131–34, 137; Jennifer Mack, *The Construction of Equality: Syriac Immigration and the Swedish City*, 2017; Jennifer Mack, 'Urban Design from Below: Immigration and the Spatial Practice of Urbanism', *Public Culture* 26, no. 1 (2014): 153–85; Arrhenius, 'Preservation and Protest'; Wallenstein, 'A Family Affair: Swedish Modernism and the Administering of Life'; Gosseye and Heynen, 'Campsites as Utopias? A Socio-Spatial Reading of the Post-War Holiday Camp in Belgium, 1950 to 1970s'.

[35] Seip, *Veiene til velferdsstaten: norsk sosialpolitikk 1920–75*, 16; Hobsbawm, *The Age of Extremes*, 284.

[36] For different variants of histories of crisis of the architecture institution, see Chapter 2 and Molinari, 'Matteotti Village and Gallaratese 2: Design Criticism of the Italian Welfare State', 269, 271; Urban, 'The Märkisches Viertel in West Berlin'; Maniaque-Benton, 'Alternatives to Welfare State: Self-Build and Do-It-Yourself'; Mattsson, 'Where the Motorways Meet: Architecture and Corporatism in Sweden 1968'.

crises. The lack of differentiation between different uses of crisis – in the historical moment 1969–76, but also in conventional history of the period – obscured the actual struggles, which makes it easier to characterise the period as a time of overwrought activism. There is thus a need to theorise the uses of crisis and their specific types and relationships – to enable the creation of knowledge for alternative actions.

The present conceptualisation of satellite town crisis comes from those with power describing those without power as outsiders. By analysing the satellite town from a diverse set of perspectives, this thesis challenges this conceptualisation by forcing a reframing of the dreaded 'large-scale riots' and 'social unrest' from 'manifestations of outsiderness' by outsiders in 'unattractive areas' to possible manifestations of real struggles and fights of values and power, as protests to structural inequality and injustice.

Specific tasks for architecture

Architecture plays an essential role in enabling welfare in terms of inclusion and attractiveness in the present-day satellite town; the typical architectural interventions are aesthetic upgrades and the creation of social meeting places. The present-day solutions are based on seeing the satellite town as such a unified environment that causes problems of outsiderness, such as low valuation of housing and lack of economic and social participation. The lack of attractiveness is seen as central in the problem. The consequence is that the function of architecture becomes the creation of harmonious images of attractiveness, social cohesion and participation, without questioning the society of which it is part. The notion of attractiveness is part of branding and place image, which are put in place to counteract the discourses of crisis of the satellite town environment. The aesthetics function of architecture is an ideological anaesthetic, which hinders perception of the real histories behind the images it constructs.

The historical analyses in this thesis show histories of contradictions between different notions of crisis of welfare in economy, politics and the social, which still ends up placing blame on loss of place. Even in these histories, architecture plays the role of ideology for capitalist development, but in a negative sense, as a scapegoat rather than the present-day anaesthetic. This thesis challenges the conceptualisations of

architecture as the creation of physical space and the architect as the creator of space in the role of an expert in form.

Crucially, since architecture is central in present-day and historical crisis discourses of the satellite town, there is great potential for alternative actions in redefining this role of architecture. It is this role of architecture in crisis discourse that must be challenged in order to find alternative strategies, both in uses in present policies and in historical accounts.

My contribution challenges the image of a unitary welfare state and a unitary architecture institution that are assumed to share the effort of providing welfare.[37] The thesis challenges generalised notions of the relationship between a unified welfare state and a unified institution of architecture in a combined effort. My studies of specific relationships within the welfare state compromise fragment such unitary images of the satellite town, where problems *in* a place are seen as problems *of* place. Tafuri states that 'it is useless to propose purely architectural alternatives.'[38] Nevertheless, Tafuri suggests the idea – without developing it further – that 'it may even be possible that many marginal and rearguard roles exist for architecture and planning'[39] – or, as he reformulates and moderates it some years later, opening for a more optimistic reading by omitting that these roles are marginal or rearguard: 'it is even possible that there exist many specific tasks for architecture.'[40] The tasks for architectural history should then be to provide knowledge to realise these possible tasks.

Research on architecture and welfare has tended to accept a generalised perspective of the welfare state, the satellite town and their common crisis. In this thesis, this image of place becomes fragmented by using the concept of crisis as a prism to contest unitary history and the welfare state compromise as a prism to contest a unitary welfare state or instance of power. In this endeavour, I expand on Tafuri, who, referring to Walter Benjamin, states that 'what the work says of the relations of production is of secondary importance, putting primary emphasis instead on the function of the work itself within the relations of

[37] See Jannie Rosenberg Bendsen et al., eds., *Forming Welfare*, 1. edition (København: Danish Architectural Press, 2017).
[38] Tafuri, *Architecture and Utopia*, 181.
[39] Tafuri, 'Toward a Critique of Architectural Ideology', 32.
[40] Tafuri, *Architecture and Utopia*, 179.

production.'[41] In this thesis, architecture is seen through the perspective of the sides of the welfare state compromise,[42] challenging the convention of seeing the welfare state from the perspective of architecture or as a background for architecture.[43] Building on Tafuri, I argue that seeing architecture through the prisms of *something else* must be the way to tease out architecture's real functions instead of its ideologies:

> Does not historical work possess a language that, entering perpetually into conflict with the multiple techniques of environmental formation, can function like litmus paper to verify the correctness of discourses on architecture?
>
> Only in appearance, then, *will we speak of something else*. For how often, when probing what is on the fringes of a given problem, do we discover the most useful keys for dealing with the problem itself – particularly if it is as equivocal as the one that we are about to examine.[44]

In analysing architecture's *specific* and functional relationships to the parts of the welfare state compromise, I address the lack of a clearly defined notion of welfare state architecture.[45] However, the logical consequence of the analysis is a multifaceted definition. The thesis expands on the idea that the state with its social institutions was not the sole agent behind welfare state architecture.[46] Whilst building on Avermaete and Gosseye, who state that the welfare state is a contract

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[41] Tafuri, *The Sphere and the Labyrinth*, 16.
[42] Tafuri emphasises that history should 'aim to understand the role of [architectural] construction in the capitalist system', a system of which the welfare state is an instance. See Tafuri, 'L'Architecture Dans Le Boudoir: The Language of Criticism and the Criticism of Language', 57.
[43] For examples of this conventional approach, see Swenarton, Avermaete, and Heuvel, *Architecture and the Welfare State*; Gosseye and Avermaete, *Shopping Towns Europe*.
[44] Tafuri, *The Sphere and the Labyrinth*, 1–2.
[45] See Mattsson and Wallenstein, *Swedish Modernism*; Swenarton, Avermaete, and Heuvel, *Architecture and the Welfare State*; Gosseye and Avermaete, *Shopping Towns Europe*.
[46] Gosseye and Avermaete, *Shopping Towns Europe*; Gosseye, '"Uneasy Bedfellows" Conceiving Urban Megastructures'; Ryckewaert, *Building the Economic Backbone of the Belgian Welfare State – Infrastructure, Planning Architecture*; Verlaan, 'Producing Space'.

between the public sector, the private sector and civil society',[47] I look at the welfare state specifically from each of those perspectives. The objective is not to define *a* welfare state architecture, but to map the multiple and contradictory ways in which architecture functions within the welfare state compromise, based on Tafuri and Foucault's notion that there is no single source of power, and therefore also no single source of resistance – and alternative actions.

Rather than any inherent *meanings*, this approach entails a focus on possible *uses* of Tafuri's theories through the fragmentation of the object of study, through the specific perspectives of planning, capital/economy, state/politics, and civil society. Via multiple types of approaches based on different readings of Tafuri, this research then reveals multiple aspects of architecture and its real relationships with welfare.

> To those who would accuse us of methodological eclecticism, we would answer that they are incapable of accepting the transitional (and thus ambiguous) role that even today is assumed by a discipline as multiform and disorganized as architecture.[48]

Through this multifaceted critique, this thesis puts the object of research – architecture and welfare – in crisis. In addressing these specific roles of architecture, I challenge the generalised or unspecific relationship between architecture and the welfare state found in architectural history, which continues to support creations of architectural ideology in the present day. As such, they are the undead remnants of architectural ideology.

Tafuri refers to Corbusier's Algiers project as the ultimate example: The creation of 'a unitary image', as a holistic architectural ideology encapsulating all development, is a forerunner to the ambitions of the welfare state.[49] In this history of the present, when the satellite town is understood as a unified, physical environment, there appears a generalised function of *architecture as unified image*, as Tafuri would call it, when it represented the welfare state as the *plan*, and the image of the place, as one would term it in the present-day context. The fragmentation achieved by analysing architecture through the prisms of the parts in the welfare state compromise – and as a consequence of that,

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[47] Gosseye and Avermaete, *Shopping Towns Europe*, 2.
[48] Tafuri, *The Sphere and the Labyrinth*, 18.
[49] Tafuri, *Architecture and Utopia*, 128.

multiple systems, organisations and institutions – contest such unified images, including the totalising images created by architecture in the present-day discourse.

The central aspects of this contribution are the challenging of conventional conceptualisations of architecture and welfare through contestation of the notions of a unified environment, a generalised periodisation, and unitary or monumental images of welfare and architecture. This contribution leads to an emphasis on the specific type of relationships between architecture and society with regard to particular societal issues, challenging the conceptualisation of architecture in terms of place-making and the construction of identity and attractiveness.

This emphasis challenges the existing periodisation based on generalised notions of progress, a golden age, or political hegemony,[50] in favour of instead looking at functional relationships with different historical trajectories. It extends on criticism of the welfare state and redefines the relationship between past and present.[51] As the notion of crisis creates new, critical relationships with the past, the past is seen not as a model to be emulated, but as a 'site of reflection' on the present-day condition.[52] In other words, crisis is a gateway to notions of time that involve the constant critical reflection on the present; a continuous crisis. Thus, there can be no single or unifying periodisation of welfare state architecture,[53] no unifying idea of 'welfare' or 'crisis': they must be determined in each specific case, and the questions must be posed again and again. As a history of crisis, the different parts of the welfare state-satellite town relationships are constituted by multiple strands of historical development, where architecture plays *different* roles within these separate developments.

[50] See Swenarton, Avermaete, and Heuvel, *Architecture and the Welfare State*, 8.
[51] See welfare state protests as redefining the relationship between past and present in Arrhenius, 'Preservation and Protest', 108.
[52] See Thordis Arrhenius, *The Fragile Monument* (Artifice Books on Architecture, 2012), 18–19, 23.
[53] This suggests a history built not on periodisation, but rather on multiple temporalities. See Helge Jordheim, 'Against Periodization: Koselleck's Theory of Multiple Temporalities', *History and Theory* 51, no. 2 (Mai 2012): 151–71.

Continuous contestations

As a history of the present, the assumptions made here cannot be universal; they are dependent on the specific problems of today that history should help illuminate. As the problems of the present change, so must the historical research. According to Tafuri, history must be revisited continuously in what he calls a 'continuous contestation of the present'.[54] In this concept of continuous contestation is an acceptance of the limitations of every single approach, which also accentuates the need for ever new interpretations to contest those already made. The thesis must consequently put itself into crisis. This contestation has been already partly been made in this thesis by establishing four different viewpoints using four different and partly contradictory interpretations of Tafuri. Nevertheless, my analyses have their limitations and biases, and it will be the task of future research to contest them.

First, there are inherent limitations related to the very problem being addressed: the satellite town crisis as the object of study. A foundational aspect of a history of the present is that the direction taken by the historical study depends on a present problem to be addressed; this amounts to a limitation related to the perspective of the researcher on the present problem, and importantly, *in* the present. In the definition of such problems, I am limited by my personal biases, my sociocultural background, experiences and current context, political and ideological standpoints and values, as well as areas of knowledge and interests as a researcher. These aspects are crucial; they are the subjective basis for the choices made continuously during research: how I have defined my research topic, how I identify the problems to be addressed, how I interpret source material, what I emphasise in the analysis. However, a history of the present is inherently constructed from the point of view of a specific contemporary problem – which is defined from a specific point of view and political, economic and social interest. The problems related to this obvious bias must be addressed by continuous contestation that involves other problems, from other points of view – indeed a task for future researchers.

According to the historian Randolph Starn, limitations of a historical approach of 'crisis' include its social construction, pathological associations, and the risk of overlooking or misinterpreting long-term

[54] Tafuri, *Theories and History of Architecture*, 233.

development when focussing on crisis events.[55] In this thesis, these limitations have instead become indicators of historical *uses of crisis*, as well as the conceptualisations of environments and the place. The subjectivity associated with social construction is a reminder that crisis depends on viewpoint and interest, meaning that when there is a conflict of interest, there is also conflict over the definition of crisis. The pathological aspects of the concept of crisis become instrumental in the analysis of discourses of territorial stigma as using histories of crisis to signify a social illness, an undesired abnormality.

Another limitation lies in the selection of source material for the thesis, the central reports and other documents in the critique of the Oslo satellite towns. There are limitations to using a concrete crisis discourse of satellite towns as the historical object of study. These reports and documents can be seen as a discourse unique to Oslo and Norway between 1969 and 1976, and thus not valid outside that context. However, while the discourses are specific to their context, it follows from the logic of inquiry that the same general patterns also exist in other places. Indeed, the thesis demonstrates that these local crisis discourses are influenced by other, similar discourses and criticism, especially from Sweden, Denmark, Britain and the USA. One task for further research could be to map out the transnational critique of satellite towns. This mapping could then further challenge the present-day international discourse of methods and standards for approaching area-based policies.

The unique geographical, political, economic and social contexts of the research pose another limitation; the uniqueness of the Oslo satellite towns of Ammerud, Stovner and Romsås as the geographical object of research in the context of the specific Norwegian welfare state suggests that the research is not relevant for other geographical contexts. However, since planners and architects have used the same spatial ideas, in the context of similar systems and organisations of welfare states based on a Keynesian economy and compromise between capital, labour, and the state, I argue that the thesis is a contribution to the history of not only a few specific Oslo satellite towns, but to the history of the satellite town as an international phenomenon. Indeed, these influences are a testimony to the notion of sites as discourses of the possible that traverses the satellite town, contesting the conventional notions of place that

[55] Starn, 'Historians and "Crisis"', 20–21.

suggest that satellite towns – in area-based policies and historical research – must be treated as unique. Further research is needed to determine how the research may also apply to other welfare state contexts. While such research could take the form of comparative studies, it would be more valuable if focussed on specific systems that function across and traverse geographical spaces, and thus further adding to research that contests a unitary image of place.

In addition to the limitations of crisis as the object of study, there are limitations with regard to crisis as the *approach* of the study – history as a project of crisis – which is about putting the research itself in crisis through continuous contestation. To escape the universals of place and periodisation, the research approach contests the dichotomies of architecture such as the relationship between place and space, progress and crisis. An approach of crisis of this kind risks only producing critique that fragments reality, creating the relative and subjective truths of which postmodernity is commonly accused. The pathology associated with crisis turns the research into a purely negative and destructive critique that creates no foundation for positive action.[56] Apparently, the consequence of this continuous contestation for the analysis of the satellite town is the complete collapse of meaning. This, however, is only in the context of the unity of the hegemonic conceptualisation of place. Thus, contesting of the notion of the satellite town as epitomising risk of social challenges implies contesting *place*.

Alternative actions – indeed, counterplans – need other conceptualisations of the satellite town; for this, fragmentation is productive. According to Tafuri, the critical approach that appears to only fragment the unity of place must contest the fragmentations by their collision.[57] In other words, the fragmentation is only part of the analysis. The fragmentation of the relationship between architecture and welfare not only enables the escaping of present conceptualisation of the satellite town as a failed place. It opens for the analytical mapping and construction of new connections and relationships of power, and the continuous contestation of the meaning of *sites of crisis*.

[56] Which is post-criticality's critique. See for example Somol and Whiting, 'Notes around the Doppler Effect and Other Moods of Modernism'.
[57] Tafuri, *The Sphere and the Labyrinth*, 8, 168.

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